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Foreign direct investment (FDI) in food retailing has generated a considerable 
amount of attention in both the media and the business world throughout the 199Os, 
with a strong focus on Asian and Central and Eastern European countries. Among 
these countries, China is a key player and a nation that no international retailers can 
afford to ignore due to its population size of 1.2 billion and its rapid economic 
development. Food retailers from different parts of the world have been keen to use 
their modem retail concepts and technology to seek expansion opportunities in 
China. Consequently, two important questions emerge: What does the process of FDI 
in food retailing entail? Is the retail and distribution market in China easily entered? 
Regarding the first question, substantial research effort has been vested in this topic. 
However, a conceptual framework that incorporates the whole scope and complexity 
of the process is still lacking. For the second question, a prudent scrutiny reveals that 
foreign food retailers are confronted with a lot of complications due to the legacy of 
the previous command economy and the unique Chinese social and business 
structure . 
The thesis develops an analytical model in which critical variables, and their logical 
relationships, are used to analyse and explain the process of FDI of food retailers in 
the contemporary era, using China as the domain for the empirical work. 
Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative approach using case studies with 
thirteen foreign food retailers in China. The research focuses on three main areas: 
long-term strategic objectives behind retail international expansion, market entry 
issues, and retail operational issues. 
Firstly, the long-term strategic objectives that underlie retailers’ undertaking of 
foreign direct investment are investigated. Evidence shows that the prevailing 
concept of reactive retail internationalisation and the tenet of psychic distance do not 
fully reflect the reality of retail internationalisation. 
i 
Secondly, three issues related to market entry are explored. The first issue is the legal 
and regulatory infrastructures that foreign retailers face when entering China. The 
second issue is the selection of Chinese partners, managing partner relationships and 
the share of managerial control. The third issue is the technical and political 
procedures of site selection and store development. The empirical work reveals that 
the lack of a systematic and well-developed legal system complicates the process of 
foreign direct investment and having a Chinese partner who possesses the 
appropriate guanxi network alleviates the problem. Furthermore, the exercise of 
dominant control over operational and managerial issues is practised by the foreign 
retailers in their joint ventures. Significant conflicts between partners appear not to 
exist under such an arrangement. On the other hand, political procedures of site 
selection and store development are found to be onerous. In terms of technical 
procedures, respondents reported that the methods that are being used in developed 
countries are not entirely applicable in China. 
The third area on which the research focuses is operational issues that foreign food 
retailers confront in the host countries. These include supply chain management; 
adjustment and adaptation; and development of human resources. Findings suggest 
that there are two types of retail know-how: core and peripheral. No changes to core 
elements should be made in the overseas operation so that the uniqueness of the 
individual retailer is preserved. Adjustments, however, have to be made to peripheral 
elements in order to match particularities of local consumer demand. A learning- 
oriented culture within a retail organisation is found to be an important underlying 
element that contributes significantly towards successful retail internationalisation. 
Taking a holistic perspective, the foreign direct investment behaviour in the retailing 
sector and the manufacturing sector, from which the prevailing foreign direct 
investment theories were developed, appear to be very different. The foreign direct 
investment behaviour of retailers seems to be better explained and understood within 
a framework that emphasises market power seeking, stresses the dynamics of 
different elements that constitute retail know-how, and underscores the notion of 
knowledge accumulation and utilisation. 
. .  
11 
Acknowledgement 
There are many people I would like to thank. Without them, completion of this doctoral 
thesis would be impossible. The first two persons to whom I am indebted are my two 
supervisors, Professor John Henley and Professor John Dawson. They have been very 
instrumental in my intellectual development throughout the doctoral research. They have 
also been very supportive and encouraging for all these years. Professor Ronald Savitt is 
another person to whom I owe much gratitude for the time and feedback he has given 
me regarding my research. Discussion with him has always been enjoyable and 
inspirational. 
I am also very grateful to all the respondents in my field study. Due to confidentiality, I 
cannot name them here one by one. However, they know who I am referring to. They 
have been very generous in spending time talking to me. providing me with much 
information that I needed. Without their co-operation, this research would simply have 
remained a plan on paper forever. I must also thank the many academic scholars and 
others whom I met in Hong Kong and Mainland China for their assistance in the 
carrying out of my fieldwork. Their help has meant a great deal to me. 
My most sincere appreciation also goes to Ms Jean Goldring for her help in proofreading 
my thesis in such a short time. In addition, I am grateful to Bella, Jenny, Leo and Oliver 
for their help in many little but important things. I would also like to thank Gez, my 
boyfriend, especially, for his devotion and support during the last stage of my study. 
Last but not least, I have to express my deepest gratitude to my parents, who have 
always been so inspiring and supportive to me, spiritually, emotionally and financially. 
... 
111 
For Mum and Dad, with all my love 
Table of Contents 
Thesis Abstract I 
... Acknowledgement Ill 
List of Figures xi 
List of Tables xii 
List of Appendices xiv 
Chapter 1 Introduction I 
1.1 Deficiencies of the Existing Theories 1 
1.2 Research Objective 4 
1.3 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) 5 
1.4 Scope of Study 7 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 8 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Underpinnings 9 
2.1 Theories on Foreign Direct Investment 9 
10 
I 0  
2.1 .I .2 Market Power Approach and Competitive Advantage 13 
2.1 .I .3 Trade Theory 15 
19 
2.1 .I .5 Eclectic Paradigm 25 
2.1 .I .6 Traditional Modes of Market Entry 28 
2.1.2 Theories Developed from Other Disciplines 29 
2.1.2.1 Process Model 29 
2.1.2.3 Strategic Orientation: Globalisation vs. Multinational 38 
39 
2.1 .I Theories Developed from the Discipline of Economics 
2.1 .I .I Transaction Cost Theory/ Internalisation Theory 
2.1 .I .4 International Product Cycle Model 
2.1.2.2 Industrial Network Approach 34 
2.1.2.4 Corporate Culture and Management Capabilities 
2.2 Fundamental Differences Between the Manufacturing Sector 
and the Retailing Sector 41 
V 
Chapter 3 Background: An Economy in Transition 
3.1 The Emergence of Transitional Economies 
3.2 The Legacy of the Command Economy 
3.3 The Process of Transition 
3.4 The Case of the People’s Republic of China: a iiSocialist 
M a r ke t Economy” 
3.5 Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Research Design 
4.1 .I Sources of Evidence 
4.2 Analysing Qualitative Data 
Chapter 5 Motives and Processes Behind Retail FDI 
5.1 Motivation 
5.1 .I Existing Research on Retail Internationalisation Motives 
5.1.2 The Empirical Results 
5.1.3 Discussion 
5.1.3.1 Reactive International Expansion 
5.1.3.2 Proactive International Expansion 
5.1.3.3 Market Power 
5.1.4 Brief Conclusion on Motivation Behind Retail FDI 
5.2 Reasons for Expanding into China 
5.2.1 The Empirical Results 
5.2.2 Economic Development and Market Size 
5.2.3 Market Potential and Retailing Space 
5.2.3.1 Learning 
5.2.3.2 First Mover Advantage 
5.2.4.1 Global Spatial Strategy 
Retailers to Expand into China 
5.2.4 (Potential of) Sourcing from China 
5.2.5 Brief Conclusion on Reasons for Foreign Food 
5.3 Internationalisation Process 
5.3.1 Psychic Distance Concept 


































5.3.3 Evidence in the Literature against the 
5.3.4 Cultural Distance 
Internationalisation Process Model 
5.3.4.1 Implication of Culture for Internationalisation 
5.3.4.2 Measuring Cultural Proximity 
5.3.4.3 Validity of the above Cultural Clustering 
5.3.5 Analysis of the Internationalisation Processes of 
basing on the existing literature 
Models 
the Retailers in the Present Research Basing on 
the Above Models of Measuring Cultural Proximity 123 
5.3.5. I European Retailers 123 
5.3.5.2 American Retailer 127 
5.3.5.3 Asian Retailers 129 
5.3.6 Implications 133 
5.3.7 Brief Conclusion on the Process Model 






Chapter 6 Market Entry 138 
6.1 Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure 
6.1 .I Stipulated Reguiations 
6.1.1.1 The 1992 Promulgation 
6.1 .I .2 The Emergency Decree 1997 
6.1 .I .3 The Experimental Measures on Commercial 
6.1 .I .4 Future Development alongside China’s Entry 
Foreign-invested Enterprises announced in 1 999 
into WTO 
6.1.2 Problems with the Existing Legal and Regulatory 
Infrastructure 
6.1.2.1 Further Details of the Interview Results 
6.1 2.2 Inconsistency in Policy and Immature Legal 
6.1.2.3 Tight Control on Foreign Retail Activities 
6.1.2.4 Discriminatory Practices towards Foreign 
System 
Operators 













6.2 Market Entry Mode: Foreign Direct InvestmentlJoint Venture 159 
6.2.1 Research Results 160 
6.2.2 Two Types of Joint Venture in China 161 
161 
Joint Ven tu res 162 
Companies Interviewed 163 
165 
6.2.2.1 Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
6.2.2.2 Si no- Foreig n Cooperative (Con t ractua I) 
6.2.2.3 Type of Joint Venture Adopted by the 
6.2.3 Partner Selection and Contribution of Each Partner 
vii 
6.2.3.1 Nature of the Chinese Partners of the 
Interviewed Foreign Retailers 
6.2.3.2 Significance of Guanxi 
6.2.4 Equity Ownership of Foreign Partners 
6.2.4.1 Research Results 
6.2.4.2 Discussion 
6.2.4.3 Control 
6.2.4.4 T h eo ret ica I I m pl ica t ion s 
6.2.4.5 Prerequisites for Negotiating Dominant Control 
6.2.5.1 Research Results 
6.2.5.2 Dominant Parent Management 
6.2.5.3 Relationships Between Foreign and 
6.2.5 Share of Managerial Control 
Local Partners 
6.3 Site Selection 
6.3.1 Comparison of Retail Environment of Different 
Major Cities in China 
6.3.1 .I Economic Landscape: An Overview 
6.3.1.2 Landscape of Retail Industry: An Overview 
6.3.1.3 Political Conditions: An Overview 
6.3.1.4 Summary: Overall Environment for 
Foreign Direct Investment in Retailing 
6.3.1.5 Factors Affecting the Selection of City 
6.3.2 Criteria for Choosing a Store Site 
6.3.3 Availability of Suitable Sites 
6.3.4 Store Development (Legal Procedures and 
Technical Issues) 
6.3.4.1 An Overview on Land System in China 
6.3.4.2 Obtaining Land Use Rights 
6.3.4.3 The Approval Procedure for Site 
6.3.4.4 The Construction Market 
6.3.4.5 Construction 
6.3.4.6 Construction Cost 
6.3.4.7 Design 
Develop men t and Construct ion Project 































6.4 Conclusion: Relationship Between Foreign Retailers 
and Chinese Government at Different Levels and its Importance 221 
Chapter 7 Transfer of Retail Expertise & Operational Issues 226 
7.1 Analytical Framework of International Transfer of Retail Expertise 227 
227 
7.1.1 .I Retail Technology 228 
7.1 .I .2 Retail Format 228 
7.1 .I The Concept of Retail Expertise 
. . .  
Vl l l  
7.1 .I .3 Corporate Culture 228 
230 
Consequences 230 
7.1.2 The Vehicle of Flow 
7.1.3 The Flow Process: Preconditions, Problems and 
7.2 Retail Technology: Supply Chain Management 
7.2.1 Empirical Results: An Overview 
7.2.2 Distribution Structure in China 
7.2.3 Logistical Issues Concerning Foreign Food Retailers 
7.2.3.1 Product Supply 
7.2.3.2 Transportation I nf rastru ctu re 
7.2.3.3 Level of Computerisation 
Interviewed and their Suppliers 
7.2.4.1 Comparison between Multinational Suppliers 
7.2.4.2 Preference on the Type of Suppliers 
7.2.4.3 Choosing Suppliers 
7.2.4.4 Terms of Purchases 
7.2.4.5 Information Sharing between Vertical Channel 
7.2.4.6 Joint Product Development with 
7.2.4.7 Importance of Relationship in the 
7.2.4 Relationships between Foreign Food Retailers 
in China and Indigenous Suppliers 
Members in China 
Manufacturers in China 
Distribution C ha n ne1 
7.2.5 Supply chain management as a competitive advantage 
7.3 Retail Format and Formula 
7.3.1 Different Retail Concepts and Formats 
7.3.2 Empirical Results on Retail Concepts and Formats 
7.3.3 Adjustments to Retail Format and Formula 
7.3.4 Communication with Consumers 
7.3.4.1 ConsumedMarket Research 
7.3.4.2 Consumption Pattern 
7.3.4.3 Consumer Behaviour 
Modernisation 


























7.4 Learning-Oriented Culture 299 
7.4.1 Human Resources Policies 300 
7.4.1 .I Extent of Localisation 30 1 
7.4.1.2 Requirements on Recruiting Staff in China 303 
7.4.1.3 Training 304 
7.4.2 Importance of Human Resources in a Retail Company 307 
7.4.3 Organisational Learning 309 
7.4.4 Incorporating Learning Orientation into Corporate Culture 31 2 
31 5 7.5 Conclusion 
ix 
Chapter 8 The Synthesis 
8.1 Overview of Key Issues 
8. 1 .I Motivation Behind Retail Foreign Direct Investment 
8.1.2 Market Entry Issues 
8.1.3 Retail Operational Issues 
8.2 Theoretical Implications 
8.3 Business Implications: Prospective Retail Landscape in China 
8.3.1 Continuity and Changes 
8.3.2 Economic Outlook and Institutional Changes 
8.3.3 Forecast on Foreign Food Retailing in China 
















List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 Outline of Factors that appear to be Pertinent to 
Foreign Direct Investment of Food Retailers 
Figure 5.1 
Figure 5.2 
Usunier's culture zones of Europe 




Figure 6.1 Hierarchy of Formal and Informal Lawmaking and 
Corresponding Construction Legislation 209 




Analytical Framework of International Flow of 
Retail Know-How 
The Traditional Wholesale Distribution System in 
China 
Wholesale Distribution Channels in China after 





List of Tables 
Table 3.1 
Table 3.2 
Total Foreign Direct Investment in the 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Sectors of 
Wholesales and Retailing, and Catering in the 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Sectors of 
Wholesales and Retailing, and Catering in the 
PRC, 1999 
PRC, 1979-1 994 
PRC, 1979-1999 
Table 3.3 





Table 4.1 List of Companies and Informants Interviewed 65 
Table 4.2 List of Interviewees in IndependentlGovernmental 










Table 5.1 0 
Table 5.1 1 
Table 5.1 2 
Population/Number of Grocery Outlets Ratio 
of Selected Countries in 2000 
Internationalisation History of Metro 
Internationalisation History of Continent 
Internationalisation History of Makro 
Internationalisation History of Ahold N .V. 
Internationalisation History of Carrefour 
Internationalisation History of Wal-Mart 
Internationalisation History of Jusco 
Internationalisation History of Seiyu 
Internationalisation History of RT-Mart 
Internationalisation History of Hutchison 
Whampoa Limited, the Parent Company of 
Park'n Shop 
Internationalisation History of Dairy Farm, 




Summaries of Interview Results on Joint 
Venture Structure 
Statistical Information on Selected Aspects of 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong, Year 1998 
Summary: Perception of Foreign Food 
Retailers on the Economic Conditions 
of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Shenzhen 
Foreign Food Retailers Active in China 
Leading supermarket chains in China, 1996 
Summary: Perception of Foreign Food 
Retailers of the Competitive Situation 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Shenzhen 
























on Political Conditions in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen 197 
Shares of Foreign Direct Investment in the 
199 




PRC by Region, 1979-1 993, I998 




Empirical Results on Retail Concept and 
Format of Foreign Retailers in China 
Average Expenditure on Food by a Person 
in an Average Urban Household 1998 
Average Urban Household Ownership on 





List of Appendices 
Appendix 1 .'I 
Appendix 2. I 











Appendix 6.1 1 
Gross Domestic Production (GDP) Statistics 
of China Between 1978 and 2001 
Bain-Type Advantages 
Case Study Memorandum 
Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign Capital Enterprises 
Rules for the Implementation of the Law 
of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign-Capital Enterprises 
Interim Provisions on Guidance for 
Foreign Investment 
State Council, Foreign Investment in 
Retailing Provisions 
Regulations of the State Council 
for Encouraging Investment from Overseas 
Chinese and Compatriots from Hong Kong 
and Macao 
Law of the People's Republic of China 
on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan 
Compatriots 
Experimental Measures on Commercial 
Foreign-Invested Enterprises 
The Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Chinese- Foreign Joint Ventures 
Procedures of the People's Republic of 
China for the Registration and Administration 
of Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures 
Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
Interim Provisions for the Duration of 
















Appendix 6.1 2 Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Chinese- Foreign Contractual Joint 
Ventures 
Appendix 6.13 Detailed Rules for the Implementation 
of the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative 
Joint Ventures 
Appendix 6.14 Explanations on Implementing Certain 
Articles of Detailed Rules on the 
Implementation of the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on 
Sino-Foreign Joint Cooperative Ventures 
Appendix 8.1 Report on the Outline of the Tenth 
Five-Year Plan for National Economic 








As individual companies became financially successful in their respective countries, 
thc:y began looking for opportunities for growth and expansion outside of their domain. 
The idea soon evolved that this could be achieved by duplicating their proven and 
urinning formula in another country. Consequently, the term 'foreign direct investment' 
(FDI) was coined and refers to companies that attempt to expand their businesses 
internationally by setting a presence abroad. However, it was discovered and became 
increasingly apparent that there are many complexities attached to such business 
ventures. The thesis focuses on the case of FDI with regards to international retailing 
and attempts to address some of these issues in detail. 
1 .I Deficiencies of the Existing Theories 
The 1990s are an important historical point in the development of international retailing. 
This period witnessed a predominant shift towards foreign direct investment', including 
both organic expansion and joint ventures, in retail internationalisation activities (Myers, 
1996). Moreover, there was a significant intensification of retail concentration in 
Europe. Furthermore, the mergers and acquisition between some powerful retailers. such 
as those between Carrefour and Promodes, and between Wal-Mart and Asda, have 
attracted tremendous attention to the speculation of the future landscape of retailing on a 
world scale. In addition, the economic transition of many countries in Eastern and 
Central Europe and Asia, especially the People's Republic of China, has catalysed the 
entrance of many international retailers into these countries. These phenomena have 
brought retail internationalisation into a new arena. 
I According to Hill (1997), foreign direct investment occurs when a firm invests directly in facilities to 
produce orland market a product in a foreign country. This is an international business textbook definition 
1 
In terms of academic research, Hollander (1970) is considered the pioneer in detailed 
research on internationalisation of retailing and his work is regarded as a starting point 
for the study of the topic (Pellegrini, 1991; Brown and Burt, 1992a; Brown and Burt, 
1992b; Burt, 1995). Then, a considerable amount of academic research was dedicated to 
the international retail activities on both sides of the Atlantic when European and North 
American retailers were very active in transatlantic investments (e.g. Dawson, 1976, 
1978, 1979, 1982a, 1982b; Waldham, 1978; Ball, 1980; Goldman, 198 1 ; Martenson, 
1981 ; Siegle and Handy, 1981; Truitt, 1984; White, 1984 in Akehurst and Alexander, 
1995; Hallsworth, 1990; Hamill and Crosbie, 1990; Exstein and Weitzman, 199 1 ; Clarke 
at  ul.) 1997; Sternquist, 1997a; Alexander 1999). 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, studies on international retailing in transitional economies 
started to emerge (e.g. Fulop, 1991; Loker et al., 1994; Drtina, 1995; Good and 
Huddleston, 1995; Myers and Alexander, 1997; Sellaro, Maskulka and Burns, 1997; 
Dawson and Henley, 1998) as retailers from Europe and America gradually entered the 
transitional economies in Central and Eastern Europe, which was triggered by the break 
down of communist power and the economic transformation in that region. The same 
period also saw a surge in research on the topic in Asia (e.g. Ho and Sin, 1987; Davies, 
1993a; Davies, 1993b; Davies and Jones, 1993; Sternquist and Runyan, 1993; Cheung, 
1994, 1996; Hise et al. 1995; Sparks, 1995; Treadgold, 1995; Yang and Keung, 1996; 
Goldman, 2001). 
The main themes of the literature on retail internationalisation include: reasons and 
motivations (e.g. Salmon and Tordjman, 1989; Alexander, 1990; Robinson and Clarke- 
Hill, 1990; Treadgold, 1990; Williams, 1992a, 1992b; Quinn, 1999); the geographical 
flows of investment (e.g. Kacker, 1985, 1990; Hamill and Crosbie, 1990; Burt, 1993); 
transfer of retail know-how from developed to developing countries (e.g. Goldman, 
1981; Kaynak, 1985; Tuncalp and Yavas, 1990; Goldman, 2001); strategies and 
of foreign direct investment. For the purpose of this thesis, retail foreign direct investment takes place 
when a retailer invests directly in and manages retail store operations in a foreign country. 
2 
processes through which internationalisation occurs (e.g. Hollander, 1970; Waldman, 
19’78; Kacker, 1985; Simpson and Thorpe, 1995; Clarke and Rimmer, 1997; Dawson, 
1999a: Dawson, 1999b); the timing of investment (e.g. Treadgold, 1990, 1991; Burt, 
199 1. 1995) and case histories of individual firms (e.g. Laulajainen, 199 1 ; Treadgold, 
1991; Sparks, 1995; Amold, 1999); and methods and typologies of investment (e.g. 
Treadgold, c 1988; Dawson, 1994b; Bailey, Clarke-Hill and Robinson, 1995; Helfferich, 
Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997). 
There is no question that the amount of academic work conducted on the topic of retail 
internationalisation is substantial. The volume of literature has increased dramatically, 
particularly over the last two decades. Nevertheless, much more research effort is 
needed to necessitate a complete conceptual understanding and comprehensive coverage 
of the process of retail internationalisation (Alexander and Doherty, 2000). More 
importantly, effort should be directed towards obtaining an in-depth and holistic 
explanation that embraces the dynamic behavioural and organisational elements, which 
play an important part in the retail internationalisation process (Dawson, 2000a). 
Furthermore, the literature developed by scholars in the retailing field has not yet 
occupied a comfortable position in the wider academic arena of international business 
studies (Alexander and Doherty, 2000; Alexander and Myers, 2000). Foreign direct 
investment is a major area in the study of international business. However, the 
dominating foreign direct investment theories are built on research in the manufacturing 
sector (e.g. MacDougall, 1960; Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969 in Hooley, Cox, 
Shipley, Fahy, Beracs and Kolos, 1996; Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977, 
1981, 1993 and 1995; Casson, 1979; Rugman, 1981; Beamish and Banks, 1987; and 
Buckley, 1988; Denekamp, 1995; Buckley and Casson, 1998). There are several 
attempts by scholars in the field of international business to extend the theories to 
include consideration of the service sector. Nonetheless, most of these attempts tend to 
maintain that the existing theories are largely readily applicable to the service sector 
(e.g. United Nation, 1993; Dunning and Kundu, 1995). There are also international retail 
3 
studies that tried to integrate and encompass the traditional international business 
theories. Regardless of other industries in the service sector, the retail sector is 
sipgificantly different from the manufacturing sector in terms of industry structure and 
many other characteristics, which are discussed in Chapter 2. These differences have not 
been taken into serious consideration in those studies. Their approaches undermine the 
idiosyncrasies of the retail process (Alexander and Myers, 2000). In fact, several authors 
in the retailing discipline (e.g Dawson (1 994b), Alexander and Lockwood ( 1996), Burt 
and Carralero-Encinas (ZOOO), and Alexander and Myers (2000)) have pointed out that 
conceptual frameworks developed in non-retail or non-service environment are unable to 
explain the process of retail internationalisation. This shortcoming has to be rectified 
because the combination of an unprecedented global economic and political 
restructuring, the significant growth in power and impact of some leading world retailers 
and the increasing importance of foreign direct investment activities in the retail sector 
\vi11 open up a new chapter in the retail development history. A framework of foreign 
direct investment for the retail sector that can capture the essence of retail 
internationalisation in the 2 1 St century is needed. 
I .2 Research Objective 
Based on the deficiencies of the existing theories discussed above, the objective of the 
present doctoral research is to establish an analytical model in which critical variables, 
and their logical relationships, are used to analyse and explain the process of foreign 
direct investment of food retailers in the contemporary era. 
In order to achieve the research objective, the study focuses on three questions: 
What are the long-term strategic objectives behind retail internationalisation? 
How do retailers handle market entry issues that they face when undertaking 
foreign direct investment in a host country? 
How do retailers transfer retail expertise from their home country to a host 
country? 
4 
The first question seeks to explain the ‘why’ and ‘where’ part of foreign direct 
investment of retailers. The long term objectives that drive the overseas expansion of 
retailers is examined and the main factors that retailers consider when choosing a host 
country are investigated. The second question aims to uncover the ‘how’ part of foreign 
direct investment that is related to market entry. Issues that are investigated under this 
question include how the legal and regulatory infrastructure of a host country affects the 
market entry of a retailer and how partners and sites are selected in the host country. The 
third question endeavours to understand the ‘what’ and ‘how’ part of foreign direct 
investment that is associated with retail operation. The process of retail expertise transfer 
is studied under this question. The elements of retail expertise that are transferred 
directly and that are transferred with adjustments are also scrutinised. 
1.3 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the largest and the fastest growing country 
among those that are undergoing economic and political reforms. The country has 
opened up new territories for international retailers. In this thesis, the word ‘China’ 
refers the People’s Republic of China excluding Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and Macao Special Administrative Region. 
There have been many economic and social changes in China since the introduction of 
the ‘open-door’ policy in 1979. Between 1978 and 1996, its annual average growth rate 
of GDP maintained at a l e ~ l  of about ten percent. Although 1997 saw a slow-down of 
the economy, China’s GDP growth has remained above seven percent since then’. In 
December 2001, the Chinese government officials announced that its GDP in that year 
was more than US$ 1.15 trillion, representing a 7.4% growth’. China is the second 
1 
- See Appendix 1.1 
Source: People’s Daily Online. 2001. “China’s Economy to Grow 7.4 Percent, GDP to Top USs1.15 
Trillion This Year.” People’s Daily Online. 2 1 December. [Online] Available from: URL: 
h t t ~ :  ’~enrlish.peopledailv.com.cnr2001 2/2 1 ;eng2001 122 1 872 12.shtml [Accessed 16 February 20021. 
3 
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largest economy in the world, after United States, in terms of Purchasing Power Parity in 
20004. Total foreign direct investment inflow between January and October 2001 is US$ 
55.2 billion'. In economic terms, China is making remarkable progress with a promising 
future development. 
Looking at the retail environment in China, the country has become a popular target for 
retail internationalisation since the partial opening of its retail sector to foreign direct 
investment in 1992 for demographic reasons. One fifth of the world population, which is 
1.2 billion, resides in China. Although the affluent population only accounts for a small 
percentage of the whole, being an emerging market China provides opportunities that are 
attractive to foreign investors. The retail market in China is largely untapped. There is 
relatively little competition. Simultaneously, the average urban disposable income has 
been increasing. When these factors combined together, China presents tremendous 
opportunities to foreign retailers. 
In addition, China's successful entry into the World Trade Organisation in December 
2001 has brought along a further liberalisation on foreign direct investment policies in 
retailing. For example, foreign department and chain stores will be allowed to run 
wholly owned networks in China6. This further increases the attractiveness of China as a 
market for foreign food retailers. 
As indicated by the above factors, China is very important to the contemporary 
development of international retailing. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the retail 
development and environment in China is necessary. On the other hand, China also 
Serves as an appropriate environment for the investigation of the process of retail 
internationalisation because of the following reason: the Chinese retail and distribution 
4 Source: World Bank. 2001 b. World Development Indicators darabase. 16 July. [Online] Available from: 
C'RL: http:!'i'~u.u..\iiorldbank.orn!'dat~'d~t~b~~opic:'GDP PPP.pdf [Accessed 16 February 20021. 
Source: People's Daily Online. 2001. "China's Economy to Grow 7.4 Percent, GDP to Top US$1.15 
Trillion This Year." People's Daill: Online. 21 December. [Online] Available from: URL: 
htt~::'!'english.peopledai1~.com.cni.2001 12!2 l:'eng200 I 122 1 872 12.shtml [Accessed 16 February 20021. 




market has been closed to the outside world from 1949 to 1992 and therefore the retail 
and distribution industry was underdeveloped. As a result, not much knowledge about 
the market was available to the outside world. Furthermore, the socio-economic, 
cultural, technological and regulatory environment in China differs significantly from 
that in most developed countries. Consequently, foreign retailers are facing and have to 
overcome many complicated issues when they conduct foreign direct investment in 
China. Under this situation, the dynamic factors that are critical to the 
internationalisation process of retailers will become even more prominent and can be 
obsen-ed more easily. Subsequently, China provides a suitable background against 
which the study of the process of retail foreign direct investment is carried out. 
Based on its importance to the development of international retailing in the 2lSt century 
and its suitability to the study of foreign direct investment in retailing, the present 
research is undertaken in China. 
1.4 Scope of Study 
The present study focuses on four main cities in China: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen’. The fieldwork was carried out in the period between April 1999 and 
September 1999 and the last update on certain secondary information was conducted in 
October 2001. Food retail sector is the subject of study. In this thesis, ‘retailing’ refers to 
the sale of goods and services to the ultimate consumers for personal, family or 
household use. Nevertheless, the readers should note that foreign cash and carry 
operators in China do not operate strictly as wholesalers, because foreign direct 
investment in wholesaling was forbidden by Chinese law prior to China’s entry to WTO, 
and hence are considered retailers in this research. For the purpose of the present 
research, food retailing is defined as main-line grocery retailing. Therefore, this study 
excludes the international activities of retailers operating in speciality 
as restaurants, confectionery, butchery, bakery, gourmet food, health 
food sectors such 
food, frozen food 
7 Rationales for choosing these four places are discussed in the Chapter 4. 
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and fast food. Furthermore, as this study concentrates on the examination of foreign 
direct investment behaviour of food retailers at the strategic level, research on 
marketing-related issues and Chinese consumers' food shopping behaviour is outside the 
scope of the study. The financial aspect of retail foreign direct investment is also beyond 
the scope of the present research and consequently is not investigated. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis starts with a review of the traditional foreign direct investment theories and 
an inL7estigation of the differences in nature between the manufacturing sector and the 
retailing sector. The chapter that follows presents an oven-iew of the characteristics of 
an economy in transition. Next, there is a discussion of the methodology adopted for the 
present research. The following three chapters present and anaiyse the data obtained 
from the author's fieldwork and discuss their implications in the light of the existing 
literature. The first of these three chapters evaluates the motivation and process behind 
retail internationalisation and the reasons for foreign retailers investing in China. The 
second of these three chapters explores the legal and regulatory infrastructure for foreign 
direct investment in retailing in China, the joint venture partners and their share of 
managerial control, the store location decisions and the legal and technical issues that 
relate to retail store development. The last of these three chapters scrutinises the process 
of transfer and adaptation of three main areas of retail expertise: supply chain 
management, retail format and formula and a learning-oriented culture. The final chapter 
of the thesis concludes with a suggested framework for the understanding and 
explanation of retail foreign direct investment in the contemporary era. Suggestions 




A sipificant volume of literature has been developed that seeks to provide an 
explanation for the extent and pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI). In the past 
few decades, an enormous amount of research effort has been invested in the 
internationalisation of f i rms in the manufacturing sector (MacDougall, 1960; Hymer, 
1976; Kindleberger, 1969 in Hooley, Cox, Shipley, Fahy, Beracs and Kolos, 1996; 
Bucley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1977, 1981, 1993, 1995; Casson, 1979; 
Rugnian, 198 1 ; Beamish and Banks, 1987; Buckley, 1988). Correspondingly, 
scholars froni the discipline of retailing have also started to conduct studies on retail 
internationalisation since the 1970s. However, as claimed by Burt (1 991 ) and 
Pellegrini (1991), most of the studies that have been done on retail 
internationalisation tend to treat the subject as an isolated topic and there has hardly 
been any integration between this subject and the wider body of literature on 
international business. Consequently, this chapter reviews in detail the general 
theories on foreign direct investment and evduates their applicability to the retailing 
ssctor. An outline including the factors that appear to be pertinent to the process of 
foreign direct investment in retailing is also presented at the end of this chapter. The 
outline serves as a blueprint on which the present research is built. 
2.1 Theories on Foreign Direct Investment 
The theoretical foundation of FDI is rather fragmented (Braunerhj elm, 1996). A 
review of literature will discover that studies on foreign direct investment can be 
divided into two categories. The first category comprises theories that come from the 
economics background. These theories include internalisation theory, market power 
approach, trade theory, product cycle model, eclectic paradigm and the theory on 
mode of market. The second category contains theories that come from other 
disciplines, such as organisational behaviour and strategic management. Network 
approach and process model is two examples of such theories. While sharing a 
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coninion focus on FDI, these strands ask different questions. Scholars also differ in 
their choice of unit of analysis. All these approaches are discussed below. 
2.1. I Theories Developed from the Discipline of  Economics 
The earliest work on foreign direct investment originated mainly from the discipline 
of economics. Theories developed by economists can be divided into two groups. 
Transaction cost theory/Intemalisation theory and market power approach take a 
microeconomic perspective, while trade theory and international product cycle model 
adopt a macroeconomic approach. These theories, together, contribute significantly 
to the study of FDI. 
2,7.7.7 Transaction Cost Theory/ Internalisation Theory 
Transaction cost theory and internalisation theory were developed independently in 
two trans-Atlantic locations at different time (Rugman, 1986). The former was 
originated from the work of Coase (1937) and that of Williamson (1975), which has 
later been extended from a mainly domestic U.S. institutional context to an 
international dimension in several papers by Williamson’s former students, David 
Teece (for instance, 1981, 1983, 1985) and Hennart (1982). Buckley and Casson 
(1976) and Rwgman (1981) advocated the latter. In fact, internalisation theory is 
based on the analysis of transaction cost. The two approaches share very similar 
underlying logic and analysis. Hence, they could be considered as one school of 
thought (Rugman, 1986; Cantwell, 1991 ; Hennart, 199 1). ‘Therefore. the two theories 
are also discussed together in this section. 
Internalisation theory aims to explain why the cross-border transactions of 
intermediate products are organised by hierarchies rather than determined by market 
forces. The main focus of this theory is on the economics of vertical and horizontal 
integration, with emphasis on the advantage to the individual firm instead of the 
industry of keeping decisions internal. Its fundamental hypothesis is that 
multinational hierarchies represent an alternative mechanism for arranging value- 
added activities across national boundaries to that of the market. Furthermore, firms 
are likely to engage in FDI whenever they perceive that the net benefits of their joint 
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ownership of domestic and foreign activities, and the transactions arising from them, 
are likely to outweigh those offered by external trading relationships. Given a 
particular distribution of factor endowments, internalisation theory predicts that 
MbIE activity will be positively related to the costs of organising cross-border 
markets in intermediate products. 
The basic argument of internalisation theory is derived from the assertion of the 
existence of transactional market imperfection, which reflects the inability of the 
market to organise transactions in an optimal way and the internalisation advantage 
is thought to arise from the existence of such imperfect markets. 
According to Coase (1937), there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most 
apparent cost of organising economic activities through the market is that of 
discovering what the relevant prices are. The costs of negotiating and settling a 
separate contract for each exchange transaction that takes place on a market must 
also be taken into account. When the contracting mechanism breaks down, the 
market is unable to correctly value and protect firm-specific advantages that are 
intangible in nature. Williamson (1 975, 198 1) went further and identified three key 
transaction costs. They are the costs of informing traders (information costs), the 
costs of reducing bargaining as to the terms of trade (bargaining costs) and the costs 
of enforcing the terms of trade (enforcement costs). Because of the existence of these 
costs, buyers and sellers do not have the symmetry of information about the 
consequences of the transactions that they are undertaking. Such cognitive 
deficiencies lead to bounded rationality, opportunism, adverse selection, moral 
hazard and information impactedness (Williamson, 1983). Under such conditions, it 
is beneficial to replace market contracting with hierarchical organisations. In an 
international context, these ideas are extended and applied to multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). The MNE is itself a governance structure, which can be 
modelled as a set of efficient outcomes subject to contingencies. 
There is another reason for transactional market failure. The market cannot take 
account of the benefits and costs that arise because of a particular transaction, but 
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which are external to that transaction (Dunning, 1993). When there is joint supply of 
products, or when products are derived from a common input or set of inputs, this 
may serve as a good reason for different stages of the value-added chain, or the same 
stage of different value-added chains, to be co-ordinated under the same governance. 
Additional advantages of common ownership such as those that exploit the 
inipzrfections of international capital and exchange markets and different national 
fiscal policies could also result from cross-border transactions. 
On the other hand, when the demand for a particular product, while infinitely elastic, 
is insufficiently large to enable the producing firms fully to capture the economies of 
size, scope and geographical diversification, transactional market failure also arises. 
In such case, there is an inevitable trade-off between the overall costs of a set of 
value-added activities and the opportunities they offer for synergistic economies 
(Galbraith and Kay, 1986 in Dunning, 1993). 
It is these market deficiencies which may cause enterprises, whether they are 
uninational or multinational, to diversify their value-adding activities and in so doing 
realign the ownership and organisation of these activities. 
To summarise, internalisation theory focuses on the transaction, with the efficient 
management of transactions, which is the ability to minimise transaction costs, being 
the source of the firm’s competitiveness. However, this concern on transaction cost 
minimisation, together with its assumption on opportunistic behaviour of human 
beings, has been extensively criticised (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). As a result, many 
alternative theories on multinational enterprises have evolved. Monopolistic 
competition theory and competitive advantage theory, which are discussed in the 
next section, are two examples. 
In addition to the widely claimed shortcomings, the applicability of internalisation 
theory to the multinational activities of retailers is also limited for the following 
reason: unlike the manufacturing industry, retail service is a non-tradable service. 
There does not exist the option of organising its cross-border activities through the 
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market mechanism when a multinational firm chooses to serve a foreign market. 
Therefore, the transaction cost analysis is irrelevant to the explanation on the 
emergence of multinational retailers. Nevertheless, as transaction cost 
theoryhtemalisation theory focuses on the economics of vertical and horizontal 
integration, it is still pertinent to the examination of the structure of distribution 
channel, which is an important constituent of the study on retailing. Nonetheless, the 
distribution channel is not the focus of the present study and therefore will not be 
discussed in further details. 
2.1.1.2 Market Power Approach and Competitive Advantage 
Market power FDI theories address the question of why firms of one nationality are 
more capable to penetrate foreign markets than indigenous firms located in those 
markets. They also deal with the question of why they wish to control value-added 
activities outside their national boundaries. They treat FDI as a means by which 
firms extend their control (Hymer, 1976; Caves, 1971) and market power (Cantell, 
199 1 ). On the contrary to transaction costhtemalisation theory, whose basis is the 
transactional market imperfection, the basis of these theories is the structural market 
imperfection theories (the differences between the two theories are discussed in more 
details later). Structural market failure is believed to give rise to monopoly rents as a 
result of the presence of entry barriers which the constituent firms may seek to erect 
or increase by a variety of means, including the acquisition of competitors (Hymer, 
1976). 
Hyrner was the progenitor of this type of explanation of foreign production 
(Dunning, 1993). He perceives firms as a means by which producers increase the 
extent of their market power. According to Lall, 
“Market power.. .may.. . be simply understood as the ability of particular 
firms, acting singly or in collusion, to dominate their respective markets (and 
so earn higher profits), to be more secure, or even to be less efficient than in a 
situation with more effective competition.. .. The concept may, of course, be 
applied to buyers (monopsonists) as well as sellers” (1 976: 1343 in Cantwell, 
1991 :2 1). 
This definition of market power purports that in the early stages of growth, firms 
constantly increase their domestic market share by means of merger and capacity 
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extension and that profit rises as industrial concentration rises. Nevertheless, there 
comes a point at which it becomes very difficult to further increase concentration in 
the domestic market when few major firms remain. At this stage, firms will invest 
their profits earned from the high degree of monopoly power at home in foreign 
operations. This, in turn, will lead to a similar process of increased concentration in 
foreign markets (Cantwell, 1991). 
By applying an industrial organisation approach to the theory of foreign production, 
Hymer (1976, 1968 in Dunning, 1993) argues that a firm must possess some kind of 
innovatory, cost, financial or marketing advantages. These advantages must be 
specific to their ownership and be sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages they 
faced in competing with indigenous firms in the country of production. He lists 
factor cost advantages, knowledge advantages, marketing advantages and product 
differentiation as the ways in which the MNE secures an advantage. The existence of 
these advantages implies the presence of some kind of structural market failure. 
Moreover, in extending this analysis to explain the cross-border activity of firms, he 
further argues that such firms had to possess some kind of proprietary or 
monopolistic advantage. 
The existence of structural imperfections, which are Bain-type advantages' to 
enhance the asset power of the MNE, is a main element that differentiates the market 
power approach from the internalisation school, which bases its argument on the 
presence of transactional market failure. According to Dunning and Rugman (1 985), 
in spite of the fact that the MNE experiences an ownership advantage that appears to 
be similar to a Bain-type asset power advantage once internalisation has been 
undertaken, it is important to distinguish the source of the advantage. If an 
exogenous market imperfection induces the MNE to organise an internal market to 
substitute for an non-existing external market (for example, in the pricing of 
howledge) or to replace more expensive modes of transactions, then the process of 
internalisation improves efficiency. No rents would be expected or realised for the 
MNE when it is exploiting transaction cost power. On the contrary, under the 
1 See Appendix 2.1 for further explanation of Bain-type advantages. 
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assumption of existence of structural imperfection, Hymer’s market power approach 
maintains that MNE has the power to close markets by using one or more of the 
Bain-type advantages to generate economic rents. 
H p e r ’ s  work on the market power approach to FDI set a platform for the 
contemporary ideas such as strategic alliances, co-operative ventures, information 
sharing, and even market sharing as a consequence of supra MNE collusion 
(Horaguchi and Toyne, 1990). He believes that in order to fully understand the 
phenomenon and behaviour of MNCs, it is necessary to take into account managerial 
resources at a specific point in time, and over time. In fact, the various expressions 
(which are used interchangeably in this paper) used today such as “managerial 
resources’’ by Penrose (1 956, 1959), “intangible assets” by Caves (1 982), “firm- 
specific advantages” by Dunning (1 979) and “competitive advantage” by Porter 
(1980, 1985, 1986) cover virtually the same concepts as “advantages of a firm” by 
Hqmer (1976). Porter (1980) and others have asserted that the main theme of 
strategic management and business strategy is to identify entry and exit barriers, and 
then operate generic strategies based upon price competition, product differentiation, 
or the seeking of market niches of product lines of the firm. Clearly, these constructs 
are direct analogous to Hymer’s Bain-type advantages (Dunning and Rugman, 1985; 
Buckley, 1990; Grosse and Behrman, 1992). Nevertheless, Grosse and Behnnan 
(1 992) claim that additional insights are offered by strategc management perspective 
as it focuses on inter-firm rivalry and intra-firm human resource management. 
As the discussion of competitive advantage, which is pertinent to the present study 
on FDI activities of retailers, involves concepts from organisational theory and 
strategic management, it is further investigated in section 2.1.2. 
2.1.7.3 Trade Theory 
The classical theory of international trade, which is known as Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, focuses on patterns of production and export. This model assumes perfect 
factor and product markets, absence of factor reversals, factor immobility, zero 
transport costs, internationally identical production functions and production factors, 
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and constant returns to scale. Export marketing costs, by implication, do not exist. 
Information about technology such as product and process specifications is assumed 
to be freely and instantly available to all. Therefore, production functions are 
virtually identical everywhere (Hirsch, 1976). In other words, at the root of this 
traditional model of international trade is the assumption of perfect competition. 
However, it is this assumption of perfect competition that has encumbered the 
establishment of a linkage between foreign direct investment and the classical trade 
theory, because imperfect competition is at the heart of all the theories of 
multinational firm (Krugman, 1983). Foreign direct investment is believed to be a 
response to market imperfection, no matter whether this is transactional or structural. 
I t  only takes place in a world that recognises firm-specific revenue-producing factors 
and information, communication and transaction costs that increase with economic 
distance. This means that a model of imperfect competition is a prerequisite to a 
formal model of multinational enterprise. 
In response to the gap between traditional trade theory and multinational theory, 
attempts have been made by a number of authors to introduce imperfect competition 
into trade theory since the 1980s. For instance, Helpman (1984) develops a general 
equilibrium model of international trade, with some of the characteristics of FDI, to 
assist the explanation on patterns of trade under conditions of MNE activities. The 
FDI features present are firm-specific advantaes, which is treated as inputs that can 
service product lines in multi-plant locations. His model incorporates the concept of 
product differentiation, monopolistic competition and scale economies. Caves 
(1 97 l), Batra and Ramachandran (1 980), Jones and Dei (1 983) and Markusen ( 1995) 
have also endeavoured to capture the intangible firm-specific advantages of MNEs as 
a sector-specific capital. In a similar vein, Krugman (1 983) borrowed the theory of 
trade in differentiated product and theory of vertical integration to establish a product 
differentiation model of FDI and a vertical integration model of FDI respectively. 
Product Drfferentiation Model of FDI 
The product differentiation model of FDI aims at explaining horizontal 
multinationals as a response to product differentiation. It assumes that the motivation 
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for trade is the presence of certain fixed costs that incur in the process of product 
development. This means that once the fixed cost has been incurred, it will not be 
repeated even if production is conducted in more than one location. The asset 
acquired by the fixed cost could be production technology, or less easily specified 
management or marketing know-how. The essence of this model is that the fixed 
costs are not attached to the location of production. This tenet is pertinent to the 
context of retailing in that when certain retail know-how, such as a concept, is 
created, the cost of its creation will not be repeated when the production of retail 
service is conducted in other locations. 
With this assumption, it is obvious that there are two alternatives, export or FDI. At 
the same time, licensing of products and franchising are ruled out by assumption, 
because the nature of product differentiation would not be tangible enough to specify 
in a contract (Caves, 1971). The incentive to produce abroad is to avoid 
transportation costs. However, there are also some costs of overseas production. This 
model focuses on the labour cost and assumes that in foreign controlled production, 
labour is not as productive as it is in domestic controlled production. In other words, 
extra labour cost arises when the production is undertaken in a foreign country. It is 
apparent that FDI will be chosen instead of trade in commodities when transportation 
costs exceed the extra labour costs. 
Under the situation of FDI, nothing material is being traded while there is no denying 
that there is some kind of trade, which benefits both the host and domestic countries, 
being undertaken. Krugman (1983) proposes that, in an economic sense, this 
situation could be perceived as if the two countries are trading information. Firms in 
each country possess different technologies, taking the form of the knowledge of 
how to produce different products. They can trade this knowledge indirectly through 
trade in commodities manifesting their specific technological advantages, or they can 
trade it directly through technology transfer with MNCs. 
This serves as an interesting way to look at FDI activities. As mentioned earlier, 
retailing service is a non-tradable service. However, under this new perspective, the 
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multinational operation of retailers could be perceived as an activity trading their 
specific knowledge such as superior retail concepts across borders. Furthermore, this 
model emphasises that it is the possession of technology or knowledge that lays the 
foundation for FDI. This notion echoes the concept of firm-specific competitive 
advantages discussed in section 2.1.2. 
Verticul Integration Model of FDI 
The vertical integration model of FDI aims at explaining the reasons and patterns of 
vertical multinationals by employing the standard model of vertical integration. It 
argues that by keeping the price of its raw material down, a monopsonistic firm 
distorts the production decisions of its foreign suppliers and leads them to 
underproduction. By undertaking FDI and integrating backward, the firm can 
eliminate the distortion and appropriate the efficiency gain. This discussion seems to 
be especially pertinent to those industries that rely heavily on raw materials that their 
domestic countries do not possess (natural resources are one example of this kind of 
raw material). In the context of retailing, this discussion of backward integration also 
appears to be relevant to those retailers with a very specific retail concept and a very 
specific type of merchandise, such as Disney Store, Benetton and Ikea'. On the other 
hand, in terms of supermarket retailing, merchandise is the analogue to raw materials 
in the manufacturing industry. It is not common for supermarket retailers to depend 
heavily on some suppliers in certain countries. Instead, in a global context, the 
supply side is dominated by a number of multinational manufacturers such as Procter 
and Gamble, Unilever and Johnson and Johnson. Backward integration of 
multinational retailers with these manufacturers has not been demonstrated, though it 
might be plausible to assume that the existence of the latter facilitates the FDI of the 
former. In China, foreign retailers are required to purchase a certain amount of 
merchandise from local manufacturers. Moreover, by considering the transportation 
costs and perishability of fresh foods, foreign food retailers would prefer to purchase 
from local food producers. However, most local producers in China are not capable 
of producing quality products, which is a characteristic of a transitional economy. 
~ ~- 
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- Some may question that whether those retailers are retailers integrating backward or are in fact 
manufacturers at the first place integrating forward. As this thesis focuses on FDI of food retailers, 
this issue will not be dealt with as this is outside the scope of the study. 
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Therefore, in order to ensure the quality of their merchandise, foreign retailers might 
choose to involve in giving technical assistance to the indigenous producers. This 
area has yet to be researched. 
Problem with the above Mentioned ‘New ’ Trade Theories 
The main problem with the investigated theories above of international trade is that 
they do not explore the reasons why FDI is preferable to joint ventures, licensing or 
other non-equity forms of foreign involvement such as franchising (Rugman, 1986). 
They rule out the choice of licensing by simply assuming that it is a costly modality. 
Other Types of Trade Theories 
Some of the more progressive trade economists have also contributed to the 
development of the macro-economic approach to FDI. Caves (1 982) and Batra and 
Hadar (1979) are two examples. 
As Caves (1982) argues, the process of FDI involves some net transfer of capital, so 
models of international capital movements are relevant in analysis of such factor 
mobility. Factors which change the terms of trade, such as long-term movements in 
exchange rates, can also affect FDI. 
Batra and Hadar (1 979) also find that devaluation of the home currency of the MNEs 
causes it to decrease FDI and expand production at home in order to increase exports. 
Following the logic of this argument, it is very plausible to believe that devaluation 
of a foreign market currency will also affect the FDI activities in that country. 
As pointed out at the beginning of the thesis, this study does not investigate the 
financial aspect of FDI and therefore, the applicability of these trade theories to the 
retailing sector will not be discussed further. 
2. I. 1.4 International Product Cycle Model 
Similar to the trade theones explained in the last section, the international product 
cycle model also takes a macroeconomic developmental approach. While the starting 
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point of the trade theories is the neo-classical type of trade model, it makes use of the 
product cycle model, which is a micro-economic concept, to help explain FDI. The 
international product cycle model moves beyond locational cost concerns to 
incorporate more micro elements. It argues that FDI is a response by the firms to 
product and/or technological maturity and to growing demand in foreign markets, 
which stimulates the entry of indigenous firms. 
The international product cycle model was initially proposed by Vernon in 1966. He 
endeavours to explain the patterns of international trade and FDI in manufactured 
goods that emerged among non-communist countries during the period after the 
Second World War. The unit of analysis of this theory is the transnational 
corporation. By exploring the importance of both product creation and effective 
marketing for new manufactured goods, a dynamic sequence of domestic production, 
export, FDI and product abroad is obtained (Grosse and Behrman, 1992). Moreover, 
emphasis is put on the timing of innovation, the effects of scale economies and the 
role of ignorance and uncertainty in influencing trade patterns instead of on 
coniparative cost doctrine. 
New Products 
According to Vernon (1966), the first assumption of this model is that the enterprises 
in any one of the advanced countries of the world can secure access to scientific 
knowledge that exists in the physical, chemical and biological sciences. Moreover, 
they all have the same capacity to comprehend such knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that all firms have equal access to knowledge does not 
mean that they also have equal probability of the application of the knowledge in the 
generation of new products. Vemon believes that a firm’s consciousness of and 
responsiveness to opportunity are a function of ease of communication, which in turn 
is a function of geographical proximity. Therefore, knowledge is not a universal free 
good. Accordingly, producers in any market are more likely to be aware of the 
possibility of inventing new products in that market than producers situated 
elsewhere would be. 
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In the early stages of introducing a new product, producers are usually confronted 
with a number of transitional but critical conditions. Nature of design at this stage is 
always unstandardised in order that further improvement could be made. With this 
unstandardised nature, producers are exceptionally concerned with the degree of 
freedom they have in changing inputs. As the nature of these inputs cannot be fixed 
in advance with assurance, the general need for flexibility in any locational choice 
must be taken into consideration in calculating the cost. Furthermore, in the early 
stages, monopoly or a high degree of production differentiation usually exists. As a 
result, the price elasticity of demand for the output of individual firms is 
comparatively low. Consequently, small cost differences count less in the 
calculations of the entrepreneur than they possibly do later on. On the other hand, at 
this stage, a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the ultimate dimensions of 
the market, the efforts of rivals to pre-empt that market, the specifications of the 
inputs needed for production and the specifications of the products likely to be most 
successful in the effort remains. Therefore, there is a tremendous need for swift and 
effective communication on the part of the producer with customers, suppliers and 
even competitors. 
All of these considerations tend to argue for a location in which communication 
between the market and the firm concerned with the new product is instantaneous 
and straight forward. 
The discussion on the importance of closeness between a firm and its market is 
relevant to foreign retailing in a transitional economy in the sense that 
communication between retailers and consumers is very crucial. Geographical 
proximity between retailers and consumers provides the best and quickest access to 
knowledge such as consumer income, taste and style, which in turn enables the firms 
to make prompt adjustment of their services. In China, retail formats such as 
supermarket and hypemarket, are considerably new concepts. It is of ultimate 
importance for foreign food retailers to operate in a location at which the interaction 
between them and their consumers is maximised. For retailers, the choice of location 
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is of two levels. The degree of economic advancement in different cities and 
provinces in China is different, because the government imposes different economic 
policies on different places. Habits of inhabitants in different parts of China are also 
different. Therefore, China cannot be considered as one homogeneous market. 
Hence, the choice of which cities or provinces in China to launch their operations 
becomes an important issue and this is the first level of locational choice. Then 
comes the decision on where in the city or province to open their retail outlets and 
this is the second level of the question. Unlike manufacturers, retailers have to locate 
themselves in a place where exposure to consumers is maximised. When retailers 
first entered China immediately after the partial opening of the retail sector to foreign 
direct investment, there might have been relatively greater flexibility on the choice of 
locations because modem formats of retailing, such as hypermarket and cash and 
carry. did not exist and hence there was very little competition. Nevertheless, as the 
number of players in the sector increases, the pressure of obtaining the prime sites in 
each city becomes more crucial. Therefore, the decision on locational choice on both 
levels is critical to the success of the foreign retailers in China. 
Maturing Products 
Vemon (1966) claims that as the demand for a product increases, a certain degree of 
standardisation will take place. Simultaneously, efforts at product differentiation Inay 
intensify in order to avoid price competition. Variety also appears as a result of 
specialisation. As efforts at differentiation increase, the acceptance of certain general 
standards will also grow. This change in the degree of standardisation has certain 
locational implications. First, there will be a decline in the need for locational 
flexibility since standardisation opens up technical possibilities for achieving scale 
economies through mass production. Standardisation also encourages long term 
commitments to some given process and some fixed set of facilities. Secondly, 
production cost will become a more relevant concern than product characteristics. 
The reduction of the uncertainties surrounding the operation appreciates the utility of 
cost projections and escalates the attention devoted to cost, even if intensified pnce 
competition has not occurred yet. 
22 
At this stage, a shift in the location of production facilities will usually occur. If the 
product has a high income elasticity of demand, or if it Satisfactorily substitutes high 
cost labour, the demand in time will start to grow. Once the domestic market 
expands, firms will begin to consider setting up a foreign producing facility where 
there are more economical factors of production and labour cost is one factor that 
Vernon emphasises. 
Vemon (1  996) further claims that international investment decisions are not always 
rational processes. Instead, threat in general is a more reliable stimulus to these 
decisions. Threat takes various forms once a large-scale export business in 
manufactured products is developed. Indigenous firms in a host country, which are 
always the targets of these export activities, grow discontented at the opportunities 
they are missing. Local government will also be concerned with generating 
employment or promoting growth or balancing their trade accounts and hence start to 
contemplate ways and means to replace imports. Therefore, an international 
investment by the exporter becomes a discreet means of pre-empting the loss of a 
market. 
Vernon (1966) also asserts that a threat to the status quo serves to explain what 
happens after the initial investment. Once a certain producer makes an international 
investment, other major producers from the same country perceive that their market 
share in global terms is imperilled. Concurrently, their ability to estimate the 
production cost structure of their competitors, who are operating distantly in an 
unfamiliar foreign area, is impaired. The uncertainty can be reduced by emulating the 
pathfinding investor and by investing in the same area. This may not be an 
oprimising investment pattern and it may largely be costly, but it is least upsetting to 
the status quo. This argument resembles the construct of market power approach in 
the sense that both believe that possessing monopolistic power is an important 
element to success and hence firms strive to increase their market share. 
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Assessing the Contribution of Internntional Product Cycle to MNE Models 
The international product cycle model directed the later efforts at MNE models 
towards firm level case analysis of the dynamics of the choice of entry modality 
(Rugman, 1986). However, Vemon based this model too heavily on the situation in 
the USA in the 1950s and early 1960s. This limits its applicability in the 
contemporary business world, because the technological leadership enjoyed by the 
USA during the period in which the model is developed has given way to a more 
balanced technological competition between the USA, Europe and Japan. 
Furthermore, this model deals mainly with import-substituting investment, but the 
global integration of affiliates with MNCs has become increasingly more important 
since the 1970s (Cantwell, 1991). In response to the deficiency of this model, Kojima 
(1978) made an attempt to supplement it by appending offshore or export-platform 
types of investment, which is a trade creating investment, to the discussion. He 
compared Japanese FDI and that of the United States. He found that the former was 
primarily trade oriented and responded to the dictates of the principle of comparative 
advantage while the latter was mainly undertaken within an oligopolistic market 
structure. The pattern of FDI in the United State was anti-trade oriented and operated 
to the long-term disadvantage of both the donor and recipient countries. Moreover, 
he believes that timing and direction of FDI should be determined by market forces. 
Criticism of Kojima ’s Theov 
Dunning (1993) asserts that the point at which Kojima’s theory ceases to be 
satisfactory as a general explanation of MNE activity is precisely that at which neo- 
classical theories fail to explain much of modem trade. They neither allow the 
possibility of market failure nor agree with the fact that firms are both producing and 
transacting economic agents. As a result, they are not able to explain the kind of 
trade flows that are based less on the distribution of factor endowments but more on 
the need to exploit the economies of scale, product differentiation and other 
manifestations of market failure. Neither can they explain trade in intermediate 
products based upon the advantages of common governance, which reflect the 
inability of the market mechanism to ensure the first-best international allocation of 
economic activity. 
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Owing to the fact that the investigation on FDI at a macroeconomic level is outside 
the scope of the present study, Kojima’s work is not further discussed here. 
2.7. I. 5 Eclectic Paradigm 
The theories examined in the above sections focus on different aspects of FDI. They 
have different assumptions and different level of analysis. Nevertheless, they are not 
mutually exclusive. There is a need to combine them in order to attain a full and rich 
explanation of patterns and growth of FDI (Buckley, 1990). Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm is an effort of such. 
Dunning’s ( I  993) eclectic paradiag-n integrates elements from different strands into a 
framework for examining international production in general and FDI in particular. 
The synthesis of ownership, location and internalisation advantages (OLI 
advantages) organises a range of variables likely to influence the ‘who’, ‘where’ and 
‘why’ of FDI activities. 
This paradigm aims at offering a general framework for determining the extent and 
pattern of both foreign-owned production undertaken by a country’s own enterprises 
and that of domestic production owned by foreign enterprises. Simultaneously, it 
accepts that the tendency of the firms to own foreign income generating assets may 
be influenced by financial and/or exchange rate variables. 
The intersection between a macro-economic theory of international trade and a 
micro-economic theory of the firm is where this paradigm stands. It begins with 
accepting the traditional trade theory in explaining the spatial distribution of some 
kinds of output. Then, he introduces the importance of the presence of both 
transactional and structural market failures to the explanation of such spatial 
distribution of output. Moreover, both the distribution of factor endowments and the 
modality of economic organisation are relevant to the explanation of the structure of 
trade and production. Besides, organisational systems, innovatory abilities and 
appraisal of and attitude to commercial risks of different firms differ. 
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According to Dunning (1977, 1981), three conditions need to be present for a firm to 
have a strong motive to undertake foreign direct investment and that three conditions 
are ownership, location and internalisation. This is known as the OLI framework. 
Ownership Advantage 
It is necessary for firms to possess some knowledge-based assets, such as special 
technological, management or marketing skills, trademarks, copynghts and patents, 
as some kind of competitive advantages over foreign rivals to overcome the inherent 
disadvantages of operating abroad in an unfamiliar environment. There are two 
reasons why these knowledge-based assets are more likely to give rise to direct 
foreign investment than physical assets. The first reason is that such assets can be 
transferred relatively more easily back and forth across space at low cost. The second 
reason is that knowledge often has a joint character in that it can be supplied to 
additional production facilities at very relatively low marginal cost. 
Locn t io pi Advan tage 
Tariffs, quotas, transport costs, and cheap factor prices, host countries’ infrastructure 
as well as host countries’ government policies are the most obvious sources of 
location advantages, but factors such as access to customers can also be important. 
These location advantages must be present in order to make it profitable to produce 
the product in the foreign country rather than simply produce it at home an export it 
to the foreign market. 
Internalisation Advantage 
In order to determine the choice between foreign direct investment and licensing, 
factors such as the form of corporate governance, the cost of internal transactions 
versus those in arm’s length markets, and the specific characteristics of the 
knowledge and information to be transferred, along with resulting market failures 
involving concepts like bounded rationality, agent opportunism, and asset specificity 
need to be considered. 
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Transfers tend to be internal, instead of at an arm’s length, when the products are 
new, complex, have no prior commercial application, and are produced by R&D- 
intensive firms. This is to avoid opportunistic behaviour and imitation by rival firms. 
Models of internalisation tend to focus on characteristics of knowledge capital like 
non-excludability, asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
incomplete contracting. 
The Main Princple of the Paradigm 
The main hypothesis of the eclectic paradigm is that the level and structure of a 
firm’s foreign value-adding activities will depend on whether the four conditions 
listed below are being satisfied. 
1. The firm possesses net ownership advantage over firms of other 
nationalities in serving particular markets. These ownership advantages 
mainly take the form of the possession of intangible assets that are at least 
for a period of time, exclusive or specific to the firm possessing them. 
2. Assuming condition 1 is satisfied, it must be more beneficial to the 
enterprise possessing these advantages to use them itself rather than to 
sell or lease them to foreign firms. In other words, it must be more 
beneficial for it to internalise its advantages through an extension of its 
own activities rather than externalise them through licensing or other 
similar contract arrangements with independent firms. 
3. Assuming condition 1 and 2 are satisfied, it must be profitable for the 
enterprise to utilise these advantages in conjunction with at least some 
factor inputs outside its home country. Otherwise, foreign markets would 
be served entirely by exports and domestic markets by domestic 
production. 
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The generalised predictions of the eclectic paradigm are straightforward. At any 
given moment of time, the more a country’s enterprises possess ownership 
advantages (relative to those of another), the more they tend to internalise rather than 
externalise their use; and the more they find it in their interest to exploit them from a 
foreign location, the more the inclination for them to engage in overseas production. 
Rem arks 
There are two points to note here. First, the concept of internalisation advantage of 
Dunning is different from that of the internalisation theory discussed in section 
2.1.1.1. The internalisation theory mentioned in section 2.1.1.1 is a transaction cost 
based theory. It mainly captures the transactional market failure, which is exogenous 
to firms. The concept of internalisation of Dunning embraces both transactional and 
structural market imperfection. In other words, internalisation in Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm considers both the market imperfection that originates from outside the 
firm and the market imperfection that is created by firms using their asset power, as 
discussed by the market power approach. In the rest of this thesis, the word 
‘internalisation’ is defined to mean Dunning’s approach of internalisation unless 
otherwise stated. The second point to note is that eclectic paradigm’s discussion on 
ownership specific advantages and internalisation advantage goes beyond the domain 
of economics. It involves some concepts of behavioural approach and strategic 
management (this is investigated in section 2.1.2). 
2.7.7.6 Traditional Modes of Market Entry 
The choice on the mode of entry is an important strategic decision a firm confronts 
when it chooses to serve a foreign market. The four common modes of foreign 
market entry are exporting, licensing, joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary. 
Due to the fact that all of these modes involve resource commitments, firms’ initial 
choices of a particular mode are difficult to change without considerable loss of 
money and time (Root, 1987 in Aganval and Ramaswami, 1992). 
Because of its importance, a considerable amount of effort has been invested in the 
area of entry mode selection (two examples are: Aganval and Ramaswami, 1992; 
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Horstmann and Markusen, 1987). Nevertheless, the choice of foreign market entry 
mode is outside the scope of the present study. Therefore, it is not discussed here in 
detail. 
2.1.2 Theories Developed from Other Disciplines 
The problem with FDI theories based on economics is that they ignore the 
behavioural aspect of foreign direct investment activities, such as culture, 
management and control that are also substantial to the success of FDI activities. In 
this section, theories incorporating the behavioural, managerial and strategic 
elements of FDI are examined. 
2.7.2.7 Process Model 
Process model, which focuses on the process of internationalisation of firms, is one 
of the theoretical lines based on behavioural approaches (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977; Wiedersheim-Paul et al., 1978; Welch and Luostarinen, 1988; just to name a 
few). Basing on the behavioural theory of firms (Cyert and March, 1963; Aharoni, 
1966 in Johanson and Vahlne, 1990) and Penrose’s (1959) theory of the growth of 
firm, this model asserts that the internationalisation of the firm is a process in which 
the firm gradually increases its domain in global geographical terms. This process 
evolves in an interaction between the development of knowledge about foreign 
markets and operations on one hand and an increasing resource commitment to 
foreign markets on the other. Market knowledge and market commitment at a certain 
point in time are affected by historical activities and commitment decisions. Then, 
they are assumed to affect decisions regarding commitment of resources to foreign 
markets and the way current activities are performed. Afterwards, the process 
continues and therefore could be viewed as a causal cycle (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1990). 
An important feature of the process model is that it views a firm as a loosely coupled 
system in which different actors in the firm have different interests and concepts 
regarding the development of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963; Weick, 1969. 
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Pfeffer, 1981 in Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). This resembles the network approach 
that is discussed later. 
The usefulness of the internationalisation process model lies in its ability to explain 
two patterns in internationalisation activities of firms (Johanson and Wiedersheim- 
Paul, 1975 in Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). 
The first pattern is that the firm’s engagement in the specific country market 
develops as an establishment chain. It usually starts off with irregular export 
activities. Then, export will be undertaken through independent agencies, which will 
be followed by through sales subsidiaries. Direct manufacturing in that market will 
eventually take place. This sequence of stages indicates an escalating commitment of 
resource to the market. During the first stage, virtually no market experience will be 
learnt. In the second stage, an information channel (that is the independent agencies) 
is established between the firm and the market and this provides the firms with 
regular but superficial information abolct the market conditions. As the firm, in the 
following stages, is directly engaged in activities in the market, more differentiated 
and wider market experience will be obtained. 
The second pattern is that firms enter new markets with successively greater psychic 
distance, which is defined in terms of factors such as culture, language and political 
systems. These factors upset the flow of information between the market and the firm 
(Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1973 in Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). Therefore, 
firms prefer to begin internationalisation by approaching markets with low perceived 
market uncertainty. 
The two patterns manifest the process in the internationalisation of the firm. Similar 
findings have been presented in the discipline of international retailing. Myers and 
Alexander (1995 in Clarke and Rimmer, 1997), based on some empirical studies, 
suggest that management has become less ‘reluctant’, less ‘cautious’ and more 
‘ambitious’ over time. Laulajainen (1987) and Treadgold (1991 in Clarke and 
Rimmer, 1997) also asserts that experience serves to overcome initial complacency. 
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The process model is originally built on the empirical work of Carlson (1 966, 1975 
in Johanson and Vahlne, 1990) on Swedish firms who were competing 
internationally. Later effort on a series of empirical work being conducted in 
different countries and situations has provided further support to the model 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). 
Knowledge 
One essence of the internationalisation process model lies in the concept of 
knowledge accumulation. By borrowing the work by Edvardsson, Edvinsson and 
Nystrom (1  993), knowledge can be conceptualised as something that is potentially 
useful for the product and company development. It can be in the form of 
technologies, or it can be financial or organisation knowledge, which is how 
companies ought to build their internal and external networks and competencies. 
According to Penrose (1959), there are two different kinds of knowledge. They are 
objective knowledge, which can be taught, and experiential knowledge, which can 
only be acquired through personal experience. Market knowledge, including the 
perceptions of market opportunities and threats, is assumed to be acquired mainly 
through experience from current business activities in the market. Experiential 
market knowledge generates business opportunities and subsequently, this acts as a 
driving force in the firm’s internationalisation process. Nevertheless, it is further 
assumed that experiential knowledge is the principal way to reduce market 
uncertainty. Therefore, in a specific country, incrementally intensified resource 
commitment is expected as a firm gains experience from current activities in the 
market. 
In section 2.1.1, knowledge was mentioned to be a salient source of competitive 
advantage in the context of FDI. In a similar vein, a number of scholars with 
behavioural background, besides agreeing on Penrose’s view on knowledge, also 
recognise the importance of knowledge as a source of competitive advantage (for 
instances, Edvardsson, Edvinsson and Nystrom, 1993; Kogut and Zander, 1993; 
Kogut and Zander, 1995; Madhok, 1997). 
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Madhok (1 997), who adopts the organisational capability (OC) perspective in his 
study, stresses on the difference between cost and value aspects in the management 
of know-how in order to achieve insightful analysis of the issues pertaining to the 
transfer of knowledge within and across firm boundaries and the exploitation and 
development of competitive advantage. He defines value in terms of the potential 
rent-generating ability of an asset or know-how. It is claimed that a balance between 
exploitation and development of knowledge is essential to the sustaining of rents 
earning (Hedlund and Rolander, 1990; March, 1991 in Madhok, 1997), because in 
the contemporary global market place, a complex set of capabilities, instead of a 
single one, is mandatory to competing successfully (Cantwell, 1991 ; Porter, 1990 in 
Madhok, 1997). Development of capabilities is more future-oriented and 
opportunity-seeking and has a greater emphasis on learning than exploitation of 
knowledge does (Hedlund and Rolander, 1990; March, 1991 in Madhok, 1997). It 
provides the potential for future value that can then be exploited whereas exploitation 
realises this value and engenders the resources for future development. Placing 
emphasis solely on exploitation can result in eventual depletion of an existing 
advantage. Similarly, development without exploitation can lead to wasteful 
expenditure of resources without realising the benefits from it. Therefore, 
development of capabilities and exploitation of knowledge are complementary to 
each other 
The treatment of ‘knowledge’ by the OC perspective (Madhok, 1997) is analogous to 
that of ‘structural imperfection’ by Dunning in his OLI paradigm (1 988 in Madhok, 
1997), but the OC perspective also goes further to claim that 
“the true source of competitive advantage and sustainable rents arises not 
from the more embodied and visible elements of the know-how but from the 
supporting structure, or complementary organisation capabilities around it, 
that would enable exploitation of this advantage” (Teece, 1986; Dunning, 
1988 in Madhok, 1997:45). 
In fact, scholars such as Bartlett, Kogut, Porter, Tallman and even Dunning (in 
Porter, Dunning, Teece, Kogut and Barlett, 1998) have also begun to direct 
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increasing attention to the importance of the development of capabilities to 
sustainable competitive advantage in the recent years. 
Another important issue related to knowledge is its transferability. Transaction cost 
theory assumes that knowledge is of a public good nature. Hence, in order to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour, firms undertake FDI so that knowledge is transferred 
internally. In contrast with this view, the OC perspective claims that knowledge has 
both a public good nature as well as a tacit characteristic and it concentrates on the 
discussion of the latter. According to this perspective, a firm’s knowledge is 
embedded in its routines and is largely firm and context-specific. It could 
“suffer erosion of rent-generating potential, and consequently value, due to a 
weak transferability and imperfect replicability in a new context, thus 
weakening its competitive advantage’’ (Madhok, 1997:47). 
Parallel to this concept is the construct of ‘slippery space and sticky place’ by Porter, 
Dunning, Teece, Kogut and Barlett (1998) that stresses on the immobility 
characteristic of knowledge. The only difference between the two concepts is that the 
OC perspective relates immobility characteristic of knowledge to the infrastructure 
and culture of a firm, whereas Porter et al. associate the immobility with the macro 
infrastructure and condition of the country in which the firm is located. 
Pertinent to the firm’s specific nature and transfer of knowledge is knowledge 
communication. Buckley and Casson (1976 in Kogut and Zander, 1993) point out 
that the personnel responsible for encoding and decoding information must be of 
similar backgrounds or operate in a similar environment, otherwise, 
misunderstanding will occur because the implicit assumptions of the decoder will be 
different from those of the decoder. If firms differ in their codes by which 
information is transferred, it follows reasonably that they should also differ in their 
capabilities to understand and apply knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1993). In other 
words, knowledge is firm-specific and differential competitive advantages in terms 
of knowledge result even if all firms have equal access to the same piece of 
information. In fact, this view has been put forward by Vernon in as early as 1966, 
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which has been discussed in section 2.1.1.4. On the other hand, this problem of 
encoding and decoding also sheds some light on the explanation of firm’s expansion 
through FDI in a foreign country, in which better communication of knowledge is 
enabled (Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
Relationshp to Other Actors on the Foreign Murket 
Besides knowledge exploitation and development, relationships between the MNE 
and other actors in that foreign country is the other important attribute lying at the 
heart of the internationalisation process model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). 
The discussion on this attribute involves the concepts of the network approach, 
which is coming up in the following section. 
2.7.2.2 Industrial Network Approach 
The industrial network approach towards the study of FDI is a very recent tradition 
(Jarillo, 1988, Forsgren, 1989). The work of the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing 
(IMP) group, which successfully demonstrated that stable long-term relationships 
exist in the dyadic relationship between buyers and sellers of manufactured products 
(Hakansson, 1982), is regarded as a starting point for this tradition. A business 
network is defined as 
“a set of actors independent from each other from an institutional point of 
view but performing activities and/or controlling resources which are 
dependent in some way’ and ‘there is at least some agreement among the 
actors regarding the existence of these dependencies’’ (Hakansson, 1992: 13 5). 
One argument of the industrial network approach is that the reduction of uncertainty, 
fast access to information, reliability, and responsiveness are among the paramount 
concerns that motivate the participants in exchange networks. Knowledge and 
experience of using resources emerge when resources are combined. This in turn 
creates possibilities for new and improved combinations that serve as seeds for 
de\ielopment and change; and change induces further change. This point is where the 
internationalisation process model intersects with the industrial network approach. 
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Exc h a nge R e1 ci t io ns h ips 
Exchange relationships are basic elements in business networks. Although the 
business aspect is central in the business network, most exchange has a 
communication and a social aspect. Blau (1 968) argues that economic exchange 
transactions are minor at the beginning and little trust exists between the parties 
engaged in the exchange. Trust between the parties increases slowly as 
trustworthiness of each party is incrementally proved through further exchange 
transactions. Easton and Araujo (1992) share a similar view. They claim that non- 
economic exchanges such as social exchanges are also present in industrial network. 
Hallen (1 992) proposes further that contact networks, which are the organisation- 
centred and person-centred networks, are an integral part of industrial networks. He 
terms them infrastructural networks because they provide underlying preconditions 
and support for the industrial and business activities in international business. 
Infrastructurai contact networks are not designed for specific business deals. They 
lay the foundation for business deaiings. They provide contacts to be used when 
required and they are important in handling links to parties with whom the company 
has no direct or indirect business relationships. In other words, the potential of 
engaging in business deals with other companies is enhanced by such networks. 
Moreover, they serve as a means of information and facilitate the handling of 
information flows to and from the company regarding issues that are extraneous. 
This implies that infrastructural network is capable of influencing the framework 
within which business is conducted. The capability of the infrastructural network to 
fulfil these functions depends on the extent of actual connections and their character 
in terms of their future connections as a second or third tier in the network, as well as 
the relative position or strength of influence of different actors in the network. 
Therefore, such network should be diverse, and should include many loosely joined 
contacts (Hallen, 1992). 
Moreover, Easton and Araujo (1992) suggest that power dependence, proximity and 
mutual orientation are also important elements in such networks. This view is 
supported by Thorelli (1 986:47) who states that 
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“networking places a new emphasis on personnel. Power, expertise, 
perceived trustworthiness and social bonds are often person-specific rather 
than firm-specific.” 
Ties are formed between the persons engaged in the business relationships. Industries 
and countries may differ with respect to the relative importance of firm and person 
relationships, but it is believed that the personal influence on relationships is the 
strongest in the early establishment of relationships (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 
1990). 
Netwot-k DJ xnm ics mzd Network Positionirzg 
Hakansson (1 992) claims that by basing on their historical experience and learning, 
actors specialise in performing certain activities in order to acquire more control in 
the network. In performing activities, resources are combined and in this process, 
mutual adjustment is made and knowledge about the resources and actiyities are 
gained. Due to the scarcity of resources. resources should be invested in economical 
ways. In other words, they should be invested in certain key areas. The actors will 
increase their efforts in utilising these resources by continuing the process if the 
result is rewarding. Consequently, a network structure where a decreasing number of 
actors control increasing amount of resources and activities u7ill emerge. Other actors 
in the network will interpret the expected change and react according to their 
interpretation. Those who expect themselves to lose or who are already losing will 
try to break the power of the companies that are controlling the resources by 
separating the existing activities from those resources that are currently in use. 
Furthermore, they will search for alternatives and try to build up new networks. As a 
result, control exercised by the original leading firms will become less valuable to 
them. This process continues and a spiral results. Sometimes, the stability of the 
network could be intentionally disturbed and disrupted by actors in order to gain 
more control and power in the network. This intention could be driven by greed and 
scarcity of resources. 
In a business network, each actor occupies a certain position (Mattsson, 1989). Such 
positions are established, maintained and developed over time through investment of 
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resources. They also serve as assets on which future development of exchange 
relationships and strategic actions can be based (Johanson and Mattsson, 1985, 1990, 
and Mattsson, 1984). The actors in the networks have different power over activities 
The differential power is based on their network positions (Markovsky et al., 1988, 
Thorelli, 1986) and the control over critical resources and activities via the 
relationships with other actors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Foreign direct investment, according to the network approach, is investment in order 
to establish, defend and develop positions in foreign networks. If a firm has already 
established a position, FDI represents an attempt to defend or improve the position. If 
a firm is new to the network, FDI depicts the establishment of a new position, which 
is a difficult task in the short run (Forsgen and Johanson, 1992b). In this case. a 
gradual process of learning to mange exchange activities and subsequently to build 
up relationships (Seyed-Mohamed and Bolte, 1992) will be experienced. Johanson 
and Mattsson (1992) argue that there are three bases for the establishment of a 
position in foreign countries. First, the firm’s original domestic network may be 
connected to the existing or potential exchange relationships in the new network. 
Secondly, a firm’s own resources can be made interdependent with resources 
controlled by actors in the other network. Lastly, the firm’s network theory can be 
communicated to other actors in the network in order to influence their actions. 
Networking in Retailing 
The discussion on infrastructural network is pertinent to the study of FDI of foreign 
retailers in China, because relationships, especially personal relationships, are 
important in Chinese business culture. Moreover, critical information such as the 
market structure, consumers’ income and taste and rules on implementation of laws 
and regulations in China is difficult to obtain. Therefore, a well-established 
infrastructural network will enable a foreign retailer to access important information 
easily. Further discussion on Chinese business culture and practice is made in the 
appropriate places in the thesis. 
37 
On the other hand, networking is also relevant to the discussion on supply chain 
management. Power struggle between suppliers and retailers is an issue that has 
drawn the attention of many academics. As supply chain management is investigated 
in further detail in Chapter 7, it is not further discussed here. 
2.7.2.3 Strategic Orientation: Giobalisation vs. Muitinationai 
In an attempt to study the extent of globalisation among corporations, Barlett and 
Ghoshal (1 993) identified four forms of organisations used to manage international 
businesses. The typologies they used are multinational, global, international and 
transnational corporations. 
Corporations are constantly searching to improve the management of their 
businesses. Over time, a particular type of organisation structure that facilitates its 
growth and international expansion will evolve. According to Barlett and Ghoshal 
(1993), different types of organisation structure emerge as a function of the need for 
firms to align their capabilities with the strategic demands of their business and the 
firm’s administrative heritage. 
According to the first factor, corporations that manage a portfolio of multiple 
national entities perform well when the critical strategic requirement is a high degree 
of responsiveness to differences in national environments around the world. When 
global efficiency is vital, it would be suitable for the firm to adopt a more centralised 
strategic and operational decision making and undertake a unitarian treatment of the 
world market. Finally, when transfer of knowledge is most important, a structure that 
leveraged learning by adapting the parent company’s expertise to foreign market is 
favoured. 
Under the first circumstance, multinational firms will establish a strong local 
presence through sensitivity and responsiveness to national differences. In the second 
situation, global companies will seek to achieve cost advantages through centralised 
global-scaled operations. In the last scenario, international companies will exploit 
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parent firms’ knowledge and capabilities through worldwide diffusion and 
adapt at i on. 
On the other hand, company’s administrative heritage is defined as the existing 
organisational norms, values, and behaviour of managers in its national companies 
and its historical context. A multinational company represents a decentralised 
organisation with distributed resources and delegated responsibilities. On the 
contrary, the global corporation manifests a centralisation orientation. Intensive 
communication and a complex system of personal interdependencies and 
commitment is the usual characteristic of such organisations. An international firm is 
willing to delegate responsibility while retaining overall control through 
sophisticated management systems and specialist corporate staffs. 
As Barlett and Ghoshal (1989) point out, no particular organisation type is best 
suited for specific industries or countries. The choice on organisation form of foreign 
operations depends on their configuration of asset and capabilities, role of overseas 
operations and development and diffusion of knowledge. 
The present study does not aim at investigating the relationship between the 
organisation form and the underlyng conditions in which the particular form is 
employed. Instead, this study is more interested in the adaptation process of foreign 
retailers operating in China. When retailing is concerned, responsiveness to local 
consumer taste and style and supply chain structure is crucial. On the other hand, 
local staff in China are not experienced enough to be delegated with full 
responsibility. Therefore, the investigation on the adaptation process, both in terms 
of retail marketing strategies and supply chain management strategies, undertaken by 
the foreign retailers in China will hopefully offer some insights to the field of 
strategic international management. 
2. I. 2.4 Corporate Culture and Management Capabilities 
As pointed out earlier, management capability is associated with the process of 
knowledge development, which is a source of competitive advantage for 
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multinational enterprises in their FDI activities. At the same time, management 
capability is also related to corporate culture of a firm. 
“Knowledge is essentially related to human action” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995 in 
Lyles and Salk, 1996:879). It is created by individuals, while organisations only 
provide a context for individuals to create and augment knowledge (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995 in Lyles and Salk, 1996). 
Top management takes an important role in knowledge acquisition. A number of 
scholars have envisaged the significance of sharing of experiences and prior learning 
among organisational members (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Lyles and Schwenk, 
1992; Von Krogh, Roos and Slocum, 1994 in Lyles and Salk, 1996). Moreover. it is 
mainly the top management who defines knowledge structures. On the other hand, 
corporate culture, such as self-identity and a core set of beliefs, provides a 
legitimising function for assessing new knowledge acquisition in the context of the 
existing knowledge structure. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990 in Lyles and Salk, 1996) point out that some 
organisations possess greater capacity to assimilate, circulate and exploit inforrnation 
than others. High capacities for knowledge acquisition is largely witnessed in firms 
with flexible organisational structures and approaches to management. A plausible 
explanation to this observation is that organisational flexibility encourages greater 
receptivity of organisation members to new stimuli from the outside. A flexible 
organisational structure can be conceptualised as one in which collaboration and 
exchanges of information within the organisation is promoted; and greater latitude in 
altering activity patterns to adapt to perceived changing needs and conditions is 
vested to its members (Lyles and Salk, 1996). 
According to the above discussion, it could be concluded that corporate culture is 
also an important element in the management of international business. 
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2.2 Fundamental Differences Between the Manufacturing Sector and the 
Retailing Sector 
The traditional foreign direct investment theories that stem from the discipline of 
economics view foreign direct investment as an mechanism to arrange different 
activities in the value chain in different parts of the world based on the net benefits of 
joint ownership of domestic and foreign activities. These theories appear to be of 
limited applicability to the retailing sector because of the fundamental differences 
between the retailing sector and the manufacturing sector in the following aspects: 
The balance between centralised and decentralised decision making 
The relative importance of organisational and establishment scale economies 
The relative size of establishment to the size of the firm 
The relative exit costs if decisions are reversed 
The speed with which an income stream can be generated after an investment 
decision is made 
Different cash flow characteristics 
The relative value of stock and hence importance of sourcing 
The degree of spatial dispersion in the multi-establishment enterprise. According 
to Moore and Birkinshaw (1998), when a multinational retailer goes across 
national boundaries, it typically replicates almost the entire value chain in each 
country of operation. Unlike manufacturing firms that can rely on patented 
technologies or unique products, a retailer derives competitive advantages from 
its ability to make use of its proprietary knowledge on a global scale. In other 
words, competitive advantage is gained through the transfer of intangible assets 
from country to country. These intangible assets include the retailer’s name, 
image, reputation, operating formats and procedures, and management know- 
how. The reader should note that under this situation, the ultimate source of these 
intangible assets is not the headquarter in its country of origin, because the world 
is not a homogeneous market. For a retailing firm, new knowledge comes 
primarily from the interactions with different markets around the world. Market 
interactions represent a two-way flow of knowledge, in which the retailer uses its 
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existing expertise to serve a market, and simultaneously the expertise of the 
retailer is enhanced and sharpened through usage and new knowledge 
accumulation. Markets evolve continuously. A retailer can only sustain its 
competitive advantage through continuous know 1 edge ac cumu 1 at i o n and 
exploitation. 
In fact, attempts to relate Dunning’s (1 98 1) eclectic paradigm of internationalisation 
have been made by Pellegnni (1991) and Dawson (1994b). Nevertheless, their 
investigation leads them both to conclude that there are significant differences 
between retailing and manufacturing and hence while some concepts may be 
borrowed from the internationalisation process of manufacturing firms, the direct 
applicability of those frameworks to the internationalisation process of retailing firms 
is limited. Alexander and Lockwood (1 996), Burt and Carralero-Encinas (2000), and 
Alexander and Myers (2000) share similar opinion. 
Based on the above arguments, the present research looks into the behaviour of 
foreign direct investment undertakings of retailers in order to establish a framework 
with which the process of foreign direct investment in the retailing sector can be 
better understood. Figure 2.1 on the next page is an outline that includes the factors 
wiich appear to be pertinent to the process of foreign direct investment in food 
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Background: An Economy in Transition 
China is a market in transition from a command economy towards a more capitalistic 
economy. The country’s open door policy was implemented in 1978. Many 
remarkable economic and social changes have been made over the last two decades. 
Nevertheless, some of the legacy of a command economy still presents difficulties to 
foreign businesses in China. In other words, an understanding of the characteristics 
of a transitional economy is important to firms that intend to enter China. Therefore, 
this chapter provides an overview of the macro characteristics of an economy in 
transition. 
3.1 The Emergence of  Transitional Economies 
The breaching of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marked the beginning of the 
unique and historic process of transformation from a command to a competitive 
market-based system in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)--for 
exaLmple, Bulgaria, Czech Republic. Hungary, Poland and Romania. The trandion to 
a market economy in these countries aroused public interest. Western govenmmcnts. 
firms and international organisations are enthusiastic about involving themselves in 
this process of transformation by understanding, assisting, trading or investing in 
these countries. While the early price liberalisation and stablisation reforms in many 
of the countries of CEE appear to have been successful, this first stage of the 
transition has been accompanied by serious decreases in output, significant increase 
in unemployment, persistent medium level inflation and the re-emergence of fiscal 
deficits. Therefore, it is now obvious that the transition will be much more difficult 
and take far longer than anticipated. 
In another part of the world, the People’s Republic of China, economic reform has 
been undenvay for more than two decades. The aim of the economic reform is to 
transform the command economy into a new hybrid system-- a socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristics. The main difference between the process of 
transformation in China and that in CEE is that the former does not involve any 
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dramatic political reorientation as the latter does. China, having started the process of 
transformation earlier than the rest, has benefited from over a decade of rapid GDP 
growth, averaging 9.4 percent between 1978 and 1995 and remaining over 7 percent 
between 1996 and 2001 '. 
The transition to the market is a long-lasting process. It brings about enormous 
challenges to all the countries undertaking the transformation. This present transition 
process has no historical equivalent or precedent. It is, at the same time, burdened 
with the legacies of the past. In the past, there was a debate as to the relevancy of the 
mainstream economics to the analysis of centrally planned economies. Furthermore, 
there has also been the debate over the necessity of creating theories pertinent to 
transition economies. When one believes that the command economies were a non- 
system now transforming into a fully-fledged market economy, there will be no need 
for a theory of the transition. However, the transition is now witnessed as a 
continuing process. resulting in a specific economic regime and hence it deserves a 
theoretical approach in order to avoid serious policy errors being committed in 
managing the transition (Lavigne, 1995). Moreover, China is a case of transition 
from a centrally planned economy but it is not towards a fully-fledsed market 
economy. Instead, it is aiming at a transition towards a socialist market economy. 
China is seen as a case for a semi-reformed planned economy. For example, 
collective farms still remain but the household-responsibility system emerging within 
them offers incentives similar to those of private farming; responsibility capitalism is 
emerging in the field of service sector and small industry but the industry is still 
dominated by large state-owned enterprises that show most of the standard features 
of a command economy (Lardy, 199 1 in Lavigne, 1995; Knell and Yang, 1992). The 
boom in the Chinese economy reflects the factors of genuine liberalisation and 
decentralisation in agnculture; the emergence of a new private sector; the opening up 
of the economy through quasi-convertibility of the currency and the position of the 
country in the early stage of the take-off. Following this line, China is an economy 
that embraces both pure capitalism and standard socialism (Lavigne, 1995). This is 
what the Chinese government calls a 'socialist market economy with Chinese 
See Appendix 1.1 1 
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characteristics’. In this case, the argument for the development of a theory pertinent 
to such transition is further consolidated. In the following section, the economics of 
transition will be discussed briefly. 
3.2 The Legacy of the Command Economy 
In a command economy, equity is the most important concern. Such an economy 
relies on material balances planning using input-output matrices to match available 
resources and the desired supply of final goods. Demand is derived from the outcome 
of previous iterations of the planning process and is a marginal consideration in 
arriving at output targets. Production capacity should be used for those goods 
considered essential or basic to health and well being of the population. The role of 
distribution system is to ensure that goods are allocated according to need and are 
available to all who need them. The only two key considerations for management of 
enterprises are to secure sufficient inputs and to meet quantitative plan targets. 
Marketing departments are prinarily concerned with distribution of product and 
marketing simply means order processing. 
Before the transition to a market economy, the central planning mechanism was an 
inflexible system. The plan directed those who were responsible for implementation, 
but at the same time, it did not give them a free hand, making it one of the sources of 
economic rigidity and lack of flexible adaptation. As a result, planners favoured very 
large integrated units in order to reduce the number of agents they had to deal with. 
Governments followed the practice of bailing out ailing enterprises through the 
banking system by offering credit, allowing tax rollovers or debt repayment 
deferrals, or even total forgiveness of debt. Consequently, enterprise managers 
always expected government planners to come to their rescue if they ran into 
financial difficulties. This led to a corrupting influence on economic efficiency by 
reducing a firm’s sensitivity to the price of money, whether measured in terms of 
interest rates or exchange rates (UNIDO, 1994). The whole system of financial and 
fiscal regulation of state enterprises was infiltrated by discretionary considerations. 
The skillful negotiator with sufficient political connections could always obtain a 
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bail-out. Therefore, it is important to destroy the discretionary link between the state 
and its enterprises in reform programmes in order to bring their budgets under 
control. 
In terms of industrial structure, the most significant difference between a market 
economy and a command economy is the size of enterprises and the degree of 
industrial concentration within each industry. In a command economy, there was a 
relative absence of small and medium-sized enterprises. Privately owned enterprises 
were not encouraged or supported. The service sector was underdeveloped. 
Distribution and retailing were two particularly neglected sectors. 
Product ranges were typically limited and life cycles were much longer than in a 
market economy. There was very limited investment in product development and 
innovation. Products were engineered to cope with capricious supplies of capital and 
material inputs. There was hardly any incentive to design products to meet 
consumers needs. Systematic market research was almost unknown and was virtually 
precluded by the organisation of industry. As a result, much management today in 
the transitional economics suffers from the lack of a thorough understanding of 
market trends and changes, pricing, and organising a sales force and modem 
distribution channels. 
The concept of profit centres and core business was not central to economic life. 
Resources were invested to fill a production plan instead of on the basis of potential 
return. This resulted in the existence of unrelated product lines, the growth of non- 
core activities and a loss of business focus in a lot of enterprises. Financial and 
accounting systems were designed primarily as record keeping tools instead of as 
fully developed management accounting systems providing the information required 
for rapid decision making (such as the decision on which products are profitable and 
which are not) or as a basis for negotiating credit with a commercial bank. 
In a typical state-owned enterprise, top management was appointed by the state 
bureaucracy. Upon the appointment, little attention was paid to the appropriateness 
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of the professional skills of the manager concerned. Party membership was an 
important factor in career success. Effective enterprise-oriented management 
information system and training options in such fields as finance, marketing, sales, 
distribution and quality control hardly existed. As a result, very few top managers 
were able to break away from the quantitative bias of the ubiquitous plan targets and 
develop a market-oriented managerial culture. 
On the other hand, product and process technology was often obsolete in those 
command economies. Enterprises mainly relied on outdated equipment operating in 
an unsuitable production environment with inefficient production methods. The non- 
existence of commercial incentives to maintain equipment properly or to manage 
inventory efficiently also meant that quality control procedures were inconsistent and 
could not be relied on to deliver products meeting international quality standards. 
All of these problems of the previous command economies are a manifestation of the 
claimed shortcomings of a centrally planned system by the advocates of market force 
led or market-based economy, who emphasise that equity emerges from an efficietx 
system. They believe that a centrally plakied system, no matter how wzl! 
intentioned, will end up misallocating a country’s resources and encouraging 
inefficiencies in production and distribution, because without a competitive 
marketplace, no incentive is provided to produce or distribute efficiently. They see 
inefficiency as a greater deterrent to development than inequity. They argue that 
consumers are better judges of their own needs than government and consumers can 
determine what will be produced by what they buy and do not buy. They further 
assert that a change from a centrally planned to a market-based economic system 
unleashes forces that lead to a significant, sustained increase in the rate of economic 
growth because of the efficiencies that are introduced (Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel, 
1987). 
Transition towards market economies is well undenvay now, both in CEE and in 
Asia. However, it is recognised that the restructuring process requires an adequate 
environment, which was absent in the command economies. The non-existence of a 
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well developed legal and regulatory system also represents another challenge to the 
process. In the following section, the framework for transition will be presented. 
3.3 The Process of Transition 
The transition process usually involves implementation of the following reforms 
(Lavigne, 1995). First, there is the macroeconomic stabilisation. Secondly, transition 
economies liberalise prices, legalise non-state enterprises, and end legal 
discrimination based on type of ownership. Thirdly comes the external liberalisation 
that removes trade and investment barriers and rationalises the exchange rate regime. 
Fourthly, there is a transformation of the system of property rights that leads to the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises and new institutional arrangements 
supporting private ownership. 
The objectives of the macroeconomic stabilisation are to prevent hyperinflation, to 
eliminate price distortior! caused by subsidks and lack of competitim, to reduce 
Edge1 defizits and credit growth, and tc establish monetary ard fiscal ba laxe  in 2 
market based economy. With the removal of subsidies, the imposiiion of a credir 
crunch and increased competition from imports, most enterprises can no longer 
employ cost-plus pricing behaviour, therefore removing a major source of 
inflationary pressure and macroeconomic instability. A punitive tax-based incomes 
policy to control wage expansion is another tactic to secure the initial objective of 
stable prices during the interregnum between the dissolution of central planning 
controls and the introduction of a hard budget constraint. 
When the threat of domestic inflation is removed, the establishment of a stable 
exchange rate and unrestricted current account convertibility is feasible. Fixing the 
exchange rate assists in bringing inflation down rapidly. State enterprises unfamiliar 
with competitive pricing strategies are provided with foreign prices as a nominal 
reference point for domestic prices. These prices offer accessible and clear criteria 
for monitoring improvements in efficiency and cost performance, which are essential 
for surviving with a hard budget constraint. 
49 
In the process of setting the correct exchange rate, undervaluation of the currency is 
usually undertaken initially so that incentives for exports are provided and scope is 
left for upward revision of wages and prices that are bound to be required in the first 
few months of the stabilisation programme. Overvaluation will follow at a later stage 
because not all domestic price adjustments are tied to world prices and not all budget 
constraints will be hardened immediately. Therefore, in order to prevent domestic 
production being overwhelmed by cheaper imports and export markets being lost, 
policy makers have to prepare for excessive real appreciation. At the same time, the 
real exchange rate is affected by the consistency between fiscal policy, inflation and 
exchange rate policy. 
On the other hand, the process of progressively hardening the budgets of the state 
sector is more than simply a matter of macroeconomic policy. It also involves 
institutional reform and legal and regulatory infrastructure. For examples, bank loan 
officers need to possess the knowledge of how to deal with defaulters; and tax 
collectors have to be capable of reading account and prclsecuting fbr non-paymen’.. 
Moreover, if the government is serious about macroeconomic stabiiisztion, no bai! 
outs will be forthcoming for distressed firms. This leads to wiider poiitical questions 
about the stability of governments, the sharing of the social costs of economic 
restructuring and the capacity and capability of institutions to alleviated hardship. 
3.4 The Case of the People’s Republic of China: a “Socialist Market 
Economy’’ 
1978 saw the beginning of the implementation of the economic reform in China. 
More than two decades have elapsed, during which, China has experienced a 
remarkable economic growth. As mentioned at the beginning, it has had a GDP 
growth averaging more than nine percent a year during 1978 to 1994, and its GDP 
has remained over 7 percent between 1995 and 2001. 
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The main elements of the reform have been: land reforms geared to boosting rural 
incomes, transfer of profits and labour from farming to industry; high saving rates to 
finance industrial investment, low taxes; intensifying competition in the home market 
and openness to foreign influence. The last element is composed of a combination of 
foreign prices, goods, investment and technology, with the objective being to bring 
world standards to the local economy. 
The economic reform in China is a gradual process, with the coexistence of a market 
and a command economy, as mentioned before. Even though it has made impressive 
progress, it also suffers from corruption, political interference and the temptation to 
override the market signal as a result of the coexistence of command and private 
sectors. The theme of the Chinese economists’ argument against quick 
comprehensive reform is that it has the same defect as central planning. They believe 
that a quick comprehensive reform forces governments to confront too many 
important decisions about which it is not very knowledgeable, such as how to 
sequence reforms and how to privatise. In fact, Woo, Parker and Sachs (1997) argue 
that ‘gradualism’ is more an unintended evolutionary process than a ‘chosen 
strategy’ and they claim that there are mainly two reasons for this unconsc io~  
outcome. First, there was a lack of a clear perception of the situation and a practical 
long-term plan in 1978 when the reform was intended to proceed. Secondly, there 
has been an absence of a common vision at the elite level. There was no consensus 
regarding the relative role of planning and markets in resource allocation. This also 
explains why China’s gradual reform has been characterised by a gradual changing 
of its reform objectives. China has proceeded through a lengthy path of readjusting 
its reform objectives, from “a planned economy with some market adjustment”, to “a 
combination of plan and market” and lately to ‘‘a socialist market economy”. The 
changes in objectives indicate that there is a gradual increase in knowledge in China 
about the merits of different resource allocation mechanisms, that there are changes 
in the political balance between various interest groups and that there are changes in 
economic structure resulting from the process of reform and development itself. 
5 1  
The success of the gradual reform in China is also due to its other initial conditions. 
At the initial stage of the reform, China was a developing country with a large and 
mostly self-sufficient agncultural sector, a low degree of specialisation, and 
abundant surplus labour. Therefore, it could afford to delay privatisation of large 
state enterprises, allowing the non-state sector to outgrow the state sector and 
improving productivity in both sectors. Instead of privatising large state enterprises 
at the outset and forcing state-owned enterprises to become more efficient for 
survival, the increase in productivity was first triggered in rural areas and 
competition in domestic markets was increased afterwards. Low productivity 
agncultural based labour was able to move into the higher productivity non-state 
enterprise activities that flourished with the ownership reforms. In addition, 
liberalisation and focus on export production accelerated China’s move into higher 
productivity manufacturing, provided higher access to international capital and 
modem technology, and increased overall efficiency and innovation by forcing 
Chinese firms to face world competition and world prices (Woo, Parker and Sachs, 
1997). The key challenges China is confronting are the restructuring of the state 
enterprise sector, the clari,fication of ownership rights in the non-state sector, rhe 
improvement of market-supporting institutions such as the kgai franxwork and the 
tax system and the reform of government, such as streamlining the administration, 
reforming the fiscal sector, revamping the financial system and redesigning monetary 
policy. 
Situation Relevant to Retailing Before the Economic Reform in the PRC 
China is a developing country with the largest population, 1.2 billion, in the world. 
As noted, in terms of economic development, it is the only former centrally-planned 
economy which has had a relatively high and sustainable growth for the past two 
decades. Retailing in China is also gradually moving towards modernisation and has 
remarkable prospects. Any study of retailing development in China during the last 
fifteen years will reveal a dramatic change. 
Prior to the economic reform, China, like other communist countries, was a shortage 
economy. Production and distribution of commodities were planned and monitored 
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by the central planning bureau, the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Materials. 
Most of the marketing and distribution channels at that time were state-owned. 
Wholesaling and retailing existed merely for administrative purposes. In contrast 
with a market-led economy emphasising efficiency, a centrally planned, command 
economy treats equity as its primary concern. Production preference was given to 
those goods considered essential or basic to the health and well-being of the 
population. Luxury goods were produced using extra production capacity after the 
basic needs of the populace have been fully met. The aim of the distribution system 
was to ensure that goods were allocated according to need and were available to all 
who needed them. In such a system, competition did not exist. Without a competitive 
marketplace, there was no incentive to produce or distribute efficiently. As time 
passed, misallocation of resources and inefficiency in production and distribution 
was the result (Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel, 1987). 
Moreover, under such a command economy, the concept of ‘production’ was limited 
only to the manufacturing sector. The distribution sector had been considered 
uIiproducti\ic. As a result, m ~ c h  lower level of investn-ients um macie in the 
di stflbiitici: and retailing seciors than ic the manufacturing secta-. Futhemore, in 
the traditional Chinese culture. people working in the distribution and retaihng 
sectors were considered to be of lower status than those engaged in the sectors of 
education, government, farming and manufacturing. Consequently, retailing in China 
before the economic reform was seriously underdeveloped. Inefficiency 
characterised the whole retailing sector. The retail outlets did not match the needs of 
the accelerating population growth adequately in geographically concentrated urban 
areas. Long queues could be easily observed outside retail stores. Choice in selecting 
products was limited as there was only a little variety of product items available. The 
concept of customer service hardly existed (Mun, 1988). 
. .  
Since the economic reform, the retail market in China has been gradually recognising 
the need of its population. Distribution is no longer a state monopoly. The formation 
of individual, private and collective enterprises has been encouraged. More 
autonomy has been granted to state enterprises (Yip, 1995). As a result of this 
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reform, profound changes in distribution structure, consumption behaviour and 
environment for foreign-invested enterprises in retailing were brought about. 
3.5 Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the Transition 
Massive amounts of restructuring and new technology will be required for successful 
transformation of the economies. The savings of the countries experiencing the 
transition will not be enough to finance this. Therefore, the promotion of foreign 
direct investment is given major attention by these countries. Besides bringing in the 
needed funds for purchasing new machinery and equipment and updated technology, 
FDI also brings in the knowledge of the mechanisms of a market economy and 
access to new markets. These are some of the most important factors required for a 
successful transition in countries in CEE and in Asia. 
China, in the search for economic modernisation, has also suffered from two serious 
bottlenecks, namely the lack of savings for capital formation and foreign exchange 
constraints (Nysw, 1996). As a result, China has sought an inflow of fareign capital 
to increase its capital formation and foreign exchange earniilgs by attracting cxport- 
oriented industries to the country. Moreover, foreign investment alsc facilitated 
technology transfer and management techniques transfer, which are desperately 
needed by China for a successful modemisation. 
The contractual values of FDI inflow in China amount to about U S 6 1 4  billion, 
while the realised values were approximately US$308 billion during the period of 
1979-2001 (November), as shown in Table 3.1. During the period of 1979 to 1999, 
3.58% of the total contractual foreign direct investment value was made in the sector 
of wholesaling and retailing, and catering, as shown in Table 3.2. In 1999, 2.39% of 
the total realised foreign direct investment value is accounted for by the same sector 
(Table 3.3). China is one of the major recipients of FDI in the world. The country is 
the world’s second largest recipient, after the United States, between 1995 and 1997 
(Table 3.4). It is the seventh largest in 2000, after the United States and five Western 
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European countries (Table 3.4). In 2000, China’s FDI inflow accounted for 17% of 
Year Number of Projects 
the total FDI inflow into developing countries and economies (Table 3.4). 
Contractual Values Actually Utilised 
Values 
Table 3.1 Total Foreign Direct Investment in the PRC, 1979-1994 (Unit: 




638 19.17 9.16 
2166 28.75 14.19 
3073 63.33 19.56 





5945 52.97 31.94 
5779 56.00 33.93 
7273 65.96 34.87 
12978 1 19.77 43.66 





1 1987 I 2233 I 37.09 I 23.14 1 
83437 1 1  14.36 275.15 
47549 826.80 337.67 
3701 1 91 2.82 375.21 
24556 732.76 41 7.26 
1 1992 I 48764 I 581.24 I 110.08 I 
I 1997 I 21001 I 510.03 I 452.57 1 
454.63 I I+’----- *-- 403.19 1 
2000 22532 62637-k 407.72 I 
I 2001 (Jan.-Nov.) I 22915 1 604.06 1 418.97 I 
Sources 
Figures for 1979-1 999: 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council. 2000. Statistics of China’s Utilisation of Foreign 
Direct Investment, 1979-1999. 23 October. [Online] Available from: URL: 
http://www.tdctrade.com/report/statlOOl OO4.htm [Accessed 17 February 20021. 
Figures for 2000: 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council. 2001. An Account of Foreign Investment Used in 
China in Jan.-Dec., 2000. 5 February. [Online] Available from: URL: 
http://www.tdctrade.com/report/statlO102OI .htm [Accessed 17 February 20021. 
Figures for 2001 (Jan.-Nov.): 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council. 2002. An Account of Foreign Investment Used in 
China in Jan.-Nov., 2001. 21 January. [Online] Available from: URL: 
http://www.tdctrade.com/report/statl0201Ol .htm [Accessed 17 February 20021. 
55 
Table 3.2 Foreign Direct Investment in the Sectors of Wholesaling and 
Retailing, and Catering in the PRC, 1979-1999 (Unit: US$ I00  million) 
Industry 
Building 
Industries Number of I Proportion (“/o) I Proiects 
249,352 73.01 
8,826 2.58 
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Hong Kong Trade Development Council. 2000. Statistics of China’s Utilisation of Foreign 
Direct Investment, 1979-1999. 23 October. [Online] Available from: URL: 
http://www.tdctrade.com/report/stat/OO1004.htm [Accessed 17 February 20021. 
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Table 3.3 Foreign Direct Investment in the Sectors of Wholesaling and 
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Source: 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council. 2000. Statistics of China’s Utilisation of Foreign 
Direct Investment, 7979-7999. 23 October. [Online] Available from: URL: 
http://www.tdctrade.com/report/statlOOlOO4. htm [Accessed 17 February 20021. 
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Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 
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23.6 1 23.23 18.16 16.98 
13951 1 35849 
23.42 31.63 
40180 I 44237 I 43751 I 40319 I 40772 I 
’ Data from: 
UNCTAD. 2001. World Investment Report 2001. [Online! kvaiiable fron: URL: 
http://www.unctad .org/wir/contents/wirOl content.en.htm [Accessed 17 February 2OC2j. 
How rapidly foreign investment will continue to expand in China depends on the 
demand for and supply of foreign investment. The demand is affected by the rate of 
capital formation in China and the ability of China to absorb foreign capital. As 
noted earlier, foreign investment constitutes part of the capital formation in China. It 
creates future flows of goods from China through its earnings. The ability of China to 
absorb foreign capital depends on the availability of resources in China that are 
complementary to the imported capital goods in production. A new machine may 
require certain skilled workers to operate. Operation of a computer requires skilled 
maintenance personnel, programmers, and users. It takes time to acquire these 
complementary inputs. The import of foreign capital goods at a rate higher than that 
can be supported by the available complementary goods would not be economically 
efficient. 
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On the supply side, foreign investors have to take profitability of their investment 
into consideration. The usual problems that come along with foreign direct 
investment in a transition economy include a lack of both physical and service 
infrastructure, uncertain property rights, inadequate financial information on which 
to value a target enterprise, a lack of sufficiently trained personnel, economic and 
political outlook and stability of the country for investment, existing regulatory and 
legal framework, prospect for business growth, employment, inflation and other 
factors that will affect domestic purchasing power. 
In the case of China, there are several particular issues with which foreign investors 
have to contend when considering investing in China. Firstly, the legal system has 
yet to be modified and made known to foreign investors to give them sufficient 
familiarity with and confidence in the system. Secondly, business practices in China 
have to be improved. One of the problematical practices is that of the Chinese 
government bureaucrats, who do not have the knowledge to run businesses 
efficiently and are difficdt to work with. Lastly, the Chinese government itself has to 
make sure that it complies with its own regulations. It ccmtrcqls the power of 
approving contracts related to joint ventures, compensatory trade and corperative 
management. It is not unusual for the government bureaucrat to violate a contract. 
There is no denying that foreign direct investment facilitates the modernisation and 
transition processes in China. However, the future development of foreign direct 




“No matter what the state of the field, whether it is new or mature, all of 
its interesting research explores. Indeed, it seems that the more deeplj: we 
probe into this field of organisations, the more complex we find it to be, 
and the more we need to fall  back on so-called exploratoq?, as opposed to 
‘rigorous, ’ research methodologies (p. 109) ... while I believe we need 
empirical data to generate our categories-systematic data reinforced bri 
a good deal of anecdote-I do not expect them to come from mechanical 
data reduction techniques. It is pattern recognition we are afler, in the 
form of those creative leaps, and I believe that human, not electronic, 
brains are most capable of achieving those leaps (p. 11 4-1 15). 
Mintzberg (1 983) 
9 1  
The present research intends to inquire into the nature of the foreign direct investment 
behaviour of food retailers. The study endeavours to understand “what is happening” in 
the process of retail foreign direct investment undertakings’. Therefore: this study takes 
a qualitative perspective and involves developing ideas through induction from data 
obtained from diverse sources’. 
According to Yin (1994), case studies are considered an appropriate approach when the 
research concerns how and why questions. Such an approach is particularly useful when 
the purpose of research is to examine the “more complex issues[, which are beneath the 
surface of a phenomena,] of what is meant by what is happening” (Edwards et al., 
According to Van Maanen (1983), the question of “what is going on here”, which seeks to “disclose and 
reveal” (p.256) the totality of a situation in a given place and time, is the elementary and fundamental 
concern in qualitative research. 
This concept is termed ‘analytic induction’. This concept contrasts the hypothetico-deductive model, 
which aims to confirm or reject hypotheses of universal significance. Van Maanen (1983) claims that 
qualitative research work should commence with a close-up, firsthand investigation of ongoing social life. 
Specific elements of the studied phenomenon are then sought. Patterns may or may not emerge. 
Generalisations are to be developed fiom the ground up and are offered tentatively on the basis of their 
ability to comprehend the whole spectrum of data in hand. The reader should note that the generalisation 
that qualitative research concerns is analytic generalisation, which is generalisation to theory, not 
statistical generalisation, with which an inference is made about a population or universe (Yin, 1994). 
I 
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1994:86). In other words, case studies provide an in-depth, intensive look at a research 
question or issue, which is a specific situation rather than a whole population or society 
(Rose, 199 1 : 196). Therefore, the case study approach is chosen as the research approach 
for the present study. 
4.1 Research Design 
The fieldwork was conducted between April and September in 1999 in Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen in China3. These cities have always been the four 
locations with the highest average urban per capita disposable income in China‘. They 
are also among the cities that have the longest history of economic and political reform 
and hence are the most developed in economic terms. Due to these characteristics, these 
cities were chosen by foreign retailers and as a result were also chosen for the study. 
There were no official lists of foreign food retailers in China available. A wide variety of 
business magazines, newspapers and journal and book publications were consulted 
before the fieldwork in order to compose a list of foreign retailers who had operations in 
the above four locations in China. Subsequently, a list comprising about twenty 
companies was generated. As a first step, the author contacted the headquarters of all 
those companies in writing, requesting to conduct case studies with their subsidiaries in 
China. Co-operation was obtained from several companies. The Chinese subsidiaries of 
those companies who did not grant permission to the author were contacted again by 
telephone when the author was in China. By these two methods and personal references, 
the author gained access to thirteen foreign food retailers in China. Case studies with 
these thirteen companies form the backbone of the present research’. 
The readers should note that China cannot be treated as a single homogenous market for the following 
reasons. First, the disparities of income between the coastal cities and the inner provinces and between the 
cities and towns suggest that the market potential vanes widely across those locations. Secondly, the 
exposure of the southern population to foreign mass media, especially those from Hong Kong, leads to 
differential buying behaviour between the southern population and the northern population (Yip, 1995). 
3 
The economic situation of these cities is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
The present study uses multiple cases because “the evidence from multiple cases is often considered 




Although the present research adopts the analytic-induction approach, a “rough working 
frame”6 (Miles, 1983: 119) was established before the fieldwork was undertaken in order 
to minimise the risk of obtaining “an incoherent, bulky, irrelevant, meaningless set of 
observations ... which no one can (or even wants to) makes sense of’ (Miles, 1983:119). 
Such “working frame” was developed according to the present research objective and 
research questions and the existing literature and past studies on the subject area. Based 
on this “working frame”, a case study memorandum that served as a loosely structured 
guide (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991) and incorporated the topics of which 
the author would like to obtained information from her fieldwork, was produced’. The 
reader should note that the “working frame” was not meant to be a “self-blinding 
framework” (Miles, 1983: 1 19). It instead served as a guiding blueprint for the research 
project and was repeatedly revised over the life of the research project as data were 
gathered and analysed. This led to the eyolution of a proper framework that the present 
research attempts to establish’. 
4.9. 9 Sources o f  Evidence 
Employng multiple sources of evidence enables the researcher to corroborate and 
address a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behaviour issues. Any findings or 
conclusions reached in case studies using multiple sources of evidence, as a 
consequence, tend to be much more convincing and accurate (Yin, 1994). Therefore, the 
present research employs three sources of evidence: interviews, documentation and 
direct observations. 
Firestone. 1983 in Yin, 1994: 45). The reader should note that the logic behind using multiple cases is a 
replication logic, which is analogous to that used in multiple experiments in science, instead of a sampling 
logic, which requires an operational enumeration of the entire universe and a statistical procedure for 
selecting the specific subset of respondents to be surveyed. For more details on replication logic and 
sampling logic, please see Yin (1 994). 
This ‘working frame’ is presented at the end of Chapter 2, which outlines the factors that the author 
believes to be pertinent to foreign direct investment in retailing. 
See Appendix 4.1 






Interviews are considered one important source of case study information (Yin, 1994) 
and it is the main source of information in the present study. Qualitative interviews 
allow the investigator to explore the mind of the interviewees, to see and experience the 
world as the interviewees do themselves (McCracken, 1988). The main purpose of 
conducting qualitative interviews in the present study is to understand how key 
informants construct the meaning and significance of the foreign direct investment 
situation they face, based on their complex personal framework of beliefs and values 
that they have developed over their lives and their experience in the industry’. Such 
purpose is best served by using in-depth, semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 199 1). Furthermore, this format of 
interview provides directions for information collection and yet gives the researcher 
sufficient flexibility to explore further or discard certain lines of inquiry throughout the 
process of data collection and the entire research project. This is significantly important 
to qualitative research (Glaser and Strauss, 1.965 in McCracken, 1988; Jones, 1985 in 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 199 1 ; McCracken, 1988). Therefore, this format of 
interview was adopted for the present study. The topics of inquiry in the case study 
memorandum serves as the open-ended questions that were used in the interviews”. 
Elaboration by the interviewees on these questions was expected and encouraged during 
interviews. 
The purpose of the present research involves understanding issues at the strategic level 
and therefore top management executives fiom the foreign side of the thirteen food 
retailers in China were interviewed”. The basic nature of these thirteen retailers and the 
position of informants in each of these companies are listed in Table 4.1. When 
According to Burgess (1 982 in Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991 ), understanding how individuals 
construct meaning of their situation based on their complex personal framework of beliefs and values is 
the main concern for conducting qualitative interviews. 
The reader should note that the case study memorandum serves as a blueprint for the author to collect 
information from various sources. It is not a questionnaire that is given to the interviewees to f i l l  in. 
All foreign food retailers were only allowed to operate as foreign-Sino joint ventures in China at the 
time of study. 
9 
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negotiating access, the author promised confidentiality of the information obtained. 
Therefore the names of the companies and those of the informants cannot be disclosed. 
Confidentiality is also the reason that the author could only provide limited information, 
which is crucial to the arguments of the study, about the true nature of those companies 
in the thesis. Wherever possible, the interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis, as 
indicated in Table 4.1. As the author speaks fluent English, Mandarin and Cantonese, the 
majority of interviews were carried out in one of these languages, depending on which 
language the interviewees felt most comfortable, as indicated in Table 4.1. The only two 
exceptions to this situation are Companies H and K, when the interviews were 
conducted with the presence of an interpreter, as indicated in Table 4.1. Although the 
author had endeavoured to gain as much access to the informants as possible, there were 
limitations imposed by the companies studied. The author could not obtain all the 
information she wanted as set out in the case study memorandum because some 
interviewees refused to discuss certain areas. The number of informants that the author 
was able to interview was also limited by the accessibility the companies granted the 
author. Some companies allowed the author to interview up to four of key executives 
while some others only gave the author access to one executive. The duration of each 
interview varied from one hour to four hours, which again was largely determined by the 
informants. Due to time constraints on both the retailers’ side and the author’s side, and 
cost constraints on the author’s side, face to face follow-up interviews were only 
conducted with one company. Follow-up inquiries with other companies, as allowed by 
the retailers, were conducted by either fax or emails. With the consent of the 
interviewees, the majority of the interviews were tape-recorded to facilitate the analysis 
process. 
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Table 4.1 List of Companies and Informants Interviewed 
Country of Origin 




Position of Informants 
[(E) indicates the person is an expatriate; 
(L) indicates the person is hired from China 
locally] 
-Director, China development*** (E) 
-Vice President* (E); 
-Senior Merchandising Director"" (E) 
-Director and Senior Manager # (E); 
-Managing Director # (E); 
-Manager of Supermarket Division** (L) 























Asia (Hong Kong) 
Europe (Holland) 
I IBeijing 
-Executive Director, Finance*** (E); 
-Vice President, Asia Region, of a company 
(with headquarter in Singapore) closely 
associated with Company E(2)' 
-Chief Operating Officer, Region Asia* (E); 
-Chief Executive Officer* (E); 
-Chief Food Purchasing Officer* (E); 
-Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer** (E) 
-Operating Division Specialist** (E) 
-Assistant General Manager** (E); 
-Secretary to General Manager** (L); 
-Store Manager*" (L) 
-General Manager** (E) 
-Buying Manager* (E) 
-General Manager* (E); 









-General Manager of the distribution centre 
of Company L* (E); 
-Deputy General Manager, Beijing, of a 
company closely associated with Company 




(1) The author was unable to interview this informant face to face due to time constraint and 
therefore a telephone interview was conducted with him. 
(2) This informant did not locate in China and therefore no face to face interview was conducted 
with him. Inquiry with this informant is made by several email correspondences. 
(3) All the informants were interviewed at the same time. 
* Interviews were conducted in English 
** Interviews were conducted in Mandarin 
*** Interviews were conducted in Cantonese 
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# During the interview, the interviewee spoke in Japanese and the author spoke in English. The 
interview was conducted with the facilitation of an interpreter. 
### During the interview, the interviewee spoke in Japanese and the author spoke in Cantonese. 
The interview was conducted with the facilitation of the Representative, Beijing Office, of 
Company M, who was a Japanese expatriate and spoke both Japanese and Cantonese. 
Geographical 
Location in China 
Guangzhou 
Shanghai 
In order to cross-check and compare the information obtained from the interviews with 
those thirteen retailers, and to gain further insights into the retail and distribution 
Organisation 
US Agricultural Trade Officer 
US Agricultural Trade Officer 
industry in China, in-depth, semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions with 
Shanghai 
some Chinese government officials and the industry specialists were conducted. Again, 
Roland Berger (Shanghai) Ltd, 
International Management Consultants 
names of the interviewees cannot be disclosed because the interviewees wished to 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
remain anonymous. A list of their identities is presented in Table 4.2. The questions 
Shanghai China Commercial Association 
Shanghai Commercial Policy Making 
Centre 
inquired in these interviews were also based on the case study memorandum. 
Shanghai 
Beijing 
Table 4.2 List of interviewees in independent/Governmental Organisations 
Commercial Commission of Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government 
Scottish Trade International 
Commercial Service, Embassy of USA, lBeiJing /China Two Commercial Assistants 
Position of Interviewees 
The Aqricultural Specialist 
The Marketing Specialist I 
A Senior Consultant, and a 
Junior Consultant 
The Vice Director & Vice Chief 
The Deputy Director 
The China Representative I 
Commercial Section, British Embassy A Senior Commercial I Remesentative 
Before going into discussion on the other sources of evidence, the author would like to 
point out an important issue related to the use of interviews as a source of evidence in 
case studies. There is a conventional conception that the views given by an interviewee 
may not be ‘true’. However, this does not diminish the significance of the information 
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obtained from interviews in qualitative research, because the main concern of qualitative 
interviews is to reveal patterns of responses, instead of a set of specific answers to 
specific questions. Each individual answer, whether true or false, is a piece of that 
pattern (Piore, 1983). Theories built by using analytic induction “fit” and “work” 
because they are derived from the concepts and categories used by the economic 
participants themselves to interpret and organise their worlds” (Jones, 1987:25 in 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 199 1 : 108). Accordingly, the views on the retailing 
environment in China given by informants of those thirteen companies might not be the 
‘true’ situation, but the main concern of the interviews was to find out a pattern of how 
these retailers interpreted the foreign direct investment environment in China and how 
they acted upon it. 
Having said the above, nevertheless, interviews with other independentigovernmental 
organisations were carried out, as mentioned earlier, and other sources of evidence were 
also used in order to corroborate evidence from different sources and achieve a more 
holistic picture of the subject area being studied. 
Documentation 
A wide variety of materials, in both English and Chinese, relating to the subject area 
being studied, were consulted in order to obtain secondary data for the present case 
studies. These materials include: 
Annual reports of the retailers being studied (various years) 
Company websites of the retailers being studied and some other leading international 
retailers (constant visits) 
Published information that the author was able to obtain from the companies directly 
on the Chinese retail operations of those retailers being studied 
Local retail magazines (various issues) 
Research reports on the development of the retail and distribution industry in China 
by various independent organisations 
Newspapers, both English and Chinese 
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Journal and book publications on subjects related to the current study 
Statistical information published, both in hardcopies and on various websites 
Chinese governmental websites on foreign direct investment policies 
Direct Observation 
Store visits to all the thirteen retailers were made. During these store visits, the author 
obtained information by direct observation on in-store customer behaviour and other 
features such as the environment of the store neighbourhood, the physical appearance on 
the outside of the store, the traffic inside the stores, the physical layout, appearance, and 
display inside the store, the types and conditions of the merchandise on offer, the staff 
on the shop-floor, the technology used at checkout points, the store atmosphere and 
company slogans or other messages displayed in the stores. The store visits to 
Companies C, F and H were accompanied by the Manager of supermarket division, the 
Chief Executive Officer, and the Secretary to General Manager of the respective 
companies. During these three accompanied store visits, apai-i. from the features 
mentioned earlier, the author was also able to observe the non-sale area of the siox, such 
as storage and reception department. and have inquiries which arose from the 
observation responded to immediately. On the other hand, the General Manager of the 
distribution centre of Company L showed the author two warehouses that belonged to 
their joint venture in China. One was a warehouse for food and non-food products. The 
other was a warehouse for frozen products. The author was not allowed to take any 
photos inside the stores or the warehouses. However, notes were written during these 
visits and some photos were taken on the outside of the stores. 
Apart from the stores of the thirteen retailers being studied, the author also visited store 
outlets of other leading international food retailers and local Chinese food retailers in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The purpose of such store visits was to 
gain an overview on the differences or similarities between the stores of the retailers 
being studied and the stores of the others. 
68 
4.2 Analysing Qualitative Data 
The framework provided by ground theory“ is employed for data analysis in the present 
research because it provides an open approach to data analysis that matches the 
phenomenological background of the research and it is particularly suitable for dealing 
with transcripts of in-depth interviews (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1991 ). The 
author would like to stress again that the ultimate goal of the present research project is 
to advance our theoretical understanding of food retailer’s foreign direct investment 
behaviour by building on their experience rather than slotting their experience into 
theoretical models derived from work on foreign direct investment in the manufacturing 
sector. Adopting the analytic-induction approach, the preliminary “working frame” was 
constantly revised and modified in the course of the research project. According to 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991), there are seven main stages” to an analysis 
based on the ground theory: 
1.  Familiarisation 
2. Reflection 
3. Conceptualisation 




These seven stages were followed when the author analysed the data obtained for the 
research project. Analysis of the data and discussion on the issues hence arise i s  
presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 that follows. 
l 2  For more details on ground theory, please refer to Glaser and Strauss (1967). who first formulated the 
theory; and other scholars, such as Turner (1981, 1983), Mintzberg 1983) and Van Maanen (1983), who 
have taken the work of Glaser and Strauss further. 
For more details on these seven stages, please refer to Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe ( 1  991 : 108- 13 
112). 
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Motives and Processes Behind Retail FDI 
Retail internationalisation’ is by no means a new phenomenon. As early as the first 
decade of the twentieth century, the Woolworths operation was introduced into the 
United Kingdom from the United States. European retailers were also instrumental in 
developing retail structures in Latin America at the same time (Hollander, 1970). 
Nevertheless, American retailers achieved a significantly higher international profile in 
the post- 1945 environment. The American economy was flourishing in 1950s and 1960s, 
resulting in a rapid development of retail structure which was in advance of that of 
Europe (Gomez, 1963 in Akehurst and Alexander, 1995) and Japan (Tanner, 1992 in 
Akehurst and Alexander, 1995). Retailers from both Japan and Europe, such as 
Kotobukiya and J. Sainsbury respectively, looked to the United States for inspiration 
during that period. Because of the innovative nature of retailing in the booming 
American market, the international expansion of American retail operations had become 
very pronounced. As a result, most of the early literature on international retailing was 
based on research carried out in the United States (Akehurst and Alexander, 1995). 
An increase in interest by the European retailers in the international environment was 
witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s (Burt, 1991). Parallel to this development, there was 
also an upsurge of European studies into retail international activities (Akehurst and 
Alexander, 1995). However, the 1970s and 1980s saw a slowing of retail activity and 
international operations in Europe. Some European retailers started to make significant 
large-scale development in North America in order to escape the less attractive 
conditions of European retail market (Kacker, 1985 in Akehurst and Alexander, 1995). 
Alongside this phenomenon, a considerable amount of academic research was dedicated 
to the international retail dimension on both sides of the Atlantic (Dawson, 1976, 1978, 
1979, 1982a, 1982b; Ball, 1980; Waldham, 1978; Goldman, 198 1 : Martenson, 198 1 ; 
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Siegle and Handy, 1981; Truitt, 1984; White. 1984 in Akehurst and Alexander, 1995) 
during that period. 
The break down of communist power and the economic transformation in Central and 
Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s presented the developed world with a place full 
of potential for development. Retailers from Europe and America gradually went into 
these transitional economies. This drew the attention of some scholars and studies on 
international retailing in transitional economies started to emerge (e.g. Fulop, 199 1 ; 
Loker et al., 1994; Drtina, 1995; Good and Huddleston, 1995; Myers and Alexander, 
1997; Sellaro, Maskulka and Burns, 1997; Dawson and Henley, 1998). At the same 
time, China’s economic reform in the late 1980s and 1990s also provided tremendous 
opportunities for retailers. This also attracted considerable academic interest. 
Among the various issues of retail internationalisation that academic researchers have 
shown interest in, rnotivations underlying international activities is one popular area. It 
is recognised that retail internationalisation is initiated and influenced by the complex 
interplay of both exogenous and endogenous factors to a retail firm. With the continuous 
change in the international retail environment and the advancement of management 
structure of firms, it is believed that the motives for internationalisation change over 
time because internationalisation behaviour is embedded in context in terms of time, 
scale and geographical orientation (Alexander, 1995a; Clarke and Rimmer, 1997; Quinn, 
1999). As mentioned earlier, the emergence of the transitional economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe and China in the last two decades is unprecedented. Against this context, 
the research on motivation that was conducted with firms going into developed countries 
in the past might not be appropriate to explain the foreign direct investment of retail 
firms in the transitional economies nowadays. 
Retail internationalisation, in this thesis, is defined as the process that a retail firm establishes retail 1 
operations in a foreign country. 
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This chapter is devoted to investigation of motives underlying foreign direct investment 
activities of food retailers. The reasons why they expanded into China are also studied. 
The chapter also examines the process of internationalisation of some leading retailers 
by looking at the chronological and geographical sequences of their expansions. For 
each of these three areas, the findings from the empirical work are discussed in the light 
of the existing knowledge in the field. 
5.1 Motivation 
5.7.7 Existing Research on Retail Internationalisation Motives 
Hollander’s work in 1970 is always regarded as the starting point for the study of retail 
internationalisation motives. He classifies the motives into three categories: inadvertent, 
profit oriented and non-commercial (i.e. social, political, personal and ethical). He also 
advocates the concept of reactive and proactive internationalisation. The former occurs 
when saturation in domestic markets becomes the key consideration on a retailer’s 
decision to expand overseas. The latter occurs when a retailer decides to venture abroad 
before its domestic market is saturated. A lot of the subsequent studies centre on 
promoting either of these two poles in the internationalisation process with the majority 
arguing that internationalisation is primarily a reaction to limited opportunities in the 
home market. 
The 1980s saw the development of the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ groupings as the approach 
towards explaining retailers’ internationalisation activities. Kacker (1 986) discusses the 
push factors of European environment and the pull factors of the US economies in his 
study on the motives behind the expansion of European retailers to the US during the 
first half of the 1980s. Treadgold and Davies (1 989) also categorise the motives into the 
push and pull groups. Other studies supporting the same theme include the work of 
Treadgold in 1990 and Alexander in the same year. All these studies recognise more 
importance on push factors than pull factors. 
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Apart from the discussion of push and pull factors and the reactive versus proactive 
grouping, Treadgold (1988) further proposes that retailers can be classified according to 
their internationalisation strategies into four categories, namely ‘the cautious 
internationalists‘, ‘the emboldened internationalists’, ‘the aggressive internationalists’, 
and ‘the world powers’. Laulajainen (1991), in his case studies on Toys’R’Us and 
IKEA, highlights the importance of ‘cultural closeness’ in the discussion of pull factors. 
In the same case studies, he also found that the first foreign entries were undertaken 
before saturation was reached in the domestic market and hence suggests that push 
factors do not always play a more important role than pull factors in retail 
internationalisation. Firms can be quite proactive. This poses a challenge to the 
prevailing belief that retailers are basically reluctant to go abroad unless they are pushed 
by some unfavourable factors in their domestic markets. Having a similar doubt about 
the simplistic push and pull dichotomies, Williams ( 1992a, 1992b) conducted a survey 
on motives of internationalisation of 61 UK retailers who operated at least one outlet 
(company owned, franchised or an in-store concession) both within and outside the UK. 
His conclusion is that retail internationalisation motives are more complex than the 
previous push and pull grouping. Low regard for motives based on perceived limited 
domestic market growth opportunities was found. In contrast, growth oriented motives 
and those arising from an internationally appealing and innovative retail offering were 
seen as significantly more important in the retailers’ decision making process. Therefore, 
Williams claims that ‘retail internationalisation has preference to domestic expansion’ 
(1992a: 278). Because of the difference in his conclusion regarding motives of 
internationalisation to those offered in the past studies, he further suggests that ‘motives 
of retail internationalisation may depend and vary across markets and operating 
environments’ (1992a: 279). 
Most of the research on retail internationalisation conducted after 1992 appears to 
merely acknowledge the past research on motivation without further adding onto the 
debate mentioned above, because they shifted their focus on other issues involved in 
retail internationalisation. Examples of these issues include growth strategies (Pellegnni, 
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1994)’ market entry mechanisms (Dawson, 1994b)’ preconditions for successful retail 
internationalisation (Simpson and Thorpe, 1995), cultural issues (Dupuis and Prime, 
1996; Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997), strategic decision making process 
(Clarke and Rimmer, 1997), and attempts of reconciling the eclectic paradigm of 
Dunning (1 993) with retail internationalisation (Pellegrini, 199 1 ; Dawson, 1994b). In 
most of these studies, motivations of cross border retail expansion were briefly 
reviewed. The contradictory nature of the results from the previous researches 
mentioned earlier was reduced into a ‘checklist’ of motivations behind retail 
internationalisation, which combines all the motives that have been put forward by 
different studies. The driving forces predominantly present in the ‘checklist’ are as 
follows: 
Various growth-related motives, when internationalisation is a means to increase 
sales and profits, expansion into underdeveloped markets with higher growth rates, 
and when expansion goals cannot be achieved domestically; 
limited opportunities for growth in retailers’ home markets due to market maturity, 
saturation and dominance, increased competition, exhausted or unsuitable 
diversification prospects and excessive regulations; 
motives derived from an internationally appealing and innovative retail concept; 
various reactive and subjective motives including imitating competitors, responding 
to offers from foreign retailers, surplus resources and depressed share prices, and 
responding to inducementiencouragement by manufacturer-supplies wishing to enter 
new market ; 
motivations related to the transfer of retail know-how and techniques, senior 
management drive and economies of scale. 
Having said that the debate on whether proactive elements or reactive elements play a 
more influential role in retailers’ moves overseas was not rigorously camed on, 
however, there has been gradual recognition on the proactive elements underlying retail 
internationalisation and on the importance of the wider socio-economic and commercial 
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environment in which retail internationalisation is embedded (Alexander, 1995a; Burt, 
1993). 
In 1999, Quinn saw the lack of empirical research into the decision-makers’ perception 
of the initial move overseas with the consideration of the operating conditions prevalent 
at the time of the initial expansion. Therefore, he decided to re-examine the motives for 
retail internationalisation using a survey of UK retailers with international retailing 
operations. His results showed that UK retailers were strongly influenced by growth 
oriented or other proactive factors in their decision to internationalise. 
Furthermore, he asserts that the conflict in opinion on the motives for retail 
internationalisation in the literature revolves around methodological, spatial and 
temporal issues. First, different researchers employ different methodological approaches. 
The reactive school adopts a tracking approach based mainly on secondary data. In 
contrast, the proactive school employs an empirical approach and mostly quantitative 
research techniques. Therefore the two schools have different assumptions. The former 
bases their assumptions on observed activity whereas the latter evaluates the opinions of 
those directly involved in the internationalisation process. Secondly, in terms of the 
spatial issue, the reactive school undertakes a more universal view of the process while 
the proactive school focuses its research on the activities of UK retailers only. Thirdly, 
the socio-economic and commercial environments from which the research of the two 
schools emerges are very different. The research conducted by the reactive school was 
undertaken against the background of wider economic, social, political and retail 
specific conditions evident in the early to mid 1980s. Their observations were acceptable 
in that national retailers were confronting limited opportunities in their domestic market 
and hence perceiving overseas markets as a means by which their growth could be 
sustained. On the contrary, the subsequent studies carried out by the proactive school 
were conducted in the late 1980s, a period with a relatively stronger economic climate in 
Europe. Furthermore, those studies focused on UK retailers who were taking a more 
proactive role in the distribution channel. Consequently, it could be argued that UK 
75 
retailers in the late 1980s pursued overseas expansion more actively, regardless of the 
situation of their home market. 
As mentioned at the beginning, retail expansion into transitional economies has become 
increasingly popular in the 1 990s. The trading conditions that international retailers face 
in this context are different from the situation that has been discussed widely in the retail 
internationalisation literature in the past. Alongside the changing socio-economic and 
commercial conditions in the transitional economies. a high concentration of retail firms 
in Europe, high closure rates and return to the respectability of price competition in the 
UK is witnessed (Quinn, 1999). This worldwide changing socio-economic and 
commercial climate provides a valuable opportunity to reassess the nature and intensity 
of the motivations behind the contemporary expansions of retailers into the transitional 
markets. 
5.1.2 The Empirical Results 
During in-depth interviews, top executives of the foreign side of the food retail joint 
ventures in China were asked to explain why their companies had gone abroad and have 
to keep internationalising. These were meant to be open-ended questions. Interviewees 
were requested to elaborate as much as possible. The author did not offer any suggestion 
on different motives to the interviewees so that the original views of the interviewees on 
their retail expansions could be best captured. The explanations on motives behind their 
internationalisation provided by different retailers were then compared and sorted for 
further analysis. It has to be noted that one of the 13 retailers being studied did not offer 
any comments on the questions regarding motives behind internationalisation because 
the interviewees of this company claimed that they were not in a position to talk about it. 
Therefore, there are only 12 retailers available for the analysis of this issue. 
On the other hand, secondary sources were also consulted in order to trace the 
internationalisation history of the companies. This procedure was done to investigate 
whether there is any pattern or stages of internationalisation of the companies being 
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studied. Secondary sources were also important in that information on the wider socio- 
economic and political background alongside retail internationalisation is needed for a 
more comprehensive understanding on the driving forces underlying retail 
internationalisation. 
When the subjects were asked to express their views on why their companies need to 
internationalise, four out of the 12 food retailers perceived growth in scale, so that they 
could have bigger bargaining power over suppliers, to be the most important reason for 
their international expansion. Three of them are European retailers and the other is from 
Japan. These three European retailers also mentioned that growth in market share is of 
equal weight as growth in scale because it is necessary to keep growing in market share 
in order to avoid being ‘eaten up’ by competitors. One of these three European retailers 
claimed that accumulation of ‘know-how power‘, meaning knowledge on different 
markets in the world and hence management know-how and retail operation techniques, 
is also a main reason for them to expand overseas. 
On the other hand, another European retailer expressed that growth in profits is the 
biggest drive for them to go overseas. From this retailer’s point of view, national 
boundaries render no confines to their business domain. It is a borderless world to them 
and they actively look for and operate in places where opportunities to make money 
exist. They further commented that domestic market saturation forced a lot of retailers to 
go abroad but their overseas expansion was never driven by it. The Japanese retailer 
whose expansion was mainly caused by the desire to increase bargaining power over 
suppliers had a similar view on saturation. They stated that saturation is only a minor 
force that made them undertake foreign direct investment. The desire to grow in profits 
was also named by two other European retailers but instead of being the biggest driving 
force, they commented that it was only the secondary important factor, although they 
shared the perception that their home countries were too small in a world scale for 
making money. 
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Another four out of the 12 retailers pointed out that it was the saturation at their home 
markets that triggered their moves beyond their home countries. Three Hong Kong 
retailers and one from Japan make up these four retailers. One of these Hong Kong 
retailers revealed that growth in market share to avoid being ‘eaten up’ and growth in 
scale for bigger purchasing power were also very critica factors causing them to become 
involved in foreign direct investment. It has to be note 1 that the other two Hong Kong 
retailers do not have any food retail operation outside Hong Kong and China. The 
Japanese retailer who thought saturation was the main reason behind its 
internationalisation mentioned that alongside saturation of the Japanese market, there 
was also the desire to grow in profit and Japan is too small a market for making huge 
profits in the world scale. 
Search for an international image, in Tordjman and Dionisio’s (1991) term, was alleged 
by the other three retailers, one Japanese, one Taiwanese and one American, as the 
paramount reason for their internationalisation activities. They have a strong desire to 
obtain an image of being a significant food retailer worldwide. 
5.7.3 Discussion 
At first glance, the motives underlying retail internationalisation given by the twelve 
food retailers are more or less the same as those that had been proposed in the literature 
before. Consequently, it is very tempting to claim that the explanation on motives for 
internationalisation provided by the existing literature is applicable to the case of foreign 
food retailing in China, which is an economy in transition. However, the various 
motivations mentioned in the last section should not be treated discretely. It would be 
imprudent to extract key phrases from the interviewees’ responses and match them with 
the existing categories being offered in the literature, which were mainly obtained from 
either questionnaire survey or analysis using secondary data, to amve at a conclusion 
about the most important driving force behind food retailers’ internationalisation 
activities. It is because under scrutiny, there are linkages between the different motives 
mentioned by the interviewees that gwe the holistic perspective of the rationale of food 
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retailers for extending their business domains overseas. This issue, therefore, will be 
examined in detail later, in the light of the elaborate and in-depth discussions with the 
twelve food retailers and the existing literature. 
5. I. 3. I Reactive International Expansion 
Reactive international expansion is related to market saturation and dominance, intense 
competition, exhausted or unsuitable diversification possibilities and excessive 
regulation constraining growth of business in the domestic market (Williams, 1 992a, 
1992b; Clarke and Rimmer, 1997). These factors are named push factors as mentioned 
earlier. The use of push factors as the explanation of retail internationalisation was most 
prominent when academic research interest was focused on the cross border retail 
activities between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean in 1980s. 
Widei- Economic Peiformance and Legal Constraints 
Both Kacker (1 986) and Treadgold (1 988) believe that European retailers were 
pressured by the unfavourable environmental condition at that period. Continental 
Europe in the 1970s and early 1980s was characterised by a relatively flat economic 
performance and population growth. It experienced a relatively high inflation rate and 
unemployment. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands and West Germany, there were 
planning policies and procedures, including stiff land use planning, aiming to restrict 
large store developments in terms of new openings of stores and acquisitions. As a 
result, European retailers were pushed to expand into the US market that had steadily 
growing economic performance, less regulation on store development and unabated 
appreciation of real estate. 
This argument is overthrown by Burt (1991) even though he is aware that a number of 
French retailers have publicly mentioned the 1973 Loi Royer as a motivating factor 
searching for opportunity outside France. He argues that French expansion overseas was 
already undenvay before the Loi Royer began to take effect. Eight French companies 
had already initiated overseas activities by 1974 and there was no further move by 
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another major French player until 1981. At the same time, the German retailers 
Albrecht, Tengelmann and Hug0 Mann had undertaken international investments before 
the large store legislation was tightened in 1978. Tengelmann had gained international 
experience from its foreign investment in Austria in the early 1970s. As a limited-line 
discount chain store, Albrecht would not have been affected by the legislation. 
Therefore, Burt claims that it is not justifiable to attribute the temporal trends of retail 
internationalisation to the individual pieces of legislation. 
Market Saturation 
Apart from the wider economic performance and legal constraints, another push factor 
that is also strongly put forward is market saturation. However, there is a lack of 
discussion on the concept of saturation in the retailing literature in spite of Treadgold’s 
(1988) effort in pointing out the ambiguity of the meaning of market saturation. 
According to Treadgold (1 988), increasing retail floor-space had been the traditional 
strategy for retail expansion during the post-war period. This approach, however, had 
gradually lost its popularity and had slowly become an unavailable option. It had been 
progressively realised that there is an upper limit to the number of large new store 
openings that can be supported by the expected future consumer demand within any one 
geographical boundary. This phenomenon is termed ‘market saturation’. Treadgold 
(1988) asserts that the concept of saturation is highly complicated. He claims that 
intuitively, there must be a ceiling to the amount of retail floor-space that can be 
supported before diminishing returns start to take effect and profit per unit begins to 
decrease. However, it is problematic to find an appropriate indicator of the onset of 
saturation. Any attempt to predict with ‘an acceptable degree of precision when this 
point of diminishing returns is reached is obviously extremely hazardous’ (Treadgold, 
1988:9). The critical point is dynamic in that there are many different variables used to 
determine the onset of diminishing returns on retail investment and those variables 
themselves are subject to change. This view is also shared by Laulajainen (1991). 
Therefore, it can only be said that any such point of diminishing returns is moving ever- 
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further forward as a result of rising price of real estate and increasing difficulty in 
obtaining new store development permission. 
Following Treadgold’s argument, it is impossible to determine whether a market is 
saturated or not in an objective and absolute term. When academic scholars or retailers 
claim that a certain market is saturated, they are only expressing their perceptions on the 
outlook of the market in terms of the possibility that retailers could further expand their 
floor-space without having diminishing returns on their retail investment. According to 
the reactive school, retail internationalisation is a reaction of retailers to market 
saturation in their domestic market. If this claim is valid, retailers should make no 
further investment in their home market once they decide to go abroad. However, 
empirical evidence shows that this is not the case. 
All of the companies being studied in the present research and other international food 
retailers continue to invest and expand in their domestic markets while they are 
simultaneously engaged in overseas operations. Wal-Mart is one example’. Wal-Mart 
started going abroad in 1991. Since then, it has been expanding to different countries 
such as Canada, Argentina, Brazil, China, Germany, Korea and the United IOngdom. 
While it keeps exploring new geographical domain abroad, it does not cease to give 
attention to its business in the domestic market. For example, in concert with the 
opening of two new stores in Brazil, two in China, two in Mexico and four in the United 
Kingdom during the first quarter of 2000, it also opened seven discount stores and 32 
supercentres in the US in the same period. Promodes, which has now merged with 
Carrefour, continued to plan for new stores while it kept internationalising3. The same 
phenomenon is also witnessed in other international food retailers such as Carrefour, 
Ahold, and Dairy Farm4. Europe is always perceived as a saturated market with very 
intense competition. However, none of the European retailers interviewed have desisted 
’ Annual reports of Wal-Mart 
Annual reports of Promodes 




from pursuing domestic growth. Nor have their counterparts in Hong Kong, which is 
also perceived as a highly saturated market. 
The Case of Hong Kong Food Retailers5 
Market saturation was mentioned as the main reason by the Hong Kong food retailers 
for their foreign investments in China. Apart from these respondents and one from 
Japan, who made the same claim, none of the other respondents mentioned this reason 
during the discussion of their motivation for going abroad. Nevertheless, this result does 
not necessarily imply that the Hong Kong food retailers were ‘pushed’ by the 
unfavourable conditions in their home market. 
Supermarkets were introduced into Hong Kong in the early 1960s. Dairy Farm acquired 
the Wellcome grocery chain in 1964 and this marked the beginning of a well-organised 
development of supermarket industry in Hong Kong. The other dominant supermarket 
chain in Hong Kong is Park’N Shop, which belongs to the Hutchison Whampoa group. 
It started operating the Park’N Shop chain in 1973. Wellcome and Park’N Shop are the 
two major food retailing players in Hong Kong. 
After more than three decades of development in a well-developed economy, 
supermarkets in Hong Kong are still unable to dominate the food market. The food retail 
sales by supermarkets and hypermarkets in the 1998 were 5 567 and 695 million US 
dollars respectively‘. They together account for 5 1% of the total food retail sales in that 
year. In other words, the supermarket and hypermarket sector managed to capture just 
over half of the food purchases in Hong Kong in 1998. The other half of the food market 
was served by the traditional food-retailing sector, which includes the ‘wet-market’, 
independent grocery stores, bakeries, Chinese foods stores and street hawkers. There 
Unless stated otherwise, source of information in the cases: various annual reports of Dairy Farm and 
Source: Euromonitor. 2000c. International Marketing Data and Statistics 2000. London: Euromonitor 
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were 1 281 supermarket and hypermarket outlets in the same year7. Given the population 
size of 7 million’, the per capita level of supermarket provision in Hong Kong was 
similar to that of France, which has a population size of 59 million9 and 8 131 
sup ermar ke t outlets O. 
Real estate is very expensive in Hong Kong and space is very limited. As mentioned 
before, Wellcome and Park’N Shop have always been the two major players in the 
supermarket industry in Hong Kong since the introduction of supermarkets dated back to 
more than 30 years ago. These, together with the statistics presented in the last 
paragraph, indicate that there is very intense head-on competition and this may give an 
impression that Hong Kong is a very ‘saturated’ market for food retailing. Considering 
this environment and the explicit claim of those respondents with a Hong Kong origin, 
regarding motivation behind internationalisation, it is very tempting to conclude with a 
verdict that follows the reactive school. Such a conclusion, however, will not be reached 
when the internationalisation history of those retailers is taken into account. 
Dairy Farm’s food retail operation first went beyond Hong Kong in 1979 by acquiring 
the No Frills chain in Australia. Since then, it has continued to extend its business 
domain to the UK and Taiwan (in 1987)’ New Zealand and Spain (in 1990), China (in 
1992), Singapore (in 1993), Malaysia (in 1994), India, Indonesia and Japan (in 1995). 
Although it has discontinued its business in the UK, Spain and Japan, its number of 
outlets in all the other countries, including Hong Kong, has been increasing throughout 
all these years. Dairy Farm’s mission is to be the leading food and drugstore retailer in 
the Asia-Pacific region as well as “to ensure Dairy Farm stays on top of Hong Kong 
supermarket industry””. Due to intense competition between Dairy Farm and the 
Source: Euromonitor. 2000c. Znternational Marketing Dura and Statistics 2000. London: Euromonitor 
* Source: World Bank. 2000c. Entering the 21” Centrrqs: World Development Report 1999Q000. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Source: World Bank. 2000c. Entering the 21” Centttg‘: World Development Report 1999/2000. hew 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Source: Euromonitor. 2000b. European Marketing Data and Statistics 2000. London: Euromonitor plc. 








traditional food retailers as well as between Dairy Farm and Park’N Shop, Dairy Farm 
and Park’N Shop have always been looking for new strategies in the hope that they 
could capture more market share in Hong Kong. In 1998, Park’N Shop started to 
introduce the ‘wet market’ into their Hong Kong outlets and they started to build outlets 
with larger floor space, which then were named ‘superstores’. By so doing, they 
expected that they would attract customers from the ‘wet market’. At the same time, 
Wellcome also adopted a certain strategy for capturing more fresh food customers. They 
opened a US$50 million Wellcome Fresh Food Processing Centre in November 1998. 
Since then, competition between the two companies has become increasingly fierce. A 
price war was started in August 1999 and continued into 2000. Nevertheless, Wellcome 
claimed that they managed to maintain their market share. 
Wellcome’s behaviour in Hong Kong described above contradicts the tenet of the 
reactive school. They have never been ‘pushed’ out of Hong Kong by the unfavourable 
operating environment there. Even in 2000 when the competition has further escalated, 
they are still very active in terms of investment and remains ambitious in the Hong Kong 
market. It has always been looking for growth in size in both Hong Kong and abroad. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to believe that Dairy Farm’s engagement in foreign 
investment is due to the limited growth opportunities in the so-perceived ‘saturated’ 
Hong Kong market. 
On the other hand, the story of Park’N Shop also adds some interesting arguments to the 
debate. The history of Park’N Shop is different from that of Wellcome. As mentioned 
earlier, Park’N Shop is a business segment of Hutchison Whampoa Limited. Unlike 
Dairy Farm, which is a retail business entity, Hutchison Whampoa Limited is a business 
conglomerate consisting of a wide variety of different businesses, such as 
telecommunication, retailing, manufacturing, real estates, just to name a few. Its 
progenitor was a dock company. Therefore, retailing is just one of the many different 
businesses of the group. Nevertheless, the company root was related to retailing. A S 
Watson, a drug store, was opened in Guangzhou, China in 1828 and this was the first 
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event in the group’s history. A S Watson extended its operation to Hong Kong in 184 1.  
As time went, the group was slowly formed. In 1973, the group acquired Park’N Shop 
supermarkets. Since then, Park’N Shop has been operating as one the of the leading 
supermarket chains in Hong Kong. Park’N Shop opened its first outlet in Mainland 
China in 1984, which was eight years before foreign direct investment in retailing was 
allowed in China. Despite the group has businesses overseas, Park’N Shop only operates 
in Hong Kong and Mainland China. This is interesting behaviour as given the intense 
competition and market saturation in Hong Kong, Park’N Shop should vest more 
attention abroad to look for more growth opportunities when its group has already had 
experience in countries other than Hong Kong. Contrasting this expectation, Park’N 
Shop has always been only concentrating its business in Hong Kong and China and has 
never ceased investing in its operation in Hong Kong. 
Based on this example, it is believed that. unfavourable domestic market conditions such 
as intense competition do not necessarily ‘push’ retailers to internationalise. In fact, Burt 
( 199 1 ) has made similar assertion. He observed that the grocery retail market in the UK 
was already highly concentrated in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the major grocery 
retailers in the UK have hardly undertaken an aggressive internationalisation strategy 
during that period. 
Given the above arguments and illustrations, the reactive school doctrine is difficult to 
vindicate. ‘Internationalisation [in retailing] is an “and” to domestic growth not an “or”’ 
(Dawson, 1999b:5). The reason for food retailers pursuing internationalisation is more 
complicated than the reactive school suggests. 
5.7.3.2 Proactive International Expansion 
Following the above argument, if retailers are not ‘pushed’ by the unfavourable 
conditions in domestic markets, they must be rather proactive in their 
internationalisation activities. In fact, the empirical work of Alexander (1 990) and 
Williams (1992a, 1992’0)’ which was carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s on 
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both sides of the Atlantic, suggested that retailers were growth oriented and proactively 
looking for internationally appealing and innovative offering. Their respondents were 
more inclined to stress their proactive responses to the international environment and 
they attached relatively insignificant importance to issues such as domestic market 
saturation. They identify opportunities continuously and internationalise accordingly 
instead of waiting for limited opportunities in their domestic market to trigger their 
expansion abroad. A similar result was obtained from the empirical work of the present 
study. 
Ten out of the 13 respondents claimed that the motives behind their internationalisation 
were related to survival and growth. Apart from the three Hong Kong retailers and one 
Japanese retailer, who talked about the unfavourable condition in their home market, 
(discussed in the previous section), aT.1 of the others put much emphasis on the 
importance of continuous expansion, disregarding geographical boundaries. Six retailers 
even explicitly stressed that they were rather proactive in terms of internationalisation, in 
that they started engaging in foreign operations before their domestic market had 
become saturated. Four of these six retailers are from Europe and the other two are from 
Asia. 
The Case of Company F 
Company F, which is one of those four European retailers, went abroad in 1968, which 
was almost 25 years before the unification of the European market. It was a time long 
before there was an integrated retailing market and an integrated distribution structure in 
Europe. It was also a time well before there was ‘domestic market saturation’ in 
Company F’s opinion. Since then, it has become established in a number of European 
countries and China. ‘Because of their entrepreneurial style and vision’, it managed to 
learn about those foreign markets very quickly and its business started flourishing soon 
after its entrance to those markets. It claimed that it always occupied a top position in the 
retailing sector in all those countries in which it was present. It believed that the 
situation in its domestic market today, where there is a population of 80 million people 
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and Company F has 55 outlets. confirmed that its vision to expand overseas 30 years ago 
was ‘very wise”’. The Chief Operating Officer added that 
“I personally believe.. .(that) we have to proactively spot opportunities and go to 
countries (other than our own) where we could make money out of our 
profession before one gets stuck in its own domestic market.” 
The Case of Companj: D 
A similar attitude was found with Company D, which is also a European retailer. The 
President of the company expressed that 
“. . .the reason why you find us all over the world is that in order to be successful, 
to be prosperous, we have no choice but to find opportunities around the 
world.. .We internationalised because of the vision of the owner. They set up the 
whole chain. They looked at the world, not just at our domestic country, and they 
saw where opportunities were going to arise. So our company has been in Asia 
for over 10 years now ... To do with the more positive side, they took decisions 
that they would pioneer. They were the first to come into Asia, when other 
people were only thinking abocit it. And we are successful ... Europe was not 
saturated at the time when our owner made the decision to go to South America 
and Asia ... The world is moving and the market is moving with regard to 
opportunities. So, our company is totally entrepreneurial. We put money into 
Asia because we saw the opportunities whereas a lot of other people only came 
to Asia to look for a solution for the problem of market saturation in Europe at a 
much later time.” 
The Case of Companj* I and The Other Two Asian Retailers 
A further look at the history of those proactive European retailers reveals that Company 
I also internationalised at quite an early time. It did so 30 years ago when it already 
realised that their domestic market would be too small on a world scale as globalisation 
would gradually become the world climate for businesses in general. The two Asian 
retailers do not have such a long history of internationalisation but they share a similar 
attitude. With their entrepreneurial proactive attitude towards internationalisation, they 
are continuously assessing opportunities in different markets and are waiting for the 
’’ Source: Interview with Company F. 
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arrival of the ‘right environment’ l 3  and liberalisation of policy towards foreign direct 
investment in the markets they are interested in so that they could enter those markets. 
The above examples lend support to the proactive school and add to their strength by 
providing vivid and detailed accounts made by the interviewed retailers on the issue of 
motivation behind retail internationalisation. The contribution of the present empirical 
work, nevertheless, does not end at this point. What the proactive school fails to address 
with enough emphasis is the ultimate reasons of why retailers have to proactively 
internationalise. The major reasons existing in the proactive school literature are the 
existence of favourable conditions at host markets. possession of some competitive 
advantages, economy of scale, enhancement of company image, managerial 
commitment, gaining access to new capital source and realisation of monopolistic profit. 
These reasons are never discussed in detail and they are only offered as a list of the 
various reasons that are of equal significance. In fact, many of the reasons presented in 
the literature were not mentioned at all during the author’s interviews with the food 
retailers”. The divergence of the results between the past research and the present study 
is believed to be due to the difference in methodology. The mainstream proactive school 
empirical work adopted the survey method (for example: Alexander, 1990; Williams, 
1992a, 1992b; Quinn, 1999). Top executives in retail companies were given a list of 
motives and they were asked to weigh the importance of each of them. In other words, 
several different motives were already assumed before the empirical work was 
conducted. This way, the empirical work could only identify the different degree of 
importance of each of the suggested ‘motives’. On the contrary, the present study 
adopted in-depth interviews with retailers using open-ended questions. When asked 
about the reasons why their companies had to engage in foreign operations, no reasons 
were suggested by the author. The interviewees’ responses, therefore, represented 
entirely their own views and are believed to be the ultimate reasons behind retail 
internationalisation. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the results obtained by the 
The ‘right environment’ here means the economic performance and infrastructure that a retailer 13 
considers crucial for their business to be able to survive. 
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past research should be overthrown. Instead, it is argued that some of the reasons offered 
in the past are only the more immediate reasons rather than the root causes of retail 
internationalisation; and some of them, such as the possession of certain competitive 
advantages, are more inclined to be the prerequisites for successful foreign direct 
investment rather than causing international moves. The ultimate motives behind retail 
internationalisation, based on the empirical work, will be discussed as follows. 
5. I. 3.3 Market Power 
According to Wilemon (1972 in Gaski. 19841, the marketing definition of power is the 
ability of one channel member to induce another channel member to change its 
behaviour in favour of the objectives of the channel member who is exerting the 
influence. 
Food retailers are proactive in internationalising because, as the empirical work 
suggested, it is necessary for them to keep growing in scale in order to pre-empt their 
counterparts from ‘swallowing’ them through mergers and acquisitions and to obtain 
bigger bargaining power against their suppliers. This point is well illustrated in the claim 
made by the General Manager of Company K, 
“If you don’t keep growing, you will be eaten up by the others, because market 
share and buying power are far more the most important in this business (of food 
retailing).” 
The continuous extension of market power both horizontally and vertically is essential 
for retailers’ survival. 
In fact, Hymer, in as early as 1960 in his PhD thesis, advocated that foreign direct 
investment is a means by which producers extend their market power’? Firms are 
tempted by the powerful incentive offered by the possibility of monopoly to pursue 
“continuous and unlimited” (Knight, 1933 in Coase, 1937: 394) expansion, even at the 
The reasons behind retail internationalisation given by the food retailers were shown in section 5.1.2. 
A more detail discussion on Hymer’s market power thesis, including a definition of the term ‘market 
14 
15 
power’, is given in the Chapter 2. 
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expense of losing efficiency. The relationship between efficiency and size is primarily a 
matter of “personality and historical accident rather than of intelligible general 
principles” (Knight, 1933 in Coase, 1937: 394). This assertion is particularly pertinent to 
the food retailing industry. In the context of retailing and wholesaling, competitiveness 
of a firm is defined by its share of a market and its ability to transfer its retail or 
wholesale concept to other countries (Dawson, 1999a). In other words. retail firms 
always strive to continuously increase its share in a market and expand the geographical 
domain of its business in order to remain competitive in the marketplace, or more 
precisely, to remove competition from its rivals. Cross border activities are especially 
important for the survival of a food retailer because of a number of social, economic, 
political and technological changes in the last two decades or so. The world trade regime 
has been increasingly liberalised. The number of countries in the World Trade 
Organisation membership is increasing. Policies such as the free trade policy facilitate 
global business dealings. Restrictions on currency convertibility, exchange control. stock 
exchange access and repatriation of capital have been largely loosened. All these 
changes, when coupled with differential tax rate and taxation policy in different 
countries, rapid advancement in telecommunication technology and deregulation in the 
retail and distribution industry, render that national boundaries provide no shelters to the 
local retailers. As a result, retailers are increasingly competing with one another in a 
global scale instead of on a national level. The mergers and acquisitions and alliances of 
various forms between retailers from different countries are indication of the borderless 
nature of retailing in the contemporary era. 
‘Horizontal ’ Market Power 
‘Horizontal’ market power in this research is defined as the ability of a food retailer to 
dominate the consumer market of food. As mentioned before, three out of the four 
European retailers stated that the major motive for their internationalisation was the need 
to grow in size in order to avoid being ‘eaten up’ by their competitors. One out of the 
three Hong Kong retailers also believed that this is an important reason for its overseas 
operation. Driven by the desire of obtaining monopoly profit, firms continuously pursue 
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expansion. Mergers and acquisitions, when compared to organic growth, serves as a 
means by which extra market power can be acquired in the shortest time. In this process. 
the original identity of the firm being acquired will ‘disappear’. Or, even in the case that 
the name of the acquired company is retained, the acquired company will lose the 
majority shareholding status and hence lose the ultimate control. In order to remain as a 
dominant player and to maintain control of their companies, retailers endeavour to 
increase their horizontal market power. In other words, retailers strive for growth in 
horizontal market power to avoid being ‘swallowed’ and internationalisation is 
perceived as an important way to achieve this. When asked about why their company 
needed to internationalise, the chief food-purchasing officer of Company F pointed out, 
“. . .the whole system is built on growth. You need to grow in terms of mass, 
turnover and power. Otherwise, you will be eaten by competitors.” 
Mergers and acquisitions in the retailing sector are not a contemporary phenomenon. 
However, those occurring in recent years are creating intensifying tensions between the 
existing players. Reynolds (1999) warns that European retailers are no longer 
safeguarded from arge-scale globalisation and size does matter for food retailing. “The 
Wal-Mart acquisit on of (the British retailer) Asda has sent shock waves throughout the 
food retailing sector (in Europe)” (Hubbard, 1999). The arrival of this world’s largest 
retailer (with an American origin) into Germany in January 1998 and the UK in July 
1 999 has pressurised firms across the retail spectrum to envisage non-domestic threat 
(Vaughan, 1999). 
In fact, there had already been strong pressure from competition in the retailing sector in 
Europe before the ‘intrusion’ of Wal-Mart. Concentration is witnessed in the food sector 
in all the Western European countries and the tendency is further increasing. In 1991, 
the top five food retailing groups accounted for more than 45% of the British market, 
40% of the French market, 12% of the Spanish market and 20% of the Italian market 
(Tordjman, 1995). In 1998, these ratios have increased to 67%, 67%, 38% and 30% 
respectively (Dobson Consulting, 1999). The small retailers had been driven out of 
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business by the big retailers (Tordjman. 1995) and nowadays even the remaining big 
retailers are experiencing very intense competition. The acquisition of Asda by Wal- 
Mart posed a serious threat to the major retailers in Britain, including Sainsbury. Tesco 
and Safeway, and resulted in a cut-throat price war immediately after the acquisition. 
Soon after this significant acquisition, there came another attention-catching event in 
August 1999. This time, it was a deal between two French retailers. Carrefour proposed 
the largest acquisition in retail history with an offer of U S 1 6 . 6  billion for Promodes. 
Management Venture, Inc. (2000) believes that it marked the first of several large-scale 
European consolidations that would take place in the following one or two years. After 
the acquisition, Carrefour has become the world’s second largest retailer after Wal-Mart, 
with consolidated sales reaching U S 6 5  billion by the end of 1999. It is postulated that 
this acquisition will exert a considerable amount of pressure on other key retailers such 
as Wal-Mart, Auchan, Ahold, Metro and Tesco (Management Venture, Inc., 2000). 
The threat of being acquired does not only affect the players within the European 
market. Retailers in other parts of the world are also affected in a similar manner. For 
example, Asian retailers are also confronted with competition, both existing and 
potential, from the international retailers with a European origin when the European 
retailers have operations in both the domestic and host countries of the Asian retailers. In 
the same vein, any Asian retailer could become the target of acquisition by European 
retailers. For instance, the retailing business of the CP Group, which has a Thai origm, 
was partly purchased by Tesco, which is a British food retailer, in 1999. In fact, it is the 
middle size players who are the most vulnerable under the consolidation trend. Hubbard 
(1999) asserts that consolidation in the food retailing industry is going to exert 
considerable squeeze to the middle size food retailers and might prove fatal to them. 
Wal-mart and key European food retailers are ranked as the top food retailers in the 
world. Asian retailers are not comparable to them in capital, size and turnover. For 
example, the total sales of Wal-Mart for the fiscal year ended 31 January 2000 was 
US$165 billion; that of Ahold for the year 1999 was about US$30 billion; that of 
Carrefour for the year 1999 was also about US$30 billion; that of Makro Asia for the 
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year 1999 was about U S 3 . 7  billion; that of Ito-Yokado Superstore for the fiscal year 
ended 29 February 2000 was US$12 billion; and that of Dairy Farm for the year 1999 
was US$6.8 billion“. Furthermore, the best target to be taken over would be those 
retailers who have strong market share in a country where the acquirer desires to 
aggressively enter and have simple company structure in the sense that they do not have 
extensive international spread. Many key Asian food retailers, who are not as 
internationalised as their key European counterparts, therefore, fall into the category of 
desirable acquirees in the global game of mergers and acquisitions. As a result, these 
Asian food retailers also strive to increase their market power by continuously 
increasing their size, turnover and presence in different countries in order to survive. 
This point is best illustrated by the comment of the Director of China Development of 
Company A, a Hong Kong retailer, 
“You may have noticed the M & A deals in the retail sector recently. Even some 
sizeable players have found difficulties to continue their growth at the historical 
pace . . .  A natural move is to put more attention to overseas markets for 
opportunities in development and acquisition. While the major competitions are 
expanding, it becomes a matter of survival to keep growing to maintain the size 
and economy of scale. Life will be more and more difficult for some operators.” 
Based on the discussion in the last few paragraphs, it is evidenced that food retailers are 
strongly inclined to pursue international expansions in order to go beyond the size and 
the complexity of their company structures in terms of international spread at which 
take-over would be a threat. It has to be noted that the speed at which a company can 
grow by organic growth will logically be lower than the speed at which a potential take 
over can be realised. Retailers are aware of this fact. Therefore, food retailers do not 
expand only by undertaking foreign direct investment but also by mergers and 
acquisitions at the same time if possible. Nevertheless, mergers and acquisitions are not 
an ‘easier’ option against foreign direct investment because the possibility of making a 
take-over depends on a lot of factors, such as the capital strength of the retailer and the 
availability of suitable acquirees. This is especially true to the cases of emerging 
Sources: Annual reports of the mentioned companies 16 
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markets, such as China and Central and Eastern Europe. In those markets, there are not 
many existing chains that are suitable to be acquiredI7. In fact, 55 percent of 
international retailers prefer organic growth strategies (White, 1995 in Helfferich, 
Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997). Consequently, foreign direct investment still serves to be a 
means of paramount importance by which food retailers could achieve continuous 
growth that would auspiciously protect them from being ‘swallowed’ by their 
competitors. 
‘Vertical ’ Market Power 
As mentioned earlier, the need for retailers to grow in size and international spread is 
due to two main reasons. One is the need to gain ‘horizontal’ market power, which has 
just been discussed; and the other is the need to achieve ‘vertical’ market power, which 
will be investigated in this section. ‘Vertical’ market power in this research refers to the 
ability of a food retailer to dominate the supplier market. In other words, it is the 
bargaining power of retailers over their suppliers. A more precise definition of buyer 
power in the context of retailing is given by the Committee of Experts on Restrictive 
Business Practices in their 198 1 report. Buyer power is perceived as “a situation which 
exists when a firm or a group of firms, either because it has a dominant position as a 
purchaser of a product or service or because it has strategic or leverage advantages as a 
result of its size or other characteristics, is able to obtain from a supplier more 
favourable terms than those available to other buyers” (OECD, 1981 in Dobson 
Consulting, 1999). Accordingly, a retailer is perceived to have buyer power when it has 
a dominant position in the supplier market and it uses this to extract favourable prices 
and other terms and conditions from suppliers. 
Three out of the four European retailers suggested that bargaining power is the other 
ultimate reason, which is of equal importance as the horizontal market power, 
underlying their internationalisation. One out of the three Hong Kong retailers also 
~ 
Further discussion on this area of  mergers and acquisitions will not be made because this is out of the 1 7  
scope of the present study. 
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believed that this is an important reason for its overseas operation’*. In fact, there is an 
extant belief in the literature that retailers’ desire to extract better terms from the 
suppliers is an important motivation for retailers to increase market share (Kacker, 1986) 
because negotiation on terns and conditions between retailers and suppliers depends 
inter alia on purchasing volume and capacity. The empirical results strengthen this 
belief. In addition, they add, and emphasise, the international element to this argument. 
Drawing from the interview results, it is claimed that a food-retailing firm has to have 
presence in as many countries as possible in order to obtain better prices when 
negotiating with multinational suppliers. The Chief Operating Officer of Company F 
pointed out that multinational suppliers look at all overseas subsidiaries of a 
multinational retailer as more or less a unit. If a retailer is the biggest in terms of scale in 
each country where the multinational supplier is present, the retailer will have a very 
strong bargaining power. At the moment, Company F is among the top three companies 
in terms of total sales in the commercial field in the world. Approximately one third of 
its total sales are from operations outside its country of origin. They claimed that with 
their global scale, they obtain support from the multinational suppliers in terms of 
guarantee of both reliable supply and good prices in each country they go into. The same 
claim was also made by the General Manager of Company I, which is of a European 
origin: 
“When we decided to come into China but before we started our operation, we 
began to communicate with our existing multinational suppliers who have 
operations in China. Because of our scale world-wide and our existing 
relationship with them, it took very little effort on our part to get them to 
guarantee supplies and provide services to our China operations at prices we are 
happy with.” 
The above cases also demonstrate that economy of scale is not the only concern when 
bargaining power is pursued. There is no doubt that pressure on prices and hence on 
costs is very strong (Tordjman and Dionisio, 1991 and Pellegrini, 1991, 1994). 
However, the power of retailers over suppliers on qualitative aspects such as product 
These empirical results are presented in section 5.1.2. 
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quality, guarantee of reliable supply and production specification is also of considerable 
importance. It is evident that retailers sometimes place huge logistical demands to 
suppliers in terms of labelling and dates of delivery. Suppliers risk incurring monetary 
penalties if they violate these ‘rules’ (Keh and Park, 1998). 
A power struggle between retailers and suppliers has always been an important area that 
draws tremendous research attention within the marketing discipline. The 1 980s and 
1990s saw increased economic pressures and intensification of competition. There are 
arguments that collaborative buyer-supplier relationships are one way to cope with the 
problem and hence there emerged a large amount of literature on long term buyer-seller 
relationships. It is also witnessed that buyers and suppliers have started examining their 
relationships with one another and shifting from ‘adversarial’ transaction relationships to 
some forms of ‘obligational contracting’ based on partnership and closer working 
relationships (Lamming, 1989; Womack et al., 1990; Sako, 1992). The importance of 
prices, on which traditional competition for contracts is based, is added to by an 
emphasis on quality criteria such as extension of technical, personnel and managerial 
assistance by manufacturers (Rubery et al., 1987). Despite such evidence, however, 
some scholars remain sceptical about the actual extent and nature to which buyer- 
supplier relationships have truly been transformed. Turnbull (1 99 1 in Bresnen, 1996) 
and Wilson and Gorb (1983 in Bresnen, 1996) claim that the development of 
collaborative relationships is often undertaken in an ad hoc manner, driven mostly by 
narrow and pragmatic concerns to rationalise supply bases and reduced costs associated 
with transactions and stockholding. Rainnie (1991) goes even further to claim that the 
notion of true partnership is misleading because his research suggests that terms and 
conditions formulated under the ‘collaborative’ relationship are, in most cases, still 
imposed by the more powerful buyers on dependent suppliers. Consequently, buyers 
obtain greater efficiency, improve quality and reduced costs through passing the costs 
and risks to their suppliers. Furthermore, it is apparent that price and cost remain central 
to managerial decision-making even though there is increasing emphasis on criteria 
other than contract price. Rainnie (1 991) also finds that there is increased dependency 
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for smaller suppliers on a few major clients and as a result, these smaller suppliers suffer 
from negotiated price reductions and pressure to adopt buyers’ costly and interventionist 
control and quality assurance systems. The dependency for suppliers on buyers is further 
observed by Chatterjee, Hyvonen and Anderson (1995) during their study with food 
distributors. They find that food distributors prefer to spread and balance their purchases 
across a number of suppliers in order to gain awareness of current prices, supply market 
conditions and product offering, retain the ability to switch suppliers should the need 
arise and reduce exposure to suppliers’ problems such as stockouts. Food distributors 
believe that these advantages outweigh the disadvantages of increased complexity of the 
inventory system and reduced average order sizes, and hence reduced quantity discounts 
as a result of having more suppliers. All this evidence points to the fact that the 
contemporary emphasis on collaborative or so-called ‘win-win’ relationships between 
buyers and suppliers are simply camouflage for attempts to extend and exert greater 
managerial control over suppliers. The terms and conditions of buyer-supplier 
relationships is actually a reflection of the power imbalance between them. The reality 
of control and market power that underpins demand-supply relationships will be 
revealed when ‘partnerships’ between buyers and suppliers are deconstructed (Bresnen. 
1996). 
The arguments presented in the last paragraph demonstrate that no matter how prevalent 
the concept of long term or collaborating buyer-seller relationship is in the contemporary 
literature, power and conflicts between channel members are still solidly embedded in 
buyer-seller interactions. As suggested by the present empirical results, bargaining 
power over suppliers is what retailers ultimately pursue behind their international 
expansions 
The cases of companies F and I described earlier also serve as a means to bring the 
traditional discussion on power struggle in a buyer-seller dyad to the international level, 
although there is a lack of empirical evidence from the supplier side due to the scope of 
the present research. To a supplier, having an account with a mass retailer such as Wal- 
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Mart means doubling or tripling its annual sales (Bolen and Davis, 1997). Because of 
this, mass retailers are very powerful in asserting influence on their suppliers. 
Simultaneously, the strong pressure from competition among retailers means that having 
the lowest possible cost and yet offering merchandise with good quality and services is 
of ultimate importance to survival. As a result, mass retailers are very compelling in 
pressuring their suppliers’ profit margins. It is found that even giant suppliers such as 
Procter & Gamble, Unilever and Kraft, who have considerable bargaining power, have 
felt the squeeze from those giant retailers (Bolen and Davis, 1997). Along with the 
internationalisation of the giant manufacturers is the internationalisation of the giant 
retailers. This has changed the landscape of the distribution industry. They no longer 
operate and interact on a national level. As Akehurst and Alexander (1995) put it, 
“The internationalisation of retailing, the pace of which has quickened in recent 
years, is redefining channel relationships and the economics of distribution on a 
b global scale.” 
Interactions between manufacturers who have overseas operations and retailers who 
have cross-border activities in a country is no longer a stand-alone game. Consequently, 
retailers strive to internationalise to increase their overall size so that they can possess 
greater bargaining power over their suppliers. 
However, it appears that only retailers with certain overall size can enjoy this ‘privilege’ 
with their multinational suppliers. Based on the empirical results, it happens that it is 
mostly the European food retailers who have this ‘privilege’. Most Asian food retailers 
interviewed admitted that their overall purchases from the multinational suppliers are not 
significant enough to enable them to have a cross-border influence on these suppliers. 
Therefore, the relatively smaller foreign retailers have to negotiate with the 
multinational suppliers in China more or less as if they were stand-alone retailers. This 
finding further reinforces the argument that food retailers have to continuously extend 
their size and scale internationally in order to obtain greater bargaining power over 
suppliers so that they would have a stronger base to compete with their counterparts. 
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It has to be noted that the four retailers who claimed that bargaining power was a strong 
driving force for their international expansions are identical to those four retailers who 
advocated the importance of horizontal market power behind their internationalisation. 
In other words, horizontal market power goes hand in hand with bargaining power in 
terms of significance as a motive behind internationalisation of food retailers. This 
leverages support to the Clarke’s (2000) argument that the dimensions of vertical 
competition between the retailer and the manufacturer over the distribution of profits 
made from selling the products to the consumers and horizontal competition spatially 
between retailers in the same catchment for sales of the same products are inseparable in 
the study of retail power and competition. 
According to Clarke (2000), the traditional literature understates the role of retailing in 
the distribution channel. It tends to define retail competition purely in spatial terms 
instead of exploring the competition in the whole supply chain. Moreover. most 
economic literature assumes the existence of perfect competition. It ignores the fact that 
individual retail establishments have a certain degree of monopoly power, even without 
high retail concentration in the industry, because of their local uniqueness. Each retail 
store possesses a distinctive image and reputation and consumers do not have perfect 
information about different retailers because of high consumer search costs. As a result, 
a major retailer on its own within a certain catchment area does not have any immediate 
competition. In a similar vein, the situation of having two retailers within a certain 
catchment area can also be non-competitive because retail firms will only be in perfect 
competition when they can capture a perceptible share of market at each other’s expense 
(Steiner, 1991 in Clarke, 2000). Therefore, retailers resell manufacturers’ products in an 
imperfectly competitive market in most cases. In order to rectify the deficiency in the 
existing literature, Steiner (Steiner, 199 1 in Clarke, 2000) proposed a “dual-stage” 
economic model of retailing that recognises the importance of the co-existence of and 
interaction between competition for share of margins between retailers and suppliers 
(vertical competition) and the competition among retailers (horizontal competition) and 
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conceptualises how power derived from vertical competition might affect power derived 
from local horizontal competition. 
Regarding vertical competition, Dobson and Waterson ( 1996 in Clarke. 2000) find 
evidence of the existence of monopsony power. They claim that 
“. . .the balance of power has shifted to the extent that retailers can 
replace an individual supplier with minimal disruption by being able 
its network of existing suppliers or find a new supplier only too wil 
in” (Dobson andwaterson, 1996:32 in Clarke, 2000). 
threaten to 
to draw on 
ing to step 
Clarke (2000) asserts that this supply-based power reinforces power derived from the 
degree of retail competition in the local market. Power derived vertically through retail 
concentration is used by retailers to ensure their competitiveness against other retailers 
in a certain catchment area. When there is no perfect competition among retailers in a 
certain area, retailers can choose between passing the benefits they derive from vertical 
competition on to the consumer in the form of lower prices or sales promotion, and 
accumulating excess profits by maintaining high prices. Lamm’s (1 98 1 in Clarke, 2000) 
study illustrates that food prices tend to be higher where local market shares are 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of retailers. 
To summarise the above arguments, co-existence of oligopsonistic and oligopolistic 
positions of retailers will give rise to high profits. Retailers are hence driven towards 
these two positions, and as evident from the present research, this is the main force that 
drives retailers to expand continuously internationally. 
5.1.4 Brief Conclusion on Motivation Behind Retail FDl 
The main argument of this section is that internationalisation of retailing is mainly 
driven by the need and desire of retailers to grow in size for survival given the strong 
pressure they face from mergers and acquisitions. They also strive to grow in size in 
order to gain more bargaining power over their suppliers, especially when they are now 
increasingly embedded in the globalisation of distribution channels. Push factors are 
believed to be of less importance than some literature suggests. Food retailers are rather 
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proactive in searching for opportunities to extend their market power. The concept of 
market power is the main thrust that forms the foundation of a comprehensive 
understanding of the contemporary internationalisation behaviour of food retailers. 
5.2 Reasons for Expanding into China 
5.2.1 The Empirical Results 
During the in-depth interviews, top executives of the foreign side of the food retail joint 
ventures in China were asked to account for the expansion of their operation into China. 
Due to the fact that this was intended to be an open-ended question, interviewees were 
encouraged to elaborate as much as possible. One of the 13 retailers being studied did 
not offer any comments on the question because the interviewees of this company 
claimed that they were not in a position to talk about it. Therefore, there were only 12 
retailers available for the analysis of this issue. 
Regarding the question why the 12 food retailers expanded into China. the results are as 
follows. All the four European retailers, two of the three Hong Kong retailers, one of the 
three Japanese retailers and the American retailer, which make up a total of eight, 
claimed that they were attracted by the 1.2 billion population base, which is one-fifth of 
the world’s population, and the recent economic development of China. They realised 
that China was a developing country with a transitional economy. However, they saw 
that huge potential exists in the Chinese market and were impressed with its rate of 
economic advancement. They expressed strong faith that China will become an 
important market in the world in the future. 
Three out of the eight retailers mentioned in the last paragraph disclosed that sourcing 
was their secondary reason for having foreign direct investment in China. One of them is 
from Europe, one from Hong Kong and the other from Japan. The European retailer 
claimed that they sourced from China 800 million Deutsche Mark annually. The 
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Japanese retailer also stated that China is a big and important exporter to their business 
in Japan. Because of this sourcing phenomenon, it is proposed that an underlyng 
element behind these retailers’ expansion into China is the possibility of transfer pricing 
as well as the opportunities to find quality Chinese manufacturers. The Hong Kong 
retailer did not mention that they source heavily from China but they said that they 
hoped to develop some kind of relationships with some quality manufacturers in China 
and source from them for their Hong Kong operation in the future. Nevertheless, they 
also warned that multinational suppliers in Hong Kong, such as Coca-Cola, might not 
allow them to source from their corresponding counterparts in China. They believed that 
the situation would depend on the development of the industry in the future. 
In contrast to the rational reason mentioned in the last two paragraphs, sentimental 
attachment between the founder of the company and China constituted the most 
important reason for three retailers entering China. The three of them have the origins of 
Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan respectively. Their founders always have the desire to 
contribute to the modernisation of China’s retail and distribution industry. For the Hong 
Kong retailer, who, as mentioned before, does not have operations outside Hong Kong 
and China, it was seen as a natural growth process to go into China when it perceived 
that the Hong Kong market had become highly saturated. On the other hand, another 
Japanese retailer claimed that its immediate reason for going into China was because it 
was approached by the Chinese government. For all these four retailers, the huge 
potential of the China market was only one factor that they considered in deciding the 
timing of expanding into China. 
5.2.2 Economic Development and Market Size 
As shown in the empirical results, the rate of recent economic development and the 
market size in China are the major factors that attracted foreign food retailers into China. 
The economic development of China since the implementation of the open door policy is 
discussed in section 1.3. Therefore, this is not repeated here. 
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5.2.3 Market Potential and Retailing Space 
All the interviewees mentioned that they saw tremendous market potential and retailing 
space in China as a result of its economic development and market size. Retailing space 
is what retailers are always competing for. According to the Chief Executive Officer of 
Company F, it would take 20 to 30 years for competition as intense as that in Europe 
nowadays to develop in China. There was a long history of retail development in 
Europe. The industry was fully mature and there were more than enough players in the 
market to make the competition very intense. The catchment area of one retail outlet 
overlapped with that of another in a lot of locations. In order to sustain growth in profit, 
a retailer had to continuously look for “space”. China happened to be a relatively 
untapped market where modern food retailing started only about six years ago. The 
modem food retailing industry was still in its early developing stage. There were still 
plenty of places where a food retailer could open an outlet with a relatively large 
catchment that should ensure a promising business. Therefore, he believed that China 
was a very “spacious area” for veteran European food retailers such as themselves to 
expand and establish a strong position before other players emerge, even though he was 
aware of the negative factors that existed at the m ~ m e n t ’ ~ .  He further perceived that 
China would become a very important market in the world in the futwe because one- 
fifth of the world’s population resides there. Because of this perception, he considered 
that their company’s position in China would affect their overall position in the world. 
Consequently, China had become one of the strategic locations of Company F. 
The case above brings out an important issue: retailing space, which in turn can be 
discussed in terms of learning and first mover advantages. 
Retailing Space 
Quantitatively, in terms of geographical coverage of the existing food retail outlets in 
China, China is a very ‘spacious’ country in which foreign food retailers can deiTelop. 
These negative factors include inadequate phone networks, railways, electnc power and water supplies 19 
that severely impede a wide range of commercial activities. 
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Table 5.1 shows the number of supermarket and hypermarket in a number of European 
countries and in Shanghai. Only a small number of countries are shown because the 
purpose is to present a rough idea on how much ‘retail space’ China has, in quantitative 
terms, in comparison to some other countries. The table does not aim to measure the 
geographical coverage of the existing grocery retailers in each country in a precise 
manner. In addition, obtaining reliable statistics on store outlets in China is very 
difficult. Therefore, Shanghai, one of the most progressive Chinese cities in terms of 
commercial development, is used as a reference in the comparison. In the table, the 
number of supermarkets per 1 million inhabitants and the number of hypermarkets per 1 
million inhabitants are calculated. These two numbers in Shanghai are apparently lower 
than that in other countries in the table. Consequently, Shanghai appears to be much 
more ’spacious’ than many other countries. Furthermore, as Shanghai is the Chinese city 
in which retail development is the most advanced, other places in China should be even 
more ‘spacious’. 
Qualitatively, China also offers much room for retailers to bring in and modify their 
‘innovation’ and to build up customer awareness and loyalty. This feature makes China 
very attractive to foreign retailers because it is unique to China. As an emerging market, 
there is only a small number of affluent people in China at the moment who have the 
financial means to afford comparatively expensive products and services, and have the 
education and consumption experience that allow them to be aware of and desire foreign 
life styles and foreign retailers. However, it is the dualism of a large group of less well- 
off people alongside this small group of wealthier people that generates opportunities for 
foreign retailers. While foreign retailers are anticipating the full blossoming of the 
market, they are able to sell their goods readily to the affluent segments” (Hill and Still, 
1984 in Nakata and Sivakumar, 1997), accumulate more knowledge on the China market 
and hence adjust themselves to adapt more to the market. 
2o The affluent segments in China are mostly located in the more developed areas such as Beijing and 
Shanghai, and other coastal cities. 
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Table 5.1 PopulationlNumber of Grocery Outlets Ratio of Selected 
Countries in 2000 
Country/ No. of 
City Supermarkets 
* 2  
No. of Population No. of No. of 
H permarkets (million) Supermarkets per Hypermarkets per 
(Approx.) ** 1 million 1 million * Y  
France 
(Germany 1 177871 15441 82 I 216.91 18.81 
Population Population 
6041 1105 59 102.4 18.7 
/Spain I 431 31 306 I 39 I 110.61 7.81 
Hungary 
Shanghai’ 
/UK I 56101 11091 59 1 95.1 1 18.81 
664 24 10 66.4 2.4 
Approx. 1200‘ Approx. 50’ 1 5m 80 3.3 
Sources: 
* IGD. 2001. European Grocery Retailing 2007. Watford: IGD Business Publication. 
** World Bank. 2000. Entering 27*‘ Century: World Development Report 7999/2000. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Moustakerski, P. 2001. GAIN Report: China, Peoples Republic of, Retail Food Sector 
Report 2007. Shanghai: US Agricultural Trade Office. [Online] Available from: URL: 
http: u . ~ ~ ~ ~ . a t o s h a n u , h a i . o r ~  news.htm [Accessed 22”d February 20021. 
China Population Information and Research Centre. 2002. Total Population of China by 
Region Year-End 7998. [Online] Available from: URL: hm:’ wnw.cDirc.orE.cn rerion.htm 




The US Agricultural Trade Office (ATO) Shanghai claims there is no unified official 
government source of retail census data in China and therefore producing reliable statistics 
on store outlets and sales is difficult. The number of supermarket and hypermarket outlets 
shown in this table are approximation estimated by the US AT0 Shanghai Office of a major 
city in China such as Shanghai, Beijing or Guangzhou. 
1 
Store size between 400 and 2500 sq. meter 




The point on accumulating knowledge and adapting is of paramount importance. It is 
found that early entrants in China are confronted with greater operational risks than late 
movers in the start-up phase of international expansion (Luo, 1988). Because of the 
uncertainty regarding the ultimate dimensions of the market, the efforts of rivals to pre- 
empt that market, the specifications of the inputs needed for production and the 
specifications of the products likely to be most successful in the future, nature of product 
design at this stage is unstandardised in order that further improvement could be made 
(Vernon, 1966). This implies that a substantial amount of learning is involved at the 
start-up phase of foreign direct investment of a firm. In the context of foreign food 
retailing in China, the style and formats introduced by the foreign retailers through their 
foreign direct investment is equivalent to the new product in Vernon’s term. Owing to 
the transitional nature of the China market, and that the retailing sector has been closed 
from foreign direct investment until less than a decade ago, there exists high uncertainty 
about the market situation, the techniques of foreign operation, business culture, 
consumers’ taste, government policy and a lot of other environmental constraints. Such 
information and understanding cannot be easily or rapidly acquired. It can only be 
developed through actual experience of foreign operations (Johanson and Vahlne in 
Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). Consequently, the contemporary stage of foreign direct 
investment of food retailers in China is an experimental and learning phase. This point 
on learning is best illustrated by the following remark from the Chief Food Purchasing 
Officer of Company F, 
“(Our foreign direct investment) has got to do with.. .know-how power, because 
whenever you need to grow, you need to learn and the new system of the next 
century will come out of Asia, not from Europe, not from America.. .Whenever 
you build yourself in a new market, you need to learn and will learn something. 
The future markets in which one can build oneself are in Asia. So, retailers from 
Europe and America have to come here and learn from Asia. We are just like 
power plants. We have to go on building and building and learning and learning. 
If we don’t come here to learn at an early stage, the markets will develop in some 
ways we don’t understand and then it will be very difficult for us to invest in 
these newly emerging markets in a later stage.” 
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In general, the longer a foreign firm operates in the host country, the more capability it 
tends to develop (Chang, 1995; Makino and Delios, 1996 in Luo and Peng 1999). As a 
result, the foreign food retailers who are in China now would acquire a significant 
competitive advantage compared to those food retailers who would enter China later”. It 
is this desire of knowledge acquisition that drives the international expansion of most of 
the interviewed foreign food retailers into China. 
5.2.3.2 First Mover Advantage 
On the other hand, emerging markets are generally characterised by goods and services 
of low quality. In such an environment, first movers will be capable of pre-emptively 
occupying the ‘quality space’ and hence achieving sizeable sales, provided their 
products are within the financial and physical reach of consumers. Foreign retailers can 
benefit from this situation especially, because many consumers in developing countries 
automatically associate superior quality with foreign retailers, thus creating a positive 
halo to stimulate trial (Nakata and Sivakumar, 1997). Therefore. pioneers who offer high 
quality products and consistently meet buyer expectations can consolidate loyalty 
(Nakata and Sivakumar, 1997). This situation is also found in China. The opening and 
modernisation of the retailing sector in China was started about seven or eight years ago. 
In contrast to their counterparts in the more developed countries, the consumers in China 
possess less information and purchasing experience. They are still trying to catch up 
with the proliferation of brand names available in the market. It appears to them that 
there is a forever-growing spectrum of foreign goods to choose. They are attempting to 
bridge the ‘experience gap’ in respect of brand names and retailer names. At the same 
time, resembling most consumers in other developing countries, the Chinese consumers 
prefer imported goods or goods with a foreign brand to local goods. Foreign products are 
psychologically considered to be of higher quality and possess better functioning, 
features and style. They are also perceived as a symbol of status and modernity (Mun, 
1988). In the case of fast moving consumer goods, shopping at supermarkets and 
A more detailed discussion on learning and organisational capability as a source of competitive 
advantage will be gven in the chapter on competitive advantages. 
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hypermarkets, especially the foreign-owned ones. becomes a modern trend. The 
comment of the Chief Operating Officer of Company F supported this view, 
“...everybody wants to shop in our stores, regardless of what format we are. 
They know that we are famous internationally and so they want to shop here.. . 7 7  
As a result of the lack of a solid history about consumption. Chinese consumers are 
learning and are susceptible to ideas and influences. This provides foreign food retailers 
a good opportunity to shape the industry in China, to ‘educate’ the Chinese consumers 
and to build up their image among them”. 
When the quantitative and qualitative aspects of retailing space being offered in China 
are considered together, China could be regarded as a country that provides much space 
for foreign food retailers to experiment and learn how to operate without much threat of 
competition. 
5.2.4 (Potential of) Sourcing from China 
Sourcing is an important activity to retail operation because retailing involves offering 
consumers an assortment of products created from a variety of sources. Purchase price is 
one of the several criteria retailers used to evaluate whether or not to buy a product from 
a certain supplier. The retailing industry in many developed countries is undergoing the 
processss of concentration and intense competition simultaneously (Liu and 
McGoldrick, 1995). As a result, retailers have to pursue alternative profit-enhancing 
strategies other than raising retail prices. Sourcing from countries such as China where 
products are offered in much lower prices resulting from substantially lower costs of 
production is one of such strategies (Liu and McGoldrick, 1995). 
According to the Chief Operating Officer of Company F, Company F exported 
substantially from China. At the time of interview, the products they sourced from China 
~~ ~~ 
22 There are certainly first mover disadvantages, such as lack of competent human resources. complicated 
and confusing legal and regulatory infrastructure and immature logistics system. These issues are seen as 
complexities of FDI for retailers and they are discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
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amounted to 800 million Deutsche Mark. Similarly, the General Manager of Good 
Goods Division of Company L said that their home business imported considerably from 
China too. Furthermore, he claimed that setting up their own retail operations in China 
facilitated the search for suitable suppliers in China for their domestic operations. The 
China Development Director of Company A shared a similar opinion, 
“As our operation in China develops, we hope that we would develop some kind 
of relationships with the manufacturers here in China. Our next step then would 
be to source products from them for our domestic operation. This was one issue 
we considered at the time when we contemplated undertaking foreign direct 
investment in China. This is not something that we can achieve in a short time 
but it is the direction we are gradually moving towards. We believe that 
ultimately there should be a very high chance of doing it. Having said that 
though, whether we will really do it depends on the development. For example, 
at the time being, I would imagine that the domestic manufacturers we used to 
deal with, such as Coca Cola Hong Kong, may not accept such behaviour and 
hence would not allow, say Guangzhou Coca-Cola, to ship products to Hong 
Kong. However, whether it is possible will depend on how they develop in the 
future too.” 
These three illustrations do not only reconfirm that China is an important exporter to 
international retailers but also suggest that Drucker’s (1 985 in Dawson, 1993) opinion 
on internationalisation of sourcing could be a renascent tenet for retail 
internationalisation into developing countries in the 1990s and 2000s. On the contrary to 
having a domestic retailer becoming more international by extending its sourcing to new 
countries, Drucker regards Sears, Roebuck’s activity in Mexico as a process in which a 
retailer establishes a branch outlet in a foreign country and stimulates local producers to 
make products of specifications of higher quality by encouraging local sourcing for the 
branch outlet. Dawson (1 993) claims that this type of internationalisation appears to be 
less appropriate for the 1990s than it did for the 1950s because retailers in contemporary 
era have higher possibility of becoming involved in the production process of foreign- 
based manufacturers without having to establish stores in the country. However, the 
cases of Company A, F and L just mentioned reveal that the internationalisation process 
suggested by Drucker in the 1950s is still pertinent to the food retail internationalisation 
in the present case of China, which is an emerging market. Based on the discussion with 
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the three persons in those three companies, China as a low-cost producer is an attractive 
source of products for the international food retailers. Nevertheless, it is still a 
developing country and hence quality varies greatly from manufacturer to manufacturer. 
It involves a considerable amount of searching before a foreign food retailer could 
decide who are the suitable supply candidates. Moreover, there exists a gap between the 
requirement of foreign food retailers and the quality standard of most local 
manufacturers. Time and effort are needed for foreign food retailers to educate the local 
manufacturers to close the gap. It is difficult to achieve from a long distance. Setting up 
foreign operations in China and sourcing locally would help foreign food retailers to 
understand the local manufacturing market and simultaneously simulate local 
manufacturers to produce products of high quality required by the foreign food retailers 
for both their local and international operations. Furthermore, undertaking foreign 
operations in China facilitates the establishment of relationship between foreign food 
retailers and local producers through their close encounters. It has to be noted that the 
sourcing purpose is not the primary motive for foreign food retailers to enter China, as 
mentioned in the empirical work result section, but this rationale is the second most 
important reason expressed by three retailers out of the twelve interviewed in explaining 
why they chose China. 
5.2.4.1 Global Spatial Strategy 
Apart from discussing sourcing from China as a stand-alone issue as in the above, on 
another level, it could also be considered within the global supply network of an 
international food retailer. In an earlier discussion on growth and market power, it is 
concluded that food retailers have to grow to increase their market power. Strategic 
addition of new stores could be one means to achieve growth and it is termed spatial 
strategies by Mercurio (1 984 in Cliquet, 1998). There exist different spatial strategies in 
the retailing literature. Ghosh and McLafferty ( 1987 in Cliquet, 1998) suggest three 
location strategies that lead to growth: 
Increase market coverage by opening new outlets in new market areas with existing 
merchandise; 
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Simultaneous geographical expansion and store diversification with new 
Expand the network of outlets in existing market areas; 
merchandise and outlets in new market areas. 
Davidson et al. (1988 in Cliquet, 1998) also offer a similar location strategy: 
Market expansion by opening new outlets close to existing ones, setting new outlets 
in a new market area that is at some distance from the existing market area, and 
acquisition. 
Cliquet (1998) asserts that ‘spatial strategies’ such as these in the prevailing retail 
literature concern only single store location. He believes that single store location is 
important but an appropriate spatial strategy should also concern the network 
performance of all the outlets of a retailer. Because of intense retail competition, the best 
location of an outlet is one of the most critical criteria of network performance. This 
location criterion deals not only with single store location but also with global network 
location. In other words, the real issue is to develop a strategy that would enable the 
retailer to cover a sufficient territory in order to increase visibility vis-a-vis customers 
and vis-a-vis suppliers. By reinforcing retail networks, a retailer could increase its 
economic power over its customers, the end-users, and its suppliers. 
The belief of the Chief Executive Officer of Company F that their company’s position in 
China would affect their overall position in the world is an illustration of Cliquet’s 
(1998) tenet that each store location should be considered in terms of the retailer’s 
global network. The Chief Operating Officer of this company also commented that, 
“You buy from international companies. They have group prices. You negotiate 
with bigger suppliers [in China] using the European prices. If you are number 
one in each country, you will have bigger power on this.” 
Globalisation in the manufacturing sector has become prominent before that in the 
retailing sector did. As discussed in a previous section, a multinational retailer will 
possess stronger bargaining power over multinational manufacturers if it occupies a 
strong market position in most of the countries that the multinational manufacturers 
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perceive as important geographical source of profit and in which the multinational 
manufacturers are present. In a similar vein, multinational retailers could exploit its 
strong position in the global scale when negotiating with local manufacturers terms of 
supply for their operations both within and outside their host countries. In the case of 
China, a number of multinational manufacturers, such as Procter & Gamble, Coca-Cola 
and Nestle, entered China more than a decade ago. On the other hand, Chinese exports, 
as pointed out earlier, are an attractive source of supply for the operations of 
multinational retailers outside China due to low production cost in China. When these 
two factors combine with their confidence in China’s future economic development, 
China has become one of the important strategic locations among Company F’s spatial 
network if Company F desires to create sufficient global spatial coverage in order to 
increase visibility vis-a-vis manufacturers. 
5.2.5 Brief Conclusion on Reasons for Foreign Food Retailers to Expand 
into China 
According to the above discussion, it is strongly believed that pre-empting competitors 
from obtaining a big market share and exploiting the ‘retailing space’ that exists in 
China at present to learn about the market and experiment their retail formula are two 
very important underlying reasons for international moves of foreign food retailers into 
China in the late 1990s and the early 3000s. These rationales are in turn embedded in 
the confidence of foreign food retailers in the future of China market, based on its 
current economic development. On the other hand, sourcing from China for their 
international operations is another significant factor that some international food 
retailers considered when deciding to undertake foreign direct investment in China. 
Apart from these two rational motives, sentimental attachment to China is also regarded 
as an important reason for a few food retailers for choosing China as their target of 
foreign direct investment. 
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5.3 Internationalisation Process 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the behavioural approach to FDI treats internationalisation 
of a firm as a process in which the enterprise gradually increases its international 
involvement. One main theoretical line using this approach is the Uppsala International 
Model by Johanson and Vahlne (1977). The theory argues that such a process evolves 
in an interplay between the development of knowledge about foreign markets through 
local operations on one hand, and an increasing commitment of resources to foreign 
markets as time goes by on the other. The growth of multinational firms, especially in a 
volatile environment, is perceived as a sequence of investments where each investment 
feeds back information that can be used to improve the quality of subsequent investment 
decisions. It is believed that market knowledge affects decisions regarding commitment 
of resources to foreign markets and the way current foreign direct investment activities 
are to be performed. Simultaneously, current foreign direct investment activities and 
commitment decisions will affect market knowledge and market commitment. 
Consequently, this process forms causal cycles. 
More detailed discussion on the process model, including the importance of market 
knowledge and commitment, is given in section 2.1.2.1. Two patterns of 
internationalisation that associate with the process model are mentioned in Chapter 2. 
One pattern is that a firms’ commitment of resources to foreign markets increases as 
they go along the internationalisation process, which usually starts off with irregular 
exports and ends up with establishing and managing their own manufacturing plants in 
the foreign countries. The other pattern is that firms enter new markets with increasing 
psychic distance. In the context of internationalisation process in the retailing industry, 
the first pattern is not of much relevance because as pointed out in Chapter 2, retail 
services are non-tradable. Therefore, this section is devoted to evaluate the validity of 
the psychic distance thesis in the light of the case study materials obtained from the 
author’s fieldwork. In fact, the present study finds that the concept of psychic distance is 
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ambiguous and the internationalisation process of many retailers do not seem to follow a 
cl ear pattern. 
5.3.7 Psychic Disfance Concepf 
Johanson and Vahlne ( 1977), Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1 975) and Hornell, 
Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul (1973 in O’Grady and Lane, 1995) who carried out 
research on Nordic multinationals, were recognised as the advocates of the concept of 
psychic distance. This concept is the foundation of their internationalisation process 
model. They distinguish two different kinds of information. The first kind is the market 
knowledge that comes from direct experience in the foreign market and an 
understanding of its internal relationships. The second kind is the more objective, 
factual, general market information that is easily transmitted and learned without the 
need for experience in interpretation. The former, instead of the latter, is what firms 
need when establishing international operations. Furthermore, the Swedish researchers 
claim that psychic distance is an important variable in understanding the dynamics of the 
internationalisation process. Johanson and Vahlne (1 977, 1990) argued that firms tend to 
commence the internationalisation process in countries that are psychically close to their 
country of origin before investing in the psychically more distant countries. Their logic 
for this argument is that entering countries that are psychically close reduces the level of 
uncertainty that firms would face in a new market (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990) 
and that such countries are easier for firms to learn about (Kogut and Singh, 1988). 
Definition of Psychic Distance 
Psychic distance can be understood as the degree of uncertainty about operations in 
foreign markets (Whitehead, 1992). Initially, Nordstrom and Vahlne (1992) define 
psychic distance as “factors preventing or disturbing the flow of information between 
potential or actual suppliers and customers”. As further studies on internationalisation 
process using the concept of psychic distance developed, varied definitions of psychic 
distance were derived, depending on the way in which the concept is operationalised. 
According to Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul (1 973 in Nordstrom and Vahlne, 1992), 
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psychic distance was understood and measured by the following variables between the 
domestic and the host countries: level of economic development, level of education, 
business language, culture and local language, and existence of previous trading 
channels. Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul obtained information about those variables of 
the domestic and host countries from publicly available statistics and data from the 
Swedish Export Board. Later studies by Kogut and Singh (1988) and Benito and 
Gripsrud (1992) borrowed Hofstede’s (1980) research and measures of culture to 
quantify the cultural distance between different countries. In other words, they used 
cultural distance as a synonym and proxy for psychic distance. This usage was then 
challenged by Nordstrom and Vahlne (1992). Both agreed that cultural distance and 
psychic distance captured overlapping phenomena, but they point out that the two 
attributes do not embrace the same set of elements. In addition to the cultural dimensions 
as defined by Hofstede, psychic distance is also comprised of structural dimensions 
(such as legal and administrative systems), language differences and other business 
difficulties such as industry structure and the competitive environment (O’Grady and 
Lane, 1995). 
The present study does not argue what psychic distance should be and how different it 
is from cultural distance. Therefore, for the purpose of section 5.3, psychic distance is 
defined in a more general sense and comprises the economic, political, legal, geographic 
and cultural distance as well as language differences. 
5‘3.2 Past Studies Supporting the Internationalisation Process Model 
The destinations of international expansion of retail firms demonstrate many of the 
characteristics expected from the literature on psychic distance. Initial movement into 
geographically or psychologically close countries is widely recognised as a feature of 
the early stage of internationalisation. The study of Treadgold and Davies (1988) found 
high proportion of French investment destined for Spain and Italy, German investment 
for Austria and British investment into Ireland. This dominance of intra-European 
investment reflects a high degree of ‘border-hopping’ activities and hence provides 
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supporting evidence to the argument that initial internationalisation activities take place 
in the geographically or psychologically close countries. Dionosio and Tordjman ( 199 1 
in Dupuis and Prime, 1996) insist on the cultural proximity of the target foreign market. 
Simultaneously, there are also examples from certain studies that conform to the tenet 
that less culturally and psychologically close countries are entered as time has 
progressed and internationalisation experience of a multinational firm has grown. Those 
examples include the moves of the French retailers into South America, the German and 
Austrian moves into Eastern Europe (Burt, 1991), and the moves of Carrefour and 
Safeway into the Far East and Latin America during the second half of the 1980s. 
5.3.3 Evidence in the Literature against the Internationalisation Process 
Model 
Whitehead (1 992) argues that if the psychic distance pattern is to be followed, British 
retailers could be expected to expand into Northern Europe and Southern Ireland, 
Australian retailers into New Zealand 2nd Japanese retailers into Taiwan and Singapore. 
However, he found that historical evidence of British retail expansion suggests a 
different pattern. Instead of entering into their neighbour markets in Europe, they turned 
their attention to North America. Examples include Marks and Spencer and Sainsbury’s. 
Whitehead attributes this deviation from expectation to the fact that either 
internationalisation process is industry-specific, or that the first step of 
internationalisation for British retailers has been ad hoc and opportunistic. 
Similar counter evidence is found in the work of Hedlund and Kverneland (1985 in 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). In their study of Swedish firms in Japan, it is found that the 
development patterns of those firms were inconsistent with those expected on the basis 
of the internationalisation process model. The explanation they claim for such a 
deviance is that there has been a general internationalisation of industries and markets. 
Consequently, the lack of market knowledge no longer affects the pace and patterns of 
internationalisation of firms. 
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Nordstrom (1 990 in Johanson and Vahlne, 1990) went further to argue that the world has 
become more homogeneous and it leads to the fading of psychic distance. Subsequently, 
Britain, Germany and the United States have become common targets for the initial 
foreign entry of many Swedish firms. Other environmental changes also play a part in 
shaping the internationalisation process. Examples of environmental changes that have 
an impact on the internationalisation process include improved information supply, 
more efficient means of information transmission, less fragmented markets, and 
increased emphasis on R&D . 
In addition to the above counter arguments, Millington and Bayliss (1 990) discovered 
from their research that ad hoc international growth usually characterises the early 
internationalisation process of a firm. Ad hoc growth is only superseded by formalised 
planning and systematic search when a firm’s experiential knowledge about foreign 
markets increases. Cavusgil (1 980) proposes two distinct modes of international 
expansion. One is a formal structured planning mode where search for new markets is 
deliberate and planned. The other is a disjointed adaptive mode where foreign 
investment decisions are made on a more random “piecemeal step-by-step basis”. Due to 
these different perspectives towards the internationalisation process, Whitehead (1 992) 
questions whether evidence from the distributive sector supports the process model of 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and whether the nature of the decision making process in 
the internationalisation of retail activity is disjointed or planned. Furthermore, he also 
points out that one weakness of the psychic distance process model does not take 
retrenchment of foreign investment, which happens frequently, into consideration. 
5.3.4 Cultural Distance 
Regardless of whether internationalisation process of retail firms follows a certain 
pattern or not, cultural issues remain as a very important aspect to retail 
internationalisation. This topic is the centre of discussion in a substantial amount of 
marketing and internationalisation literature. The topic/subject is also an important 
element in the concept of psychic distance, although it is not the only element. 
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Nevertheless, the implication of culture for internationalisation is a controversial topic, 
like the process model of internationalisation that was discussed above. 
5.3.4.1 Implication of Culture for Internationalisation basing on the existing 
literature 
A spectrum of opinions exists on the implications of culture for international business. A 
certain school of thought argues that markets are becoming more homogeneous (Levitt, 
1983 in Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997; Nordstrom, 1990 in Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1990). New technology has emerged and this increases the ease of movement of 
people and communication, which in turn facilitates and accelerates globalisation 
(Appadurai, 1990 and Naisbitt, 1995 in Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997). 
Consequently, the differences in cultural preferences. national tastes and standards, and 
business institutes are diminishing. International firms will produce standardised 
products worldwide because that is what everyone demands. In particular, there are few 
cross-cultural differences between white-collar workers, and between groups that consist 
of people with a high level of income and education (Katona, Strumpel, and Zahn, 1973, 
Thorelli, Becker and Engledow, 1977 in Martenson, 1988; Martenson, 1988). Martenson 
(1988) claims that luxury products are the same anywhere in the world. Youth products 
such as jeans and music are highly international too. Low-price, but good-value, 
products also sell well in almost any market in the world. IKEA’s international success 
was largely credited to the fact that their target customers in any market in the world 
were well educated, young” and in the early phase of their life cycle with one or no 
children (Martenson, 1988). Martenson further asserts that less emphasis on family 
tradition and more emphasis on individual experience, together with an increase in the 
number of single people in the society, have led to the rapid dissolution of cross-cultural 
barriers. Therefore, Martenson alleges that cross-cultural differences in values will have 
diminishing significance in the coming future and similarities instead of differences 
across borders will become the determinants for global success. 
Between 18-40 years of age and are less interested in investing heavily in furniture and hence willing to 23 
make the effort to assemble and transport the furniture themselves. 
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Conversely, there is another school of thought that claims that globalisation is forced on 
consumers instead of being induced by them. This results in cultural differences being 
neglected to the detriment of both consumers and international firms. In other words, 
this school of thought recognises the importance of cultural differences to 
internationalisation strategies (e.g. Solomon, 199 1, Featherstone, 1993 and Steenkamp, 
1993 in Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997; Dawson, 1994b). Alexander ( 1990) 
maintains that cultural barriers to retail internationalisation is more profound than 
technical obstacles. Pellegnni (1 992) stresses the impact of cultural determinants of 
buying and consumption behaviour. 
5.3.4.2 Measuring Cultural Proximity 
Regardless of which perspective to take on the issue of cultural distance that exists in the 
international marketplace, one questior, that must be addressed is how to measure cross- 
cultural distance so that firms could formulate their internationalisation strategies 
accordingly. There is no consensus on how cultural closeness should be measured 
(Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1973 in Laulajainen, 199 1 ; Hofstede, 1984; Mole, 
1990). 
Hofstede 's Study 
The most well-known research in culture was conducted by Hofstede (1984). He 
measures national cultures using four dimensions: power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualismkollectivism and femininity/masculinity. Fifty-three countries 
were mapped in order to investigate how their responses and attitudes to management 
and organisation issues varied. In his later study, Hofstede (1991) furnished his 
framework with one more dimension, named long-term orientation versus short-term 
orientation, so that more meaningful distinctions between Eastern and Western culture 
could be attained. 
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Usunier ’s and Kasper and BIoemer ’s Studies 
In 1993, Usunier employed Hofstede’s data and designed a refined hypothetical map of 
cultural proximity zones for Western Euorpe (Figure 5.1). These zones are based on an 
underlying geographic picture and correspond to national cultural groups to a large 
extent. Kasper and Bloemer (1995) also made use of Hofstede’s first four cultural 
dimensions to analyse data of seventeen European countries by correspondence analysis. 
A perceptual map of the position of each country relative to the positions of the other 
sixteen countries and the four dimensions simultaneously was derived (Figure 5.2). 
From their perceptual map, three clusters of European cultures are found. The first 
cluster is the Anglo-German cluster that consists of Ireland, Britain, Austria, 
Switzerland, Germany and Italy. The second one is the Dutch-Scandinavian cluster 
comprising the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The third cluster 
is the Roman-Southern European cluster that includes Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, 
Portugal and the former Yugoslavia. 
The major difference between Usunier’s clustering system and Kasper and Bloemer’s 
perceptual map is the position of some overlap countries, such as the Netherlands and 
Germany. and the relative positions of neighbouring countries such as the Netherlands 
and Belgium (Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997). 
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Figure 5.1 Usunier’s culture zones of Europe 
(Taken from Helfferich, E., M. Hinfelaar and H. Kasper. 1997. “Towards a Clear Terminology on 
lnternational Retailing”. lnternational Review of Retailing Distribution and Consumer Research. 
7:  287-307.) 
Figure 5.2 Kasper’s clusters of European country cultures 
(Taken from Helfferich, E., M. Hinfelaar and H .  Kasper. 1997. “Towards a Clear Terminology on 
International Retailing”. lnternational Review of Retailing Distribution and Consumer Research. 
7: 287-307.) 
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Gatley arid Lessen ’s Stu& 
Conversely, by drawing on the work of Hofstede (1980, 1991 ), Trompenaars (1993), 
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars ( 1  993) and Lessem and Neubauer (1993), Gatley 
and Lessen (1995) developed a cultural audit system in which there were sixteen cultural 
variables: time, emotional. hierarchical, relationships. status, profit, systems, ambiguity, 
rule, control, gender and group”. According to their analysis, all the countries in the 
world could be L- grouped into four quadrants: the Northern quadrant (Northern Europe), 
the Eastern quadrant (Asia), the Southern quadrant (Southern Europe) and the Western 
quadrant (the United States). Within these four quadrants, the cultural distance between 
the Northern and the Western quadrants and between the Eastern and Southern 
quadrants are short. This four-quadrant model claims to serve as a useful and practical 
means for enhancing the awareness and trans-cultural management skills of management 
personnel, and to act as a tool that helps define cultural issues relevant to the national 
and trans-national business acti\rities of multinational companies. 
5.3.4.3 Validity of the above Cultural Clustering Models 
There is evidence suggesting that the cultural zones established by Usunier (1  993) and 
Kasper and Bloemer (1995) could be of relevance to a certain degree to retailers’ 
choices on foreign markets and formulation of marketing strategy. For example. a few 
years after the Dutch retailer Ahold had established its drugstore Etos in Begium. 
differences in consumer expectations and buying behaviour were found to be so great 
that Ahold had to withdraw from the market. Koninklijke Bijenkorf Beheer also had to 
make a drastic change to the format of their Dutch variety store, Hema. However, a lot 
of other Dutch-based formats, such as Halfords, Blokker and Free Record Shop, are 
successful in Belgium (Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper. 1997). This mixed experience 
of the border-hopping activities of Dutch retailers is consistent with the discrepancy in 
the interpretation by Usunier and Kasper and Bloemer of the Hofstede data regarding the 
relative positions of Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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Nevertheless. Hotstede‘s Data and the cultural cluster systems deri\.ed from them by 
Usunier and Kasper and Bloemer have limitations (Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper. 
1997). They are based on national boundaries. which become artificial when the 
question is about cultural proximity. This point is made valid by the recent 
developments in Eastern Europe. The cultural clusters Of Usunier and Kasper and 
Bloemer cover only the seventeen European countries investigated by Hofstede. There 
are another thirty-six in Europe that are yet to be analysed. 
Despite the above limitation to the cultural cluster models, they will nonetheless be the 
starting analysis point for the information regarding internationalisation process obtained 
from the present case studies. The reason for this i s  because they are the more 
recognised models in the field of cultural studies asainst the background discipline of 
int erna t i onal business. 
5.3.5 Analysis of  the lnternafionalisation Processes o f  the Retailers in the 
Present Research25 Basing on the Above Models of Measuring Cultural 
Proximity 
5.3.5.1 European Retailers 
According to their sequence of first entry into different countries, different patterns are 
found. Metro’s internationalisation process follows closest to the pattern suggested by 
the process model. It went into Austria and France, which is. according to Usunier’s 
model, located in the same cultural zone as the one Germany is located, when it first 
went across the German border. Afterwards, it approached Denmark which is located in 
the adjacent cultural zone. The next country they went into was Italy, which is located in 
another adjacent cultural zone to the one in which Germany is located. In 1994, it went 
further to Central Europe and then to China in 1996 (Table 5.2). 
For details of their cultural audit system, please refer to their article. 
> i  
-- The information about the history of internationalisation of the retailers mentioned in this section is 
obtained from their Annual Reports of various years. 
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Table 5.2 Internationalisation History of Metro 
1990 
1 
]Metro C&C GmbH (I) I 
Turkey 
IYear of First Entrv kountrv i 
1996 
I I 1964lGermanv 1 
China 
! 1971 IAustria I 
I 1971 1 France I 
~ 1971 denm mark i 
I 19721 ltalv I 
Note 1 : As internationalisation history is the subject of analysis, Metro is considered separately 
from SHV Makro in this particular section, despite the merger of Makro NV Cash and Carry and 
Metro Holding AG (CH) in 1998. 
On the other hand, the internationalisation history of Continent and Makro shows that 
the countries they mrent into before a certain year are also located in the same or adjacent 
cultural zone to that in which their countries of origin are located. Nevertheless, the 
footsteps of those two retailers after that certain year appear to be less consistent with 
the cultural proxinity tenet. For example, all the countries that Continent entered before 
1995 were located in the same cultural zone as the one in which France is located. 
Howe\rer, the countries it went into after 1995 were scattered in various cultural zones 
(Table 5.3). A similar phenomenon is also observed with Makro. All the countries 
Makro entered before 1972 were located in the same cultural zone as the one in which 
the Netherlands is located. In 1972, it entered Spain, which is located in the next cultural 
zone. After 1989, however, it approached countries located in various parts of the world, 
including Asia, Central Europe, Latin America and southern Europe (Table 5.4). These 
regions, according to Gatley and Lessen's model, are very different in terms of culture. 
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Table 5.3 Internationalisation History of Continent 
t 1970 France 
1 1987 
I 1 99 1 
1995 
I around 1995 
around 1995 
! around 1995 









I around 19951Dubai 
around 1995jArgentina 
Note 2: As internationalisation history is the subject of analysis, Continent is considered 
separately from Carrefour in this particular section, despite the merger between Carrefour and 
Promodes (the retailer that Continent belongs to) in 1999. 
*acq = acquisition 
wd = withdrew 
The internationalisation track of Ahold and Carrefour shows the least conformation to 
the cultural proximity tenet among all of the European retailers being studied. Ahold N. 
V. was founded in 1973 in the Netherlands (Table 5.5). When it first went abroad in 
1979, it chose the US, which remained an important market for Ahold for the next one 
and a half decades. It has to be noted though that Ahold's involvement in the US market 
is entirely in the form of acquisition. The second main overseas market that Ahold went 
into was Czechoslovakia, a Central and Eastern European country. Ahold saw the fall of 
communism in Central Europe in 1990 and decided to seize the opportunity and enter 
this market. Then, its internationalisation effort was directed towards Asia and Latin 
America albeit investment was also made in some European countries simultaneously. 
The path of international development of Carrefour was even more divergent. It initially 
went into Spain, a Southern European country, ten years after it was founded in France 
(Table 5.6). Two years later, it involved itself in Brazil in Latin America. That was 
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followed by entry into Argentina. another Latin American country. In 1989, it began 
investing in Asia and started by breaking into Taiwan. The sequence that followed was 
Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe. Asia, Europe 
(Belgium), Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and then Latin America. 
From the sequence, it could be seen that Carrefour had entered countries with greater 
cutlural distance (basing on Usunier’s, Kasper and Bloemer‘s and Gatley and Lessen‘s 
models) before entering countries with closer cultural distance. Furthermore. Carrefour’s 
internationalisation history does not appear to indicate any sequential path that has a 
relationship with cultural distance. 
I 1970 
1971 
Table 5.4 Internationalisation History of Makro 
Belgium 
UK 

























I 972 j S ~ a i n  I 
Note 3: As internationalisation history is the subject of analysis, Metro is considered separately 
from SHV Makro in this particular section, despite the merger of Makro NV Cash and Carry and 
Metro Holding AG (CH) in 1998. 
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Table 5.5 Internationalisation History of Ahold N.V. 
1 
Ahold I 
Year of 1st Entry !Country 
1887/established first retail store 
19551 1 st supermarket in Rotterdam 
19731Ahold N.V. founded I 




1 988 1 US (acq) 
1990 Fa l l  of Communism in CE, Cezchoslovakia 
1991 US (acq) 
1992 Portugal (jv) 
1994 US (acq) 








*acq = acquisition 
jv =joint venture 




5.3.5.2 American Retailer 
Wal-Mart was founded in 1962 by an American businessman called Sam Walmart in the 
US (Table 5.7). Its business domain remained within the US for almost three decades 
before it ventured abroad in 1991 by entering Mexico, a country located in Latin 
America. Three years later, it opened stores in Canada. In subsequent years, Wal-Mart 
expanded into China, Germany and the UK. A description of the cultural distance 
between the US and the countries in Latin America was not included in Usunier’s, 
Kasper and Bloemer’s and Gatley and Lessen’s models. However, Latin America was an 
1996 Malaysia (jv) 
1996 China (SH, Zhongbui Supermarket Co. Ltd) Cjv) 
1996 Brazil (jv) 
1996 Spain (jv) 
1996 Poland (jv) 
1997 China (SH, Tops) (wd. In 1999) 
1998 Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay (acq) 
1 1996 Indonesia (jv) - 
emerging region 
closer to the US 
does not show 
in the early 1990s. Furthermore, Canada is perceived to be culturally 
than Latin American countries. In other words, the case of Wal-Mart 
full support to the cultural proximity tenet. However, there is an 
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important observation in this case. First. Wal-Mart is the world’s biggest retailer. 
However, it became an international retailer much later than its counterparts in Europe . 
Secondly, Wal-Mart commenced the internationalisation process urith countries located 
close to the US and its international moves into countries further away appear to be very 
‘cautious’ in Treadgold’s (1 988) terms. 
i 1989’Taiwan 
1991 Greece 
1991 Portugal 1 








Year of F i r s t  Entry /Country 
19631 France 
I 
I L 1996’China 
1996 Thailand 
1995 Korea I 
19971Poland 





















I 2001 ISlovakia I 
Note 4: A s  internationalisation history is the subject of analysis, Continent i s  considered 
separately from Carrefour in this  particular section, despite the merger between Carrefour and 
Promodes (the retailer that Continent belongs to) in 1999. 
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Table 5.7 Internationalisation History of Wal-Mart 
Wal-Mart 






- _ _  - 





1 s t  supercentre 
1 s t  international--Mexico City 









Brazi l  
*acq = acquisition 
Jusco 
Year of 1 s t  Entrv 








is noticed that the internationalisation activities of the two Japanese retailers, Jusco and 
Guangdong Jusco in China I 
Qingdao Dongtai Jusco in China 
Shanghai Jusco in China I 
j 
I 
Seiyu. and a Thai retailer, Lotus, were confined within Asia. Furthermore. Jusco stayed 
within Japan until the 1980s (Table 5.8) whereas Seiyu only ventured internationally in 
1990 (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.8 Internationalisation History of Jusco 
I 19701 Jusco was established I 
I 1981  \tie with safewav in US I 
I 
19841 Malavsia Jusco I 
i 1985/Hona Kona I 
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Table 5.9 Internationalisation History of Seiyu 













Seiyu Store, Ltd. was established 
Hong Kong i 
Singapore 
Indonesia 
China BJ 4 , 
Thailand BK 




The second pattern found is that RT-Mart, a Taiwanese retailer, and Park'n Shop. a 
Hong Kong retailer. had operations in their respective domestic countries and Mainland 
China only. RT-Mart (Table 5.10) was founded in September 1996. About half a year 
later, it decided to undertake foreign direct inyestment in China. The first store in China 
was opened in July 1998. Its corporaLe mission is to grow rapidly in Taiwan and China 
and it anticipates opening more than 100 outlets in China within ten years of entering the 
market. In the long run, the company also has a strong desire of developing itself into a 
leading global retailer that would be comparable to those with a European and American 
origin. On the other hand, Park'n Shop (Table 5.1 1) is deeply rooted in Mainland China. 
as mentioned earlier . These two cases demonstrate that the process of engaging in 
internationalisation activities could be highly linked to sentimental attachment of the 
decision-maker or of the company history. Sentimental attachment, at the same time, 
includes the element of cultural proximity. It is logical to argue that when a retailer 
considers growing overseas, the decision-maker would choose countries from which he 
comes or with which the company was highly associated in the past. It is because those 
countries are the countries in which the company possess a relatively high degree of 
market knowledge in terms of business practice, business culture, buyng culture, food 
culture, lifestyle and the local language. Therefore, the decision-maker believes there is 
a lower risk in internationalising into those countries. This argument is not well 
documented in existing literature, because sentimental attachment is always regarded as 
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an irrational reason. However, the two cases here demonstrate that this irrational reason, 
sentimental attachment, should not be ignored in the context of retail 
internationalisation, even though these two cases could be special instances. 
Year of 1st Entry 
SeDt. 1996 
Country 
Founded in Taiwan 
Year of 1st Entry Country 
1828 AS Watson in Guangzhou 
1841 AS Watson in Hong Kong 
1973 Hutchison Properties Ltd acquired Park’n Shop 
1977 HWL formed 
1984 Park’n Shop in China 
t 





Table 5.1 1 Internationalisation History of  Hutchison Whampoa Limited, the 
Parent Company of Park’n Shop 
acquired Canada’s Husky Oil 
Telecom in UK and Australia 
Park’n Shop opens Asia 1 st multi-temp fresh food distribution centre 
AS ~ ~ Watson ~ ~ - form ~ ~ joint venture with Thai Central Department Store 
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 
The international moves of Dairy Farm, a Hong Kong retailer, offered the third pattern. 
The acquisition of the Wellcome grocery chain by Dairy Farm in 1964 in Hong Kong 
marked the beginning of its serious engagement in the grocery retailing business. Dairy 
Farm’s interest went international in 1979 (Table 5.12) when it acquired the supermarket 
chain No Frills in Australia. Since then, it has made many international moves. The 
foreign direct investment activities of Dairy Farm were focused in Asia while its 
internationalisation activities in the form of acquisition were focused in Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand were. In its 1998 Group Profile, Dairy Farm announced that 
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they had decided to concentrate on the Asia-Pacifjc region and would dispose of all of 
1964 Wellcome chain stores formed in HK 
1979 Acquired No Frills in Australia 
its non-Asia-Pacific businesses. It also declared having the vision of becoming the 
leading food and drugstore retailer in the region. This case shows that the 
internationalisation process of Dairy Farm was inclined to have a more ad hoc basis 
before 1998 and after that year, it has become more focused in the Asian-Pacific region. 
the cultural quadrant in which Hong Kong is also located, according to Gatley and 
Lessens’ model. 
1 1987 
Table 5.1 2 Internationalisation History of Dairy Farm, the Parent Company 
of Wellcome 
UK (acquired Kwik Save) (sold in Mar 98) 
IDairv Farm 









China (7-1 I )  
Singapore 
Malaysia 
Indonesia (technical assistant agreement) 
India (Technical assis?ant agreement) 
Japan (joint venture with Seiyu) (discontinued in Feb 98) 
I 
China (Wellcome) (joint venture) -__i 
In addition to these three patterns, it is also interesting to note that Lotus and Park‘n 
Shop belong to the bigger conglomerates of CP Group and Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
respectively. These 
example, CP Group 
Taiwan, Indonesia, 
Germany and Turkey), 
Limited has also built 
two conglomerates possess extensive international networks. For 
has an established network in Asia (including Thailand, Malaysia, 
Cambodia, India and Vietnam), Europe (including Belgium, 
the USA, Africa and the Middle East”. Hutchison Wrhampoa 
its network in the UK, Australia and Canada (Table 5.11). 
Logically, the two retailers should perceive less psychological distance and encounter 
16 Information Obtained from CP Group‘s websites. 
less difficulty in establishing foreign operations in countries with which their parents 
have networked, because their parents should possess certain amount of market 
knowledge of those countries. However. they have not taken this advantage and remain 
active in a very limited geographical region. This observation suggests that there must 
exist many factors other than cultural proximity that affect the internationalisation 
process of a retailer. In the case of conglomerates, one of these factors is the core 
business direction and strategy of the group. 
5.3.6 lmplica tions 
The empirical studies of the present research discussed above show that some food 
retailers progressively entered countries with increasing cultural distance in their 
internationalisation process. Simultaneously, there is also a significant proportion of the 
food retailers being studied that did not follow that pattern. In other words. the findings 
are inconclusive. Therefore, it is inappropriate to argue either for or against the validity 
of the cultural proximity thesis. Xevertheless, some insights could be drawn from the 
present case study analysis. 
First, one explanation for the divergence from the cultural proximity thesis could be that 
the internationalisation process of food retailers is not always planned. It could be more 
situational. Food retailers need to kzep growing in order to sunivel-. The political and 
economic development of different markets in the world keeps changing and it i s  
exogenous to any retailer. Timing of an international move is important. First mover has 
advantages such as pre-empting competitor's move, building brand loyalty, obtaining 
market information and experience, and establishing channel relationships. It is an 
important factor that induces food retail firms to seize the opportunities to expand and 
grow overseas whenever those opportunities arise? As mentioned above, Ahold 
explicitly expressed that the fall of communism in central Europe in 1990 opened up the 
opportunity for them to tap these potentially profitable markets. It entered 
)7 - This point is discussed in section 5.1. 
28 This point is discussed in section 5.2.3.2 
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Czechoslovakia in the same year even though they did not possess much experience in 
other European markets at that time. Dairy Farm's internationalisation process also 
appears to be more ad hoc as discussed earlier too. Their moves could be explained by 
the importance of other factors such as economic and political development, industry 
infrastructure and intensity of competition in the foreign markets that outweigh the 
importance of cultural proximity in some food retailers' decision-making process. 
Furthermore, food culture varies across space (Dawson, 1994b). Many inteniewees 
expressed that they performed thorough market research on what the consumers want 
before they started their business in any market. Some of the food retailers interviewed 
further stated that they were always aware of the differences between different markets. 
This awareness does not only apply to markets in different countries but also to markets 
in different regions within one country. It is plausible to argue that this recognition of 
differences in food culture in the food retailing industry diminishes the importance of 
cultural proximity in the internationalisation process of food retailers. 
Secondly. it is believed that some retail formula could be transferred across countries 
regardless of their cultural distance. IKEA encountered no problem in transferring its 
standardised formula across borders in Europe. This proved that a standardised retail 
formula could work across various cultural clusters. Within the food retail industry. one 
obvious element that retailers transfer across borders is their retail concepts and format. 
As far as China is concerned, formats such as hypermarkets and cash and carrys appear 
to be performing well. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to suggest that food retail 
formats are universally transferable. It has been witnessed that IKEA began to 
experience problems when it crossed the Atlantic Ocean (The Economist, 1994 in 
Helfferich, Hinfelaar and Kasper, 1997). Neither the psychic distance concept nor any of 
the three cultural cluster models mentioned above could explain this phenomenon. 
Therefore, more research has to be conducted in order to arrive at a more conclusive 
understanding on how cultural distance affects the success of transfer of retail formula. 
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Thirdly, O’Grady and Lane (1995) claim that entering countries with close 
psychological distance during the initial stage of internationalisation does not 
necessarily give rise to successful performance in the foreign countries. Their claim is 
supported by their empirical study with thirty-two Canadian retail companies who have 
operations in the United States. They found that only seven out of their thirty-two 
subjects were functioning successfully in the United States. This is due to the 
assumption of similarity between Canada and the United States that prevents executives 
from learning about critical differences. Moreover, the 27 1 CEOs they interviewed 
confirm that there are greater cultural differences between the two countries than what is 
assumed. A similar finding is also documented in Simpson and Thorpe’s (1997) study. 
They conducted a case study of an American specialty store operating in Britain. The 
manager interviewed stressed that the difference between the English culture and the 
American culture are more significant than what is assumed when it comes to a foreign 
retail operation. The results of these studies also undermine the importance of cultural 
proximity in the decision-making process of what countries to enter. Furthermore. they 
suggest that cultural differences, instead of cultural proximity, should be the critical 
consideration in the formulation of food retailers’ internationalisation strategies. 
The studies of O’Grady and Lane (1995) and Simpson and Thorpe (1997) also 
demonstrated that there is a gap between the perception of decision-makers on cultural 
distance between two markets and the actual cultural distance. In addition, the actual 
cultural distance is always found to be greater than anticipated at the beginning. This is 
another shortcoming of the cultural studies against the background discipline of 
international business. 
5.3.7 Brief Conclusion on the Process Model of Retail Internationalisation 
Literature on the concept of psychic distance and cultural proximity is reviewed in this 
section. Empirical results on internationalisation process of food retailers are analysed. It 
has been shown that the internationalisation process of only some of the food retailers 
studied follows a certain pattern Other food retailers appear to be relatively unplanned 
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and on a more ad hoc basis. Similarly, cultural proximity is found to be less critical in 
the internationalisation process of food retailers. However, it does not imply that culture 
is not significant to retail internationalisation. Food and consumer culture is very 
sensitive to geographical space. Cultural difference must be given a considerable amount 
of attention in the formulation of food retailers' operational strategies in a different 
market. 
Simultaneously, it is believed that factors other than cultural proximity could provide a 
more plausible explanation to the sequential mo\-es of some food retailers into countries 
in different parts of the cvorld. Those factors include the economic and political 
de\.elopment, industry infrastructure and stage of industry dek7elopment in a foreign 
market. As mentioned at the beginning of this section. some scholars call these factors 
structural dimension and business dif5culty and they are treated as elements of psychic 
distance. According to the definition of psychic distance in this section, the findings of 
the present research still support the concept of psychic distance. Xe\ ertheless, caution 
must be made when using the term psychic distance in the discussion of ietail 
internationalisation because different elements in this concept carry different weights in 
the internationalisation process. 
Williams ( 1992a, 1992'0) claims that in order to ink-estigate the internationalisation 
behaviour of retailers and to avoid confusion, the psychological distance, which is the 
proximity-similarity perceived by the decision makers between the domestic market and 
target foreign markets, instead of the actual cultural distance based on the cultural 
cluster models, or the term psychic distance, should be considered. Dupuis and Prime 
(1996) extend his idea and propose in their study on internationalisation of a retail 
format that there are four elements in the psychological distance consideration. The four 
elements are: 
the consumer (location, equipment, shopping habits); 
the retail store: concept and retailing mix (core business, assortment, localisation. 
price, communication, human resources management); 
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the channel mix: relationship management with both internal channels (retail store, 
staff. central purchasing) and external channels (suppliers. wholesalers. and other 
partners ) : 
the environment: public opinion, and the economic, political. legal, competitive and 
technological environment). 
These elements are of high relevance to the present study and are discussed in the 
appropriate chapters presented later in this thesis. 
137 
Chapter 6 Market Entry 
6.1 Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure 
6.1 .I Stipulated Regulations 
6.1 .I .I The 1992 Promulgation 
6.1 .I .2 The Emergency Decree 1997 
6.1.1.3 The Experimental Measures on Commercial 
6.1 .I .4 Future Development alongside China’s Entry 
Foreign-invested Enterprises announced in 1999 
into WTO 
6.1.2 Problems with the Existing Legal and Regulatory 
Infrastructure 
6.1 2.1 Further Details of the Interview Results 
6.1 2.2 Inconsistency in Policy and Immature Legal 
6.1 2 .3  Tight Control on Foreign Retail Activities 
6. I 2.4  Discriminatory Practices towards Foreign 
System 
Operators 
6.1.3 Prospective Legal and Regulatory Development 
6.2 Market Entry Mode: Foreign Direct Investment/Joint Venture 
6.2.1 Research Results 
6.2.2 Two Types of Joint Venture in China 
6.2.2.1 Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
6.2.2.2 Sino-Foreign Cooperative (Contractual) 
6.2.2.3 Type of Joint Venture Adopted by the 
6.2.3 Partner Selection and Contribution of Each Partner 
6.2.3.1 Nature of the Chinese Partners of the 
Interviewed Foreign Retailers 
6.2.3.2 Significance of Guanxi 
6.2.4 Equity Ownership of Foreign Partners 
6.2.4.1 Research Results 
6.2.4.2 Discussion 
6.2.4.3 Control 
6.2.4.4 Theoretical Implications 
6.2.4.5 Prerequisites for Negotiating Dominant Control 
6.2.5.1 Research Results 
6.2.5.2 Dominant Parent Management 
6.2.5.3 Relationships Between Foreign and 
Joint Ventures 
Companies Interviewed 

































6.3 Site Selection 
6.3.1 Comparison of Retail Environment of Different 
Major Cities in China 
6.3.1 .I Economic Landscape: An Overview 
6.3.1.2 Landscape of Retail Industry: An Overview 
6.3.1.3 Political Conditions: An Overview 
6.3.1.4 Summary: Overall Environment for 
Foreign Direct Investment in Retailing 
6.3.1.5 Factors Affecting the Selection of City 
6.3.2 Criteria for Choosing a Store Site 
6.3.3 Availability of Suitable Sites 
6.3.4 Store Development (Legal Procedures and 
Technical Issues) 
6.3.4.1 An Overview on Land System in China 
6.3.4.2 Obtaining Land Use Rights 
6.3.4.3 The Approval Procedure for Site 
6.3.4.4 The Construction Market 
6.3.4.5 Construction 
6.3.4.6 Construction Cost 
6.3.4.7 Design 
Development and Construction Project 
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and Chinese Government at Different Levels and its Importance 221 
Chapter 6 
Market Entry 
Since the Communist Party seized power and formed the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, China’s retail and distribution system had remained under-developed for more 
than four decades. This was because the retail and distribution sector was largely 
neglected under the communist regime. Commodities were mainly allocated on a ration 
basis. Consumers were deprived of Western shopping experience. 1979 saw the 
implementation of the ‘open-door’ economic policy in China but the retail and 
distribution sector remained immune to foreign investment for another twehe years. In 
July 1992. the State Council promulgated the Foreign Investment in Retailing 
Provisions. The Provisions proyides for foreign investment in retail businesses, u.hich 
was allowed in several locations in the country. Since then a number of multinational 
retailers have entered the market and they have induced profound changes and 
advancement in the retail and distribution sector. Nevertheless, this sector has remained 
highly regulated until recently. After making a number of concessions to the Western 
world, China became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 
2001. Being a member of the World Trade Organisation requires China to gradually 
relax its policies regarding foreign trade and foreign direct investment. One aspect of 
such liberalisation is that the current regulation on foreign direct investment in the retail 
and distribution sector will have to gradually disappear within the next three to four 
years. 
This chapter examines the market entry mechanism of foreign investment in the retail 
and distribution sector in China. The first section in this chapter reviews the relevant 
stipulated regulations and investigates the problems with the existing legal and 
regulatory infrastructure. The next section provides an evaluation of the modes of entry 
that are allowed to foreign retailers. Issues regarding partner selection are also included 
in the discussion. The third section scrutinises the site selection and store development 
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processes of foreign food retailers in China. The last section examines the relationship 
between foreign food retailers and the Chinese government at different levels. The 
cultural issues that affect foreign business practitioners and the attitude of the Chinese 
government towards foreign direct investment in the future is also considered in this 
final section. 
6.7 Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure 
6.1.7 Stipulated Regulations' 
6.7. 1. 1 The 1992 Promulgation 
The Chinese goyernment opened its door to foreign investors in retailing in July 1992. 
Nevertheless, foreign investors were only allowed to invest in retail joint-venture 
operations in six cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianj in. Tsingtao. Guangzhou and Dalian: 
and the five Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Shenzhen. Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and 
Hainan. A maximum of only two large-scale joint venture stores were permitted in each 
location. The six major restrictive provisions governing foreign retail activities in China 
proclaimed in 1992 were as follows (Appendix 6.4): 
Foreign enterprises may take the form of equity joint venture or co-operative joint 
ventures with the majority shareholder being the Chinese partner. U%olly foreign- 
owned enterprises will not be permitted. 
The detailed proposal of the applying foreign enterprise shall be submitted by the 
regional governments to the State Council for approval. The qualifications of the 
parties to the joint venture shall be examined and approved by the newly formed 
Ministry of Internal Trade. 
The business scope of the foreign enterprise is restricted to the retailing of general 
merchandise and the commercial business of import and export. Engaging in 
wholesale business or acting as an import and export agency for another company is 
not permitted. 
For regulations governing foreign investment in China in general, please see Appendices 6.1. 6.2 and i 
6.3. 
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General merchandise is the only kind of commodity that enterprises can import. The 
amount of such imported merchandise throughout the year must not exceed 30% of 
the turnover of the year. For importation of domestic electrical appliances. 
cosmetics, cigarettes, wine and beverages. approval formalities shall be completed in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the State. 
Tax treatment shall be implemented in accordance with the State's policy that 
applies to the places where the foreign enterprise carries on the retail business. 
Income tax' will normally be at 33% with no tax-free period, as retailing will not be 
regarded as a production enterprise. 
Foreign enterprises shall have autonomy to purchase commodities for sale and fix 
their selling prices unless the state or local administrators of commodity prices 
stipulate otherwise. 
The above regulations were formulated by the Chinese Central Government. However, 
these regulations were not strictly followed by local authorities. Many shopping malls in 
a lot of cities in China did not perform satisfactorily. Furthermore, most Chinese 
businesses were capital deficient and therefore finding a Chinese partner who could 
afford to fund the majority stake is difficult. As a solution to these problems, many local 
authorities creatively bent the Beijing rules and brought in a lot of foreign retailers 
without closely following the instructions from the Central Government (Virtual China 
Inc.. 1999). They hoped that the introduction of experienced foreign retailers who 
possess management know-how and capital into their districts would boost economic 
activities, improve their local competitiveness and create employment opportunities. 
More than 200 sino-foreign retail joint ventures have entered the Chinese retail market 
through provincial and municipal governments during the period between 1992 and the 
end of 1999 (China World Trade Corporation', 2000). In contrast to this number, there 
' Income tax in the Western world is a tax on an individual's personal income. The term 'income tax' in 
the context of China has a different meaning and is equivalent to 'profit tax' in the Western concept. This 
difference is a concomitant of the communist regme. 
China World Trade Corporation is the name of a website documenting a lot of materials about China's 
entry into the WTO. For the URL, please refer to the bibliography. 
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were only 20 Sino-foreign retail joint ventures that were approved by the State Council 
in the same period. According to Zheng (1998), those 'illegal' joint ventures were 
operated in one of the following disguised forms: 
Register as a Chinese company using L- the identity of the Chinese partner but the 
company is actually run by the foreign partner. 
The foreign partner first registers as a Hong Kong or Taiwanese company and uses 
this identity to form co-operative retail joint ventures with a Chinese partner'. 
The foreign partner registers as a management consultant for a particular Chinese 
retail company but the retail company is practically run by the foreign partner. Sogo, 
a Japanese retailer. is an example of those foreign retailers who entered the Chinese 
market in this way5. 
6.7 , l .  2 The Emergency Decree 7 997 
The Central Government slowly realised that the situation of illegal sino-foreign retail 
joint venture activities had become unmanageable. In order to maintain the consistency 
of the Foreign Investrzzent in Retailing Policv and the control of the local governments. 
the State Council, which is the highest organ of the Chinese government. issued an 
emergency decree in May 1997. This decree ordered all local authorities to stop 
approving projects involving foreign retailers without consulting the State Council. 
Moreover, foreign invested ventures were requested to hand in their licences for 
inspection on whether or not they had complied with the provisions set out in 1992, 
especially the rule on Chinese majority shareholder status. In August 1997, the Ministry 
of Foreign and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC) published the Notice of Information 
on Clearing and Rect$t)ing Non-Experimental Foreign Investment Conzmercial 
Enterprises by the Office of the State Council. This notice stated clearly that the licence 
of any retail joint venture without majority Chinese ownership would be revoked 
Companies with such identities could enter the China market more easily because there are special laws 
and regulations governing foreign direct investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan companies. This 
furnishes such companies with more freedom and flexibility (Appendices 6.5 and 6.6). 
' This piece of information was obtained from an informal interview k i t h  a foreign retail practitioner in 
China who wished to remain anonymous. 
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regardless of whether a license had already been issued or not. Nevertheless. a 
commercial representative in the Commercial Section of the British Embassy in Beijing 
pointed out that up to August 1999, none of the illegal v retail joint ventures had received 
notification that their licences had to be revoked, although many such retailers virere 
attempting seriously to formulate a solution to this order". 
6.7. 7 .  3 The Experimental Measures on Commercial Foreign-invested 
Enterprises announced in 7999 
Two years after this notification was issued, MOFTEC and the State Economic & Trade 
Commis si on ( S ETC ) announced the Expel- im en t u 1 Meus Lues On Coin nz el-ciu 1 Fo rcigrz - 
im,estetl Enterprises (Appendix 6.7), which vi-as approved by the State Council, on 25ith 
June 1999. The fundamental principles governing foreign retail activities \\'ere similar to 
those laid down in the provisions made in 1992, except that they signify the further 
opening of the retail and distribution market to foreign players. There are three major 
changes. 
Firstly, the Measures abolished the prohibition on foreign investment in the distribution 
sector. However, the Chinese side of any sino-foreign wholesale joint venture must hold 
at least 5 1% share. 
Secondly, Sino-foreign retail and distribution joint ventures can now be set up in the 11  
locations permitted in the 1992 provisions, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, all 
special economic zones, and all provincial or autonomous region capitals. 
Thirdly, the onerous approval process of the establishment of Sino-foreign commercial 
joint ventures is substantially simplified by the Measures. The consent from the State 
Council is no longer required for every application, although its involvement is still 
necessary in certain circumstances (such as deciding on a majority foreign stake, or on 
the application of an already established joint venture who wishes to extend into the 
Information obtained from the author's field work (interview) 
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retail and/or distribution market). Instead, MOFTEC and SETC are now held responsible 
for approving Sino-foreign retail and distribution joint venture projects (see Appendix 
6.7 for details). 
Apart from the three changes just mentioned, the Measures also set forth some more 
details regulating foreign retail and distribution joint ventures. The main concern is 
regarding the share distribution betkveen the foreign partner and the Chinese partner. 
because in the past the rule that the majority shareholder in a Sino-foreign retail joint 
venture had to be the Chinese partner was largely ignored. According to the 1999 
Measures, the Chinese partner of a retail joint venture that has more than three retail 
outlets must hold at least .51?/6 of shares. Nevertheless, if after establishment the foreign 
partner has procured domestic products massively and can help expand the exports of 
domestic Chinese products by utilising its international network, it can then become the 
majority shareholder subject to the approyal of the State Council. For foreign retail joint 
ventures with three or less stores. the Chinese partner must hold at least 35% of the 
shares. For distribution joint ventures, at least 51% of the shares must belong to the 
Chinese partner. No franchising or yoluntary chains in which there is less direct 
management by the joint venture retail company, are allowed to participate in foreign 
retail or distribution joint ventures. Furthermore, all these joint ventures can only operate 
up to a maximum of 30 years, except in the midland and Western part of China, where 
they can operate up to a maximum of 40 years. 
Commentators believe that the reason for the relaxation of regulations in the 1999 
Measures on the operational and geographical scopes of Sino-foreign commercial joint 
ventures is the strong desire of China at that time to join the World Trade Organisation. 
At first glance, the 1999 Measures legitimise numerous previously forbidden practices, 
which in reality had proved difficult to control. Nevertheless, on a closer inspection, the 
Central Government’s determination that the new Measures will be observed by both the 
authorities (whether district or local) and foreign investors, is embedded in the document 
(Virtual China Inc., 1999). In other words, this liberalisation is of a mixed nature. 
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6.1, 1. 4 Future Development alongside China’s Entry into WTO 
As China’s WTO accession gathers momentum, the extent and speed of reform in its 
foreign economic and trade management systems will gradually increase. Laws and 
regulations that are not compatible with the provisions of the WTO will have to be 
changed. China has to establish a legal and regulatory environment that is conducive to 
fair competition and in line with international practices. 
According to China World Trade Corporation (2000). one main reform that China will 
make is to increase the transparency of its system of examining and approL-ing foreign 
investment. Moreover, the examination and approval procedures of foreign investment 
\vi11 be kept as simple, open and efficient as possible. However, there is a transition 
period, within which the relevant regulations will be changed or abandoned. for different 
sectors. 
In relation to the retail and distribution sector, China made comprehensive and specific 
commitments in the WTO accession agreement. Foreign companies will be allowed to 
import and distribute most products within three years of accession. Restrictions on 
virtually all products will be phased out within five years. Regulations on the percentage 
of equity ownership, business scope, number of distribution service suppliers and 
geographic areas will be progressively abolished in three years. China has also agreed to 
open a number of related logistical functions such as maintenance and repair, storage 
and warehousing, packaging, trucking, air courier services, freight forwarding, rental 
and leasing, advertising, marketing and customer support to foreign investors in three to 
four years. Furthermore, franchising will also be gradually permitted within five years. 
China World Trade Corporation (2000) states that the further opening of China’s trading 
and distribution system to foreign companies will accelerate the economic growth in 
China and improve response to the needs of Chinese consumers. 
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6.1.2 Problems with the Existing Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure 
The above is an account of the development of the regulatory infrastructure over the last 
eight or nine years. The regulations governing foreign direct investment in retail and 
distribution sectors have been continuously revised. refined and modified. Taking an 
optimistic viewpoint, the new development should furnish both existing and potential 
foreign retailers and wholesalers in China with more freedom. However. the Chinese 
legal system is still far from perfect. Moreover, there will be a transition period of about 
three to five years before all the legal restrictions on foreign v in\.estment in the retail and 
distribution sectors will be completely eliminated (as discussed earlier). Therefore, the 
new retail and distribution landscape in China has yet to be witnessed. 
The author’s interview results demonstrated that there are problems inherent in the legal 
and regulatory infrastructure with regard to foreign retail and wholesale investment in 
China. When the respondents were asked to describe the major problems related to the 




inconsistency in policies and immature legal system, tight control on 
activities and discriminatory practices towards foreign operators. These 
be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
stency in pol 
five retailers 
6.7-2.1 Further Details of the Interview Results 
Five out of the thirteen retailers interviewed mentioned that incons 
immature legal system were two major problems. Four of these 
cies and 
claimed 
that tight control on foreign retail activities was also a main obstacle to the development 
of their business in China. Among these four retailers, two are from Europe, one from 
America and the other one from Hong Kong. Discriminatory practice was recognised by 
six retailers as another major shortcoming of the legal and regulatory infrastructure in 
China that affect their retail business. Two of these five retailers are from Europe, three 
from Hong Kong and one from Japan. There are two retailers who mentioned all the 
above three problems during the discussion on legal and regulatory infrastructure. One is 
of a European origin and the other is of a Hong Kong origin. 
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It appears that European and Hong Kong retailers were more open in discussing issues 
relating to legal and regulatory infrastructure, whereas their other Asian counterparts 
were more reserved. There was only one European retailer who refused to discuss this 
topic whereas there were four Asian retailers who refused to do so. This European 
retailer and three out of these four Asian retailers only stated that they had a good 
relationship with the government but refused to discuss anything further on legal and 
regulatory barriers to their foreign direct investment in China. Their relationships with 
the Chinese government will be investigated in more detail at the end of this chapter. 
6.7.2.2 Inconsistency in Policy and Immature Legal System 
As economic reform in China has been undenvay for more than two decades, the 
distribution sector has become one important area that China desires to modernise. 
However, China is deficient in capital and the relevant technology and management 
know-how that is required for distribution modernisation. Consequently, the introduction 
of foreign direct investment into the retail and distribution sector has become a very 
attractive and almost inevitable solution. Nevertheless, the Chinese government insists 
on keeping the activities of foreign retailers on its territory under control. These two 
antagonistic considerations, together with international pressure, have led to frequent 
and unpredictable changes in regulations and policies for foreign direct investments in 
the retail and distribution sectors. New direction could be introduced at any time. This 
makes it difficult for foreign retailers to predict the future and formulate an optimal 
medium-term strategy. The Chief Executive Officer of Company F commented, 
“Generally speaking, they want to open the market and continue the 
development. But you never know what is next with the Chinese government.” 
Furthermore, the Chinese legal system is immature. The indigenous legal philosophy 
and practice is inconsistent with the international one. For one and the same ordinance 
there is sometimes a discrepancy between the interpretation of a foreign retailer or 
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lawyer and that of a 
confidence in the Ch 
effort to ensure the 
ocal court. Therefore, i t  is difficult for foreign retailers to establish 
nese legal system. Moreover, foreign retailers have to make a lot of 
smooth running of their business in legal c ternis. Based on the 
author’s interview results. foreign retailers are facing three particular problems that are 
related to the nature of the existing legal and regulatory infrastructure. These three 
particular problems are differences in legal practice, different political environments in 
different parts of China and additional municipal regulation of foreign retail direct 
investment. 
D ffer-erices iri Legal Pmcticc 
Company F considered the main legal obstacle to their foreiLm direct investment in 
China to be the Chinese legal system. They perceived it to be very different from 
international practice. In particular. Chinese judges were not accustomed to commercial 
business. In order to alleviate this prcblem, Company F invited judges to visit their sites 
so that they could have the system, rules and instructions explained to them. These visits 
have facilitated the understanding of the judges. This method did not however solve all 
the problems because it required the willingness of judges to go outside the law courts to 
experience the reality. Not a11 the judges were so enlightened. Furthermore, there is the 
possibility of moral hazard in that the situation may easily end up in corruption. 
Because of the difference between Chinese and international legal practices, Company F 
employed both local (in-house) and foreign lawyers from Hong Kong. The foreign 
lawyers were not qualified to represent the company at court. However, they played an 
important role for the company in that they helped the company’s local lawyers to 
compare Chinese and international law practices. 
In fact, revision and modification of legal system is one of the items on the agenda of 
Chinese economic reform. Contract law was refined in October 1999 and at the time of 
writing constitutional law was also under review. Company F believed that the 
government was heading in the right direction, although time was needed for the system 
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to take effect. However. there \vas still one major issue, described as ‘a yery big 
problem’: bribery . This. together m.ith the discrepancies between the local legal system 
and the prevailing international practice has made the company sceptical about the 
trustmrorthiness of Chinese law. 
- 
The experience of Company F shows that the Chinese legal and regulatory system is 
sometimes unsystematic and unconventional when compared to the international legal 
practice that foreign retailers are used to. Besides the problems described by Company 
F, the author‘s fieldwork also suggests that there is another problem inherent in the 
existing legal system. Despite the promulgation of many laws and the modification of its 
legal c system. the actual operating rules are not published and hence unavailable to 
foreiqn c retailers. Lawyers who work with foreign clients claim that they have difficulties 
in accessing the content of the laws and regulations that apply to business operations 
(McClain and Cheng, 1995). These operating rules are contained in neihu. meaning 
internal documents, which are confidential. As the Vice General Manager of Company 
M put it, 
“Chinese legal issues are yery difficult to know because all the important rules 
are in the form of ncihu, urhich is only circulated internally among the relevant 
governmental departments. We never have a crystal clear understanding of what 
is going on.” 
Consequently, the actual rules in force may be applied capriciously, and at the discretion 
of the decision-maker. 
Different Political Environments in DlfSerent Purts of Chinu 
The existence of neibu and the divergence in application of the actual rules also lead to a 
diversity of provincial legal practices. In addition to the confidentiality of the actual 
operating rules, Chinese laws regarding foreign retail operations are always construed in 
a very ambiguous manner (China World Trade Corporation, 2000). Even when the 
Bribery was an issue on which the author could not obtain any details from the inten;ieu.ees and 
therefore will not be discussed further in the thesis. 
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relevant regulation can be found, provisions are always too equivocal to be certain of 
correct interpretation (McClain and Cheng, 1995). A specialist at the US Agricultural 
Trade Office (Guangzhou Office) maintained that the vagueness of the Chinese laws 
was a significant problem to foreign retailers' operations in China'. He further pointed 
out that cases were always treated individually and discretely. It is futile to refer to a 
similar case in the past because the verdicts of similar cases could be different. This i s  
due to the fact that there is no systematic compilation of case-law precedents that would 
facilitate the interpretation of statues and regulations (McClain and C'heng. 1995). 
The ambiguity inherent in legislation not only imposes an interpretation problem to 
foreign retailers, it also leads to different interpretations and thus variations in the 
implementation of the laws by government officials at district and local levels. The 
specialist at the US Apcultural  Trade Office (Guangzhou Office) observed that 
officials in the north of China are generally more prudent in their interpretation. They 
perceive certain acts to be forbidden if not explicitly legitimised by law. By contrast, 
officials in the south tend to be more daring. The non-existence of a prohibition is 
deemed to be permission. Subsequently, there is more flexibility in the south, which is 
more conducive to the development of private enterprises'). 
The specialist at the US Agricultural Trade Office (Guangzhou Office) believed that 
this difference in attitudes is the result of geographical and historical factors in China"'. 
There is a common Chinese saying, 'the mountain is high and the emperor is far away', 
meaning that the more distant a central authority is, the more difficult for the Central 
Government to regulate and monitor the local authority. and hence more 'flexibility'. As 
illustrated in before, local authorities also have a record of deviating from the 
instructions of Central Government depending on the attitude and traditions of the 
particular local authority. Several speakers at San Francisco Conference 1995 expressed 
concerns about the extent to which Central Government could put through their policies 
Information obtained from the author's interview. 




at local l e ~ ~ e l .  They were sceptical about urhether 1an.s and regulations formulated at the 
national level were being routinely enforced at the local level if local officials felt that 
the enactment was in conflict with local interests (McClain and Cheng. 1995). 
Furthermore there are many major coastal cities in southern China. They have alnrays 
been the gateway between China and the outside world. Historically, they have been the 
locations in which commerce and economy have been most prosperous prior to the 
formation of the PRC. They have rarely been closed to foreign business culture. 
Some informants perceived that the political environments in the south and that in the 
north of China are different. Economic factors play a more important role in Shanghai 
than in Beijing. In Shanghai, economic performance is a big consideration. The 
Shanghai government i s  very ambitious about reforming its commercial status and 
believes that retailing is a crucial area to develop. A lot of support is given to local 
retailers while a considerable effort is made to work and communicate with foreign 
retailers such that modern retail knowledge and know-how is transferred to local 
retailers. For example, arrangements are made by the government to send local retail 
candidates abroad for training with the help of foreign retailers. 
In comparison, officials in Beijing are more politically conscious as befits a capital city. 
Relationships and networking are of higher priority than economic results. Their role in 
the development of a retail sector is regulatory. Carrefour, a French hypennarket, offers 
a good example to illustrate this point. Most players in the industry consider Carrefour to 
be the most profitable food retailer in China, although there is a lack of published 
statistics. It has operations in both Shanghai and Beijing. The joint ventures in neither 
place were approved by the Central Government at the time of formation. In Shanghai, 
its partner is one of the leading local supermarket chains and the operation has been very 
successful. It has experienced no obstacle to expansion. However, it had been prohibited 
from expansion in Beijing albeit it was equally successful in economic terms. The 
official reason for the restriction was non-compliance with the requirements for joint 
Information obtained from the author's interview. 10 
150 
ventures since inception. ‘4 siL-ificant c amount of effort and time \?.ere taken by 
Carrefour to rectify this problem’ I .  
The inconsistency in applying the law by different prolrincial governments complicates 
market entry of foreign retailers into different parts of China. Apart from the necessity o f  
handling the low transparency and accessibility of the Chinese law on foreign direct 
investment, foreign retailers also need to learn about the different political environments 
in different regions. and hence enter different regions in China with carefiil preparations. 
Recently, the Central Government has tried to hold a tighter control on the provincial 
c governments (as discussed before). For examples, February 2001 saw the beginning of a 
prolonged negotiation of Carrefour with the Central Government over restructuring of its 
businesses in China. None of all the 27 outlets of Carrefour were approved by Central 
Government but instead relied on the goodwill of local authorities. This non-compliance 
to the rules of the Central Government eventually triggered an order to Carrefour to 
restructure its businesses. The Central Goyernment however had not decided on what 
Carrefour had to do at the time. 
Beijing’s crackdown on the retail sector in 1998 and 1999 resulted in the closures of 35 
retail outlets of various foreign retailers. Several foreign retail groups also had to sell 
some of their shares to Chinese partners because of the crackdown. Industry experts are 
unsure about what this restructuring order on Carrefour will involve but they believe 
Carrefour’s plan to open ten more stores in China could be hampered. They also 
consider this move is a warning to other foreign retailers that Beijing intends to enforce 
Central Government regulation more actively before joining the WTO (Financial Times, 
Feb 07 2001). Whether or not Central Government’s determination to enforce its 
regulations at provincial level will eliminate the inconsistency in implementing the law 
has yet to be seen. 
This piece of information about Carrefour was sourced from a foreign retail practitioner in China u h o  11 
would like to remain anonymous. 
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Besides the Central Go\.ernment provisions. each municipality has its 0ixl.n further 
regulation of foreign direct investment in the retail sector Lvithin its domain. This can be 
illustrated by the folloming case'.'. 
There has been a surge in foreign FMCG retailers in Shanghai City since 1995. They use 
various formats: hypermarket, supercentre, cash and carry. mrarehouse club, or the like. 
In China, all these formats are collectiLrely called tliit?iuicJzaIig. which literally means a 
big marketplace selling a very wide range o f  products at reasonably low prices in a clean 
and modern self-sen-ice environment. (Such nomenclature reflects the fact that fern, 
Chinese consumers are able to distinguish differences in retail format.) Based on 
research carried out by international management consultancy in Shanghai, there were 
27 durzzaichang outlets in Shanghai City in June 1999, of which 26 were foreign-Sino L 
joint ventures? In the absence of any development plan, the rapid inflow of foreign 
direct investment in retailing and the speedy competitive response of local retailers in 
Shanghai resulted in chaos. In 1999, the Commercial Commission of Shanghai 
Municipal People's Government realised that growth was out of control. Consequently, 
they decided to limit the number of cfurnuic/iang outlets occupying ten thousand square 
metres or above to 30 within the outer ring road in Shanghai City. 
Municipal legislation has also suffered from problems similar to those encountered at 
the national and provincial level. RecoLmition of foreign retail investments at municipal 
le~7el can be subject to change at short notice. There is also inconsistency of policy at 
district level. Laws in different districts and towns within even the same city are not 
standardised. As an example, the rules on product licensing in Pudong are different from 
those in Putao, mo different districts of Shanghai city. Although the lack of national 
" The case matenal h a s  obtained from author's intervie% with an international management consultancy 
firm in Shanghai and the deputy director of the Commercial Commission of Shanghai Municipal People's 
Go\ ernment. 
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procedures for product licences is normal in Western countries, variation kvithin the 
same city in China was criticised severely by foreign retailers. 
Furthermore, disaqreenients v between different local authorities urithin the same city over 
certain regulations are sometimes found. This is because o f a  conflict of interests. When 
the regulation limiting the number of cirininrclirrrig outlets to 30 was issued, various 
reactions among different local authorities to this rule occurred“. Under the city 
Y government there are two further layers: district and town. Each has considerable 
interest in foreign direct investment in their domain because of the increase in income 
through b taxes and higher L employment. and therefore strengthened performance within 
their own particular area. Due to the change of regulation. they were no longer able to 
bring in as much direct f o r e i p  in\.estment as they desired. The consequence was 
competition among the local authorities for the remaining quota. For example, a certain 
town would take immediate action tcl demolish some old factories and redevelop the site 
to make it suitable for large-scale retail stores in the hope of pre-empting the attainment 
of permission to introduce a damaichang by another town. 
6. I .  2.3 Tight Control on Foreign Retail Activities 
As mentioned before, China has only partially opened its retail and wholesales market to 
foreign players, although a gradual relaxation in restrictions is seen. Therefore, the legal 
procedures for foreign retailers to set up their business in China are onerous. 
“There are countless barriers to doing business in China. The red tape is endless 
and there are fees for foreign companies, public services, taxes, etc.,’ claimed the 
Vice President, Asia Region, of Company E. 
In fact, the empirical study showed that compliance with government regulations is 
considered by foreign retailers to be the most complicated aspect of setting up joint 
ventures in China. There are many regulations for foreign retailers to observe and there 
It has to be noted that not all of these 27 damaichang outlets sell food products. However, a name list 
According to the Chief Purchasing Officer of Company F 
13 
was not available for public access. 
14 
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are many forms to fill in. The Chinese goL7ernnient is highly in\.ol\-ed in the process of 
screening and granting permissions to foreign retailers. ’4s pointed out by the Chief 
Purchasing Officer of Company F, the legal procedures in Central and Eastern Europe 
are much simpler than those in China. Obtaining a business licence is relatively easy in 
Eastern Europe ivhereas the process of getting a business licence is complicated in 
China. For instance. Company C, a Japanese retailer who at the time of interview has 
one outlet in Guangzhou, wanted to open new stores but one of its directors pointed out 
that it would take a long time before any solid decision about expansion could be made 
because of the prolonged application procedures for business licences. The Chief 
Purchasing Officer of Company F described the situation of government control in the 
folloa.ing Lvay: 
”It seems that you are gi\.en the freedom once you get the business license but in 
reality you do not have the freedom. You will find that the freedom is denied to 
you when you really start developing your retail business.” 
Similar experiences \I ere found in cases involving Asian retailers in China. However, 
Company A, a Hong Kong supermarket chain, sho\;c.ed a milder attitude towards the 
legal and political complications. The company admitted that there are many steps 
involved and getting permissions for a joint venture in China is a prolonged process but 
they did not consider the legal procedures to be a problem. They believed that 
bureaucratic red tape is reducing gradually. Guidelines for approval procedures 
regarding conditions under which local authorities accept and register a f o r e i p  retailer’s 
application have become clearer. Co-ordination among different governmental 
departments has improved and there is now a deadline system for government 
departments to respond to applications”. 
Many steps are involved in the application process for a foreign retailer. In the past, a 
foreign retailer had to visit a vast array of different departments in turn during the 
’’ Source: Director of Company A 
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process. This involved the expenditure of a considerable amount of effort and time 
before the whole process is finished. In order to increase efficiency, a one-stop office 
has been set up in Guangzhou to accommodate representatiyes from each of the relevant 
governmental departments to deal with and follow up foreign retailers' applications'". 
Owing to the continuous streamlining of governmental structure and procedures with 
regard to the application process of Sino-foreign joint ventures, Company A claimed that 
the preparation of feasibility reports, and not the approval process. has become the most 
time-consuming aspect in the setting up of the joint venture. 
6.7.2.4 Discriminatory Practices towards Foreign Operators 
Four out of eight Asian retailers and two out of four European retailers pointed out that 
the retail market in China at the time of interview was not a level playing field. A 
detailed account of their perception on unfair treatment is described below. 
Local retailers usually enjoy lower rent for land than foreign retailers. Economic reform 
has led to the re-structuring of state enterprises. In the past, these state enterprises were 
entirely owned by the state and their economic activities were controlled by goL'ernment 
officials (Reeder, 1984). As part of the reform process, gufenji was introduced: shares 
were issued and owned by different interested parties. However. the majority 
shareholders of most large scale local companies are stakeholders that have emerged 
from government related organisations. It is widely beIieved that 'the form is changed 
but the substance remains similar'. It is alleged that this enables the now private owners 
to obtain land at a much lower cost than foreign retailers because of their continuous 
close relationship with state officials. However, the four local food retailers the author 
interviewed denied that they obtained free land or sites from the state and they had to 
Source: Director of Company A 16 
pay an economic rent’?. Nonetheless. foreign retailers continue to believe that local 
retailers pay rent that is lower than that which foreign retailers can negotiate because of 
guaizxi (relationship)”. 
Three executives of the foreign retailers interviewed (who have either worked in China 
for a significant period of time or are indigenous Chinese and have worked in the 
industry for a considerable amount of time) explicitly claimed that most local retailers 
have ways of evading tax by, for example, underiover-invoicing. Consequently. 
although foreign retailers are granted a lower corporation tax rate domestic retailers 
more than make up for difference through lower land rents and tax evasion. The Chief 
Non-food Purchasing Officer of Company F revealed: 
“Basically there are a lot of local competitors doing a lot of things we can’t do- 
manipulating invoices, low rznt, low labour costs. sometimes they don‘t pay tax, 
sometimes they cheat. In this case, their cost of merchandise drops and if we add 
all these up, our price can‘t be competitive anymore.” 
Furthermore, foreign retailers believe the Chinese government is stricter with them than 
with local retailers. The regulatory bodies tend to turn a blind eye to the issue of whether 
a local retailer complies with the regulations or not. When a breach of regulation i s  
discovered, there is a less serious consequence for a local retailer. According to the 
General Manager of Company K, there were always officials coming to their outlets to 
check whether they had complied with all the regulations or not. If they were caught for 
non-compliance a fine would normally be imposed, but officials could stop them from 
carrying on business until all non-compliance was rectified. The interviewee claimed 
that the government officials did not check the local retailers as often as they check 
them. 
Apart from the 13 foreign companies and those independent organisations that are listed in Chapter 3. 
the author also chatted informally with four Chinese food retailers during her fieldwork. They are not 
listed in Chapter 4 because they were not meant to be formal inteniews. 
1: 
The concept and meaning of gztanxi is discussed in more detail in section 6.2.3.2. 18 
156 
6.7.3 Prospective Legal and Regulatory Development 
Economic reform in China will undoubtedly accelerate after China’s entry into the WTO 
in December 2001. China has long recognised the importance of foreign direct 
investment to the modernisation of China. In October 2000 State Councillor of China 
Wu Yi re-emphasised this point. She stressed that foreign capital benefits the Chinese 
economy not only in terms of growth rate but also in terms of structural adjustment and 
industrial optimisation ( Chinafair, 2000). In the distribution and retailing sector. 
abolition of the many regulations that prohibit and restrict foreign participation in 
trading and distribution activities will undoubtedly improve the efficiency of distribution 
in China. Efficient distribution is essential to the success of any business in China that 
involves the movement of products from suppliers to customers. Distribution activities 
include import and export trading, shipment and delivery of goods, order processing, 
invoicing, warehousing, wholesaling, the establishment of distribution networks, 
retailing, and after-sales service. Economic reform in China necessarily entails the 
replacement of state-owned and centrally managed trading and distribution systems with 
more flexible local and regional distributors. At the moment, China’s distribution system 
is at a critical stage in its development (China World Trade Corporation, 2000). China 
has promised in the WTO accession agreement that modernisation in distribution and 
retailing will gain further momentum and most commentators believe that large scale 
foreign retailers will play an important part in the process. 
The liberalisation and gradual abolition of restrictions on foreign participation in the 
distribution and retail sector, nevertheless, does not imply that all the difficulties relating 
to legal and regulatory issues will immediately disappear for foreign retailers. 
Foreign retailers should also pay attention to the vagueness of the language used 
throughout the foreign direct investment policies in China, even though the tone and 
agenda of recent policy appears to be resp0nsiL.e to some of the major difficulties that 
foreign retailers face (China World Trade Corporation. 2000). China World Trade 
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Corporation warns that foreign investors should be aware of the possibility of watering 
down of the benefits and reforms proposed as they enter. 
On the other hand, the Chinese government has endeavoured with certain measures to 
guard against the domination of foreign retailers in the retail and distribution sector. The 
China Bzisincss Times reported on 29 May 2000 that foreign retailers were expected to 
control a significant market share after China join the WTO (China World Trade 
Corporation, 2000). The paper further commented that the retail sector was one of the 
weakest areas of China’s economy and is highly vulnerable to foreign competition. A 
director with the Beij ing Municipal Commerce Committee believes that the fundamental 
solution is scale expansion and institutional streamlining (China World Trade 
Corporation, 2000). Therefore, the Beijing municipal government plans to consolidate 
the 3000 or so local retail enterprises in the city into about five supermarket groups. The 
director also claimed that construction of distribution centres, development of e- 
commerce within the existing retail enterprises and service improkrement will follow the 
consolidation. The Shanghai municipal government shares the same view and has, in 
fact, already set up five large scale local retail chains via mergers, alliances, trustees and 
shareholding in 2000 (China World Trade Corporation, 2000). 
Clearly China’s entry into the W O  does not remove local competition-fair or unfair for 
foreign retailers. It will certainly bring along with it further relaxation and gradual 
softening of legal and regulatory restrictions on foreign direct investment. It m d l  also 
create a new competitive landscape in the retail and distribution sector. Most 
importantly, how the law and regulations that govern the actual operation of foreim CI 
retailers are implemented is yet to be seen. It will also take time for the Chinese legal 
system to mature and for indigenous and foreign business people to adapt and adjust to 
each other’s business practices. 
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6.2 Market Entry Mode: Foreign Direct InvestmenVJoint Venture 
In China, there are three principal structures for foreign direct investment: Sino-foreign 
equity joint ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative (contractual) joint ventures and wholly 
foreign owned ventures. As mentioned earlier, wholly foreign owned ventures are not 
allowed for foreign direct investment in retailing. Therefore, this section mainly focuses 
on the two types of joint venture. 
International joint ventures are a common topic of analysis in international management, 
strategic management, financial management, international marketing, international 
accounting. and international business law literature (Konieczny and Petrick, 1994). 
Different scholars have used different perspectives to explain their existence and 
characteristics (Pan and Li, 20C10). Transaction costs, bargaining power. social 
institutional processes and cultural differences are some examples of the analytical 
approaches that have been adopted. At the same time, different studies on international 
joint ventures have different focuses. The main themes include the influences of 
differences in strength and strategic objectives between partners on their bargaining 
approaches, choice of joint venture partners, success and failure factors of international 
joint ventures and other dimensions concerning co-operative strategies between partners 
(Harrigan and Newman, 1990). A lot of such research has also been conducted on Sino- 
foreign manufacturing joint ventures. However, it appears that there has not been much 
research on joint ventures in the retailing sector in China. 
This thesis does not aim to investigate the details of joint venture. but to examine the 
phenomenon as an element in the internationalisation process of food retailers in China, 
particulars market entry strategies of retailers in China. Those issues include the type of 
joint ventures that foreign retailers adopted, partner selection and contribution of each 
partner, equity ownership of foreign partners, share of managerial control. and 
relationships with their Chinese partners. 
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6.2.7 Research Results 
The interview results regarding the nature of local partners, type of joint venture and 
proportion of shareholding of each partner are summarised in Table 6.1. The research 
results on other aspects will be presented below in the appropriate sections. 
I Foreign Retailer 
Table 6.1 Summaries of Interview Results on Joint Venture Structure 
1 T y p e o f J V  1 I Nature of Local Partner 
C 
D 
IB /Non retailer. state-owned /Eau i tv 
Under provincial government !Equity I 
Owned by Commercial Bureau of the city /Equity I 
I 
I 
G' !A real estate company that own a shopping mall in the city !Equity I 
1 






,A company belongs to Ministry of Internal Trade, non-retailer IEqu ity 
A trade association, get it thru Chinese govt., some experience in retailing Equity 
p\ company in alcohol industry E q uit y 








I I k s i a  I 
I Contribution of Local I t 
Foreign S hareholdi ng Partner Country of Origin I 
majority cash, services, assets As ia ~ 
capital, legal i s s u e s  IUS 
8 0 o/o Asia j 
70% capital, legal i s s u e s  IEurope 




I 4 9 '/o site As ia 




apital, legal and govt. 1 
Pssues iE u roDe 
capital, advisory, acts I I 
~ 
4 9 '/o as supplier !Europe 
49% h s i a  
b /confidential I R s i a  i 
Company G claimed that they had 49% shares in their joint venture and therefore it should be 
an equity joint venture. However, according to the Deputy Director of Commercial Commission 
1 
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of Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, Company G’s retail bus iness in China was a 
cooperative one. T h e  author was unable to obtain further information regarding i ts  form of joint 
venture from Company G. 
There are no entries in some of the boxes in the ab0L-e tables. This is due to the 
unwillingness of the inteniewees to disclose information. Company J explicitly stated 
that the holding of shares between themselves and their partners was confidential. 
Company E made it very clear that they urould not discuss anything related to their 
foreign direct investment structure when they accepted the author’s request for 
intervieus. With other companies, although information related to the joint venture 
structure and partners \vas obtained, the author experienced difficulty in extracting 
further details. The reluctance of foreign retailers to discuss this topic openly suggests 
that the identity of their partners and the diL-ision of contribution between themselves 
and their partners are of strategic importance to the success of their retail ventures in 
China. The comment of the Chief Non-food Purchasing Officer strongly illustrates this 
point, 
“To have the right partner is the most important and it is the critical success 
factor for any joint venture in China. If you don’t have the right partner, you are 
dead already.” 
6.2.2 Two Types of Joint Venture in China 
In general, joint ventures are defined as legally and economically distinct organisational 
entities created by two or more parent organisations that jointly invest capital and other 
resources to pursue certain strategic objectives. Joint ventures are further divided into 
two different kinds in China. The two kinds are called Sino-Foreign Equity Joint 
Venture and Sino-Foreign Cooperative (Contractual) Joint Ventures. 
6.2.2.1 Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
Sino-foreign equity joint ventures are enterprises established in China with joint 
investment from foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organisations or 
individuals; and from Chinese companies, enterprises or other economic organisations. 
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This is the oldest form of foreign direct investment in China. The law governing this 
kind ofjoint ventures dates back to 1979". 
All parties involved in a Sino-foreign equity joint venture jointly ink-est in, operate and 
share the risk of the venture. Investment can be in the form of cash. buildings. 
machinery. equipment. the right to use the work site, industrial property and exclusively- 
owned technology. Profits and losses are shared by all shareholders in the ratio of their 
contribution to capital. The joint venture must adopt the form of a limited liability 
corporation and the board of directors is its supreme body of governance. 
6.2.2.2 Sino-Foreign Cooperative (Contractual) Joint Ventures 
Sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures are also called Sino-foreign contractual joint 
ventures. Such ventures are enterprises established in China with investment or 
conditions for cooperation jointly offered by foreign companies, enterprises, other 
economic organisations or individual and by Chinese companies, enterprises or other 
economic organisations. The law governing this type of ventures was passed in April 
1988"'. 
The main difference between cooperative joint ventures and equity joint ventures is that 
profits and losses are not shared according to the ratio of each party's contribution to 
capital. The rights and obligations of all parties involved in the cooperative venture are 
all clearly defined in the contracts that are signed by all parties. Examples of rights and 
obligations include the provision of investment and conditions for cooperation, the 
distribution of profits or products, the sharing of risks and losses, the form of operation 
and management, and the ownership of property at the termination of the contracts. 
See Appendices 6.8, 6.9, 6.10 and 6.1 1 for laws and regulations of Sino-foreign equity joint \'entures in 
See Appendices 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14 for laws and regulations of Sino-foreign cooperati\.e (contractual) 
19 
China. 
joint ventures in China. 
20 
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The cooperative venture structure avoids the issue of valuation of foreign technology 
and equipment that has derailed many equity joint venture negotiations (Beamish and 
Spiess, 1993). 
In most Sino-foreign cooperative joint ventures, the foreign party provides all or most of 
the funds while the Chinese side offers land, workshops. usable equipment, facilities, 
and sometimes a certain proportion of funds. Furthermore, the foreign and Chinese 
parties involved usually define in their cooperative joint venture contract that when the 
cooperation terminates, all assets of the venture will be owned by the Chinese party and 
that the foreign party is gi\:en priority to recoup its investment within the duration of 
cooperation. This arrangement is attractive to many Chinese enterprises and foreign 
investors because i t  satisfies both the need of Chinese enterprises for sources of 
investment and the desire of foreign investors for recouping their investments. 
6.2.2.3 Type of Joint Venture Adopted by the Companies Interviewed 
Except Companies A, E, G and H, all other companies took the form of equity joint 
venture. Nevertheless, Company D said that they desired to transform the joint venture 
into a cooperative joint venture in the future because cooperative joint ventures offer 
more flexibility and the manner in which the joint venture functions depends on the way 
the contract was written. 
Company A stated that they had both equity and cooperative joint ventures in China but 
they preferred equity joint venture. Company A believed that real partners in a joint 
venture should contribute to the investment and at the same time share risk and return. 
They perceived that an equity joint venture offers the simplest arrangement that could 
reflect the principle of sharing. A cooperative joint venture, by contrast, does not always 
reflect this principle. Company A pointed out that in some cooperative joint ventures. 
the Chinese side provided land and arguments always resulted because of difficulty in 
evaluation of the land. There is also difficulty in evaluation of technology in cases that 
one partner contributes technology to the joint venture. 
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As mentioned in Table 6.1, Company G appears to have an equity joint venture but 
another source claimed that they had a cooperative joint venture. KO further information 
about the kind of joint venture was obtained. On the other hand. Company H stated that 
their business in China was a cooperative joint venture. 
Companies A and F pointed out that they always preferred to take the form of wholly 
owned subsidiary when they made foreign direct in\yestments because of issues relating 
to control and problems uith managing relationships with partners”. At the time they 
entered China, the Chinese l aw forbade mrholly foreign owned subsidiaries and therefore 
they had to enter the market with joint ventures. 
The results of the present research are consistent with those of joint venture research that 
is not directed towards the retailing industry. Equity joint venture is the most popular 
form of joint ventures in China (Mills and Chen, 1996). Western companies prefer less 
cooperative joint ventures although it is still an important form of joint venture in China 
(Mills and Chen, 1996). 
Apart from the reason offered by company A, there is a plausible complementary 
explanation for thc preference of the majority of the respondents on equity joint venture 
over cooperative joint venture. The laws governing cooperative joint ventures in China 
were only passed in 1988, which was almost a decade after the time when those 
governing equity joint ventures were passed. Consequently, the laws covering 
cooperative joint ventures are not as clear and well developed as those for equity joint 
ventures (Mills and Chen, 1996). Therefore, foreign companies perceive equity as a 
relatively secured and effective means to protect their interests (Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw, 
2001), especially when they are unfamiliar with the Chinese environment and the 
Chinese business culture. This also explains why those retailers who adopted the form of 
cooperative joint venture in the author’s study were from Asia, especially the overseas 
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Chinese, who are relatively more familiar with the Chinese business context. This tenet 
of a lack of a well-developed legal framework on cooperative joint venture activities and 
unfamiliarity of f o r e i p  retailers with the local business context may also serve to 
explain why Company D did not start as a cooperative joint venture in China but 
adopted the equity form at the time of first entry and only started considering changing 
to a cooperative form, which offers more flexibility. after gaining some years of 
operational experience in China. 
6.2.3 Partner Selection and Contribution of Each Partner 
According to the author’s field study (Table 6.1). the local partners of all the eleven 
foreign retailers who gave information about the nature of their local partners were non- 
retailers. Most of these local partners. furthermore, were either state-owned or associated 
with local authorities that had strong regional influence on trade and retail policy 
development and implementation. 
When asked about the main contribution of their local partners, three (two of them were 
European retailers and the other one w7as American) of the nine retailers who were 
willing to discuss this issue stated that the main role of their local partners was to deal 
with the government and legal issues, such as the legal process of obtaining a business 
licence. The president of Company D responded to this question in the following 
manner, 
“I will say his contribution is to get us the licences. That’s supposed to be his 
contribution.” 
The General Manager of Company I made a similar comment, 
“Apart from a contribution to capital, the main contribution of our Chinese 
partner is that they develop and maintain good relationships with government and 
deal with most legal-related issues for our joint venture. Our partner can do a lot 
of things (on this aspect) for us.” 
” These issues are discussed in further details in sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5 
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The Vice President of Company B also stated that the ma-jor contribution of their local 
partner was to obtain the business licence for the joint yenture. 
Four retailers, one Asian and three from Europe, were willing to discuss further the 
criteria by which they chose their local partners. Among these four retailers, three of 
them explicitly stated that they preferred to choose non-retailers as their partners. The 
reason was that they wanted a high degree of control. Retail partners tend to bargain for 
a significant proportion of control of management of the joint venture, which was not 
desirable from the foreign retailers’ point of view because foreign retailers do not want 
to have obstacles in putting through their own retail concepts in China. The Chief 
Operating Officer of Company F stated. 
“Retail partners will always want to talk to us  and always want managerial 
control. And this is what wz cannot accept. We u’ant to put through our system 
and have the last say and decide everything.” 
Nevertheless, the Chief Non-food Purchasing Office of Company F and the General 
Manager of Company K pointed out that they would not mind if their partners had a 
little bit of experience in the retail industry because in that case. their local partners 
would not bargain too much for power and at the same time they would be more 
knowledgeable about what licences to obtain and how to obtain them and be more 
understanding and patient during the development stage of the retail joint venture. 
Another criterion that foreign retailers used in choosing local partners was the amount 
and kind of contacts and relationship that the potential partners had with government at 
different levels. Three retailers claimed that this was their main concern in choosing 
partners. Compared to this criterion. the nature of their partners’ business in China was 
relatively irrelevant. 
As mentioned before, the retail industry in China has not gone through the 
modernisation process as the retail industry in the Western world has. Foreign food 
retailers have developed their own retail concepts, formula and expertise, which they 
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perceive as a source of their competitive advantage. Indigenous v Chinese retailers laq c
behind in terms of retail know-how when compared to their Western counterparts. 
Consequently, foreign retailers perceive that local retailers could hardly offer any critical 
resources to the operation of the retail joint venture. Foreign investors want to put 
through their own retail system when they undertake foreign direct investment. 
However, one big obstacle in establishing a retail business in China is the legal and 
political environment. As explained earlier in this chapter, the legal system in China is 
radically different from those in most Western countries. The need for government 
support is essential in running a business in China. Retailers must be able to interact 
diplomatically with local regulators and government officials because their protection 
from the vagaries of Chinese law and regulation is important (Si and Bruton, 1999). 
Foreign retailers lack this expertise and this is what they need most from the Chinese 
partners. Chinese partners can bring to Sino-foreign retail joint ventures a clear 
understanding of the local circumstances. culture and politics. which complements the 
retail expertise of the foreign retailers. 
In China, local provincial or metropolitan governments usually play the most important 
regulatory role (Child and Markoczy, 1993). The most suitable Chinese partners for 
foreign retailers are therefore those with good relationships or association with 
authorities at different levels. The present study shows that foreign retailers share the 
same perception of the role and importance of their Chinese partners. Seven retailers 
provided some details of their Chinese partners and these details are presented below. 
Due to confidentiality, the names of the Chinese partners of foreign retailers are not 
disclosed. Pseudonym names are assigned to each of them. Moreover, in order to further 
protect the anonimity of both the foreign retailers and their Chinese partners, no 
reference to the identity (even their pseudonym identities) of the corresponding foreign 
partner is made. 
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6.2.3.7 Nature of the Chinese Partners of the Interviewed Foreign Retailers 
Company 1 was a state-owned hotel group. They had business activities in many cities 
in China. They were approached by their foreign retail partner and a decision was made 
to form a joint venture together to develop a retail chain in China. 
Company 2 was a holding company with three trading companies. The company was a 
vehicle for investing in the retail joint venture while it had a little retailing experience. 
They were also one of the suppliers to the retail joint venture. Memorandum of 
understanding was first reached between the Ministry of Trade of China and that of the 
foreign partner‘s home government. Then, the foreign partner of the joint venture 
concerned approached the Chinese Central Government. The Central Government, in 
essence MOFTEC, introduced Company 2 to the foreign retailer. 
Company 3 was a company that reported to the commercial committee of the city in 
which it operated. The commercial committee is a governmental organisation that 
handles all the business enterprises in the city. According to a respondent, the 
commercial committee had very strong legal and political influence on the entrance of 
foreign enterprises. The respondent put it, 
“If they (the commercial committee) want to keep you out, you won‘t get into the 
city. I go to the other cities and I meet with the commercial committee people. If 
they like us and want to work with us, okay and we could go ahead with our 
entrance plan. If not, you can forget it. That’s how it works.” 
Company 4 was a company that belongs to the Ministry of Internal Trade in the city in 
which the joint venture operated. Chinese Central Government recommended Company 
4 to the foreign retailer partner. 
Company 5 and Company 6 were state-owned companies. The foreign retailer 
concerned approached the municipal government of the city in which the joint venture 
was located. The municipal government introduced Company 5 and Company 6 to them. 
The joint venture had the same Chinese partners for all their outlets in one city. 
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The founder of the foreign partner of Company 7 and Company 8 always maintained 
contacts and good relationships with the Ministry of Internal Trade, under wrhich there 
was Company 7. Company 7 always wanted the foreign partner to develop a large scale 
supermarket in the city in which it was located. Therefore, they suggested a site in the 
city in which it could be located to the foreign retailer. The foreign retailer was 
interested in the project and the local government further introduced Company 8. which 
was under the local government’s jurisdiction. Then these three companies became 
partners and formed the retail joint venture. 
Company 9 was a company owxing a shopping mall. It was a subsidiary of another 
company that was under the control of the provincial government. Company 9 
approached their foreign partner and formed a joint venture. 
From the case studies presented above it is clear that the Chinese partners of most 
foreign retailers were well connected to the authorities at various levels. Obtaining 
support from political authorities appears to mean buying some insulation from the 
many legal and political difficulties for foreign retailers in China. This is due to the 
importance of guanxi in social and business activities in Chinese society. Such 
importance is illustrated by the remark of the Chief Food Purchasing Officer of 
Company F, “What one needs to have to be our partner is to have the (political) 
contacts.” The Buying Manager of Company J made a similar comment, 
“What business our potential partners do is not central to the decision in choosing 
the partner.. .we mainly want to gain from their relationships with different 
authorities .” 
The President of Company D also pointed out, 
“Exactly what our partner does, I am not terribly interested in. I just want them to 
get us the licences.” 
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6.2.3.2 Significance of Guanxi 
Child and Markoczy (1993) define g u a m i  as the quality of a personal relationship 
outside an individual‘s immediate family. G u c ~ n ~ i ,  as mentioned above, is widely 
recognised as an important element in Chinese society. It is based on personal relations 
and exchange of favours. When a situation arises that is beyond the capacity of an 
individual, one’s guanxi network can be mobilised to achieve the desired results 
(Redding and Ng, 1982 in Park and Luo, 2001). It is critical for businesses. both local 
and foreign, in China to understand and appropriately utilise gua~zxi n order to gain an 
advantage over competitors (Park and Luo, 2001). When guuizsi is put in the business 
context, the norm of reciprocity applies. 
Park and Luo (2001) suggest that there are four features that characterise a guun.xi 
network. First, guanxi is transferable among different parties through a common 
connection in the middle. Secondly, it is reciprocal. A favour is expected to be returned 
with another, not necessarily of the same value, at some future date. Thirdly. it is 
intangible. Guanxi members are tied together by a code of reciprocity and equity that is 
invisible and unwritten. The long-term viability of guanxi depends on the commitment 
of the guanxi members to the guanxi and to one another. The range and frequency of 
exchanging favours also depends on the individual’s own choice. Fourthly, guanxi is 
utilitarian rather than emotional. It is based on exchange of favours instead of emotional 
attachment. Therefore, friendship is not always involved, albeit friendship can reinforce 
the commitments of the guanxi members. 
In Chinese culture, having mianzi (face), is perceived to be highly important. A person’s 
mianzi is determined by one’s position, credibility, honesty. reputation. power. income 
or social network (Park and Luo, 2001). Miansi forms the root of gum-xi. Maintaining 
miunzi at a certain level is essential in order to successfuily cultivate and expand a viable 
guanxi network. Manipulation of the dynamics within a guanxi network becomes easier 
once a person has strong mianzi. Therefore, members of a guanxi network will strive to 
maintain his mianzi by observing the rule of reciprocity because failure to do so will 
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damage one’s reputation, which in turn leads to a humiliating loss of prestige or nziulrzzi. 
Consequently. the rule of reciprocity establishes a structural constraint that restrains self- 
seeking opportunism and preserves social capital within an existing guunsi netu.ork 
structure (Coleman. 1990 in Park and Luo, 200 1 ). 
In the Chinese business context, transaction often follows successful guun.xi, while in 
Western countries a relationship more usually follows successful transactions (Park and 
Luo, 2001). Therefore. guunxi is a valuable resource for individuals and firms in China 
to induce cooperation and govern relationships between firms efficiently. Due to the 
existence of uncertainty and confusion in China’s administrative structure. firms develop 
and manipulate guurzxi to fill structural holes and alter the existing network structure 
(Burt. 1992 in Park and Luo, ZOOl), which in turn gi\res rise to protection against 
arbitrary state intervention. The possession of guunxi with government agencies or 
officials is especially crucial for fulfilment of enterprise targets” (Child and Markoczy, 
1993 ). Guan.xi provides a means to counterbalance the cumbersome and ambiguous 
Chinese bureaucratic rules by utilising one’s personal relationships. Nevertheless, 
cultivating and sustaining guanxi with government officials is costly because of the 
reciprocal and utilitarian demands. A deep understanding of Chinese political cultural 
and a considerable investment of time are also needed in establishing guanxi. Therefore. 
building and utilising g u m x i  with government officials to circumvent bureaucratic and 
political hurdles appears to be almost impossible for foreign retailers during the initial 
stage of their foreign direct investment in China”. Nevertheless, guanxi is transferable 
and this characteristic of transferability allows foreign retailers to benefit from the 
guanxi network of their Chinese partners with political authorities. A Chinese partner 
7 7  
-- According to Luo and Chen (1996 in Park and Luo, 2001), guanxi operates both honzontally and 
vertically. Horizontal gztnnxi is gitanxi with other organisations in the task environment. such as suppliers. 
buyers, and competitors. Vertical guanxi is guan.xi with various le\.els of government and regulatory 
authorities. In this section, vertical grranxi is the main focus. 
23 Foreign retailers also recognised that they themselLTes had to cultivate gzianxi with government officials 
apart from utilising their partner’s giianxi network at the initial stage of their foreign direct in\.estments in 
China. The cultivation of relationships at different levels is discussed in a later section in the present 
chapter. 
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who possesses a well-cultivated guanxi network 
valuable if not essential resource for foreign retai 
with legal and political authorities is a 
ers in China. 
6.2.4 Equity Ownership of  Foreign Partners 
6.2.4. I Research Results 
The division of equity ownership of joint ventures between foreign retailers and Chinese 
partners is shown in Table 6.1. There was no information about the division of equity 
ownership for Companies B, E and J. Company H was a cooperative joint venture and 
therefore did not have the division of shares. Among the nine companies for which 
information was available. five foreign retailers had majority equity ownership and the 
other four foreign retailers owned between 40% and 4996 of shares in the joint ventures. 
Among the four companies who owned minority shares in their retail joint ventures. 
Company K and Company L were the only two retail joint ventures that. at the time of 
seeking entry to China, had strictly obsened the rules of foreign direct investment 
promulgated by the Central government and had obtained the formal approval of the 
Central government in China. These two foreign retailers had had to agree to let their 
Chinese partners own at least 519'0 of shares in the joint ventures in order to obtain 
formal approval. At the end. both of them owned 49% of the shares in their respective 
joint ventures. 
The other two companies that owned minority shares are Company G and Company M. 
Company G said that they would like to abide by the Central Government rules on 
majority equity ownership because they wanted to be a legal business enterprise in 
China. They did not want to encounter any potential political difficulty because of 
legality. This company also chose to own the maximum amount of shares that they were 
allowed to by Central Government regulations, normally 49%. 
According to the Vice General Manger and the Beijing Office Representative of 
Company M, the founder of Company M had a strong sentimental attachment to China. 
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Assisting with development of the distribution system in China had alw,ays been the 
founder’s wish. The founder met with the Prime Minister of China in the 1980s and 
promised that if China needed them. they would endeavour to help modernise the 
distribution system in China. Company M had maintained a very close relationship with 
the Ministry of Internal Trade since then. The origins of Company M imply that 
Company M had no intention of disregarding Chinese law on joint ventures when 
entering the market. 
Companies A, C, D F and I were the five companies where the foreign partner owned 
majority equity in the joint venture. Company I was the last to enter the Chinese market 
among the interviewed retailers. Its first operation opened in July 1999, which was after 
the announcement of the E.xperir?iental hfeasur-es On Commercial Foi-eigri-imgested 
Enterprises in June 1999 that relaxed the restrictions on foreign equity ownership in 
retail joint ventures in China. Therefore. Company I managed to legally own a majority 
stake. The General Manger of Company I claimed that having a majority equity 
ownership was important because Company I wanted to have more control over the 
running of the business. 
Companies A and F also believed that ha\-ing control was important and therefore they 
also preferred to own as much equity in the ventures as possible. Normally. they 
preferred the form of a wholly-owned subsidiary in foreign direct investment. However, 
when they first entered China, foreign retailers were forbidden by the law to establish 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Therefore, they had to adopt the form of a joint venture. 
Nevertheless, as they did not apply to the Central Government to establish their joint 
ventures in China but only got approval of local governments, these two companies 
managed to own majority shares in their joint ventures. Companies C and D also did not 
apply to the Central Government for formal approval for their retail joint ventures either. 
Their retail joint ventures were created with only the consent of local government who 




The retailers in the present study did not have any choice on the mode of entry when 
they entered China. The Chinese law stipulated that the form of a joint venture had to be 
taken. As noted earlier, there were hardly any local food retailers that were of 
comparable scale or capability to foreign food retailers. Ignoring the legal requirement, 
it appears that the only benefit to be obtained for foreign retailers from joint ventures 
with local Chinese companies is to utilise the local companies’ guaizsi network with 
v go\remment officials and local suppliers and their knowledge of the legal and regulatory 
aspect of business practice in China. However. this contribution from the Chinese 
partner does not create long term sustainable competitive advantages for the joint 
ventures (Naughton, 1995 in Luo. Shenkar and Nyaw, 2001). From the data presented 
abokve, almost all of those interviewed preferred majority control (or as many shares as 
the law allowed) in their joint ventures. This preference, in turn, originates in the desire 
of firms to control their overseas business. Equity ownership forms the basis of 
acquiring effective control (Killing. 1982; Pan, 1996 in Pan and Li, 2000; Child and 
Faulkner, 1998). 
6.2.4.3 Control 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). the word ‘control‘ in organisation theory 
involves the use of power, authority and other systems to monitor and influence the 
activities and outcomes of a firm’s subunits and its member. In the context of 
international joint ventures, control refers to the process by which one business entity 
influences the behaviour and performance of another entity through the use of power. 
authority, and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural, or informal mechanisms (Geringer 
and Hebert, 1989). 
In a dynamic and unfamiliar environment of China, control is crucial to the evolution of 
a foreign-Sino joint venture. Control, however, is an intricate task because foreign and 
Chinese partners are very different in terms of culture, objectives and experience. 
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Insufficient or ineffective control will hamper the parent firms’ ability to effectively 
coordinate activities, utilise resources and implement strategies (Geringer and Hebert, 
1989). However, the need for control is not symmetric for both the foreign and the 
Chinese partners because foreign and Chinese partners are subjected to different 
cultural, economic and legal constraints. In the context of foreign food retailing in 
China, possessing managerial control, at both the strategic and operational levels, is 
especially important to the foreign partners for the following reasons. 
First, there is a difference in objectives between the foreign and the Chinese partners. 
Foreign partners aim to obtain a competitive share of the Chinese market, whereas local 
partners focus on technological and organisational skills acquisition from their foreign 
partners. In order to obtain a competitive share of the Chinese market. a foreign retailer 
must be able to fully utilise its retailing expertise. In the context of food retailing, the 
retail concept and the retail operaring system is the essence of a food retail firm. The 
product that a retailer produces is its retail stores”. A retail store can be perceived as the 
manifestation of a concept and a combination of different retail elements. The retail 
concept and the retail system are the fundamental constituents that give each food 
retailer its own distinct identity and competitive advantages. Naughton ( 1995 in Luo, 
Shenkar and Nyaw, 200 1) points out that the superior technological and organisational 
skills contributed by the foreign parent are the main elements that determine the 
sustained competitive position of a joint venture in the Chinese market. If a foreign food 
retailer cannot put through their own concept and system in a host country, they not only 
suffer from dilution of and hence degradation in their brand equity” but they, more 
This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
7 5  
- -  Gomes-Casseres (1990 in Pan, 1996). Klein (1980 in Pan, 1996) and Klein and Leffler (1981 in Pan. 
1996) claim that when a foreign partner commits an established brand to an equity joint venture located in 
a developing country, the foreign firms has more to lose and less to gain from diluting the brand equity 
than does the local partner. Therefore, there is a strong need for the foreign partner to have effective 
control over the venture to prevent its brand from degrading in the host country. In the context of food 
retailing. the brand concerned is a retailer’s retail brand. Pan (1996), after conducting a study with 4223 
international equity joint ventures in China from 1979 to the end of 1992, confirms that foreign firms with 
high brand equity prefer a higher equity ownership. His results also show that foreign firms with the 
following characteristics would prefer a higher equity ownership: strong capital. long equity joint venture 
contractual duration, high cultural distance between foreign and local partners. and when the joint \.enture 
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importantly, are not be able to produce the ‘product’ to leverage c0mpetitik.e adkrantages 
over their rivals and the kind of profits they expect. Therefore, foreign food retailers are 
keen to maintain effective control over their joint ventures in China so that they 
experience no barrier to the full exploitation of their retail expertise. 
Secondly, control of an overseas joint venture also has important implications for a 
firm’s global strategies. Possessing overall control of their joint ventures in China 
implies that the foreign parent is in position to control the strategic direction of the 
combined bundle of complementary resources represented by the joint LTenture (Geringer 
and Hebert, 1989) and therefore the foreign parent can implement their strategies and 
aligp the joint \-entures in China with the overall strategies and long-term goals of the 
company at the global level, such as international supply strategies and global market 
expansion. This ability to develop the joint venture within the wider set of the company 
strategies on a global scale is especially important to foreign retailers compared to their 
Chinese partners, because a local firm in an emerging economy is unlikely to be in a 
position to integrate its main operations with those of the foreign-local joint venture 
(Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw, 2001). 
For the Chinese parent, overall control may be neither desirable nor feasible. As pointed 
out earlier, Chinese firms and the Chinese government tend to use foreign-Sin0 joint 
ventures as a means to acquire foreign technologies and management know-how and to 
generate income. Subsequently, they are less concerned with the corporate strategies of 
the joint venture. Overall control is not primary for the Chinese parties to achieving their 
desired benefits. Furthermore, local businesses usually benefit from the Chinese 
government protection (Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw, 2001). The Chinese government has 
the ability to control market access to foreign firms and to hand out or withhold 
investment incentives. Such protection becomes even more apparent if the Chinese 
parent involves government ownership (Nee, 1992 in Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw, 2001). 
is located in either South China or the three metropolitan cihes of Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. These 
characteristics appear to exist in the present cases of foreign retailers joint ventures in China. 
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This host government bargaining power and potential for institutional interference 
strengthens the position of the Chinese partner in monitoring and controlling c the 
operations of their foreign-Sino joint ventures. The importance of overall control to the 
Chinese partner is thus further mitigated by the ability to manage political risk. 
Thirdly, in order to implement their system effectively. some foreign food retailers 
believe that maintaining the parent‘s corporate culture is significant, and this also 
requires dominant control of foreign retailers on the running of their joint ventures. 
President of Company D claimed. 
“I think it  is very confusing when you get your partner involved in the running of 
the business. You \\,ill just get a \.cry confused culture in the company. To me. 
the company culture must be clear so that the staff v-ill not be confused.””’ 
6.2 .4 .4  Theoretical Implications 
‘The present research results have demonstrated that the foreign retailers inte1 viewed 
pursue maximum control of their business in order to ensure preservation of their retail 
systems and retailicorporate cxltures. Therefore, the present research appears to show 
convergence to previous research in the sense that firms pursue majority equity 
ownership to safeguard their interests. However, the kind of interests I^oreign retailers Lry 
io safeguard is different to that explained in most of the existing literature, especially 
those studies that undertake the vien-point of foreign manufacturers. Foreign 
manufacturing firms who operate in an unfamiliar environment of China usually rely on 
their equity stake to prevent potential opportunistic behaviwr on the part of their local 
partners, which is often exercised in collusion with local authorities (Luo, Shenkar and 
Nyaw, 2001). On the contrary, foreign food retailers’ desire to perpetuate their retail 
systems and corporate cultures in their overseas operations has little to do with guarding 
against opportunistic behaviour from their Chinese partners. Foreign retailers are mainly 
concerned about exploiting their retail expertise and ensuring that their joint ventures in 
China are developed in accordance with their strategies on the international level. This is 
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important because. for example. developing an international netcl.ork of supply is of 
strategic significance to an international retailer, especially when nom,adays strugcle  for 
bargaining v power between suppliers and retailers has escalated to an international 
level? China is an important market in the \\.orld because of its sheer size and economic 
potential. If foreign retailers do not possess dominant control o\.er their joint \’entures in 
China. having operations in 
bargaining power over supp 
possessing dominant control 
foreiqn c retailers’ international 
China may not give them a platform to increase their 
iers, both multinational and local. In other words, not 
over their joint \ventures in China may encumber the 
strategic de\.elopment. 
The stress by foreign food retailers on exploiting one’s retail expertise to generate rent 
instead of on guarding against opportunistic behaviour illustrates that the FDI theory 
based on transaction cost is not appropriate in explaining equity ownership preference in 
FDI in food retailing in China. 
6.2.4.5 Prerequisites for Negotiating Dominant Control 
One must note that the retailers intewiewed in the present study are mainly large retail 
groups and are internationalised to a certain extent. Large international firms are less 
likely to be affected by the cyclical changes in the risk condition in China and 
consequently, they are more likely to stay over a longer period of time (Pan and Li, 
2000). Most of the retailers in the study mentioned that their foreigm direct investments 
in China had a very long-term perspective. Moreover, large firms, compared to smaller 
firms, are more capable of raising the necessary resource to acquire a majority equity 
stake in their overseas joint ventures (Pan and Li, 2000). Large firms also possess the 
necessary bargaining power to acquire this equity position in the negotiation with the 
host country parties. This is especially true in the case of those foreign food retailers in 
China who entered with only the approval of local governments. As explained before, 
local governments in China are very keen to attract foreign investment and foreign 
76  Role of corporate culture is discussed in Chapter 7.  
’‘ This IS discussed in Chapter 5. 
178 
technologv C r  into their domains in order to push foru ard the economic de\-elopnient. 
International food retailers with certain scale possess the expertise (such as supply chain 
management technology. retailing hoMr-hon, and strong financial backqround) c that is 
highly desired by local governments. MoreoL er. the number of local Chinese firms that 
possess strong financial resources that will enable them to acquire a majority ownership 
stake in a joint venture is very small. Therefore, the foreign food retailers in the present 
study were in a very strong position to neqotiate U niajorit\i. equity ommership \vith both the 
local gok'ernments and local business parties. This may not be the case for smaller 
foreign food retailers. 
6.2.5 Share of Managerial Control 
In the last section, the importance of possessing the power to control their retail 
businesses in China to the foreiLg food retailers and the rationale behind the desire of 
such possession are demonstrated. This section focuses on the actual share of managerial 
control between foreigp retailers and their Chinese partners and presents a more detailed 
discussion of dominant parent management. 
6.2.5.7 Research Results 
In the present study, eight retailers said that they had almost complete managerial 
control in the joint venture. Their Chinese partners were not involved in the daily 
operation and management of the business. What those foreign retailers needed to do 
was to report to their Chinese partners about the performance of the joint venture and 
hold board meetings with the Chinese board members. All of these eight foreign retailers 
claimed that they had good relationships with their Chinese partners and they had not 
experienced any major disagreement regarding either this arrangement on the share of 
managerial control or the daily operation and management of the business. 
On the other hand, Company M mentioned that they managed and operated the business 
with their Chinese partners together. Company L said that they controlled the major 
managerial and operational issues in the joint venture but their Chinese partner 
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controlled finance and personnel issues. Both Conipanlr M and (’onipany li are ti-oni 
Japan. They reported no major conflict Lvith their Chinese partners regarding the sharing 
of managerial c control and the running of the business. 
N o  information on the share of managerial control \\.as obtained from the remaining 
three retailers. 
6.2.5.2 Dominant Parent Management 
-4ccording to Killing ( 1982). joint \.entures in the industrial sectors o f  land de\pelopnient. 
construction, and oil and gas exploration are usually managed by one parent as if it m’t‘re 
\\.holly owned subsidiaries and he calls these joint ventures ’dominant parent ventures’. 
The present study suggests that dominant parent management i s  also a common practice 
for foreign-Sino food retail joint \,entures in China. The foreign-Sino food retail joint 
\.entures in China that are studied in the present research are mainly managed by the 
foreign retailers. Although some functional managers were appointed by the Chinese 
parents, the nuniber of such appointments remains very few. Moreover, although the 
board of directors are made up of members from both parents, the role that the board 
plays is mainly ceremonial because the ventures‘ operating and strategic decisions are 
usually made according to the foreign retailers’ wishes. This situation is illustrated by 
the description of the Buying Manger of Company J,  
“Our partner does not really participate in the managerial control. But of course, 
they play a part as we ha\.e the responsibility to report to them. However, I will 
say it is a more a retailer run operation, meaning that we are the main party 
running this retail joint venture.” 
Killing ( 1982) demonstrates that dominant ventures usually outperform shared 
management ventures and the difference in failure rates between the two kinds is 
striking. The lower failure rate of dominant parent ventures indicates they are easier to 
operate than shared management ventures. With both parents sharing management, 
disagreements are easy to occur. When one parent dominates, disagreements will be 
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largely reduced. However, there is a trade off between using shared management and 
dominant joint ventures. Dominant joint venture should only be used when the resulting 
disadvantages of having all partners running the business outweighs the resultinrr. c 
benefits. 
According to Killing ( 1982), dominant parent management is appropriate under certain 
conditions. If one partner in the joint venture is chosen by the other partner for reasons 
other than management input, such as financial backing, access to resources, patents, or 
because it is an important consumer of the product to be produced by the joint venture, a 
dominant parent venture will be a fitting arrangement. Dominant parent joint ventures 
are also appropriate when one partner takes on another partner merely in response to 
pressures from a host government. In such a situation, foreign companies often prefer a 
passive local company that has no knowledge of the product. i s  willing to be a passi\-e 
investor and is not government-affiliated. If the local partner never learns the joint 
venture’s business, the dominant parent‘s bargaining position with the host government 
will remain strong. The passive partner will exert very little influence over the joint 
venture. Nevertheless. such arrangement will only work when the local partner trusts the 
competence and honesty of the dominant foreign company. 
In the case of foreign retailing in China, the investing condition is similar to the 
condition under which dominant parent management should be adopted as suggested by 
Killing (1982). As mentioned before, foreign retailers entered China using the mode of 
joint venture because it was the only mode of foreign direct investment allowed in 
retailing. Foreign retailers took on their Chinese partners for their local networks and 
knowledge on local business practices. Most of the interviewed foreign retailers 
preferred to choose non-retailers as their Chinese partners so that their Chinese partners 
would be more willing to let them put through the their own retail systems. Under these 
circumstances, deducing from Killing’s research, dominant parent management should 
be the most appropriate for such foreign-Sino food retail joint ventures. Coincidentally. 
most of the foreign food retailers interviewed did practise dominant parent management 
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in China. Therefore. the present research extends the validity of Killing’s finding onto 
the cases of international food retail joint ventures in China. which is a country with 
characteristics of a transitional economy. 
Nevertheless, one point has to be noted, which is different from Killing’s cases. All of 
the Chinese partners of the foreign food retailers inteniewed were affiliated with the 
Chinese governments at different levels in some Lvays, as described in section 6.2.3. 
Under the legal and regulatory conditions on foreign food retailing in China, it is almost 
impossible to have a Chinese partner that is not affiliated ivith the government for two 
reasons. First, foreign food retailers must approach some Chinese local goL’ernments, if 
not the Central Government, in order to be approved to establish their operations in 
China. The Chinese government always tends to introduce or involve local business 
companies that are affiliated to them into the retail joint venture. Secondly. the foreign c 
food retailers in the present study are of considerable scale and their invesrments in 
China are substantial. A potential Chinese partner must be tinancially able to take up a 
reasonable amount of equity or even rriajority equity (as stipulated by Chinese law in the 
past) in the foreign-Sino retail joint venture. Unfortunately, due to the legacy of 
communism, all businesses were state-owned in the past. Therefore, there is. at the 
moment, hardly any local company that is financially strong enough to be a partner in 
such a foreign-Sino retail joint venture that is not under the influence of the government. 
6.2.5.3 Relationships Between Foreign and Local Partners 
The present research found that most foreign retailers had good relationship with their 
Chinese partners. Five retailers interviewed (Companies A, J, E, G,  and I )  did not 
comment on their relationship with their Chinese partners. Seven foreign retailers 
reported that they were happy with the co-operation and distribution of managerial 
control with their Chinese partners. The Chief Food Purchasing Officer of Company F 
expressed, 
“We have very good co-operation with our partner. They are actually 
participating in management, although we have the major control. My colleague. 
who is from the Chinese side, is not some useless guy in the back office trying to 
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control everything. He is actually an active member of the management in the 
sense that he is open-minded and is willing to listen and learn. He is up to the 
job. Our Chinese partner as a whole is also open minded and willing to listen to 
us and learn.” 
The Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer of Company F also had a similar appreciatiLe 
experience with their colleagues from the Chinese side, 
“Although our company is pretty much in the managerial control of this joint 
\Tentwe, we have Mr X from the Chinese partner. He is in charge of the sales of 
stores. He fully represents and gets full support from the Chinese partner. Mr X 
and I discuss important or critically issues jointly. So far, I think our foreign side 
has a very good relationship with the Chinese partner. Moreo\‘er, I believe our 
joint venture is one of the best joint ventures in China at the moment in terms of 
co-operation and relationship betm.een foreign and local partners. Our joint 
venture is also very successful in terms of operational performance so far.” 
Only one company from the thirteen retailers interviewed, Company D, claimed that 
they were not too satisfied with the performance of their Chinese partner because their 
Chinese partner was unable to obtain more business licenses for the joint venture at the 
rate they wanted. 
All these eight retailers said that they had experienced no major conflicts with their 
Chinese partner. They admitted that sometimes there was disagreement but they 
normally could reach consent at the end. The Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer of 
Company F remarked, 
“We have had quite intense discussion but we ended the discussion with common 
objecti\.es. 77 
Company M had also experienced objection from their Chinese partner to enlargement 
of their scale of’ operation in China because their Chinese partner held a different 
perspective on fresh food buyng behaviour of Chinese people”. Nevertheless. they 
successfully persuaded their Chinese partner to agree with their plan in the end. 
7 8  This i s  discussed in detail in section 7.3. 
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Furthermore, minor conflict is regarded as healthy for the business by the General 
Manger of Company K as he pointed out, “our Chinese partner is very critical. but it 
helps to improve our operations. 7 ,  
Conflicts between foreign and Chinese partners are always claimed as an important 
factor leading to the failure of joint ventures in China. Having a good relationship with 
their Chinese partner is therefore very important to the foreign retailers. No major 
conflict was reported in the present research. It appears that the combination of adopting 
dominant parent management and having a Chinese partner n.ho is not in the food retail 
industry works well for the foreign-Sino food retail joint \’entures in China. Another 
important reason for the harmonious co-operation between foreign and Chinese partner 
is that the major objective of the Chinese partners is to learn the retailing expertise and 
management know-how from their foreign counterparts. Because of this intention. the 
Chinese partners are more willing to listen instead of to control. Consequently, the 
number of conflicts is limited and the joint venture can be run more smoothly. 
This situation may not be sustained for long because as time goes, both the Chinese side 
and the foreign side shall be able to acquire a considerable amount of knowledge they 
need. When the Chinese side is more knowledgeable, it may want more control. 
Simultaneously, the foreign retailers, as they develop, will be able to accumulate 
knowledge about the Chinese retail environment. Furthermore, as mentioned before. 
foreign retailers will be able to operate as wholly-owned subsidiaries in China in a few 
years time. As some interviewees expressed that they normally prefer the form of 
wholly-owned subsidiaries to joint venture when they undertake FDI. there is a 
possibility that foreign retailers will separate from their Chinese partners once the 
restriction is removed in the near future. 
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6.3 Site Selection 
This section investigates five issues relating to site selection and store development 
process of foreign food retailers in China. First, there is a comparison of retail 
environment of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Shenzhen in terms of economic 
development, landscape of retail industry and political condition. The factors that affect 
the city selection decision of foreign food retailers are also discussed here. Secondly, 
criteria for choosing a store site are examined. The third issue is the availability of 
suitable sites from the point of view of foreign food retailers. Fourthly. the lesa1 
procedure and technical issues related to developing a site and a store are looked at.  The 
last issue is about political opposition from local retailers against the deLJelopment of 
foreign food retailers in China. The reader should note that a detail investigation of land 
trading and property development in China is outside the scope of the present study. 
6.3.7 Comparison of Retail Environment o f  Different Major Cities in China 
In China, the spatial distribution of population is unbalanced. with concentrations in 
coastal provinces. Together with historical circumstances and physical geographic 
conditions, the economic policy of the introduction of Special Economic Zones ( SEZs): 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan; Open Coastal Cities. including 
Shanghai; Open Coastal Economic Areas; Pudong New Area, which were established in 
1990; and Free Trade Zones further enhances the uneven development among different 
places in China. Such imbalance is a key feature of the economic geography of China 
and that with the introduction of economic reforms, these imbalances have surfaced as a 
central issue in China. Poverty levels and trends vary greatly between rural and urban 
areas, and between different regions of the country. By employing the World Bank's 
poverty line of $1 per person per day and the 1985 purchasing power parity, it i s  
estimated that 13.5 percent of the population is poor (Woo, Parker and Sachs, 1997). 
Moreover, different areas in China offer different investment incentives to attract foreign 
direct investment. A study by Hongkong Bank (1993 in Dai-ies, 1993a) reveals that in 
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1993 decentralisation of economic autonomy to enterprises and regions has exceeded the 
extent of that in 1988. Consequently, tensions between Central State Council and the 
provincial and large municipal governments over the form of the legislation governing 
foreign companies and the pace at which it should be implemented have resulted. 
Competition for investment and funds among regions also arise. All of these issues play 
a part in the consideration on locational choices of foreign retailers who are wishing to 
invest in China. Therefore, foreign investors should not treat China, with its 1.2 billion 
population, as one huge homogeneous market. 
In fact, when the activities of foreign food retailers are examined. it is found that 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, are the four most popular locations chosen 
when they first set foot on China. The overall en\Tironment for foreign retail investment 
in these four places i s  broken down into three elements: economic development, retail 
industry development and political condition. These three elements are discussed 
individually below in terms of statistical assessment and retailers' own e\-aluation before 
a summary of the overall picture of these four places is c given. 
6.3.1.1 Economic Landscape: An Overview 
Statistical information on certain aspects of the Beijing. Shanghai and Guangdong 
(which includes Guangzhou and Shenzhen) are shown in the following table. Data is 
extracted from StatisticuZ Szrnq7 of Chinu by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. 
Shenzhen is a special economic zone but is not a province and therefore there is no data 
about Shenzhen on its own is available from the Statistics Bureau. However, Shenzhen 
is part of Guangdong. Therefore, statistical information about Guangdong incorporates 
that about Shenzhen. 
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Table 6.2 Statistical Information on Selected Aspects of Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangdong, Year 1998 
l Province G D P  Population Average 1 Total Sales in 
(Hundred (Ten Thousand) Disposable i Wholesales and 
Million Income per Person 1 Retail Sector 
R M  BIHundred in I (Hundred Million 
Million U S $ )  Urban Area RMBlHundred 
Million US$)' (R M BIU S$) 
1 R a n k * ,  i Rank* Rank* 1 Rank* 
/Whole P R C  79552.811 ~ 1248101 5425.1 I ~ 19185.811 I 
2009.91/ 16th/ 1 2 4 6 /  26th 8472.0/ 3rd 1 758.7// 11 thi iBeijing 
653 .6  ~ 2311.51 j 9584.7,  / I !- 
j i 242.2'  1 1020.7 1 91.41 
/Shanghai 3688.21 
,(con't) 
9th 14641 25th 8773.11 2ndj 11 89.811 5th ~ 
~ 
8th ~ Beijing 1 1592861 
ishanahai j 4225361 3rd I 
__i 
I 
~ 1057.0 I 143.31 444.41 I 
IGuanqdonq I 11710831 I 1 s t /  
' Total Foreign Direct ~ 
Investment (Actually 
Source: Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, 1999a, A Statistical Survey p f  China. Chinese 
Statistical Publish i ng . 
T h e  author was unable to 2btain figures for retail sales alone 1 
*Rank among all the 3 1  provinces in Mainland China 
Note: Regionalised statistical information i s  gathered on the provincial basis.  In China, there are 
3 1  provinces: Beijing, Tianjiang, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoling, Ji l in, Heilongjiang, 
Shanghai, Jinagsu, jijinag, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Hainan, Chongqin, Sichuan, Gueizhou, Yuannan, Tibet, Xianxi, Ganshou, Qinghai, 
Lingxia and Xinjiang. 
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As shown in table 6.2, Guangdong. Shanghai and Beijing are the three provinces with 
the top urban average disposable income in China. Furthermore, Guangdong is ranked 
the first in terms of GDP, urban average disposable income, total sales in Lvholesale and 
retail sector and actually utilised foreign direct investment. Combining the statistical 
information on the aspects shown in the table, retailers' decisions of choosing one of 
these three places to launch their entries in China appear to be logical. 
The author's interview with the thirteen retailers offers further insights of the perception 
of foreign food retailers on the economic conditions of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong 
and Shenzhen. Apparently, they all looked at Beijing, Shanghai. Guangdon and 
Shenzhen as the rnost economically advanced places in China and are the most suitable 
for modernised retail development. In particular, they expressed that Shanghai is the 
most commercialised in China and has a very high income level. There is no denying v 
that different foreign retailers put different amount of focus on different cities when they 
e\-aluated the various cities during inten-iew. This is because their perception on 
economic situation of a city, and preference of a certain city. was influenced by their 
perception on other aspects of the city, such as competition landscape and political 
condition. All the three aspects of economic situation. competition landscape and 
political condition have to be considered together in evaluating the environment of 
different cities for foreign retail investment. Competition landscape and political 
conditions will be discussed in the following sections. 
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Table 6.3 Summary: Perception of Foreign Food Retailers on the Economic 














Guangdong has about 70 million population. 
Guangdong is close to Hong Kong. 
Development i s  most influenced and closest to Hong Kong compared to 
other places in China. 
Guangzhou has considerable opportunities. 
People in Guangzhou are more mobile and Westernised. 
Guangzhou is a very commercial city and more developed compared to 
other places in China. 
Shanghai is very commercial. 
Consumer awareness in terms of what they buy and who they buy from: 
Shanghai>Guangzhou>Shenzhen> 
Beijing 
Disposable income in Shanghai is very high. 
Shanghai is the business centre of China, easily accessible from 
different direction and from different countries, and has relatively good 
infrastructure compared to other cities in China. 
Shanghai is the largest market for FMCG retail in China. 
Food consumption in Shanghai is about 5% of that of whole China, even 
though there is only about 14 million inhabitants here. 
Shanghai is very commercial 
Shanghai is very commercial, technological advanced compared to other 
places in China. 
Beijing i s  about 10% to 25% les s  populated than Shanghai, but 
disposable income in Beijing is only about 5% less  than that in Shanghai. 
However, there i s  le s s  number of FMCG stores in Beijing than in 
Shanahai. 
6.3.1.2 Landscape of Retail Industry: An Overview 
In 1996, there was a total of 2785 foreign funded retail outlets in China (Glasse, 1999). 
The number jumped from 393 and 518 in 1994 and 1995 respectively to 2785 in 1996. 
Unfortunately, there does not exist any officially published data on the total number of 
outlets of foreign funded food retail outlets. Major foreign food retailers in China are 
listed in Table 6.4. 
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From the author’s observation, there are many different kinds of food retail outlets. 
These include ‘mom-and-pop‘ stores, kiosks, traditional Chinese wet markets, 
supermarkets. cash-and-carry, hypermarkets, supercentres, warehouse clubs, 
independent grocers and food stores, and convenient stores. In the supermarket sector, 
there are a few local retailers in Shanghai that are very strong compared to foreign 
retailers with the same format. These are Lianhua, Hualian, and Nonggongshang (Table 
6.5). The number of outlets of Lianhua and Hualian together in Shanghai increased to 
more than 400 in 1999’”. Even Royal Ahold could only occupied the 24“’ position after 
21 indigenous and two Hong Kong supermarket retailers in 1996 (Glasse, 1999). Late 
1999/early 2000 saw the disinvestment of Royal Ahold from China and it is widely 
believed that it was due to their poor performance in financial terms in Shanghai:“. 
Daiei \Japan 
Table 6.4 Foreign Food Retailers Active in China 
/Convenience Store 
Foreign Food retailer ICountry of Origin /Year of ]Retail Format(s) 
i i /F i r s t  Entry i 1 
I to-Y okado 
Jusco 
I i j 
Japan I ‘GMS 
Japan 11 995 D S  with supermarket 
Auchan ~France 12000 ~ 
Lotus /Thailand 
Makro i Netherlands 
Carrefour j France i 1994 ~ HvDermarket 
1997 S u percen tre 
1992 Cash and Carry 
Continent (Promodes) 1 France 11 999 /Hypermarket 
Metro IGermany 
Park’n Shop Hong Kong 
President Enterprises Taiwan 
Roval Ahold Netherlands 
1996 Cash and Carry 
1988 Supermarket 
1996 I SuDermarket 
IGA (PRD) a /Hong Kong ~ 1997 Isupercentre 
Seiyu 
Seven Eleven 
Japan 1995 D S  with supermarket 
Hong Kong 1992 Convenient Store 
Wal-Mart 
Wellcome 
U S A  1995 Supercentre and 
Warehouse Club 
Hong Kong 1994 Supermarket 











I Y ~ 
Y I 
Y j 
I Y 1 













’’) Source: Author‘s field study 
their closure but u,ithout success. 
Source: author’s field study. The author has attempted to contact Ahold to confirm the reasons behind 30 
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Remarks: 
a PRD stands for Pearl River Distribution. It is a company from Hong Kong and they bought the 
franchise of IGA, which is from USA, and operate in China. 
Wellcome started managing supermarkets in Beijing inside 2 hotels back in 1989. However, b 
their actual investment in China started in 1994 in Shenzhen. 
GMS stands for General Merchandise Store. It is, basically, similar to a department store with a C 
supermarket at the lowest level. This is a term used by Jusco to describe its own format. 
D S is an abbreviation for Department Store d 
e When the author was conducting her fieldwork in Shanghai in the summer of 1999, Ahold was 
undergoing restructuring. When the author attempted to contact them again in winter 
-1 999/Spring 2000, it was found that they had closed their operations in China. 
Sources: 
Company interviews; 
The Asian Wall Street Journal (issues published between June 1991 and November 1997); 
The China-Britain Trade Review (issues published between July 1993 and February 1998); 
The Economist (issues published between January 1991 and September 1997); 
Davies, K. 1993a. “The Lure of One Billion New Customers: Foreign Investment in the Retail 
Sector of the People’s Republic of China”. Working Paper 9301, Institute for Retail Studies, 
U n iversi t y of Stir1 ing ; 
Glasse, J. 1999. Supply Chain Management in China: Pitfalls and Opportunities to 2005. 
London: Financial Times. 
Overall, small retailers continue to predominate in the China retail market (Glasse, 
1999). Moreover, around 70% to 80% of fresh food items are purchased from the 
traditional Chinese wet markets (Glasse, 1999). These wet markets are an essential part 
of Chinese people’s life because freshness is much emphasised in Chinese ’eating 
culture’. A lot of the bigger scale foreign food retailers had incorporated the wet market 
into their stores to attract customers to enter the stores to induce their buying. Despite 
the aggregate dominance of small retailers and the wet markets, warehouse club, 
supermarkets, hypermarket and cash-and-carry have proved to be popular and food 
retailing has experienced the fastest growth within the retail sector in China (Glasse, 
1999). It is further forecast that the number of such outlets will grow and these retail 
formats will prosper. 
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Table 6.5 Leading supermarket chains in China, 1996 
j Number of 1 Turnover (RMB, 
1 ShoDs million) 
Name I Rank i Turnover (US$, million) 1 
12 
I1 
I Shanghai Lianhua 101 ~ 900.0 108.41 
Shanqhai Hualian , 1081 800.1 9 6 4  
Hutchison W hampoa/ 4212711 5 
Shenzhen Park’n 
Shop1 
Shanghai Park’n Shop I 
I 3 
4 Shenzhen Huarun 1 44 




i Resources I 




!I 4 1 Beijing Xifu 32 1 1 11.9; 13.51 ----11 5 i Dalian Wanqda I 28 I I 10.3i ’! 3.3 I 
9 
10 
1 1  
j 16 IHainan Shida I I01 1 _- 1101 I3.31 
11 7 ~ Beijing Eke long  I 161- 13.31 
! d S h  a nq h a i H u i s h an 191 109.41 13.2; 
- 110/ 
Shanghai Zhonghui i 151 170.41 20.51 
Dongguan Meijia 40 145.9 j 17.61 
Shanghai Jieqiang ~ 30 134.41 16.21 
Beijing Wufu I  22 132.91 I 6.01 
I 119 !Qingdao Haibin 101 103.21 12.41 
I 120 IBeijing Fanxing I 30 1 1021 12.31 
‘12 Beijing Mingzhu I 151 132 
I 
121 IGuangzhou Your I 141 73.31 8x1 
1 (Xidan Store) i I j I 1 
15.9 




Foshan Baihui 15 52.5‘ 6 .q 
Guangzhou Grandcity 1 13 50.0 6.0’  
Source: Taken from Glasse (1999, p.27) 
I 
Based on the author’s interviews, Table 6.6 provides a summary of how foreign food 
retailers perceived the competitive situation in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen. Basically, most foreign retailers did perceive that retail competition in 
Shanghai is the keenest in China. Guangzhou and Shenzhen have a similar degree of 
competition too. Consequently, margins have become so thin because of cut-throat 
pricing. Subsequently, surviving in the retail market in those places, especially Shanghai c 
24 iRoyal Ahold 1 151 25 
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3.0 
has become very difficult. There is less competition among retailers in Beijing and 
therefore there is relatively more room for foreign retailers to manoeuvre. The Chief 
Non-food Purchasing Officer of Company F pointed out, 
“As a matter of fact, the retail market in Shanghai is the most competitive in 
China and then Beijing and Shenzhen. Of course the retail market in Shanghai is 
also the largest in comparison to others. I believe there is still room for retailers 
in Shanghai, but not a lot of room, because the market is just that big. Another 
one comes in is going to kill somebody else, or everybody else is going to suffer 
a little bit. Right now, we are not in a situation where demand can be created by 
supply. If there is oversupply, everyone suffers. You can see the same thing 
happening in Eastern Europe after the crashing in of everybody (meaning 
retailers). Say Poland, by the end of April. all the British were there. all the 
French were there and all the German \yere there and the situation and 
competition is crazy. At the moment, the situation in Beijing and Guangzhou is 
not as bad as Shanghai although it is getting close” 
The Director. China Development of Company A showed a similar concerned. 
“The increase in the number of supermaket outlets is L-ery quick but it doesn‘t 
mean that there is no room for foreign c retailers. Of course this makes it tougher 
for every player. The number of stores of Hualian and Lianhua (turo leading local 
supermarket chain) together in Shanghai is more than that of Wellcome and 
Park’n Shop together in Hong Kong. Of course in terms of volume per store, they 
may be lower than that in Hong Kong, but in terms of outlet and trading area, 
they are proceeding very quickly. Of course I suspect that their speedy 
development is mainly because of governmental support and backing.” 
The same view is shared by the Buyng Manager of Company J. He further claimed that 
the margin has become increasingly low and competition is highly price-oriented. 
“Shanghai is over run with local supermarket chains: Hualian, Lianhua and 
Nonggongshang. In between them they have something like 500 stores. This is a 
huge number. Furthermore, one must note that these strong local competitors are 
getting preferential treatment in their development.. . . . . Margins are not what 
they are in the UK. Tesco gets about 30% average margin. It is not the case in 
China. Also, in the last two years, there was food deflation. The prices of food in 
supermarkets are generally coming down. Like now, Pepsi in BJ is about 1.8 
RMB. Two years ago, it was about 2.2RMB. It is quite a big difference. Retail 
prices are being pushed down a lot more. So, every player is struggling to 
increase sales against general deflation in the market and against the decrease of 
consumers’ willingness to spend money over the last few years. Consumers are 
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getting more money but they are less willing to spend. For example, in Shanghai. 
the market share of some of the more expensive leading manufacturing brands 
are being taken away by the cheaper options of the same product. For retailers, 
the margin for supermarkets in both Shanghai and Beijing is tiny, maybe about 
5%. If you don’t take the price down, the store next to you will a 10% 
cheaper price. What are you going to do? Basically supermarkets attract people 
on the basis of low prices. It a very price-oriented. Of course any retailer around 
the world is price-oriented but the price-orientation in Shanghai and Beijing is 
more serious. Shanghai is more price-oriented than Beijing, because of more 
competition in Shanghai. In Shanghai, if a consumer does not want to buy here. 
he can easily find another one within a very very close distance. In Beijing, it’s 
not quite the same, it‘s a big city. If he doesn’t buy here, he probably needs to 
travel half a kilometer to find another store. So, it’s a bit different. Moreover. 
consumers in Beijing are a bit less conscious about horn- much they spend 
compared to those in Shanghai. People in Beijing tend to spend more money than 
Shanghai.” 
The Executive Director, Finance of Company E also pointed out that every retailer in 
Shanghai competes by cut throat pricing at the moment. Subsequently, a lot of food 
retailers in the Shanghai market hardly make any money. The General Manager of a 
partnering company of Company L made the same comment about the low retail margin 
in Shanghai. 
On the other hand, the Executive Director, Finance of Company E revealed some 
problems of the Guangzhou market. albeit the competition there is not as intense as in 
Shanghai. One main problem in this market is counterfeit goods. He observed that 
consumers habit in Guangzhou is different from that in Shanghai. He also saw that the 
development of the retail 
Nevertheless, he said that 
market in Guangzhou is not well-planned and is quite chaotic. 
food retailers in general can still make money so far. 
For the Shenzhen retail market, the Director of Company A held this view, 
“Competition among food retailers in Shenzhen is getting more intense too, 
because there are already quite many local and foreign food retail operations 
there. On the other hand, it is not a big market but the income level there is the 
highest in China.’’ 
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Table 6.6 Summary: Perception of Foreign Food Retailers of the 





Company M L 
Competition w a s  not a critical factor to Company A about four or five years 
ago, but it is now. 
Shenzhen is not that big a city, but income level here i s  high. However, 
competition is very keen too. W e  may need to think about starting 
consolidation. 
Shanghai is similar to Shenzhen in terms of income level and Competition. 
However, the qualitative aspect of competition is different. Shanghai 
government has a more long-term orientation and better plan on 
developing retailing industry. Therefore the three top Shanghai local 
retailers have been developed s o  quickly with the Shanghai government’s 
backing. 
Competition in Shanghai is the keenest. Guangzhou is better for Company 
C. 
Intensity of competition is ranked in this order by Company E: 
Shanghai>Guangzhou>Shenzhen>Beijing 
Cut-throat pricing in Shanghai. The retail pricing in Guangzhou is similar. 
The competition in Shenzhen and Shenzhen outskirt is less  keen relatively 
and therefore there is less  mice war. 
Competition in Shanghai is obviously more intense than that in Beijing and 
Guangzhou because most people sees Shanghai as  the centre of industry 
and commerce and therefore lots of foreign retailers coming in. 
The  total number of FMCG outlets in Beijing i s  much less  than in 
Shanghai. Therefore, there is less  competition in Beijing. 
There are too many supermarkets in Shanghai, especially the local ones. 
The local supermarket chains get preferential treatment from the 
govern men t. 
Competition in Shanghai is more price-oriented than in BJ. 
There are many supermarket outlets in Guangzhou too. Consolidation 
may occur there soon. 
0 
Almost reaching saturation. 
Competition in Shanghai is very keen. There i s  le s s  competition in Beijing. 
Retail margin i s  very low in Shanghai. 
Competition in all Beijing city, Shanghai city and Guangzhou i s  very keen. 
The data from both the secondary sources presented earlier and the author’s interviews 
with foreign food retailers in China indicate three points. First, there is very intense 
competition in Shanghai. Secondly, the situation in Guangzhou and Shenzhen is 
developing close to that in Shanghai. Thirdly, food retail competition appears to be the 
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least when compared to Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. The next section will 
investigate the political conditions in these four places. 
6.3. I. 3 Political Conditions: An Overview 
The legal and regulatory environment for foreign food retail investment has been 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. This section, therefore, concentrates on how 
foreign retailers evaluated the political conditions of different cities in China. According 
to the author’s interview results, Shanghai, in general, is believed to be the most suitable 
for foreign retail development politically. because Shanghai government appears to be 
more open-minded and have a long term vision of supporting the development of 
distribution and retail industry in the province. They are keen on introducing advanced 
retail management system and know-how from foreign food retailers. The Chief 
Operating Officer of Company F put it this way, 
“All government officials in Shanghai are krery open-minded, very \vel1 trained 
about dealing with commerce, and ha\*e seen a lot of the world. Therefore, they 
have very different view to some of the administrative people in Beijing.” 
Beijing is thought to be a more ~olit ical  place in which commercial activities do not 
receive first priority. The Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer of Company F said, 
“Beijing is a place with lots of politics. Relationships networking rather than 
economic results that matters. In Shanghai. your business performance plays a 
bigger role in determining the government’s attitude towards you. This is the 
main difference in terms of political conditions between Beijing and Shanghai.” 
The General Manager of a foreign partner of Company L also remarked that, “1 think 
Beijing is a place for politics, not for commerce.” Guangdong and Shenzhen, on the 
other hand, are viewed as places where the governments have relatively little support or 
interference on the development of both local and foreign food retailing in their 
domains. The following is a table summarising the views of the foreign retailers that the 
author interviewed on the political conditions of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and 
Shenzhen. 
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Table 6.7 Summary of Perceptions of  Foreign Retailers on Political 










Beijing is the capital and it is a very political place. 
In terms of government support towards foreign food retailing: 
Shanghai>Shenzhen>Guangzhou>Beijing 
Guangzhou government does not have any plan on the retail 
development in Guangzhou. 
Shanghai government officials are well trained and open-minded. 
T h e  further away physically from the Central Government, the more 
freedom foreign retailers have in developing their business.  
T h e  are a lot of politics in Beijing. Relationship instead of economic 
performance that counts. T h i s  is the main difference between Beijing and 
Shanahai. 
ComPanv J i 
Company K 1 Strict foreign retail regulation in Beijing. 
Company L , 
Company M 
The following section combines the elements of economic development. retailing 
industry development and political conditions to derive the overall picture of the 
enirironment that embraces foreign direct investment in retailing in China in Beijing. 
Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. 
6.3. I .  4 Summary: Overall Environment for Foreign Direct Investment in Retailing 
Beijing is the capital of China and is considered the second largest shopping centre in 
China. The municipality is under direct administration of China’s Central Government. 
There are 10.6 million permanent residents in the city, while the transient population is 
over 3 million. Its overall economic power is next only to Shanghai. In 1998, the GDP of 
Beijing reached RMB 201 billion (which is US$ 24.2 billion). On the other band, the 
municipality is also granted the privilege to enjoy all the preferential policies given to 
open coastal cities. Owing to the fact that the city is administrated directly by China’s 
Central Government, all the projects involving foreign direct investment have to go 
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through the Central Government as well and therefore they will be subjected to more 
prudent scrutiny and stricter compliance to the regulations regarding foreign direct 
investment. 
Shanghai, on the other hand, with a population of 14 million in 1998, a GDP of RMB 
368 billion (US$ 44.3 billion) and per-capita disposable income of RMB 8773.1 (USS 
1057), has enjoyed the status of the best-known industrial city in China since the 1930s. 
In 1930s and 1940s, it was also a very important financial and trading centre on the 
Western Pacific coast. It was the most prosperous commercial city in China. However. 
after 1949, its overseas connections were truncated for many years due to China’s self- 
imposed isolation. Nevertheless, Shanghai nowadays is still famous for being China‘s 
most active retail centre. It has played the role of the largest shopping centre in China 
since the beginning of the twentieth century (Mun, 1988). Moreolrer. with the economic 
reforms and open door policy after 1979. Shanghai has strengthened its relationship with 
the rest of the world again. According to a study by Nyaw (1996). the majority of the 
forzign investors in the city perceik-e it as a place with huge market potential in China. 
They also believe that Shanghai offers them workers at a lower rate level but with higher 
technical skills, higher technological capabilities and short payback period of 
investment. On the other hand, as provincial government has been granted autonomy to 
a certain degree to deal with approval of projects related to foreign direct inyestment, in 
order to strive to maintain its reputation of good quality, the provincial government will 
adopt a more welcoming and open attitude towards foreign direct investors. 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, on the other hand, have a very high geographical proximity 
to Hong Kong. They have been largely subjected to the influence of Hong Kong’s life 
style. The products offered in these two locations tend to imitate the design of those in 
Hong Kong. In 1998, Guangdong has a population of 71 million. Its GDP amounted to 
RMB 794 billion (US$ 95.7) in 1998, with a per-capita income of RMB 8840 (US$ 
1065.1). Its location is quite distant from Beijing, where the Central Goyernment is 
situated. This, together with the proximity with Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
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attracted the largest proportion of foreign direct investment in China (Table 6.8). 
I 
O/O i O/O I O/O YO (US$ million) 1 
45.0 20.2 5.5 8.5 j 3 487 
42.2 20.5 1 8.1 9.8 15 495 
44.9 23.9 4.1 7.0 1 4366  j 
31.6 10.8 i 7.0 3.1 j 11 007 1 
28.7 9.8 8.9 2.6 j 27515 
25.9 - I  9.3 3.5 1 45257 ~ 
Table 6.8 Shares of Foreign Direct Investment in the PRC by Region, 1979- 
1993,1998 
I Year I Guangdong 1 SEZs i Shanghai 1 Beijing 1 China 1 
Sources: 
Figures for 1979-1 993: Adapted from Nyaw, M. K. 1996. “Investment Environment: Perceptions 
of Overseas Investors of Foreign-Funded Industrial Firms” in Y. M. Yeung and Y. W. 
Sang (eds.) Shanghai: Transformation and Modernisation Under China’s Open Policy. 
Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. 
Figures for 1998: Derived from China National Bureau of Statistics, 1999a, A Statistical Survey 
of China. Chinese Statistical Publishing. 
The implication of the different environments that embrace foreign direct investment in 
retailing in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Shenzhen respectively is different for 
different foreign food retailers in terms of selecting an appropriate city. This is because 
the strength of retailers varies and each retailer has its own emphasis on different factors 
when they evaluate the overall suitability of a place for their foreign direct 
investments”. Consequently, retailers’ choices on the first city to enter differ. 
Nevertheless, there is a common implication of diverse environment in different cities 
for all foreign retailers in China. This is regional protectionism? Regional 
protectionism in China is a common phenomenon that impedes the pace of distribution 
reform. An unequal pace of economic development across regions and wide variations in 
The factors that foreign food retailers used in determining which city of China to entry first is discussed 3 1  
in the next section. 
31 Regional protectionism is discussed in more details in Chapter 8. 
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reform policy are hence inevitable. Moreover. regional protectionism may also result in 
a lack of lateral co-operation that in turns makes co-ordination of distribution activities 
in different provinces an extremely difficult task. This issue will be investigated in 
further details in a later chapter. 
The next section looks at the elements foreign food retailers considered when 
determining the city to launch their first operation in China. 
6.3.7.5 Factors Affecting the Selection of City 
For food retailing, the usual factors that would be considered in deciding whether a 
market is suitable or not for a retailer to set foot on include GDP, population, income 
level, consumer buying habits and life style and competition. As mentioned in an earlier 
chapter, foreign food retailers were attracted to China for its market potential based on 
its huge size of population and the rate of economic development. Foreign retailers were, 
by law, only permitted to invest in Beijing. Shanghai, Tianjin, Tsingtao, Guangzhou and 
Dalian; and the five Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Shenzhen. Zhuhai. Shantou. 
Xiamen and Hainan when the retailing sector was first open to foreign direct investment. 
Guangdong, which include Guangdong and Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing show the 
highest disposable income level among all cities in China. Therefore, these three places 
have become the logical choices for foreign food retailers to launch their first operations 
in China. Different retailers have different ways to evaluate the overall appropriateness 
of a place for their own foreign direct investment although they are given the same set of 
economic indicators. This is because in assessing which place is the most suitable for 
them, they also need to consider their own company resources. Therefore, different 
retailers look at competition in the same place differently. The relationship or pan-ui 
network that one retailer has also differs in different places. The remark of the President 
of Company D illustrates this point very well, 
“We have a local partner and an international partner in our joint venture here. 
Our international partner have got a considerable amount of influence in this 
province. They have got many other businesses here. So in this joint venture. 
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they are one of the partners. This is one of the important factors we considered in 
choosing thi s city . ” 




I A has and the location of potential partner 
Company C I 
50 different locations in China were identified and each of those location 1 
was considered in terms of GDP, Population, retail expenses, legal 1 
problem to establish a retail business 
The location of foreign retailers‘ potential Chinese partners also plays a crucial role in 
their choice of city because as pointed out before, suitable Chinese partner for foreigp- 
Sino food retail joint ventures is not numerous in China. The following table provides a 
summary on the factors that foreign food retailers considered in choosing their first city 
of entry in China after they compared the retail environment of Beijing, Shanghai. 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen in terms of political condition, economic situation and retail 
competition in general. 
Company F 0 The  location of potential partner 
Table 6.9 Summary of Factors that Foreign Food Retailers Considered in 
City Selection in China 
I Company I ! Development of commerce and competition. I 
i 1 Company J I I Physical proximity to country of origin (ease of control and familiarity with the market) and industrial growth. 
I C o m p a n y ~  ~ Where they got the business licence. ~ 
I C o m p a n y ~  I Market Potential and the location of Dotential Dartner. , 
The economic development in China is gathering further momentum. The economic 
indicators of the inner cities in China are improving. This, coupled with the lack of 
competition in those inner cities, triggers the extension of interest of foreign food 
retailers into cities west of those coastal Chinese cities. Nevertheless, political factor 
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appears to remain significant in foreign food retailers’ decision on what cities to expand 
into. 
“I did a review of the whole of China. We looked at the potential of different 
parts of China. We identified 50 locations. We then group them up in sectors. 
Now I am running the southern sector and a colleague of mine is running the 
northern sector. We got those cities well documented. in terms of GDP. 
population and retail expense. Since I have been here, I have travelled quite 
extensively. Even last week, I was in Kumming and Chongqing. This morning, 
we have people from Cheungsha talking about a business opportunity in 
Cheungsha. So there are adequate opportunities all over here. But we have to 
solve the legal problem. So, we are ready to move very quickly once we get this 
thing behind us.” said the President of Company D. 
As presented at the beginning of this chapter, China is progressively liberalising its 
policy on foreign direct investment in retailing as a result of gaining entry into the World 
Trade Organisation. Foreign food retailers should gradually have more freedom in 
expanding into cities of which the income level and other economic indicators are 
becoming appropriate for modern retailing. 
6.3.2 Criteria for Choosing a Store Site 
Store location decisions have always been of critical importance to the success of 
retailers (Achabal, Gorr, and Mahahan, 1982 in Kaufmann, Donthu arid Brooks. 2000). 
There is no shortage of literature and research on this subject. ,4 number of disciplines 
have been contributing to the development of this topic. According to Clarke, Bennison 
and Pal (19971, the traditions of research on retail location can be classified into two 
main categories: the geographical tradition and the managementlmarketing tradition. 
The geographical tradition can be further divided into three different inter-related 
strands. The first strand concerns the spatial patterns of retailing. At the macro-level, this 
research strand looks at the distribution of shops, shopping centres and retailers within 
an area, and the associated patterns of shoppers’ behaviour. At the micro-level, the 
internal arrangement of shops within centres and its relationship to shoppers’ 
movements are studied. 
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The second strand lies in the development of data and techniques for locational analysis 
and evaluation. This strand of research complements and build on those data and 
techniques derived from the practitioner school of retail location, which is largely 
presented by the work of Nelson (1958 in Clarke. Bennison and Pal, 1997), Applebaun 
(1966 in Clarke, Bennison and Pal, 1997) and the more recent pragmatic. rule-based 
approach of property managers and surveyors such as Wiggins (1986 in Clarke. 
Bennison and Pal, 1997). The three main achievements of this strand in the 1980s and 
the 1990s are: the building of geodemographic classifications; the growth and 
refinement of spatial interaction modelling: and the development of geographical 
information system (GIS). A small number of retailers have now started to use the 
linking of all three in spatial decision support systems, and this move signals the 
inception of a phase of more rigorous technique development. 
The third strand of the geographical tradition addresses land use planning and public 
policy issues surrounding retail location. The impact of’ emergence of new retail 
formats” on the prevailing patterns and structures of retailing have been a major 
attraction to researchers within this strand? 
As shown above, the geographical tradition mainly provides an understanding of the 
critical significance of space and how it is structured. On the contrary, the 
management‘marketing tradition largely deals with how decisions that carry important 
spatial imprints are reached. The main focus of the marketing discipline is on the 
distribution of goods from producer to end-user and most marketing literature considers 
retail location as one element of marketing mix. Consequently, the marketing discipline 
focuses more on the aesthetic dimension of a ‘place’ instead of the spatial relationships 
of outlets to customers, competitors and other elements of their environment that have a 
spatial imprints. 
j3 Such as covered malls and large solus stores 
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The 1980s started to see a convergence of the geographical and marketing traditions in 
retail location research. Furthermore, more emphasis has been put on the strategic 
dimensions of location where consideration is vested to networks and portfolios of stores 
instead of to individual outlets. This strategic approach to retail location has become 
even more prominent as dramatic changes in retail environmental conditions occurred in 
1990s during which intensification of competition resulting from recession, saturation 
and rapid growth in internationalisation increased awareness of the importance of 
location to retail success and led to more diverse and complex patterns of locational 
decision making (Bennison et al., 1995 in Clarke, Bennison and Pal. 1997). With the 
intensifying need to plan for the opening and parallel operation of multiple stores within 
a single market, and across markets, the strategic nature of store location decisions has 
significantly increased (Ghosh and Craig, 1983 in Kaufmann. Donthu and Brooks, 
2000). In order to produce superior and the greatest market coverage in a given 
geographic area in the long run, the inter-relationship among outlets, both existing and 
potential, and the impact of the location of an individual outlet on the whole network of 
stores of a retailer should be prudently taken into consideration in location decision 
making of each store. Some authors suggest that retailers should plan for the entire array 
of outlets and select all locations in a single. initial decision (Achabal, Gorr, and 
Mahajan, 1982 in Kaufmann, Donthu and Brooks, 2000). 
The present study shows that all ten international retailers in China, who discussed the 
issue of the criteria for choosing a store site with the author during interviews, were 
looking for suitable sites continuously instead of selecting all future sties in a single 
decision process. Planning and selecting locations for the entire array of outlets in a 
single initial decision appear to be infeasible in China for at least the time being. The 
first reason is because modern food retailing only started about a decade ago when 
foreign investors went into the market. Therefore, there is no data for location analysis 
For research work on the formulation and implementation of policy. see Davies (1984 in Clarke, 34 
Bennison and Pal, 1997). 
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available on hand for foreign retailers. Gathering information and converting them into a 
meaningful database ready for locational analysis takes time, especially considering the 
geographical widespread of China. Consequently, planning and selecting an entire array 
of sites were impossible when the author carried her fieldwork. Secondly, land in China 
is largely controlled by the government. Obtaining land use right for a certain location is 
very political and time consuming. This makes it difficult for foreign retailers to select 
all the sites for their retail network at the beginning because of the high uncertainty of 
how the government will react to the site request of a foreign retailer. Thirdly, China 
only partially opened the retail sector to foreign investors when most of the intewiewees 
entered the market. At that stage, foreign retailing in China carried an experimental 
element and opening of a retail business of more than three outlets were not allowed 
except Makro and Ito-Yokado, who were centrally approved. 
Apart from the aggregate level, the strategic approach to retail location also considers 
the issue at the individual outlet level. Again, much literature has been developed on this 
subject. The type of sales and hence profitability assessment that retailers make in 
evaluating sites ranges from pure intuition to the use of mathematical models (Davies, 
1995b). Simkin (1990 in Davies, 1995b) claims that the norm would appear to be 
inclined towards the pragmatic instead of the analytic. Two concepts penetrate much 
location theory (Davis, 1995b): that retail centres have an attraction due to their relative 
size; and that this attraction decays rapidly with distance, which implies that proximity 
to where customers live or work is highly desirable as a location. These concepts are 
based on the assumption that retail sales are a function of the pedestrian flow (Paver and 
McLintock, 1935 in Davis, 1995b) and therefore pedestrian flow is one of the most 
widely used criteria by retail practitioners (Simkin, 1990 in Davies, 1995’0). Other 
criteria that are also widely used are geodemographic composition of the catchment, the 
presence of neighbouring outlets and the quality of transport at the site. 
All of the ten retailers interviewed who were willing to discuss about their site selection 
criteria reported that they looked at all of the above criteria in their site selection in 
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China. The General Manger of Company K and the Chief Operating Officer of 
Company F expressed that they used this same set of criteria all over the world. 
Collins (1 992 in Clarke, Bennison and Pal. 1997) maintains that a good match between 
the location and the product is vital to retail success. Dawson and Sparks (1986 in 
Clarke, Bennison and Pal, 1997) indicate that contrasting formats in different type of 
retail location can meet varied consumer needs. Obviously, different formats have 
different requirement on their sites. 
The present study found that foreign cash and carrys tend to locate at the edge of city 
centres where main traffic passes by and where they can hold a car park of about 500 
parking slots. Foreign hypermarkets and supercentres in China are usually found at 
locations away from city centres but close to residential areas with big enough parking 
space. Foreign supermarkets arr largely located in the more populated areas and in city 
c entres. 
From the above discussion, it appears that site selection methods of foreign retailers in 
China are the same as in the Western world. Nevertheless, one must note that site 
selection process is more based on guessing in China although similar criteria are 
considered and effort has been put into the attainment of precision. The Vice President, 
Asia Region of an associated company of Company E pointed out that. 
“Site selection is a exact science in the United States and other developed 
countries. It is based on accurate data and statistics. China has not reached that 
level yet. Site selection is still based on guesswork and gut feeling. Many 
mistakes are made and many stores and companies have folded.” 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, land is still strictly controlled by the government. 
Searching for and obtaining sites depends to a large extent on what the local 
governments want to offer. The President of Company D commented that, 
“Site selection is a European question. Remember what happens here: we’ve got 
a lot of restrictions and it’s not a question of site, it’s a question of what you can 
do. You have to get Central Government’s permission. It’s a restricted industry. 
Give you an example. I have been travelling. Say, Chonggqing, I have just been. 
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There is apparently an agency in that city, plus the resource commissioner. The 
commissioner and the city is virtually in control of the land. So. they take us 
around the city and say ‘look, there is this, is this, is this. So, what do you urant? 
How much you are going to pay’ and that sort of discussion. This means that the 
problem goes back to the system of state ownership and the governmental 
system. ’1’ 
This comment also implies that the guaizsi network of the Chinese partner should be 
very important in the process of site selection and acquisition. 
6.3.3 Availability of Suitable Sites 
Only six out of the thirteen retailers interviewed expressed their opinion on the 
availability of suitable sites for their retail development. Four retailers stated that finding 
a suitable site was difficult. Two retailers found that there R‘ere more than enough 
suitable sites available for their retail development. 
The two retailers jcorripany K and Company F) who were optimistic about the 
availability of suitable sites operated casn and carry in China. Company K belie\red that 
the critical issue u‘as not about availability of suitable site but the administrative process 
of obtaining the land. The General Manager of Company K stated that, 
“To me, there are just more than enough adequate sites. It’s not an issue. If you 
can sort out the administrative issues related to land. you can find 20 suitable 
sites for our company here.” 
Company F claimed that finding suitable site for their company expansion was not a 
problem because there was always the closing down of factories and hence those sites 
would be made available to bidders by the government. Nonetheless, both the Chief 
Operating Officer and the Chief Non-food Purchasing Officer of this company belielred 
that cost of land was going up and competition for land between bidders might increase 
in the near future. 
The four retailers (Companies I, J, E and L) who reported difficulty in finding suitable 




that because of this difficulty, they chose to expand each store’s existing 
at the time of being intervieu-ed. 
The author believes that the divergence in opinion on the availability of suitable site is 
due to the differential requirements on site by different retail formats. As mentioned in 
an earlier section, cash and carry tends to locate further away from city centres when 
compared to hypermarkets and superstores. Land is relatiLrely more abundant in those 
locations. Competition for land is relatively loiv. On the contrary, hypermarkets and 
superstores in China tend to locate closer to city centres and near residential areas. Less 
land space is available as it gets closer to city centres and competition is keener. 
Consequently, it is more difficult to find suitable sites for these formats. The difficulty 
intensifies for Company J, a supermarket retailer in Beijing, because it preferred sites in 
city centres. 
6.3.4 Store Development (Legal Procedures and Technical Issues) 
6.3.4. I An Overview on Land System in China 
The last two decades saw a progressive reform of the land tenure system although c the 
charge of a premium (the form of collecting the total land rent for the entire term of the 
lease) for the use of land by negotiation, auction or tender still forms only a small 
proportion of total land transactions nowadays. The majority of land is still allocated 
administratively to government and quasi-government organisations by a land use fee 
system that is similar to the collection of an annual land tax. Modern real estate is 
governed by the Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Administration of the Urban 
Real Estate. This law was adopted and promulgated at the Eighth Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on 5 July 1994 and 
become effective on 1 January 1995. The real estate law is still far from precise. The law 
is mainly concerned with principles and policies instead of details, which is typical of 
Chinese laws at the national level35 (Walker, Levett and Flangan, 1998). The national 
Laws made by the National people’s Congress or its standing committee are the highest authont! of 
China. However, they normally resemble statements of general policy and require detailed implementing 
35 
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law sets out the framework and local governments f i l l  the gaps with implementing 
regulations after assessing the situation. Investors need to refer to the specific local rules 
and regulations for details of how the national principles would be applied in the local 
context. Drafting such regulations takes considerable time and the resulting provisions 
are flexible so that much discretionary power is allowed to local governments to 
interpret and implement the national policy. The following figure shows the hierarchy of 
formal and informal lawmaking and the corresponding legislation affecting construction. 
Figure 6.1 Hierarchy of Formal and Informal Lawmaking and 
Corresponding Construction Legislation 
National People’s Congress (NPC): ‘basic law’, 3 
‘resolutions’, ‘decision’ 
N P C  Standing Committee: ‘laws’, ‘resolution’, 
‘decisions’ 
State Council: ‘regulations’, ‘other normative 
Documents’ 
Ministr ies, Commissions and Bureaus: ‘rules’, 







Local People’s Congresses with lawmaking 
Power (municipal, provincial, provincial 
Capital, ‘quite big city’): ‘local administrative 
rules’, ‘other normative documents’ 
Local people’s governments with lawmaking 
power (municipal, provincial, provincial capital, 
‘Quite big city’): ‘local administrative rules’, 
’other normative documents’ 
Local People’s congress and governments 
without lawmaking power: ‘other 





P R C  Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture 
Law and Administration of Urban Real 
Estate Law 
City Planning Regulations 
Implementing regulations, detailed 
technical standards, rules, and 
procedures 
regulations. These regulations are usually made by the State Council for national effect and by local 
government for local effect. Often the lower the level of government. the more detailed are the provisions. 
Local implementing regulations are intended to interpret the way in which national provisions will be 
applied in the local context but leave much discretion to the implementers. Clarity only exists at the le\.el 
of rules and circulars. When conflicts arise between two sets of laws. the one published by the superior 
lawmaking organ will prevail (Walker, Levett and Flanagan. 1998). 
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6.3.4.2 Obtaining Land Use Rights 
Land use rights are rights for which the State demanded compensation and which have a 
definite term. Land use right created after 1986 is normally termed “granted land use 
right”?”. Foreign investment enterprises established after the effectiveness of the 1994 
Law on Urban Real Estate Administration usually obtain this kind of land use rights. 
Granted land use rights have specified term with a maximum of 70 years”. have to be 
used for approved purposes only’8, is transferable but subject to use restriction”, and is 




Five of the 
and mortgageable“. Moreover, grantee pays according to the Granting 
More specifically, the maximum term of granted land use rights is 
by the schedule of purposes. For commercial purpose. it is normally 40 
interviewed retailers in the author’s study obtained granted land use right 
from the government and built their retail complex from scratch. Company F and 
Company K obtained the right for 40 years. Company G 50 years. Company D and 
Company L both 30 years. These results imply that the duration of the granted land use 
right is not fixed as the regulation (discussed above) stipulated and is granted at the 
discretion of the authority to a certain extent. 
Prior to 1999, city or county governments had the authority to grant land use rights in 
parcels of land of certain maximum size“. The Bureau of Land Administration in the 
i h  1986 Land Administration Law 
,- 
-” Law on Lirban Real Estate Administration, Section 13. Intenm ProLisions on Urban Land Use Rights. 
Section 12. 
Law on Urban Real Estate Administration. Section 1 1. 17. Land Administration Lam,. Section 55. 
Law on Urban Real Estate Administration, Sections 36-45. Interim Provisions on Urban Land b s e  
Interim Provisions on Urban Land Rights. Sections 28-3 1 .  
Law on Urban Real Estate Administration, Section 47. Interim Provisions on Urban Land Rights, 
Section 32. 
Law on urban Real Estate Administration, Section 15. Interim Provisions on Urban Land Rights, 
Section 14. Land Administration Law, Section 55. 
‘’ 1990 Interim Provisions for the Granting and Transfemng of Land Use Rights on Urban State Ouned 
Land in Cities and Towns, Section 12. 
If the proposed land use right was for a parcel larger than that authorized to be contracted for by a given 
city or county, then such agency had to seek the authority of a higher state organ to appr0L.e the grant. 
-3 8 
-3 9 
Rights, Sections 19-27. 
10 
31 
1 2  
13 
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city or county was usually the agent to facilitate the granting of the right but the actual 
land use right contract was between city or county“. 
In 1998, the Land Administration Law establishes a new system called Land Use 
Purpose Control System, which became effective on 1 January 1999, for authorisation of 
the creation of granted land use rights. The system calls for an integrated system of 
comprehensive plans at the National. Provincial, Prefectural, County and Township 
levels. Cities and counties are now required to prepare a more detailed plan 
implementing the National Annual Land Use Plan by setting forth specifically the name 
of each development, the nature of the project. the size of the required investment for the 
project, the number of parcels and their size, and the character of the preexisting use of 
the land. These plans must be approved by the provincial governments and the 
provincial plans must in turn be approved by the State Council. 
A party seeking a land use right can initiate a request for that right. The first step is to 
develop a feasibility plan and submit it for preliminary approval to the local Land 
Administration Bureau. Upon obtaining feasibility approval, the applicant \vi11 proceed 
to the local agencies that are responsible for approving construction projects, often the 
local Planning Commission, for another approval. If successful, the applicant will return 
to the Land Administration Bureau for processing of the land use right itself. The Bureau 
will determine whether and how to provide the land for the proposed purpose in 
accordance with the various planning controls. Upon approval at this stage, the applicant 
will then sign a land use contract. 
Alternative means of obtaining granted land use rights are auction and bid invitation. 
Nevertheless, if the land is intended for commercial, tourist, recreational purposes or for 
luxury housing, the land use right must be granted by auction or bid invitation “if 
possible” (Randolph and Lou, 2000). 
35 Urban Real Estate Administration Law,  Sections 1 1 .  14. 
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Foreign-Sino joint ventures in China usually obtain land in one of the ways described 
above. In some cases, the joint venture company applies to the local Land 
Administration Bureau for a granted land use right. In other cases, auction or tender, 
when land is offered on this basis, are used. 
All of the five retailers mentioned above obtained their land through direct negotiation 
with the government. This result appears to contradict, to a certain extent, the regulation 
that land use rights for land intended for commercial purposes must be granted by 
auction or bid invitation “if possible”, because retailing is a commercial activity and 
therefore the land use right granted should be by auction or bid invitation “if possible”. 
The phrase “if possible” is very ambiguous and this leaves much flexibility to the 
granting authority. One reason for the ‘discrepancy’ could be that the land required by 
those five retailers is away from city centres. Moreover, these retailers are international 
retailers with intention to invest heavily into their retail business in China. This was 
what IocaI governments wanted and needed at the time when they entered China. This 
very nature of the retailer’s investment and their land requirement may explain the 
‘discrepancy’ between the lam. itself and its implementation. 
Apart from obtaining land from direct negotiation, auction or bid invitation. foreign-Sin0 
joint ventures sometimes obtain land through the contribution of land by the Chinese 
partners. In these cases, the Chinese partners obtain the right to develop a certain piece 
of land and then contribute the value of the land to the joint ventures. Company M 
reported that the land on which their retail complex located belonged to and contributed 
to the joint venture by their Chinese partner. 
Company F stated that they always buy laild and construct their cash and carry complex 
from scratch regardless of which country they are in. This is because 
“we can’t implement our system the way we want to if we do not get buildings 
with the exact features we want. We require ground stores. We need to use high 
racks, about 7.5 m high. Therefore, we need a building of at least 10 m high on 
the ground floor. We also want to have the customer exit just behind the cashier 
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and there must be a covered parking lot coming with the site, which is very 
important for protecting the merchandise being transported in and out of the store 
from sun and rain. It is extremely difficult to find a site with the exact 
requirements we want. Therefore, we always buy land and construct our own 
complex,’’ claimed the Chief Operating Office of Company F. 
Company D, which is also a cash and carry operator in China, developed their stores in 
the same way as Company F. The President of this company held similar opinion to that 
of the Chief Operation Officer of Company F at the beginning, but he changed his mind 
after running the business in China for a few years and learning about the situation. This 
is what he revealed during interview. 
“Our company usually own and develop our own sites no matter where we go. 
But in China, after being here for a number of years, I started to think that this 
does not make economic sense and I am persuading my colleagues that owning 
and developing our stores is not necessary here. The reason is that the Chinese 
government is gradually leasing land for only 30 years. A few years ago, they 
granted land for 50 years. They are shortening the term of granted land use rights 
now. So, nrhy should I put in so much money at the beginning when I are only 
having it for 30 years?” 
Despite his change of opinion. he did not indicate the chance of their company changing 
their policy on site acquisition and store development in China in the near future. 
In contrast to Companies F, K ,  G, D and L, companies I, B, A, J and E rented their 
existing business site. The main reasons for their renting a site instead of getting the land 
use right and building up their own store were that the former is cheaper than the latter 
and their retail operations could start in a much shorter time once they decided to invest 
in the Chinese retail market. The General Manager of Company I stated that if they had 
to own a piece of land and build the complex from scratch, it would take them at least 
two years in building the store before they could actually start their business. The 
bxecutive Director of Company E pointed out another advantage of renting a site. He 
claimed that although most of the building available for renting did not match their 
requirement, they still chose to stick with their renting policy because renting a site was 
- 
much cheaper so that if they felt that the chosen location was not right at a later time, 
they could dispose of the store and move to other places relatively more easily. In 
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addition, the sophistication of construction process in China presents a further reason for 
some retailers’ preference to rent a site. The Vice President of Company B made this 
remark, 
“We like buying exiting stores, because it is easier, no headache on construction. 
construction is not easy. There are lots of laws and regulations in China for 
construction. We simply try to avoid that. Therefore, we u.ill just wait for ready 
made sites.” 
The complicated procedures and requirements on construction in China will be 
discussed later. On the other hand, the Direction of Company A and the Buying 
Manager of Company J (Ccmpanies A and J operated supermarkets in China) both 
believed that supermarket retailers seldom buy land and build their stores from scratch. 
Supermarket retailers require a large number of stores in order to obtain economies of 
scale. Therefore, buying land and build stores from scratch do not make economic sense 
to supermarket retailers. Having said that Companies A and J preferred renting store 
sites, the Director of Company A pointed out that they ne\.er bought existing 
supermarket stores in China, which he said was very common to retailers in other 
coantries. because the quality of those supermarket stores was poor. 
“The existing - supermarket stores that are available for renting in China haye no 
renovation or decoration. ,4 lot of the original merchandise is \.cry slokv moving 
and the equipment i s  more than ten or even twenty years old and has fully 
depreciated. Would you consider buying them under such condition? It ‘d better 
for us to rent a greenfield site and renovate and build up the inside cf the xhole 
store ourselves,” stated the Director of Company A. 
6.3.4.3 The Approval Procedure for Site Development and Construction Project 
A proposal to establish a foreign-Sino joint venture in China frequently incorporates the 
construction of buildings and other facilities. Joint venture inyestment proposals and 
construction approvals are often seen as a continuum of the same process. The state 
administration system in China is complex and usually presents formidable problems for 
foreign joint venture partners in obtaining approvals for both the joint venture itself and 
the construction that they requires. The Vice President of Company B validated this 
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point as mentioned earlier. The General Manager of Company K also shares the same 
view. He commented, 
“We got the land and then built up the stores ourselves. We used outside 
contractors. They are local ones. It is difficult to get them because the process is 
very complicated, let’s say, very strictly governmental. First of all. building has 
to be built according to goyemment regulations. They claim that government 
standards are optimal standards, but they are not always the best standard. Then, 
there are regulations for the bidding process of building and that’s very much in 
favour of the government and the construction company and not of the 
customers. So, it takes time to get to them, build in such ways. to get round the 
rules and etc. 7 1  
Figure 6.2 presents the in\-estment and capital construction approval procedures for 
foreign-Sino joint ventures in China. All the steps are clearly shown in the figure. 
6.3.4.4 The Construction Market 
Before the economic reform, all China’s construction companies were state-owned. 
Projects were allocated to contractors by the government. Prices were fixed on the basis 
of standard schedules of price. Nowadays. many major construction projects, both 
domestic and joint venture, x e  bid by competitive tender among construction 
companies. Competitive tendering is normal practice in Western markets but to Chinese 
contractors it was a major advancement from the system of having projects allocated to 
them. 
Since 1994, foreign contractors are permitted to act as general contractors and bid for 
work for foreign invested construction projects. Simultaneously. local Chinese 
construction companies are rapidly updating their techniques and are adopting new 
approaches to management. Despite the progressive changes in the construction industry 
in recent years, nevertheless, many construction companies remain to operate in a 
bureaucratic environment in which they are responsible to their local construction 
commission or their state authority. For example, most ministries control their own 
construction companies . 
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Figur~6.2 Investment and Capital Construction Approvals Procedure 
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Foreign contractors working in China usually subcontract work to Chinese construction 
companies because there is no other feasible way of carrying out projects. Foreign 
construction companies are allowed to undertake construction work in China but they 
are not legal persons and foreign investors are not allowed to set up wholly owned 
construction enterprises (Fang. 1998 in Walker, Levett and Flangan, 1998). Foreign 
contractors are only permitted to undertake work for foreign-Sino joint venture clients 
and some special classes of projects. Furthermore, working in China without 
collaborating with a Chinese construction company is impractical for a foreign general 
contractor for problems that they would otherwise be encountered in obtaining local 
labour and materials, and in dealing with the many parties and go\-ernment agencies 
involved. 
6.3.4.5 Construction 
Currently, there are four options available to a foreign-Sin0 joint venture company for 
the appointment of a contractor. They can employ a Chinese construction company. a 
Chinese construction company together with a foreign construction company that acts in 
a management role only, a foreign-Sino joint venture construction company. or a foreign 
construction company that possesses a valid licence and is duly registered. In reality, the 
project will be built by a Chinese contractor regardless of what option is chosen for 
reasons mentioned earlier. 
For construction projects of a foreign-Sino joint venture client, only Class 1 Chinese 
contractors will be used. The major Chinese construction companies that are qualified to 
work on their projects are owned by either the state, province or municipality. The ways 
by which a contractor is chosen include calling for tenders from a group of Class 1 
contractors in the administrative region in which the project is situated or negotiation 
with a single contractor. The companies invited to tender or selected for negotiation may 
be proposed by the Chinese partner in the joint venture or the local Construction 
Commission. The Chinese partner usually has sound knowledge of the strengths and 
track records of local construction companies or at least is in a good position to obtain 
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such information. Construction Commissions administer and are held responsible for 
supervising the work of the construction companies that are under their control. These 
construction companies may include specialist contractors such as building engineering 
services contractors that are often referred to as engineering installation contractors. 
Walker, Levett and Flangan (1998) claim that many of the larger national Chinese 
construction companies in the major cities have been involved in building 'high-tech' 
international quality buildings over the past two decades. The level of activity in these 
construction projects, especially in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beij ing. has been far 
higher than in the main cities in Europe and the USA. 
Homrever, the Buying Manger of Company K claimed that for retailing construction 
projects, the better contractors were the local branches of construction companies in 
Hong Kong because they had much more experience in building retail stores. Company 
D pointed out that they used a Hong Kong contractor in their retail complex 
development, while Company K employed a local one. 
6.3.4.6 Construction Cost 
According to Walker, Levett and Flangan (1 998), the rough order of construction costs 
for joint venture projects in China, with the most expensive first. is Japan. United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong, Australia, the USA and then China. 
6.3.4.7 Design 
Foreign design practices are required by a regulation issued by the State Development 
Planning Commission to work with Chinese design institutes. Foreign designers' 
drawing and specifications must be checked, approved and stamped by a design institute 
to signify approval. 
Commentators claim that the design institutes in China adopt similar practices to foreign 
designers (Walker, Levett and Flangan, 1998). They use a large range of standard design 
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details for parts of local projects and are using computer-aided design packages to 
produce working drawings. 
Seven retailers in the study mentioned that they used much of their parents’ expertise in 
the store development and design in China because this is crucial to the retail business. 
The President of Company D stated, 
“We control the building design because the function of the building is crucial to 
the economics of the business and so we are keen to bring in that expertise. We 
have a consulting group in our home country who has built a lot of our stores in 
different countries in Asia. So, we know exactly what we want in a building.” 
The General Manager of a closely associated company of Company L also made a 
similar point. He asserted that Company L was \rery keen on abiding by their company 
rules on the feature of the building and the interior design of the stores in China because 
they believed that these .&’ere critical to their retail operations. Therefore, the store 
deLTelopment and interior design of Company L in\.ol\.-ed a specialised team from their 
home country‘”. Company B also employed some engineers in their home country in the 
process when they iirst entered China. 
6.3.5 Poiitical Opposition from Local Retailers 
U%en compared to most local Chinese retailers, the foreign retailers that have entered 
the Chinese market are much better off in terms of capital, expertise and technology. 
Therefore. foreign retailers present great threat to the local retailers’ sunival. 
Six retailers in the present study reported that they had experienced political opposition 
from local retailers in one way or arlother. According to the intewiew results, the 
political opposition from local retailers ranges from informal lobbying by the local 
retailers to their local government against the development of foreign retailers, to 
disturbance on foreign retailers’ operation (see examples following), to creation of 
negative propaganda. 
Further details on in-store fixtures and fittings are not pursued in the present study 16 
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According to an Agricultural Specialist of US Agricultural Trade Office, once there was 
an eye-catching “news report” article in a local paper saying that a Chinese consumer 
was suing Company D for damages because he was beaten up by the security guard of 
the company for something he had not done. This happened only a few months after the 
opening of Company D. The Agricultural Specialist highly suspected that this story was 
generated by local retailers in an attempt to tell people that Company D was not a good 
place to shop. He also revealed that a year before this incident, there was a big lawsuit 
suing Company B by a local person who bought a television from Company B. The 
person claimed that Company B mis-advertised the television as a product from the USA 
but it was actually produced by an American joint venture located in Shenzhen. He 
therefore sued Company B for misrepresentation. The Agricultural Specialist believed 
that there was a high chance that some local retailers were behind this incident. 
A similar story was provided by the Executive Director of Company E when describing 
the kind of political opposition that they encountered from local retailers: 
“There is some political opposition. When their business can3 compete with you. 
they will use some people to disturb you. For example. it is easy to give you 
trouble, because the system in China is very sophisticated. They can get an 
official into your store, collect a bottle of air sample and take it to test to see if 
your polluted level exceed the standard or not. Or go to your kitchen saying that 
you are dirty and then tell you that you have to clean it up and improve the 
hygiene standard before you can open and use the kitchen again. There are so 
many of such tricks in China. China has problem in this sense.” 
Nevertheless, the Executive Director of Company E claimed that such political 
opposition would not be able to affect their operation and development in China to a 
significant level. 
“Our company has established quite a good relationship with the local 
government so that we also ’know people’ in the government, not only the local 
retailers do. So, if there is any problem between us and the local retailers. we 
both know people in the government and hence we can usually sit down to solve 
the problem.” 
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Apart from Company E. all of the other five retailers who reported opposition from local 
retailers stated that their business and development was not materially affected by those 
oppositions. All of them mentioned that their development in China was supported by 
the local governments and the governments in China in different levels largely ignored 
the opposition of local retailers against foreign retailers. Even if local retailers 
complained directly to local governments, the foreign retailers felt that the government 
did not care and would not take any action. Furthermore, the Chief Non-Purchasing 
Officer of Company F firmly believed that as their company gradually benefiting the 
community, their image and business would increasing be immune from being damaged 
by negative propaganda created by opposing parties. The Chief Food Purchasing Officer 
and the Chief Operating Officer of the same company further pointed out that there 
should be no reason for local retailers to oppose their company’s development because 
they did not target the same customers. Company F targeted professional customers 
while local retailers targeted individual consumers. Therefore. they alleged that when the 
local retailers slowly learned this different nature of their business. the opposition would 
disappear. 
6.4 Conclusion: Relationship Between Foreign Retailers and Chinese 
Government at Different Levels and its Importance 
This chapter accounts for some of the basic legal and regulatory infrastructure that 
foreign retailers face in China, the various issues relating to mode of entry, such as 
partner selection, ownership and share of managerial control between partners, and site 
selection and store development procedures and processes. Highlights of some important 
stipulated laws and regulations related to these three issues are presented, and the views 
and experience of foreign retailers on the three issues discussed. The materials presented 
in this chapter demonstrate that all market entry related issues in China involve onerous 
and complicated administrative procedures and require good relationships between 
foreign retailers and the Chinese governments at various levels. One reason for the 
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present situation is the legacy of the state-owned system. Another reason is that Chinese 
economic and law reform still has quite a distance to go before systems becomes well 
designed, organised, managed and implemented in the Western standards. The remedy 
for this ‘problematic’ Chinese business context is to establish good relationships with 
governments at different levels. 
Ten retailers interviewed explicitly pointed out that having a good relationship with 
3 povernments, either local, of a higher level, or the Central Government, was crucial to 
their business development in China4-. Both Companies F and B stressed that this 
relationship was important in getting business licences and other permissions in their 
business development. This point is best illustrated by the comment of the Vice 
President of an associated company of Company E. 
“Nothing is easy to do in China. It is always best if you have connections of 
some type. Company E has been doing other business in China for many years. If 
it mras not for their connections and relationships that they have built over the 
years with government organisations, their retail entry to China would still be 
just an idea. There are countless bmiers in doing business in China. the red tape 
is endless and fees for foreign companies. public senicss,  taxes, etc. you need t.c, 
know someone local well to help you to get through these barriers, or else you 
will be eaten up very quickly. 7, 
Having the relationship, according to the Chief Food Purchasing Officer of Company F, 
could also means having support from the governments against opposition against their 
company by some interest groups. 
Six retailers mentioned that they had performed joint activities with the local 
governments. These activities range from holding seminars, helping with training 
courses, to sponsoring community events. For illustration, the Chief Non-Food 
Purchasing Office of Company F said that their company had organised seminars for 
government officials who were in charge of the industry and some Chinese retail 
operators several times to introduce them the concept of cash and carry, and worked 
There was no discussion on this subject with Company A during the inteniew because of the refusal of 1 7  
the interviewee. 
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with governments to organise trade shows. Company B had also held seminars for 
government departments that were in charge of the retail industry to teach them about 
retailing. They once held a large-scale seminar for local retailers in Shenzhen to 
introduce them about mass retailing, and a seminar in Beijing on distribution centres. 
Similarly, Company J had held several training sessions on retailing for local 
governments. Company H had also done the same for their local Commercial 
Committee. On the other hand. Company E, according to its Financial Executive 
Director, had provided assistance to the local China Store Association in the following 
“A lot of times, when they go abroad. we have arranged for them to visit our 
associated companies in those countries they went to. such as Australia. On the 
other hand, when they have to go abroad, they will ask us to help them to write 
recommendation letters. We will do it for them. Sometimes, we help them with 
organising seminars together, arrange trainers to come to China as speakers. This 
is our relationship.” 
The kind of joint activities that Company K and Company C had done with the 
government were different from those described above. Company K once sponsored a 
community event for young people organised by the district government. Company C 
mainly concentrated on organising joint environmental consemation activities with the 
L government. Most of these companies believed that besides having a good relationship 
with the governmenr, they also need to contribute to and be a part of the community. 
Up until the time when the author’s fieldwork was carried out, nine retailers claimed that 
they had been having strong support from their local governments for their business 
development and expressed that their relationships with the governments were good. 
One should note that in China, when relationships are involved, the main focus is on 
personal relationships. This point was stressed by the CEO of Company F. He further 
added that, 
“You never know who is the one to make the final decision, and therefore we 
need to focus widely on building relationships with a broad number of people.. . 9 7  
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Establishing good relationships takes considerable time and effort because trust. a 
crucial element, can only be built gradually through increasing interactions betu een the 
parties involved. Economic exchange transactions are minor ones at the beginning and 
little trust exists between the parties engaged in the exchange. The parties can then prove 
their trustworthiness through these transactions and trust is slowly built up. 
Subsequently, a social exchange relationship emerges. Hallen ( 1992) further proposes 
that such a social exchange relationship provides underlying preconditions and support 
for industrial and business activities in international business. In the case of the 
establishment of relationships between foreign retailers and local parties in\-ol\-ed, such 
as government officials and local suppliers, economic exchange transactions may not 
necessarily be involved at the beginning. Nevertheless, trust between the parties can still 
be built up gradually as their interactions (such as those described in the last paragraph) 
increased. The relationship hence established mi l l  then provide support for business 
activities of foreign retailers in China. The time and effort required to establish 
relationships is a business a cos!. However, Thorelli (1 986) and Easton ( 1992) maintain 
that a good network of connection reduces uncertainty, enables fast access to 
information, and increases reliability and responsiveness in a business context. They 
argue that the gain far outweighs the cost. 
As relationships can only be built through actual interactions and knowledge, especially 
tacit, of China, and can only be learned through operating business in the context, it is 
logical to argue that investing in China at an early stage, when the systems there are not 
fully developed and the market not fully opened yet, offers foreign retailers golden 
opportunities to establish useful relationships and accumulate knowledge. both explicit 
and tacit, of the market. The relationship and knowledge, in turns, will leverage them 
advantages over late comers in the future. 
One may argue that once the system in China improved and become closer to 
international standards, the advantages leveraged by the relationships that earlier movers 
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have established w7ill not be sustained. Howe\.er, one must notice that the context in 
question is China and the people involved are Chinese. The importance of and reliance 
on relationships and networks in overseas Chinese‘* business dealings are well 
documented (for examples, Redding, 1993, 1995; Wong. 1992; Whitley, 1992: Pyatt, 
1995a, 1995b). Relationships and networks have attributed strongly to the success of 
most Chinese businesses over decades because they allow much flexibility to business 
transactions. A commentator (in Kao, 1993) remarks that “doing business is like driving 
a car ...... in Taiwan, even if the light is red somebody can get through it. If it‘s green, 
there still aren’t rules to tell you how to go.” Follomving this line of argument, pan.ui  
(relationship) will always remain one very important characteristics of Chinese 
communities in China and remain a crucial element in which business dealings are 
embedded regardless of how the legal and economic system in China will change in the 
future. Therefore, the relationships that foreign retailers have built up and the knowledge 
of local culture and market that they have leanit through their experience now will still 
provide them advantages in the future. 
Furthermore, the experience of doing business in China, a highly relationship-oriented 
context, is valuable to company’s international expansion in many other East Asian 
countries, especially as Japan and South Korea. This is because reliance on relationships 
and networking instead of clear rules and regulations are also paramount in the business 
context in many East Asian countries (Alston, 1989; Whitley, 1992). There is no doubt 
that the forms and features of the type of networks in different Asian country, for 
example, between Chinese business networks and Korean Chaebol, is different. 
Nevertheless, the most crucial part of the learning process of foreign retailers is not the 
accumulation of the explicit part of knowledge but that of the tacit part, which in this 
context, is the mind set and capability needed in working in a business environment in 
which rules and regulations are not as heavily relied upon as relationships and 
networking. This tenet of learning is discussed in more details in the next chapter. 
Overseas Chinese includes Chinese people in Hong Kong, Taiw,anese, Singaporeans with Chinese 1 8  
origin, and all other people residing outside mainland China but with a Chinese origin. 
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Chapter 7 
Transfer of Retail Expertise & Operational Issues 
The extent and impact of retail internationalisation has become increasingly 
prominent in the last fifteen years. Internationalisation has appeared to be inevitable 
for those Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) retailers who desire to maintain a 
strong and competitive position in the marketplace. Owing to the opportunities 
offered in transitional economies in recent years, several Western FMCG retailers 
with their ‘superior’ retail expertise have ambitiously expanded their operation 
domains into these largely untapped markets. Modem Western retailing has evolved 
over a long period of time in Europe and North America, whereas structured retail 
development in transitional economies, such as China and Central Europe, only 
began about a decade ago. Therefore, there is a gap in the level of retail development 
between the developed countries and the countries in transition. This provides 
retailers from developed countries with an opportunity to exploit the under- 
developed retail industry in transitional economies. Due to the differences in 
economic, social, cultural, technological and political conditions between the 
developed and the developing countries, retailers are confronted with many 
complications when they transfer their retail expertise fiom their developed domestic 
countries to the developing host countries. This is because their retail expertise is 
rooted in a specific set of underlying social, economic and political preconditions and 
level of infrastructure development. 
This chapter discusses the complications that foreign FMCG retailers encountered in 
their process of transfer of retail expertise fiom their domestic base into China. 
Particular attention is focused on three aspects of retail expertise: supply chain 
management, retail formats and corporate culture. The first section presents an 
analytical framework of international flows of retail expertise. The next section 
investigates issues relating to supply chain management in China. The thrd section 
analyses the extent of adaptation that foreign retailers made to their formats. The 
fourth section evaluates the human resources policies that foreign retailers adopt. The 
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chapter concludes with the importance of learning processes to international retail 
operators. 
7.1 Analytical Framework of International Transfer of Retail Expertise 
7.7.7 The Concept of Retail Expertise 
The term “retail expertise”’ has not been well-defined in the literature. Kacker (1988) 
defines it broadly as the business concepts, operating policies and techniques 
employed in a retail business in a given environmental setting. He further suggests 
that the term includes two elements: the managerial element, which embraces 
concepts, policies and systems; and the technical elements, which are the techniques 
employed in areas such as site selection and store layout. Drawing on Bucklin, 
Betancourt and Gautschi, Ghosh, Goldman, Hollander, Kacker, Manson and Mayer 
and Messinger and Narasimhan, Goldman (2001), on the other hand, advocates that 
“expertise” is one element of “format” and “offering” is the other element. 
“Expertise” is the internal part of a retail format that determines a retailer’s 
operational strength and strategic direction whereas “offering” is the external 
elements that are related to the delivery of the functional, social, psychological, 
aesthetic and entertainment benefits that attract customers to stores. These 
conceptualisations of retail expertise are vague and inconsistent. 
Building from the existing literature, a more comprehensive concept of “retail 
expertise” is presented in this section. Retail expertise identifies the main elements 
that define a retailer’s strategy, which in turns determines the retailer’s competitive 
position in a market. The author identifies three components to retail know-how: 
retail technology, retail format and corporate culture. 
Some authors used the term “retail know-how” instead. There are two t e r n  are used 1 
interchangeably, carryng the same meaning, in this thesis. 
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7.7-7. 7 Retail Technology 
Retail technology2, according to Goldman (200 1 ), contains the systems, methods, 
procedures and techniques that a retail firm employs; and determines the firm’s 
operational strength and strategic direction. Therefore, the author suggests that it 
comprises four areas. First, there is information technology, which a retailer uses to 
manage the flow of information, physical materials and finance throughout the whole 
supply chain. Second, there is supply chain relationship management, which is about 
selecting and negotiating with suppliers, and establishing and maintaining 
relationships with them. Site selection and store development is the third area. The 
fourth area is cash flow management, which is mainly about the retail financial 
formula for different formats. This chapter deals with the first and second area. The 
third area is the focus of the last chapter. The fourth area will not be discussed 
because it is outside the scope of this thesis. 
7.7.7.2 Retail Format 
Retail format is the second component of retail know-how. It is the physical elements 
of a retail outlet that is visible to consumers, such as assortment, store atmosphere, 
services inside the store, physical location and price. Simultaneously, each retail 
format comes with a specific cash flow and ROI management philosophy. 
7.7.7.3 Corporate Culture 
Goldman (2001 ) claims that retail culture consists of concepts, norms, rules, 
practices and experiences. It determines a retailer’s ability to evaluate situations, 
identify trends and opportunities, and deal with problems. A retailer must have a 
learning-oriented culture in order to be competent in these tasks. Organisational 
learning, which is defined as the capacity or process within an organisation used to 
maintain or improve performance through experience (Nevis, DiBella and Gould, 
1995), provides an approach for continuous adjustment of organisational issues and 
knowledge utilisation in a turbulent competitive climate (Geman, 1993; Stata, 1993 
in Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). Retailing is an industry directly 
interacting with consumers. With rapid development of technology and intensifying 
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competition, together with rapid changes in consumers’ taste, retailers could not 
sustain their favourable positions in the market without a continuous fine-tuning of 
the organisation and its processes. In other words, retailers could not survive in a 
turbulent competitive environment without a learning orientation. 
The capacity to learn is termed organisational capability. Grant (1996a in Morgan, 
Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998) considers the concept of organisational capability 
within the boundaries of a knowledge-based view of the firm. He advocates that 
analysis of the organisation as an integrator of knowledge is an appropriate frame of 
reference for researchers to diagnose organisational capability. He further interprets 
it as a consequence of complicated assimilation of knowledge, where productive 
activity is a function of the firrn’s capacity to harness and integrate knowledge 
attributed to multiple individuals and groups. It is important to emphasise that 
organisational capability depends on the firm’s mechanisms and processes of 
knowledge integration, not simply the extent of knowledge that individuals and 
groups possess per se. 
Owing to the highly dynamic nature of the market environment, effective 
organisations are always loosely coupled in order to maximise the buffer effect 
between them and their environments. Organisational capability can act as such a 
buffer in the following four aspects (Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). 
First, learning activities are always designed and organised according to the 
predicted future circumstances with the aim of minimising the incidence and 
potential impact of serious environmental disturbances. Secondly, since learning 
organisations usually enjoy good relationships with suppliers, customers and related 
constituencies, an attitude of mutual accommodation is evidenced when anticipated 
problems arise. Thirdly, flexibility within the learning organisation means that rapid 
company responses are possible in order to exploit and respond to emerging 
opportunities or threats. Finally, information usually flows efficiently within learning 
organisations and this leads to significant reduction of transaction costs and 
economies of information. 
Note that the term “retail technology” in this thesis does not only mean “information technology”. 
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According to the above conceptualisation of ‘retail know-how’, the concepts of self- 
service and discounting within specialty retailing is an example of retail know-how 
and this retail know-how is manifested in the format of a category killer, such as 
Toys R Us. The concept of one stop shopping, department-based store design, and a 
merchandise mix of soft and hard items is another example of retail know-how, 
which is transformed into the format of a department store. 
7.7.2 The Vehicle of Flow 
‘Flow’ is the movement of retail know-how from one enterprise to another within the 
same regions or between different regions (Kacker, 1988). There are two different 
kinds of flow. A flow that is unplanned or incidental is called diffusion. Diffusion 
may take place during overseas business trips and in professional meetings or 
seminars. A flow that is planned and purposive is called a transfer. The vehicles of 
transfer include foreign direct investment, management contracts, franchising and 
supply of equipment and support services. Only deliberate retail transfer is discussed 
as diffusion is by its very nature difficult to identify and measure. 
7.7.3 The Flow Process: Preconditions, Problems and Consequences 
“No technology or innovation evolves in a vacuum’’ (Kacker, 1988:44). Retail 
technology or concepts are created to respond to human needs. Human needs, in 
turns, are shaped by a given social, cultural and economic environment. The 
development of retail technology is also constrained by dimensions such as 
information technology and political regulation. Retail know-how thus evolves in 
response to different contexts. Retailing know-how that is developed in an 
environment with a certain family size distribution, store patronage patterns, levels of 
retail industry growth, urbanisation and presence of supportive infrastructure may not 
be effective in an environment with different business conditions. In other words, the 
environmental dimensions of a host country affect the effectiveness of retail know- 
how transfer. Field investigation and analysis of secondary data reveal that the 
This term i s  used to mean “ways of doing the various aspects of retailing”. 
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process of transfer of retail know-how may experience serious problems in the 
absence of certain preconditions or basic infrastructure (Kacker, 1988). 
Consequently, a retailer may need to adjust the original retail know-how that they 
intend to transfer in order to adapt to the host environment. 
Apart from the environmental dimensions, Goldman (2001) believes that the global 
position of a retailer also affects the adjustment of their retail know-how in the host 
country. When deciding how much adjustment to undertake during the process of 
retail know-how transfer, a retailer must consider the following four factors. The first 
factor is scale economies and standardisation that global sourcing of products and 
equipment, standardisation of operations, elimination of duplication and the global 
use of specialised skills can derive. The second factor is experience and learning that 
can be generated by operating in diverse environments. The third factor is global 
flexibility that enables retailers to move resources, expertise, innovative concepts and 
methods across countries. The last factor is specialisation that a retailer can enjoy by 
serving global segments. 
The environment of the host country and the retailer’s overall strategy at the 
international level determine the extent of adaptation that a retailer undertakes in the 
host country. As a retailer continues to fine-tune their retail know-how in response to 
the environmental factors in the host country, “new” retail know-how emerges. 
Following the tenets of organisational learning, this know-how should then feed back 
to headquarters in the home country to enhance the capabilities of the retailer as a 
whole and another flow cycle of a “new” retail know-how begins. Figure 7.1 presents 
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7.2 Retail Technology: Supply Chain Management3 
Proper management of the supply chain is vital to the long-term success of a retailer. 
This section discusses three aspects of supply chain management. The first aspect is 
about the distribution structure in China, which is different from the kind of structure 
foreign retailers are used to. 
The second aspect is logistics, which involves the coordination and management of 
the actual flow of products and the terms of supply contracts. Transportation 
infrastructure in China has not been well developed and this makes the physical 
movement of goods inefficient. Therefore, logistics is one aspect to which foreign 
retailers should pay particular attention. 
The third aspect is management of supplier-retailer relationship. As is described 
later, intermediaries in the distribution channel in China are accustomed to operating 
and surviving within volume-oriented channels but not with customer-oriented 
channels. They may fail to recognise the strategic role of marketing channels in a 
firm’s overall marketing strategy. They may also not be oriented towards performing 
complicated marketing tasks. The nature of suppliers will hinder the cooperation 
between foreign food retailers and their local suppliers and hence encumber the 
whole channel performance. Some scholars argue that this problem can be solved by 
establishing a trusting long-term relationship between buyers and suppliers because a 
trusting long term relationship can facilitate the transfer of modem retailing know- 
how from retailers to suppliers and hence improve the marketing function of local 
distribution channel. 
Redistribution structure in China, logistics issues and relationship between retailers 
and suppliers are discussed in more details in the following sections. 
As mentioned in the section 7.1, this chapter deals with issues related to logistics and supply chain 
relationship management. 
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7.2.7 Empirical Results: An Overview 
Based on the thirteen case studies, the following areas were found to be of main 
concern when foreign food retailers transferred retail technology. First, the 
distribution structure in China is quite different to that in the home countries of 
foreign retailers. In China, most foreign retailers had to go through more middlemen 
than they had to in their home countries. Secondly, there was very low involvement 
of information technology systems on the side of Chinese suppliers. Thirdly, the 
quality control on the side of Chinese suppliers was poor. Fourthly, suppliers 
performance in terms of timely product delivery and supplyng the right quantity in 
China was lower than that of the home countries of foreign retailers. This is largely 
due to the poor transportation infrastructure in China. These areas are investigated in 
more details in the following sections. 
7.2.2 Distribution Structure in China 
Under the command economic system, in order to control the flow of commodities, a 
three-tier distribution system, as illustrated in Figure 7.2, was adopted by the Chinese 
government. 
Traditionally, all kinds of commodity procurement were performed by state- 
controlled agents at different levels and distributed by state-owned wholesalers from 
the state level down to the lowest administration level. Under this structure, there 
were two types of organisation operating in parallel: planning and administrative 
organisations; and operational organisations. The former provides information that 
was needed in the formulation of the state’s economic plan and co-ordinates the 
corresponding business activities. The latter implements the stipulated economic 
plan. The marketing channels that existed under this system could be classified in 
two ways. First, they could be classified by the extent of their affiliations with the 
Ministries. Under this classification, marketing channels in China were divided into 
those operating within the commercial system and those operating in the non- 
commercial system. The second way to classify marketing channels was by the 
nature of ownership. Three types of channel could be identified this way: the state- 
owned distribution network, the collective distribution network and the individually, 
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privately owned distribution network. In the state-planned economy, most marketing 
channels operated within a narrow, specific domain. The government predetermined 
their business scope in accordance with the economic plan. Market forces were 
suppressed. Distribution was monopolised by state-owned commercial units in city 
districts and co-operatives in the countryside. Consequently, a highly rigid and 
inefficient distribution network covering both wholesale and retail activities resulted. 
Such distribution suffered from a number of weaknesses: 
Members in the distribution channel performed hardly any value-added 
activity. They were only responsible for the physical movement of 
commodities (Iwinska-Knop in Luk, 1995). 
Manufacturers were sometimes deprived of access to the required raw 
materials for production. Subsequently, the changing customers needs could 
not be matched. Moreover, a black market of production materials was 
created, which led to intensified problems of bribery and speculation 
(Gajewski in Luk, 1995). 
The rigidity of the administrative mechanisms encumbered the smooth 
circulation of goods. The consequence was the build-up of unnecessary 
inventories in distribution centres at every level of administration. Extra 
operational cost for these inventories was therefore incurred. 
Horizontal interaction amongst commercial enterprises at the same 
administrative level was restricted. Therefore, exchange of market 
information amongst firms from different provinces was extremely difficult 
and they had little choice but to localise their operations. 
As members in the distribution system merely existed for administrative 
purposes, they were only motivated to pursue the political interests of the 
ministry instead of the satisfaction of customers’ needs. 
No alternative means were available to contact foreign manufactures or 
suppliers other than through import/export agents affiliated with the 
ministries. 
Distribution channels only aimed to set in quantitative terms and hence were 
incapable to market differentiated products. 
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Figure 7.2 The Traditional Wholesale Distribution System in China 
State Level 
Ministry of Commerce 
State Level 
Ministry of Material 
Management 
Grade I Wholesale Stations (National) 
Province Level Wholesalers 
Grade I1 Wholesale Stations 
D i s tri c t L, ev e 1 Who 1 e s a1 er s 
Grade I11 Wholesale Stations 
City/Country/Township 
Wholesalers and Retailers 
Grade IV Wholesale Stations 
Adapted from Luk, Xu and Ye (1 998) 
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Figure 7.3 Wholesale Distribution Channels in China after the 
-q Distribution Reform 
+-. . 
Adapted from Luk, Xu and Y e  (1 998) 
The above weaknesses became increasingly noticeable as the Chinese economy 
grew. Therefore, modification to the distribution system was one of the prioritised 
items in the government’s economic reform (Luk, 1995). A new distribution system 
was then created (Figure 7.3). The major changes made by the distribution reform are 
described in the following (Luk, 1995; Luk and Li, 1997). 
A new commodity circulation system has been established. In this system, 
state-owned commerce plays the leading role. Collectives and individuals are 
encouraged to engage in the circulation of commodities by all kinds of 
methods and through a variety of channels. A new city-based wholesale 
system comprising multiple channels but fewer intermediate links has also 
been introduced. In addition, a comprehensive network has been created to 
ensure smooth flow of commodities between town and county and between 
different regions. 
State-owned channel members have been given more autonomy in setting 
their own business scope, pricing strategies, staffing and income distribution. 
More horizontal interaction among economic enterprises, especially those 
located in different resions, has been promoted. 
Corporations have been reorganised at the state level. The aim is to 
streamline administration of the commercial sector, improve internal 
management of commercial enterprises, avoid duplication of resources and 
functions in government departments and facilitate the cultivation of a more 
market -oriented system. 
Sino-foreign joint ventures have gradually become the authentic channels to 
the domestic market considering the transaction volume that they are allowed 
to handle. Moreover, both central and local governments are now 
increasingly more flexible in applying domestic sales quota on such joint 
ventures. 
There has been dramatic increase in commercial establishments of different 
kinds of ownership and fast, parallel expansion of the retail sector. 
With greater autonomy in the management of purchasing and marketing 
activities, channel members at all levels are becoming more active in selling 
their products directly to customers than before. Expansion in business scope 
has been witnessed in many commercial enterprises. Competition within the 
distribution sector has also intensified. 
The influence of state-owned wholesalers in marketing channels has been 
gradually declining because of their inflexibility and inefficiency of 
operation. 
Despite the restructuring described above, distribution in China can still be difficult 
(Tseng, Kwan and Cheung, 1995). 
In China, foreign retailers have to go through the wholesale market and various 
agencies for most fresh food products. According to the author’s field work, only two 
retailers claimed that they dealt with farmers directly for fruit and vegetables. Three 
retailers reported that they partly dealt with farmers and partly dealt with agencies or 
wholesalers. The other eight retailers always went through intermediaries. For meat 
products, all of the foreign retailers interviewed had to buy from slaughter houses 
because it is stipulated in government regulations. For many other products, most 
retailers normally went through agencies instead of dealing directly with 
manufacturers, which is what they preferred normally. According to the Chief Non- 
Food Purchasing Officer of Company F, this is 
“because of the existing distribution network system in China. When a 
manufacturer tries to sell product in China, they cannot do it themselves 
because there are no national chains established yet. So, what they do is that 
in each city, they appoint dealers. Their dealers then have the authority to sell 
their products in that area. In the supply chain between manufacturers and 
retailers, there are many tiers. You will have a regional distributor, and then a 
lower level and then another lower level of distributors. This system of 
distribution has been running for the last twenty years. Before that there was 
the state-owned distribution system, which was also similar. You went to the 
provincial distribution network, then into the district and then the city level 
distribution network. Although the state-owned distribution system no longer 
exists, each vendor has their own distribution network. The dealers in 
Shanghai do not have the right to sell in say Nanjing because Nanjing is the 
territory of another dealer. The right to sell is exclusive. Therefore, when the 
foreign retailers come in, we still need to deal with these local networks 
although we are in the process of reducing the number of layers that we have 
to go through.” 
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The Executive Director, Finance, of Company E pointed out that multinational 
manufacturers in China such as Proctor and Gamble and Nestle stipulated that buyers 
must buy from their appointed distributors. This contradicts Goldman and Qin’s 
(1 998) allegation that multinational producers behave differently from indigenous 
producers in that multinational producers tend to maintain direct contact with grocery 
stores. One reason for using distributors, the Executive Director, Finance, of 
Company E claimed, is because in China, especially in Guangzhou, many local 
retailers have a tendency to evade tax and therefore prefer purchases from producers 
without proper invoices being issued. Consequently, multinational manufacturers 
preferred to use distributors so that they did not need handle this complicated issue 
themselves. 
On the other hand, the Executive Director, Finance, of Company E added that the 
norm of having intermediaries in the distribution channel in China had something to 
do with the nature of the merchandising system in China. He pointed out, 
“A lot of buyers choose to buy from distributors instead of from 
manufacturers because they have established some kind of personal 
relationship with the distributors. They have a lot of ‘under-table‘ deals. This 
practice was ‘nurtured’ through many years in the past and has become the 
‘norm’. However, we believe that the market is changing slowly and this 
practice u7ill disappear in the near future.” 
The Chief Food Purchasing Officer of Company F claimed that although they could 
not deal directly with Nestle but must buy from Nestle’s distributor, their purchasing 
price was the same as if they dealt directly with Nestle because of their world-wide 
relationship with Nestle and its volume of purchase in China. 
On the other hand, when smaller manufacturers are concerned, the Chief Food 
Purchasing Officer of Company F stated that they preferred to go through 
intermediaries in China because intermediaries would take care of everything related 
to transportation. 
For vegetable and h i t ,  the Chief Food Purchasing Officer of Company F claimed 
that producers in China were quite fragmented compared to those in Europe. The 
General Manager of Company I shared a similar opinion. He pointed out that the 
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scale of most farms in China was too small and therefore their company had to buy 
from many farms in order to obtain the quantity they required. Consequently, going 
through cooperatives was a better way to get the quantity and quality they required. 
The General Manger of Company K offered another reason for their practice of 
buying from cooperatives instead of farms for vegetables and fruit. He said that in 
China, the government required their company to document proper VAT invoices for 
all their purchases and sales. He claimed that most farmers in China did not want to 
follow this rule and hence did not want to issue proper VAT invoices so that they 
could evade some tax. However, he stated that their company does not want to break 
any rules and therefore would buy from cooperatives where VAT invoices would be 
issued for all purchases. 
7.2.3 Logistical Issues Concerning Foreign Food Retailers 
Logistics has become increasingly significant to firms in their strategic planning 
process since the 1970s (Carter, Pearson and Li, 1997). In order to remain 
competitive, firms must utilize logistics function to enhance certain strategic 
advantages such as more efficient distribution networks, improved quality, reduced 
total cycle time, better post-sale service and efficient response to customer needs 
(Langley, 1986; Poist, 1986; Zinn and Grosse, 1990 in Carter, Pearssn and Li, 1997). 
Consideration of logistic issues in strategy planning is especially important for 
international firms because the differences in business customs, inadequate 
transportation infrastructure, restrictive regulatory frameworks, and different levels 
of logistics services complicate overseas operations and make it much less 
controllable than in the domestic markets. 
7.2.3.1 Product Supply 
Fast moving consumer goods retailers require a large assortment of standardised, 
pre-packaged products and consistency in quality and supply. Due to high import 
duties, retailers tend to carry very few imported goods. The majority of products are 
supplied by suppliers within China. These suppliers can be Chinese manufacturers or 
multinational manufactories with factories in China, such as Procter and Gamble, 
Johnson and Johnson, Coca Cola and Nestle. 
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Among the thirteen retailers that the author interviewed, five of them disclosed to the 
author the proportion of products that were produced and sourced within China. All 
products in Company I were produced and sourced within China. Company B only 
imported 5% of its products. Company D had 80% of its products produced and 
sourced within China. All three of them reported that they were happy with these 
proportions. For Company A, about 70% of products were supplied within China. On 
the other hand, Company C imported about 1548% of its products. Both of these 
two retailers intended to decrease the proportion of imported goods for cost reasons. 
According to Carter, Pearson and Li (1 997), merchandise produced by local Chinese 
manufacturers tends to be of poor quality. Products often vary in size, weight, and 
quality from one production run to another. Packaging is also of low quality. 
Moreover, manufacturers lack marketing and selling techniques. They do not 
respond to the need of retailers or consumers. They appear passive in the 
relationships with retailers and indifferent to complaints. Delivery is unreliable 
because of production scheduie problems and underdeveloped transportation 
infrastructures. The poor quality of products, lack of responsiveness to retailers and 
unreliability of supply make up the three most severe problems foreign retailers face 
in China. Carter, Pearson and Li (1997) further point out that there are other 
problems, including the unavailability of local suppliers, high prices from local 
suppliers and the lack of purchasing management skills of Chinese managers. 
The present study supports some of Carter, Pearson and Li’s (1 997) claims. Foreign 
food retailers that the author interviewed reported that they experienced those 
problems that are claimed as the three most severe problems by Carter, Pearson and 
Li (I 997). Nevertheless, the other problems that Carter, Pearson and Li suggested 
were hardly mentioned by the foreign retailers. In fact, on the contrary to their 
allegation that there is unavailability of local suppliers in China, the Vice President 
of Company B pointed out that there is a “good, wide variety of Chinese suppliers 
supplyng different products”. This opinion is also shared by the Chief Non-Food 
Purchasing Office of Company F. In addition, the General Manger of Company K 
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also pointed out that “China market offers enough choices of products so that we can 
establish a very wide assortment”. 
Quality control is an area to which twelve out of the thirteen foreign food retailers 
interviewed paid special attention because of poor quality of product supply in the 
supply chain in China. These twelve retailers claimed that they had to maintain very 
tight control on the quality of products at the receiving department where products 
were first delivered by the suppliers. This is especially the case for fresh food 
because the concept of a cold and chilled chain was not common among suppliers in 
China. There was no cooling system and technology in some slaughter houses and 
not all meat delivery trucks had freezers or refrigerators installed. The General 
Manger of Company K stated that “it was difficult to find meat suppliers with cold 
and chilled chain facility”. The Buying Manager of Company J similarly pointed out 
that there were 
“only a handful of suppliers who have cold and chilled chain facility and the 
companies who need these suppliers are mainly foreign-Sino joint venture 
companies in China”. 
Therefore: foreign faod retailers had to give suppliers very strict requirements on the 
quality of meat and check the temperature of meat very carefully at the reception 
department. Any item that did not pass the quality test was rejected. The Chief 
Operating Officer of Company F mentioned that they also needed to spend time and 
be patient in explaining to suppliers their requirements and educate them about the 
importance of quality. 
Another reason for poor quality of meat and frozen products is related to electricity 
supply and cost in China. According to the Executive Director, Finance, of Company 
E, electricity is very expensive to suppliers in China. Refngeration system only 
became more commonly used when foreign retailers such as Carrefour and Wal-Mart 
entered China and demanded better quality of fresh and frozen food supply. Because 
of cost reason, some suppliers do not consistently maintain good rehgeration for 
their products. On the other hand, according to the General Manager of the 
distribution centre of Company L, power failure is serious in China. He stated as an 
example that it happened about once a month in their own frozen warehouse, 
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although the failure usually lasted for a day each time when it happened. Serious 
electricity cuts in China are another reason for the difficulty of maintaining good 
quality supply of fresh and frozen food. 
Packaging is another area that foreign retailers need to focus in more detail. Products 
sometimes did not arrive in the packaging specified by the retailers. The Chief Food 
Purchasing Officer of Company F pointed out that many suppliers in China do not 
understand the importance of issues such as combined truck loads, pricing, quality 
and packaging. He further reported that some Chinese suppliers did not categorise 
goods. For example, sometimes their suppliers packed goods of different size 
together. The Buyng Manager of Company J, on the other hand, claimed that one of 
the biggest problems with product supply in China was that most Chinese suppliers 
had a very poor understanding of delivering brand messages through packaging. 
Consequently, retailers had to check the packaging of products very carefully when 
they arrived and reject any item that did not match their requirements. 
On the other hand. suppliers’ poor sensitivity to retailers’ needs is another problem in 
product supply in China. Late delivery of products of an extent that is not negligible 
is experienced by all thirteen retailers interviewed. Although the poor transportation 
infrastructure in China is responsible for a large part of this problem, negligence in 
observing the need of retailers on the supplier side also contribute significantly to 
this problem. For example, the Manager of Supermarket Division of Company C 
alleged that some Chinese suppliers sometimes delivered less quantity than they 
ordered and they delivered the difference in their next delivery. The General 
Manager of the distribution centre of Company L also gave a very similar example, 
“sometimes, many times, they can’t deliver the products we ordered.. . . . . and 
they do not provide us with information about the situation.. . . . .. So, say, 
today we order 400 cases of products from the suppliers and expect them to 
deliver within the same day. We can hear nothing from them today, the next 
day and the day after. Then, suddenly they can send you 100 cases the day 
after that.” 
According to the Executive Director, Finance, of Company E, another example of 
suppliers’ lack of sensitivity to retailers’ needs is that some suppliers refused to 
deliver products if the retailers locate far away from the suppliers. 
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All thirteen retailers said that the problems related to product supply mentioned 
above do not disrupt their operations in China as long as they carried out careful 
monitor of the quality and packaging of products from suppliers. Furthermore, they 
believed that the standard of product supply is improving gradually as they continue 
to communicate to suppliers about their requirement and enforce it. 
7.2.3.2 Transportation Infrastructure 
According to all thirteen retailers interviewed, transportation of goods is normally 
dealt with by suppliers in China. Company A owned a few trucks for the 
transportation of goods from its distribution centre to its stores. The transportation of 
goods from supplier to distributor centre is still the suppliers’ responsibility. Another 
two retailers, Company C and Company M, owned a few trucks to transport a small 
proportion of goods from suppliers to their own stores. For Company C, 99% of the 
transportation of goods was dealt with by suppliers and it only owned two trucks. For 
Company M, 70% of the transportation of goods was dealt with by suppliers. 
Company M was hoping that a larger proportion of goods would be transported by 
their suppliers and hence decrease the number of trucks they owned. 
The transportation infrastructure in China is not well developed. This encumbers 
efficient physical movement of goods. A study by Carter, Pearson and Li (1997) 
shows that the most severe problems related to transportation service in Chma are the 
lack of delivery reliability of local carriers, inadequate transportation infrastructure, 
lack of carrier selection, excessive loading and unloading time at terminals, lack of 
cargo tracing services and the unavailability of transportation services. Other less 
severe problems include lack of transportation equipment, lack of inter-modal 
services, high tariffs from local camers and the lack of transportation management 
skills of local Chinese managers. 
The present research produces similar results to Carter, Pearson and Li’s study. 
except that those problems related to long haul transportation do not appear to be of 
main concern to foreign food retailers in China. All thirteen retailers interviewed 
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believed that transportation infrastructure in China is poor, which partly causes late 
delivery and stock-outs in their stores. The Vice President of a company closely 
associated with Company E described, 
“Logistics is one of China’s weakest areas. The transportation infrastructure 
has not kept pace with the development of commerce and so we have this 
huge bottle neck in transportation of products.” 
Although their operations were not severely disrupted by transportation problems, all 
of the retailers interviewed claimed that the physical movement of goods in the 
supply chain from producers was not as efficient as in their host countries and 
therefore a lot of attention has to be given to the control of inventory level. 
Delivery of goods between cities in China is difficult. The highway system is not 
comprehensive and it links only a few coastal cities. The Chief Operating Officer of 
Company F also pointed this out. Consequently, most distributors resort to railroads 
for long distance shipping. Nevertheless, the rail system is under tight control of the 
central government. Priority is often given to goods such as coal and agncultural 
products. Furthermore, r d  freight is expensive. In addition to the base price of 
containers, finns are expected to pay for handiing fees, delivery costs to and from the 
depot and other surcharges. Moreover, rail freight is extremely inflexible. Firms 
requiring less than one complete container receive very limited discount. 
Furthermore, booking on space has to be made several weeks, usually one month, in 
advance. In fact, the price of airfreight has been increasing significantly. Although 
airfreight remains competitive for many foreign firms, it is constricted by the volume 
limitations of individual aircraft and a shortfall in overall supply. With continuous 
increase in the cost of using a plane, joint venture road haulage tends to be more 
attractive. Delivery using road haulage between Beijing and Shanghai takes two to 
three days. It is available at shorter notice and breakage rate tends to be lower. 
The Director of Company A pointed out that many products sold in retail stores were 
not produced locally. They could be produced in places that are very far away from 
the store in which they are sold. In this case, they have to be transported for long 
distance from manufacturers to retailers through a varied number of intermediaries. 
Because of the difficulty in delivery between cities as mentioned in the last 
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paragraph, together with poor coordination between different intermediaries, the last 
tier of intermediaries may not be able to deliver the products required by retailers 
because of out-of-stock at some earlier tiers in the distribution channel. 
Another issue is that the transportation industry in China is largely controlled by the 
army, according to the President of Company D. He claimed, 
“the army is heavily involved in the transportation business. I am not saying 
that they have the monopoly on the transportation, but they are very heavily 
involved in the industry. So, they operate the transport to a large extent. There 
are other modem companies coming in here but the transportation industry is 
still extensively army reserved.” 
Some foreign firms such as Denmark’s Santa Fe, Germany’s Schenker, Britain’s 
Inchcape and US-Japanese Crown Pacific have set up nationwide trucking networks 
with some Chinese players in the form of joint ventures in an attempt to alleviate the 
physical distribution problem. There is no doubt that the involvement of these 
foreign firms means more comprehensive national coverage with competitive rates 
and reasonable efficiency. These joint ventures’ edge lies on their ability to organise 
many different clients, each of whikh wants to move merely a few cubic metres of 
freight, but each of which is willing to pay a premium for quality service andjust-in- 
time delivery. However, owing to the dominance of the army in the transportation 
industry as described by the President of Company D above, modernisation of the 
transportation industry is a very slow process, which encumbers the efficient 
distribution of goods throughout the distribution channel. 
Traffic congestion within cities also hinders the efficient movement of goods. For 
example, delivery of goods in Shanghai is horrendous. According to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (1 996a), the Shanghai municipality auctions separate delivery 
licenses for even and odd days in order to alleviate traffic congestion. These licenses 
cost about Rmb 20 000 (US$2 400) per truck. The number of licenses that each 
company is permitted to purchase depends on the firm’s paid-in capital. To alleviate 
the traffic congestion further, the municipality only allows 5% of a company’s 
delivery fleet to obtain passes for travel within the inner ringroad and the travel time 
is limited to from 8pm to 8am. These passes allow delivery on certain inner ringroad 
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streets, whereas other streets are either completely off-limits, temporarily closed for 
construction or require an additional pass. What further complicates the delivery 
problem is that there are always regulatory changes. When conflicts arise, there is no 
clear direction on what determines the overriding regulation. 
According to the General Manager of Company K and the General Manager of the 
distribution centre of Company L, there are also similar restrictions on commercial 
transportation in Beijing. Commercial transport in Beijing is limited to certain hours 
and big trucks are not allowed on ring roads outside the specified hours. 
All of the above factors make transportation of products from suppliers to retailers 
difficult. Consequently, as mentioned earlier, foreign food retailers had to adjust their 
stock level very carefully, especially during festival periods. In case of supermarket 
retailers, as suggested by the Buylng Manager of Company J, this may mean that 
they will need distribution centres in order to keep up the stock level to solve the 
problems of unreliable delivery or stock-outs caused by the poor transportation 
infrastructure. The Executive Director, Finance, of Company E, also disclosed that 
they would probably have a distribution centre in the near future in order to avoid 
stock-outs. Because of the distribution centre, he further mentioned, they would need 
to own two to three trucks to transport goods between their distribution centre and 
their stores. On the other hand, retailers may need to ‘work around things’ in China. 
Due to the underdeveloped distribution and transportation infrastructure, the 
president of Company D reported that he sometimes found transporting products 
with up to five tricycles was more economical and efficient than using trucks. He 
claimed that this did not make sense to him when he first worked in China but he was 
convinced at a later stage. 
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7.2.3.3 Level of Computerisation 
The employment of electronic point-of-sales (EPOS) and electronic data interchange 
(EDI) in the distribution channel enables manufacturers to obtain accurate market 
information directly from retailers and allows retailers to track inventory 
requirements, reducing the need for the cushion that wholesalers provide. However, 
in China, the level of computerisation is still low. The utilisation of computer and 
information technology in logistics is limited. 
EPOS and a barcode system were introduced into China during the early 1990s. 
Since then, the interest of domestic retailers in adopting such technology has been 
increasing. An EPOS system was first introduced into Guangdong and Shanghai. 
During the two-year period of 1992 and 1993 more than 40 supermarkets and large 
stores in China were known to have introduced EPOS (Euromonitor, 1995). 
Commentators claimed that these stores doubled or trebled their profits as a result of 
the introduction of the technology (Euromonitor, 1995) 
Barcode has become quite widely used nowadays. Nevertheless, according to some 
respondents in the author’s fieldwork, there is sometimes confusion over the codes 
being used. The president of Company D described the situation in China as similzr 
to that when barcode was first introduced in Europe. There is sometimes overlap of 
barcodes for different products. Both the president of Company D and the Vice 
General Manager of Company M claimed that this problem is quite common. 
Sometimes, the barcode for the same product is different, which causes much 
confusion and inconvenience for repeat orders of the product. The General Manager 
of the distribution centre of Company L provided this example, 
“There is a noodle manufacturer. They have four factories producing the 
same product, let’s call it A. This manufacturer gives A from different factory 
a different barcode. Sometimes, they supply us A from factory 1. Sometimes, 
they supply us A from factory 4. So on and so forth. As a result, we have got 
four different barcodes registered in our system. However, we do not know 
which batch is from which factory. The situation, hence, is very confusing 
when it comes to making a repeat order. Once, when the level of stock of 
product A ran low, we looked at the barcode of that batch and we called up 
the manufacturer to order more of that product. However, they told us that 
they didn’t have that product. It took both them and us quite a while to realise 
that the factory we were talking about was no. 1 and it was factory no. 4 that 
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supplied us the batch of product A that was almost being sold out. So, at the 
end, they got factory no. 4 to send us more of that product. This is a very 
confusing situation. Another problem with this confusion of barcode is that at 
the beginning, we stick with the first barcode of product A that we received. 
After some time, when we reviewed product performance, we found that 
there was no sales for three products. It also took us some time again to figure 
out that that three ‘products’ was actually product A, only that they had a 
different barcode. So, the whole situation can be quite confusing.” 
The confusion of barcode does not only occur with Chinese suppliers. Even some 
foreign-Sino joint venture manufacturers make mistakes sometime, as pointed out by 
the President of Company D and the General Manager of the distribution Centre of 
Company L. In order to resolve the confusion, retailers have to double check the 
barcodes when the merchandise comes into the store and if needed, they have to re- 
barcode themselves. The Executive Director, Finance, of Company E, said that they 
also helped teaching some suppliers, who originally did not have the knowledge, 
how to make barcode 
On the retailer side, foreign food retailers possess the knowledge and resources tc 
implement the latest computer technology in inventory management and logistics 
activities. However. due to a number of reasons, which are discused later. there is 
no iniplementation of EDI system in China. Disregarding the EDI system, nine of the 
thirteen retailers claimed that they were fully computerised. They used an EPOS 
system and scanners. They made use of the EPOS data to monitor the performance of 
their stores and inventory level. Computer technology is utilised wherever possible. 
Five of these nine retailers had distribution centres. In the case of these retailers. their 
distribution centres were also fully computerised and there was automatic 
computerised replenishment system between their stores and their distribution 
centres. 
Company C and Company H reported that they were only partly computerised. 
Inventory management in their companies was partly carried out manually and partly 
using a computer system. Company A and Company I described their level of 
computerisation to be very low. The General Manager of Company I explained that 
they wanted to open their first store as quickly as possible and keep costs at the 
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minimum. Moreover, the level of computerisation throughout the industry was low at 
the moment. Therefore, they decided to go without much reliance on information 
technology at the commencement of their business in China, although he believed 
that their level of computerisation would gradually increase. The Director of 
Company A also similarly claimed that their company in China was slowly moving 
in the direction of full computerisation, because information technology would no 
doubt increase efficiency and profit. He also believed that the whole industry would 
improve in this aspect in due course for the same reason. 
As stressed by the Chief Operating Officer of Company F, information technology is 
of paramount importance to the efficiency of a distributor. Company F believed that 
it is so important that they had a special department set up in Europe to research and 
develop the best information technology for their company. The lack of EDI system, 
together with the lack of communication infrastructure, makes order processing and 
inventory management in China more difficult tasks than in many other more 
developed places. Manual documentation operations lead to slow order processing. 
The deficiewy of an efficierit and effixtive order procsssing and inventory control 
means Inore difficult nianagement of a huge variety and volume of merchandise. I t  
also makes the track keeping of the information of products being sold and control of 
stock-outs situation difficult. 
Some foreign food retailers have tried to convince their suppliers to adopt more 
information and computer technology. According to the General Manager of 
Company K and the General Manager of the distribution centre of Company L, some 
small Chinese suppliers did not even have fax machines, primarily because of lack of 
financial resources. The Executive Director, Finance, of Company E added that 
because of their lack of capital, getting suppliers to computerise became very 
difficult and there was not much that their company could do. He pointed out that 
subsidising their suppliers’ process of computerisation was no doubt an option but it 
did not make sense for the time being. Developing their own chain in China at the 
moment appeared to be a better investment. Apart from the need of financial 
resources, according to the Buymg Manager of Company J, educating suppliers 
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about the benefits that computerisation will bring is also essential. Improving 
financial status and getting educated take time. Consequently, “it will take a long 
time for the Chinese suppliers to computerise”, said the Buying Manager of 
Company J. 
In fact, even multinational manufacturers in China are unwilling to bring in EDI 
technology. The General Manager of Company K stated that these multinational 
manufacturers were reluctant to invest in this technology in China because the 
number and scale of their buyers in China who possess the necessary resources to 
invest and implement the same system did not justify the cost of investment. He 
further revealed, 
“we have talked with Proctor and Gamble to set the EDI system up, but they 
have their difficulty. They won’t introduce it without the possibility of 
making a profit out of it. I don’t know what a company would be able to do if 
P&G can’t do it. 
The General Manager of the distribution centre of Company L also suggested that the 
unreliable electricity supply in China could hinder the efficient utilisation of 
computer systems. 
Based on the above discussion on product supply, transportation infrastructure and 
level of computerisation in China, a few implications are presented as follows. 
Suppliers directly affect a retailer through their product quality and on-time delivery 
performance. Simultaneously, they also have indirect effects. Bamers in the areas of 
infrastructure, transportation services, inventory control and warehousing services 
result in long transit time, high transportation costs and high inventory levels. All of 
these problems are especially pertinent to food retailing because food has a 
characteristic of high perishability, especially fresh food. The in-store availability of 
merchandise depends heavily on the timely delivery from suppliers. A food retailer 
will be able to reduce cost on storage space for inventory if they can manage to 
create a ‘time-definite supply-chain management’. In other words, the severity of 
these problems can be decreased by suppliers who can ensure high quality of 
services. Although all thirteen retailers interviewed claimed that the logistic related 
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problems discussed earlier did not have significant negative impact on their 
operations in China, those problems do require adjustment to some of the retailers’ 
practices. In fact, as demonstrated in the discussion earlier, adjustments were 
witnessed. The transformation of Chinese suppliers and the emergence of a 
computerised era in the distribution industry in China will only come gradually and 
is heavily dependent on improvements in infrastructure. 
7.2.4 Relationships between Foreign Food Retailers Interviewed and 
their Suppliers 
Supply chain relationship management is a crucial element in retailing because 
retailers’ relationships with their suppliers can affect the quality of merchandise they 
offer to the consumers. When a foreign retailer enters China, one important issue that 
they face is sourcing. Sourcing from indigenous suppliers is inevitable. The Chinese 
business culture is unique in some sense. Trust‘ is a very important element in 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) conceptualise trust as existing when one party is confident in an exchange 
partner‘s reliability and integrity. In operational terms, norms of exchange in the wholesaler-retailer 
dyads are represented by the extent to which the wholesaler and retailer feel confident that the oihe1 
party will attach tc channel decisiox and agreements. and by openness and sharing of information bv 
the two parties. The presence of good personal relations and reciprocal confidence is perceived as 
important elements of trustful norms of exchange (Young and Wilkinson, i 989). Economic 
performance of :he channel is demonstrated by Reve (1981) to be positively related to the level of 
trustful norms of exchange within the channel. Williamson (1975) also holds sirmlar view. He 
maintains that transaction costs will reduce when exchanges take place in an atmosphere of trust and 
commonality of purpose because of diminished possibility of opportunistic behaviour. If people were 
completely trustworthy, it would become possible to reach an agreement that the parties could rely on, 
even with the existence of bounded rationality (Dixon and Wilkinson, 1986). 
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In fact, interorganisational exchange such as the one between buyers and sellers is governed. to a 
significant c extent, by social control mechanisms, which are the traditions and values, inherent in the 
channel. Channel itself is an organisation arising from the network of trading relationships that have 
established over time. Consequently, a channel culture emerges. The shared values that constitute this 
culture generate trust that reduces uncertainty. The enduring dyadic relationship is also manifested by 
mutual adjustment and working rules that provide a means of co-ordination (Dixon and Wilkinson, 
1986). 
Trust also influences commitment. This causality is explained by social exchange theory through the 
principle of generalised reciprocity, which maintains that 
“mistrust breeds mistrust and as such would also serve to decrease commitment in the 
relationship and shift the transaction to one of more direct short-tern exchanges” 
(McDonald, 198 1 :834). 
A retailer’s trust in its supplier affects the commitment of the retailer in the following three ways. 
First, it reduces the perception of risk related to opportunistic behaviours by the suppliers. Secondly. it 
increases the confidence of the retailer that short-term inequities will be resolved over a long period. 
Finally, it reduces the transaction costs in an exchange relationship. 
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Chinese business dealings (Redding, 1990). This implies that foreign retailers are 
confronted with a different context in which business transactions are carried out. 
The following investigates, from the viewpoint of the foreign retailers, the 
relationship of foreign retailers in China with their suppliers. 
7.2.4. I Comparison between Multinational Suppliers in China and Indigenous 
Suppliers 
In general, the foreign retailers interviewed held the opinion that multinational 
suppliers in China, in comparison to indigenous suppliers, were more reliable, had 
better quality control and marketing and offered broader range of assortment. They 
also claimed that multinational suppliers had a better-defined set of standards and 
trading policy, which then camed different implications to retailers. 
The Buying Manager of Company J stated that, 
“With international suppliers, price-wise, it’s more convenient when you are 
negotiating. They’ve got very good structure on it, for example, what price 
for what. Obviously you have to negotiate to see what level you can get to but 
there is a general structure. They are not just coming in and just negotiating 
and trying to knock off a bit here and knock off a bit there. Furthermcre. they 
are more willing to look at long-term basis. They will support you long term. 
They are willing tc look at longer term. Now, that support might be through 
promotion, product range or merchandising, different fees for different 
support, advertising, and so on and so forth. Some of the local suppliers, they 
don’t have the money. They don’t have the structure. They don’t have the 
experience either to do that kind of support. A lot of them (local suppliers), 
they are obviously under pressure, well of course everyone is under pressure, 
but they have to see ‘what can I sell this month’, so what they do is: take this, 
take this, take this, do a promotion hoping to boost sales for that month. But, 
it might not be the best time in a year or might not be the right product to do 
the promotion. And then they basically can’t see how there can be a long- 
term relationship between them and a retailer, how they can have a 
cooperative relationship with a retailer. This is actually the most frustrating 
thing about being a buyer in China. If you look at supply chain in China, it’s 
very primitive, and the relationships between buyers, suppliers and 
manufacturers are very primitive too. A lot of suppliers of course don’t look 
further than next month, and they don’t look at the whole brandthe 
development nor at what retailers are doing in the market. So, basically, they 
are kind of like shooting themselves at the throat in the long term. They might 
get pretty well sales this month but long term, they need quite a 
development.” 
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The General Manager of Company K also shared a view that resembles the second 
point of the Buying Manager of Company J. He reported that establishing “working 
relationship” with indigenous suppliers is difficult because they did not know how 
establishing a relationship would benefit them in the long run. 
Contrasting the above opinion, both the Chief Executive Officer of Company F and 
the General Manager of Company I alleged that because of a well establish structure 
of multinational suppliers, dealing with them could be quite difficult sometimes 
because they had very firm policy about prices and requirements on how and where 
to display their products in the retailers’ stores. These two foreign retailers found 
that, in contrast, they could more easily influence indigenous suppliers in terms of 
price and product policy. 
Although there are differences between multinational suppliers and indigenous 
suppliers in terms of reliability, quality control, marketing and merchandising, the 
Vice President of Company B claimed that the indigenous suppliers were “picking 
up very quickly”. 
7.2.4.2 Preference on the Type of Suppliers 
Six of the thirteen retailers interviewed did not respond on their preference on the 
type of suppliers. They are Companies A, C, H, I, L, and M. Company E did not 
directly respond on this issue but the Executive Director, Finance, pointed out that 
the products they carried that were from the big multinational manufacturers did not 
make up a great proportion. In approximation, at the time of interview, only about 
2000 out of 14 000 SKU that they carried in one of their stores were from the “big 
boys”. He further indicated that they did not have any inclination towards 
multinational suppliers. 
Five retailers, Company B, D, F, G and K, stated that they did not have any 
preference between the multinational suppliers and indigenous suppliers. They said 
that which supplier they chose to deal with depends on the purchase terms, quality 
and services of the product concerned. The President of Company D further 
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emphasised that their preference was, instead of on either multinational or 
indigenous suppliers, dependent on the size and progressiveness of the suppliers. 
They in general preferred larger or “more progressive” suppliers because they found 
that small companies usually had a slower pace in modernising their management 
operations. The Assistant General Manager of Company H and the Vice General 
Manager of Company M had a similar preference on larger suppliers, regardless 
whether they were multinational or indigenous. However, the reason for their 
preference is slightly different to that given by the President of Company D. Both 
respondents from Company H and Company M stated that suppliers of larger scale 
usually supplied higher quality products. The Vice General Manager of Company M 
disclosed that they had a company rule stipulating that they should not buy from the 
medium to small-scale suppliers that located outside the district where their store was 
situated. Instead, they should buy from the manufacturers or wholesalers who were 
of a larger scale and were situated inside Beijing city. He claimed that by doing so 
their product risk was reduced. 
Only one retailer, Company 3, preferred niultinatjonai suppliers to indigenous 
suppliers, for the reason that negotiating with multinaliona! ones was more 
cowenient as they had better structure and multinational suppliers had a longer term 
perspective. These reasons are discussed in details in an earlier paragraph. 
7.2.4.3 Choosing Suppliers 
When asked how they chose suppliers, response was obtained from nine companies: 
Companies A, B, D, F, H, J, K, L and M. In general, all of these nine companies 
reported that they used the same methods to choose suppliers in China as in any other 
countries. In other words, they follow the same rule in choosing suppliers. They 
chose suppliers based on the merchandise they wanted. In other words, they first 
established a list of assortment they wanted to carry. Then, they looked at which 
suppliers could provide those merchandise in the conditions they wanted. Obviously, 
the conditions they mentioned that they considered were price, quality and services. 
256 
A number of interesting points were revealed during the discussion of this topic. 
First, there are fundamental differences in the concept of choosing suppliers between 
foreign retailers and most traditional indigenous retailers, which has implications for 
the trading relationship between foreign retailers and indigenous suppliers. 
According to the Vice General Manager of Company M, 
“many local retailers in Beijing think about suppliers first because they even 
think about what kind of products they should carry in their stores. Their 
whole concept is to use suppliers to fill their stores, whereas we use 
merchandise that we want to fill our stores. We decide on assortment first and 
then choose suppliers who can provide those assortment to us with terms that 
suit us. They decide on the suppliers first. Then they will use whatever 
merchandises the suppliers carry to fill their stores. This is a very common 
Chinese practise in the distribution channel here. And this has implication on 
our dealings with some Chinese suppliers, who are used to this concept and 
practice. 
“We have tried to transfer and explain our concept to them. It was a shame 
that most of them just couldn’t grasp the essence of our concept. They just 
couldn’t understand what we mean by ‘what merchandise do we need to fill 
this store?’ For Chinese retailers, for example, if they are a cup retailer, what 
they would do is to find some cup suppliers/manufacturers and put their 
products in stme and sell theni. In other words, they are more like just i! 
means to provide 2 place for ~nanufacturerslwholeszlers to sell their preducts. 
For us, we think abour our whole retail concept. If we are a cup retailer, we 
will thipk about a cup retail concept and formula and hence decide on what 
cups we want to sell. Only then will we look ‘for the right suppliers. We tried 
to educate them about our concept repeatedly but all they can achieve so far is 
about, say, 5% of what we want, in terms of conforming to our distribution 
concept. 
“Because of this difference, there is a discrepancy between our desired 
product policy and their product policy. They usually expect that we will let 
them be responsible for a department/section in our store and let them fill the 
departmenthection with their merchandise as they see fit. Because of this, we 
need to put some effort in dealing with them.” 
The second point is that some respondents believed that local suppliers were more 
willing to trade with foreign retailers than with local ones because foreign retailers 
had better reputation in terms of paying on time. Both the Vice President of 
Company B and the President of Company D claimed that there were many local 
suppliers approach them everyday hoping that they could be their suppliers. Their 
belief and claim could well be plausible, because, according to the Execut1k.e 
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Director, Finance, of Company E, most Chinese retailers in China have serious 
financial problems. The money that they are liable to pay their suppliers usually 
becomes bad debt. The Executive Director, Finance, of Company E had been 
working on the supply side in the distribution channel and had had very close 
contacts with a huge number of Chinese retailers in China. He witnessed that these 
Chinese retailers seriously lacked financial capital. However, they kept expanding. 
The trick was that they expanded on the suppliers’ credit terms. In other words, they 
used short-term credits from suppliers to support their fixed asset, which is a long 
term investment. What had worsened the problem was that they did not possess the 
relevant retail know-how to make their business take off. Subsequently, they had to 
go bankrupt. This in turn means that many of their suppliers could never recover the 
debt. 
Thirdly, Company A stated that they used local people to handle Chinese suppliers 
because local staff was more familiar with the norm, practice and culture of Chinese 
suppliers. They were therefore also in a better position to communicate with Chinese 
suppliers, especially in cases when Company A had concept and practice that was 
different to that of the Chinese suppiiers. This point has further implication on the 
establishment of relationships in the channel in China, which is discussed later. 
7.2.4.4 Terms of Purchases 
Two retailers were not willing to discuss their terms of purchases with the author. 
Based on the discussion with the other eleven retailers, credit terms that foreign food 
retailers obtained in China are not significantly different to those they obtained 
elsewhere in the world. The Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer of Company F 
stated that “the norm (in China) is the same as in Europe”. The General Manager of 
Company K shared the same opinion. The General Manger of Company I claimed 
that “credit terms (in China) is similar to that everywhere else in the world”. The 
Director of Company A and the General Manager of the distribution centre of 
Company L made the same remark. 
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As disclosed to the author, the credit terms received by most of the foreign retailers 
in China range from immediate cash payment, five to seven days, 30, 50, 60 or up to 
90 days. Credit terms for food are very short, usually up to 10 days. Purchases of 
fresh food made at markets usually require immediate cash payment. The credit 
terms for other products are longer. The only significant deviation to this ‘norm’ that 
the author found is that Company C obtained 30 days credit for some fresh food 
products, according to the Manager of its Supermarket Division. He stressed that 30 
days credit for fresh food was a very good credit term according the industry 
standard. He further pointed out that even if they could not get 30 days, they could 
easily obtain 15 days. When the author posted a follow up question to this manager 
about how or why they could obtain such a favourable term, this manager refused to 
discuss further because he claimed that this was company secret. 
In general, the exact terms of purchase that foreign food retailers in China obtained 
depends on the products, prices, confidence of suppliers in the retailer’s ability to 
clear the credit and the balance of power between the suppliers and the retailers. 
Apart from Company C, the Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer of Company F and 
the President of Company D specifically expressed that they believed the terms thzt 
they were obtaining in China were quite favourable. 
7.2.4.5 Information Sharing between Vertical Channel Members in China 
No information on this issue was obtained from Companies A, H, I and M. Out of the 
other nine retailers interviewed, one retailer, Company D, claimed that they did not 
share any information with their suppliers in China. The other eight retailers reported 
that they shared with their suppliers sales figures and other performance related 
information of the products that were supplied by them. These retailers had to share 
this information with their supplier so that their suppliers could make better forecast 
and hence preparation for the kind and quantity of the products that the retailers 
needed. For company F and Company K, there was another reason for the sharing of 
that information. According to the Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer of Company 
F and the General Manager of Company K, they also hoped that by sharing this 
information they could have better cooperation with the suppliers in terms of 
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increasing the performance of the products. The Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer 
of Company F further added that in exchange they also needed information from 
suppliers on the overall marketing information of the products so that Company F 
could work out their own position in the market. Company F also gave their suppliers 
information about their new store opening so that again their suppliers could better 
prepare the inventory Company F would need. On the other hand, the General 
Manager of the distribution centre of Company M claimed that sometimes they and 
their suppliers would discuss and share information of new products in the market. 
According to the above discussion, information sharing between foreign retailers and 
their suppliers in China is only done to a certain extent. This implies that there is 
only very little, if any, trusting and committing relationship established between 
foreign food retailers and their suppliers in China (this is investigated further in a 
later section). Cooperative activities such as joint management of products are rare. 
As the General Manager of Company K remarked, product category management 
had only just started in China. It is in its very infancy. Other cooperative activities 
are discussed below. 
7.2.4.6 Joint Product Development with Manufacturers /i3 China 
Three retailers, Company B, F and G, expressed that they sometimes had joint 
product development with suppliers in China. 
Another three retailers, Company I, K and M claimed that they were seriously 
considering joint product development with suppliers. Nevertheless, the General 
Manager of Company I pointed out that they might encounter difficulty in finding a 
manufacturer who could produce for Company I in the quality, quantity and time 
they required. This point was also emphasised by the Executive Director, Finance, of 
Company E, who stated that many manufacturers in China were very cautious in 
expansion and opening of new product lines because most of these manufacturers 
were losing money and they therefore were more keen to sort out their financial 
problem and credit terms with buyers before they delved into other issues. The Vice 
General Manager of Company M acknowledged this same difficulty but they stressed 
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that they would like the manufacturers to grow with Company M in China, although 
achieving this would take a long time. 
Four companies: A, E, J and L, said that they did not have such activity with 
suppliers nor were they trying to do it at the time of interview, because of scale 
problems for the time being. All of these four retailers maintained that the investment 
in joint product development with manufacturers would only be justifiable when the 
products to be developed were of large enough volumes. Nevertheless, the scale of 
their operation in China at the moment was not big enough to absorb that kind of 
volume. Consequently, they would not look too much into joint product development 
at the moment until the situation changed. In addition, the Buying Manager of 
Company J went further to share his opinion on selling own brand product. He 
alleged that it was not the right time to manufacture and sell their own brand 
products in China at the time of interview, because selling own brand products would 
only be profitable when there was high awareness of their company brand. He stated 
that they had not achieved that yet and brand awareness would take a long time to 
build. The Director of Conipanly A also remarked on the issue of se l l iz~  4 own brand 
products in China. His discussior, revealed some other difficulties related to this 
issue, 
“.. .we sell our own brand products in many other countries. We have them 
manufactured in places such as Thailand and China. However, we do not sell 
them in China. The first reason is that we do not handle import ourselves in 
China because of the regulatory situation here. Of course we can use import 
agent, but anyway, import involves high import cost. Then, there is the 
labelling requirement. The labelling requirement in China is much stricter 
than in a lot of other countries. Give you a very simple and straight-forward 
example. If we have to sell our own brand products in China, one requirement 
is that all the labelling of those products must be in simplified Chinese 
characters. Our own brand products are sold in Australia in large volume. Our 
operation scale in China does not justify making a separate batch or new 
packaging design just for our operation here, regarding whether we are 
talking about manufacturing them here or in Thailand.” 
No information on the issue ofjoint product development was provided by the other 
three retailers, which are Companies C, D, and H. 
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7.2.4.7 lrnportance of Relationship in the Distribution Channel 
From the above discussion, the interactions between foreign retailers and their 
suppliers in China at the moment appear to remain largely transactional. There has 
not yet been a committed and trusting relationship established. This is not surprising 
when the modernisation of distribution in China is at its infancy, because such 
relationship requires a long time and effort to nurture and requires a good match 
between the retailers and the suppliers. The Buying Manager of Company J stated 
that, 
“We have tried to developed cooperative and long term oriented relationship 
with suppliers but it is difficult with some of them in China. Generally, most 
people in the supply chain in China have no exposure to the idea of service 
and how you increase sales and market share together in the long term. They 
have kind of just started to see it now, but the management 
expenence/exposure is not up to a critical level yet. Moreover, they change 
people quite often. Some local suppliers may have started to understand this 
‘new’ concept and want to develop such relationships with retailers but they 
may not have the money to support a long term development. So it is difficult 
for them. Nevertheless, we do work with some local suppliers in terms of 
promotion, I mean, you try to give them good space and equal support, 
although they tend not to have much money to spend.” 
The Managing Director of Compatiy C shared z similar view. The General Mariager 
of the distribution centre of Company L, on the other hand. made a similar pc;int 
about the problem of the frequent change of personnel on the supply side. 
“We have a so-so relationship with suppliers here in terms of trust and long 
term relationship. We try to keep a long term relationship with them. We do 
the same in our home country. But there is one problem here. The person in 
charge on the manufacturer side changes very frequently. The personnel in 
one of our manufacturers with whom we have established relationship with 
has left the company. The person who succeeded the job did not know the 
practices of our deals. The worst thing is that the original personnel did not 
write any reports. So, his successor did not know a thing about the 
relationship between us. This is the problem when the personnel changes 
frequently.” 
Moreover, the lack of a committed and trusting relationship between foreign retailers 
and their suppliers in China does not necessarily imply that foreign retailers had no 
intention to build up such relationships. In fact, many respondents believed that 
developing a trusting and long term oriented relationship is beneficial in the long run 
and they endeavoured to do so. 
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The Buying Manager of Company J pointed out that, 
“Having long term relationship with suppliers is very important if you are a 
growing retailer because when you grow, you need suppliers’ support, in 
financial term as well as in terms of producing the product you need. If you 
don’t have that support, you can’t be able to run a successful retail business. 
In other words, if you don’t have that kind of relationship with your suppliers. 
it’s a real problem, you will struggle.” 
The Manager of Supermarket Division of Company C also emphasised that they 
were committed to the development of long term cooperating relationship with 
suppliers. 
“We develop suppliers with non-stop communication. We help them to make 
better use of capital investment and to carry out value added activity. We 
encourage them to cooperate with us. We want to help our suppliers to 
develop in the same phase as us. Communication is very important. We want 
to build a relationship in a long term basis. But whether establishing such 
relationship with suppliers is successful or not depends on whether the 
supplier has the same goal. If not, if we can’t cooperate and we have to 
change suppliers. ” 
In the same vein, the Chief Executive Officer cf Cornpay F stressed that a i-etailer 
“has to have trusting long term relationship with their suppliers so that 
information can b=: shared among the supply chain partners, which is very 
crucial for the optimization of the business.” 
The Vice-President of Company B stated that they always do their best in having 
their suppliers grow with Company B. Similarly, the Chief Non-Food Purchasing 
Officer of Company F also deeply believed in the importance of long term 
relationship with suppliers. 
“We have very good relationship with our suppliers. We count on them. 
Basically we are facing the customers with the back support of suppliers. We 
need them to back me up and help me to face our customers. I intend to build 
up a very professional long term win-win relationship with suppliers.” 
In fact, a number of studies in the west have also shown that both buyers and sellers 
receive more tangible benefits when they have established a trusting relationships 
than when they merely attempt to exploit their power over one another (Kumar. 
1996). Trust helps supplier-buyer relationships to realise their full potential. When 
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both sides trust each other, they are able to share confidential information, to invest 
in understanding each other’s business, and to customise their information systems or 
dedicate people and resources to serve each other better. Ellram’s (1995) study on 
buyer-seller relationship shows similar results. He found that the two primary 
reasons buyers attempt to build up a relationship with their suppliers are to obtain a 
better price for the purchased items and to secure a reliable source. Source reliability 
comprises the idea of having an ensured source of supply in times of scarcity, a 
source that will live up to its commitments and promises, and one that demonstrates 
overall dependability. The ability to influence suppliers’ quality and the desire to 
influence supplier delivery schedules were found to be the two next most important 
factors that induce a buyer to enter into a relationship. His results mirror the 
traditional emphasis on price, quality and delivery in supplier selection decision. 
Furthermore, his study indicates that trust is a very important element to the success 
of the relationship. 
In the case of retailing, the same principle applies. Price, quality and delivery of 
merchandise are the most important factors that influence the success of retailers. 
Moreover, the cr3ns~?iner’s taste changes very qcickly. Therefme, if a supplier a d  a 
retailer work very closely with each other, both will be more capable to cope with 
these changes. 
In China, trust is the most important element for building up a network, translated as 
guanxi in Chinese, which in turn is the most influential factor to the success of doing 
business there. Network has been recognised as the dominant form of transactional 
governance in China since long before the concept has been given vast attention by 
Western scholars (Davies, Leung, Luk and Wong, 1995). China is a country in which 
the maintenance of harmony is perceived to be of paramount importance. Sellers 
would do their utmost to avoid embarrassing customers (Luo, 1995 in Davies, Leung, 
Luk and Wong, 1995). Foreign retailers should observe this culture and endeavour to 
establish harmonious and trusting relationship with their suppliers in order to obtain 
cooperation with their suppliers in China. 
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Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of long term oriented relationship 
discussed above, one must note that power struggle and conflicts between vertical 
members of the supply chain still exist. Trust is not all encompassing (Kumar, 1996). 
One may trust the partner on some issues but not on others. Buyers and sellers are 
always aware of which information, skills and technologies are to be protected and 
which are to be shared. Competition between retailers and suppliers originates from 
the decision on the rate the profit caused by a transaction is divided. The party with 
the stronger bargaining power will have the bigger share of the ‘pie’. Bargaining 
power can be affected by factors such as the degree to which one party relies on the 
other, the number of alternatives available for each party to choose, the scale of 
production or operation, the financial condition, the capacity to resist risk and 
bargaining skill (Zhuang, 1998). In other words, channel members are constantly and 
simultaneously confronted with both the need of struggling for power and the need of 
developing long term relationships with their partners, although there has been an 
increasing emphasis on the “trust game”, or the so called “win-win situation” 
(Kumar, 1996: 105). This point is illustrated in the Chief Food Purchasing Officer of 
Company F’s sxpression. 
“What we try is to get more profit by having low prices fiom the 
wholesaler/supplier. Ctherwise ir makes no sense from the costs point of 
view. Simultaneously, and normally, we stay with our suppliers. We try to 
build up cooperation with, and educate our suppliers. This is what we’ve been 
doing from the beginning of our business here. We try to educate them and 
tell them what we do, what our customers need, how- we serve these 
customers, who are also their ultimate customers. In other words, we are 
serving their customers. So, we try to educate them how both of us can s e n e  
our common customers together.” 
The inevitability of co-existence of power struggle and the need to build up long 
term relationships among vertical channel members is even more prominently shown 
in the statements made by the President of Company D when discussing about their 
bargaining power over their suppliers, 
“I think we have a very high reputation among the suppliers because we are a 
world known business and we know what we are doing and we do pay on 
time. We need to grow our company and with the grow of the company, we 
should get bigger and bigger bargaining power. But I think we have already 
got a very high reputation in the market. And we have brought differences to 
the market. We set new standards. Many people have copied our system and 
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standards already. So, we have bargaining power to a certain extent here 
already. We negotiate very hard but then we pay on time and honour what 
we agree to do. So, as recognized, we are not easy to deal with but once you 
have got subscribed, your company will be safe with us. We are giving our 
suppliers the opportunity to increase their market share. If they want to grow 
too, we will develop business with them. This is what we want to do. So, they 
like to deal with, I would say, modem distribution company like us. They 
want us to expand as well. So, there are two sides of the game: you need the 
bargaining power but you also need to build a good cooperative relationship 
within the buyer-seller dyad because of the inter-dependence.” 
Therefore, both power struggle and commitment to long term relationships should be 
considered at the same time, instead of being treated as two mutually exclusive 
elements, in the study of channel behaviour, if a comprehensive understanding is to 
be obtained. 
7.2.5 Supply chain management as a competitive advantage 
Supply chain management is a means through which competitive advantages can be 
developed and sustained (Ellis and Kelley, 1992; Skytte, 1992). According to Day 
and Wensley (1 988), there are three sequmtial elements of competitive advantage in 
the supply chain. First, there needs to be a source of advantage. There are twc types 
of source: superior skills and superior resources. Superior skills are the distinctive 
capabilities of personnel. Superior resources are the tangible requirement for 
advantages. These sources of advantages can then be converted into the second 
element: positional advantage. In the supply chain, positional advantages are 
recognised as superior customer value and lower relative costs. The former is 
obtained when some value-adding activities are created and performed in a way that 
results in perceived superiority along dimensions that are valued by customers. The 
latter means performing the majority of activities at a lower cost than that of 
competitors when offering a parity product or service. When these positional 
advantages are combined, they can be transformed into performance outcomes, 
which is the third sequential element. Examples of performance outcomes are 
customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, market share and relative profits. In order to 
sustain competitive effectiveness, the key factors that have the greatest leverage on 
positional advantages and performance outcomes must be identified. 
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For a retailer, achieving low cost structure and offering superior value-adding 
activities are not possible without appropriate management of the distribution 
channel right from the manufacturers through to the middlemen and finally to the 
retailers themselves, because the upstream supply chain significantly affects the costs 
and services of the "products" that retailers offer to the end users. According to 
Kumar (1996), when retailers and suppliers work together as partners, they can 
provide consumers with products with the greatest value at the lowest possible costs. 
Proper management of the channel relationship accelerates the deployment of 
complicated systems such as electronic date interchange and efficient-consumer- 
response systems that enable manufacturers to monitor sales in stores and to produce 
and ship their merchandise in response to actual consumer demand, which in turn 
provide retailers with competitive advantage. This point is well demonstrated by the 
remarks of the General Manager of company K, 
"We have to form a partnership with our suppliers. At the end, we are 
selling their products so we have to find a way to get their products 
consumed, so you have to work together with your suppliers so that the 
products can be well consumed. First of all. you have to exchange 
infoimation, such iis market share of each product, promotional acti\%ies and 
j result of promotiolial activities. Results of promcdional activities c21-1 be 
things such as does it work, does it work. ir. this way, does it work in that way, 
etc. You have to make promotional plans together for the future. Next. stage. 
you have to work with your suppliers in fine-tuning the assortment. This is 
called product category management, which is at a very initial stage in China 
but local people are starting to pick up and people are starting to get 
interested in it. Then you have the fine-tuning of the logistics, and they call 
for a physical human response, because in China, there is the missing 
technological network.. . . . . 7 7  
As mentioned in the last paragraph, a retailer must possess superior skills and 
resources to give rise to competitive advantages in channel management. A large part 
of superior skills of a retailer derives from its personnel. If its personnel are able to 
handle interactions with partners in the supply chain in a better way than their 
competing counterparts, the retailer will possess certain kind of superior skills. A 
supply chain is considered as interorganisational collectives of institutions that are 
simultaneously pursuing self-interest and collective goals (Stem and Reve, 1980). It 
is made up of many different buyer-seller dyads. Within a dyad, there is internal 
economy and internal polity. The transactional form linking dyad members 
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represents the economic structure of the dyad. The means by which the decision 
mechanisms used to determine the functions and the terms of trade defines the 
economic process. As discussed before, there is a power-dependence relation 
between the buyer and the seller in a dyad. The pattern of this relation forms the 
internal socio-political structure. The extent and pattern of cooperation and conflicts 
forms is described as the internal socio-political processes within the dyad. These 
structures and processes affect the competitive effectiveness and the economic 
performance in a dyad. Capable personnel should be able to manipulate these 
structures and processes and interorganisational relations for the good of their 
retailing companies. 
In order to manipulate those interorganisational relations, the personnel have also to 
be aware of the fact that business transactions are never one-off deal. As discussed 
earlier, when transactions are camed out with the same partner for a period of time, 
trust between the partners can be established. When transactions are carried out in 
internal markets where long tern relationship exists and transactions are planned and 
administered, there is mort; efficieni management of information, a decrease in 
transactional costs, the sFlergy G f  combining com;;,lenentary opcratjons and i - ~ h c e d  
uncertainty of operations (Arndt, 1979). Consequently, the pcsonnel should ako pay 
attention to the dynamic nature and development of each interaction with its supply 
chain partner. Simultaneously, retail personnel should also note that the environment 
in which buyer-seller interactions are embedded is also constituted by the actions of 
other actors in the channel. In other words, interactions of other actions in the field 
also affect the structures and the processes of a specific buyer-seller dyad (Achrol. 
Reve and Stem, 1983). Following the line of argument that the environment plays an 
important role in affecting supply chain management, it is then the ‘relevant’ instead 
of ‘latest’ retail skills and knowledge that gives rise to competitive advantage in the 
context of international retailing, because the ‘latest’ retail expertise that a foreign 
retailer possess may not be applicable to a particular overseas environment. 
Infrastructure for information technology is not well developed in China, as 
mentioned before. Foreign retailers could not make use of the latest logistics and 
inventory management technology in China as if they were in other countries. They 
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could not use their site selection science either, as discussed before. There are 
different business culture and norms within the distribution channel. The list of 
differences between the retail background in China and that of the countries that 
foreign retailers are used to is not exhaustive, and many of these differences are 
either demonstrated earlier or are discussed later. Therefore, competitive advantages 
do not come from the latest technology when a retailer operates in a different 
country; instead, it comes from the relevancy of the know-how to a specific 
background. 
7.3 Retail Format and 
As mentioned before, re 
Formula 
ail format and formula is he element of retail know-how 
that is visible to consumers, which is manifested in different retailing mix and certain 
supporting cost structure. Retail format and formula also consist of retailing strategy 
that is actually the backbone of the retailing mix. Simultaneously, underlying a retail 
fonnula there is a certain cost structure. However. cost structures are not investigated 
because this is outside the scope of the present study. 
In general sense, a product is always perceived as the individual items being 
displayed in a grocery store. However, on giving a closer look, a different meaning 
can be derived from the word ‘product’ in the context of food retailing’. The product 
produced by a car manufacturer is the car. The product produced by a clothing 
manufacturer is the clothes. In the same vein, the product produced by a grocery 
retailer should be the grocery store, which comprises basically everything in the store 
that are visible to the consumers. In other words, it is composed of more than just the 
individual items being sold inside the store. Other attributes that constitute the 
product-the store-include store size, assortment, store brand, decoration, store 
atmosphere, image, pricing policy and customer communication. These elements, 
when combined, form the retail format of a retailer, which partly gives rise to a 
ret ai 1 er’ s competitive advantage. 
This concept i s  introduced very briefly in Chapter 6. 5 
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Investigation of the retailing mix of foreign retailers in China is beyond the purpose 
of the present research. Therefore, only those aspects that are most pertinent to the 
transfer of retail know-how are examined. One main element of format that is 
relevant and is investigated is retail concept. It is relevant because it is an important 
source of competitive advantage in the context of foreign direct investment. The 
other relevant element that is also examined is communication with consumers. It is 
relevant because the whole idea of retailing is to deliver what the consumers want. 
Therefore, communicating with consumers in order to know what they want is very 
important. This is especially crucial in the context of foreign direct investment 
because in a foreign country, particularly a developing one, foreign retailers face a 
very different set of consumers in economic, social and cultural terms. 
Following the analysis of the above two elements of format is an investigation of 
adjustments made to the format and formula by foreign retailers for their businesses 
in China. This section ends with an evaluation of performance of foreign retailers in 
China and the impact of their retail format and formula or? the local retail structure, 
7.3.7 Different RetaiP Concepts and Formats 
Tordjman and Dionisio (1  991) found a strong correlation between 
internationalisation of a given form of retail activity and its success in the country of 
origin has been found. They maintain that particular European countries appear to 
have acquired a distinctive competence in a particular form of retail distribution and 
that the types of operation that are exported are mainly market leaders in their 
country of origin. For example, French hypermarkets (such as Carrefour), German 
discount stores (such as Aldi), and Dutch and German cash-and-cames (such as 
Metro) are dominant concepts in their country of origin that have reproduced abroad 
the key factors in their success. Different types of retailing possess different 
competitive advantages. That of hypermarkets lies in their low costs and high 
productivity; that of discount stores lies in their reduction in cost through reduction 
in assortment and service; that of cash-and-carry on cost reduction through bulk 
purchasing and reduction in service. 
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The concept of hypermarket was first introduced in Europe by the GB group in 
Belgium in 1962. It was born to fill the gap between the conditions prevailing in 
industrial manufacturing, which was mass production, and the conditions offered by 
traditional retailing techniques, which were inadequate and ill-suited to marketing 
such production. A hypermarket epitomises the techniques of discounting and self- 
service in the retail distribution of food and general merchandise items on a very 
large scale at low prices. The floor space of each store is normally in excess of 2 500 
m'. It usually operates with an average gross profit margin of 15%. The concept of 
hypermarket was spread to other European countries, notably France, soon after its 
birth. The lightning expansion of hypermarket in France following the opening of the 
first Carrefour store in 1963 constitutes the most remarkable phenomenon in the 
history of the distributive trades in France since the birth of the department store. 
French hypermarkets have begun to expand into other countries since the 1970s. 
With the exception of the United States where their success has not been 
demonstrated yet. hypermarkets have become popular primarily in countries where 
they enjoy a competitive edge over local businesses. By exploiting their know-how 
in a favoilrable environrnent, they have made ccnsiderable profits and achieved 
remarkable rates of expansion (Tordjman and Dionisio, 1991 >. R q i d  expansion of 
the French hypermarket Carrefour in China has also been demonstrated. 
On the other hand, the concept of discount stores was originated in post-war 
Germany. They usually have an average floor space of 500 m'. These outlets are 
normally located on the edge of towns or off main streets. They carry a wide but low- 
stocked range of basic necessities, with a strong emphasis on their own brands, 
which account on average for 60% of turnover. Their average gross profit margin is 
about 13%. This aggressive pricing policy explains the success that they have had in 
Germany. 
Cash and carry is a format that was made world-famous by German Metro. The 
founders of the company obtained the idea from the US. At the time just before the 
company was established, the founder saw that transportation cost was increasing 
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significantly. Small to medium sized entrepreneurs could no longer keep pace with it. 
Consequently, the founders decided that it was the right time to introduce the concept 
of serving these entrepreneurs with a wide assortment, both food and non-food items, 
under one roof at low prices so that the entrepreneurs could get everything they want 
in one trip at good prices. German Metro has started exporting the concept as early as 
1969! 
The retailers interviewed in the present research operate supermarkets, hypermarkets, 
superstores, supercentres or cash and carry in China. Generally speaking, a 
supermarket is a full-line, self service grocery store of a size up to 30 000 square feet 
(2 840 square meter)'. A superstore has a sales area of 25 000 to 50 000 square feet 
(2 367 to 4 734 square meter). Any unit of over 50 000 square feet (4 734 square 
meter) is usually called a hypermarket. Superstores and supermarkets usually have 
their own substantial surface car parking spaces for their customers. They sell a 
range of 25 000 to 30 000 individual items, covering most foods and many non-foods 
(usually taking up 40% of the total selling area), at low prices (Cox and Brittain. 
1996). A supercentre is a retail store of a combination of supermarket and discount 
stores with a size of above 200 000 square feet (1 8 935 square meter)*. Sometimes 2 
supercentre is called a hypermzrket. A warehouse store is a grocery store offering 
low price merchandise in bulk quantity in no-frill environments? The readers should 
note that there is no universal definition for different retail formats. Different 
institutions define them slightly differently. 
This piece of information was obtained from the author's intemiew with a respondent who wished to 
keep -, his identity anonymous. 
' Food Marketing Institute. 1998. Language o f  the Food Industr;l*: Glossai?. of  Supemarket Terms 
[Online] Available from URL: http, '  'M,~i.~\:.fnli.org~facts - fig ,'zlossar\; - search.cfm. [i\ccessed 10th 
January 2002 J .  
http? I M ; 1 w.discountmerchandiser.corn'images:pdf,~'rr guts.pdf. [Accessed 10th January 20021 
ht~::',;~\..M'W.discountmereliandiser.com,'inlages~ pdfi;rr guts.pdf. [Accessed 1 0th January 2002 J 
6 
Definition from Defining Retail [Online] Available from LRL: 




7.3.2 Empirical Results on Retail Concepts and Formats 
Adaptation to local market demand is undoubtedly important to the success of FDI of 
a retailer. However, determining the extent of adjustments to one's retail elements is 
not an easy task. In order to preserve the vivid illustration of the adjustments 
different retailers made to their operations in China, the retail concept and format of 
foreign retailers in China are presented in detail in Table 7.1. The information was 
obtained through the author's fieldwork unless otherwise stated. Those statements in 
double quotation marks are direct quotes of the respondents of the corresponding 
retail company. In cases that more than one person was interviewed in a company, 
the corresponding respondent is given in brackets. Significance of these results is 
discussed in the next section. 
Format in China 
Described by 
Respondents 
Table 7.1 Empirical Results on Retail Concept and Format of  Foreign 
Retailers in China 
Description of or Remarks related to Retail Concept & 
Format in China 
Company 




c? nlpi China, we are now modifying ~ i l r  coljcepts, hoping to 
fhci m e  that suits the local pespk most. Sc, now; OUT 
concept is just to serve our consu.mer best"; 
"&;-nosphere is -- not a top issue. 
"Cater for everyday need."; 
"You have to have attractive offers. The consumers are 
different in different locations. You have to have a 
combination to make sure your customers will come back. 
So, you compete in the market with every element: 
promotional products, range, fresh food. What we are trying 
to do is that you can go into our store to get fresh food, 
bakery, hot food, chilled, frozen, grocery, other general 
merchandise, etc. You have to cover the major products that 







Supermarket I'We target middle class people living nearby." 
Su percen tre 
Superstore 'We call our store superstore, meaning that we are not a 
traditional supermarket selling food. People in Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen in general do not like shopping in department 
stores because department store is of a different social class. 
Nevertheless, they like superstore because in terms of 
assortment, superstore is similar to department store, but 
superstore does not have too much decoration and products 
are offered in a lower price. People here just love this 
conceDt because thev can buv a lot of different thinas in one 
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T 
3 :ash & Carry 
3 u percen t re 
4ypermarket 
:ash & Carry 
:ash & Carry 
Sash & Carry 
Stop and can shop comfortably in this kind of setting." 
"Traditional Cash and Carry concept but we have shorter 
racks than Metro and more and better display. We also 
have fitting rooms for our customers to try clothes on 
before they buy it. Of course, we use magnetic security 
system to guard against theft. " 
'Typical supercentre similar to Wal-mart supercentre stores" 
'We bring the traditional French hypermarket concept." 
Aims at niche; have customers profile on our record; good 
:rack on their spending pattern; 
Teed a good match between customer types and 
nerchandise mix; 
'we've got our own formula for our business worldwide." 
'We chose this concept because there is hardly any 
zompetition of this type of stores in China, not like 
iypermarkets ....... Cash and Carry concept means low cost 
structure, low prices so that our customers can sell the 
xoducts with their budgets. We are mass merchandising, 
rNith high racks: 7 m high. No frills. No decoration. Offer full 
-ange of food and non-food products. The proportion of food 
10 non-food pro.l?ucts varies from 'country to couniry. We 
wed  high rotation, low stock set:dhe duration of stock must 
3e iess than payment credit sotha! suppliers finance a i r  
stocks." (Chief Operating Officer); 
'We looked at population, population density, density of 
-etailers, and the like in deciding to go ahead with Cash and 
Carry concept ...... Cash and Carry concept works on a given 
zombination of average invoice, SKU prices and traffic. We 
ieed high value of invoices but low traffic, about 1 /4 to 1 /5 of 
iraffic of hypermarket, about 1.7 times the turnover of 
iypermarket and we have about 1.7 times or more of their 
floor space." (Chief Food Purchasing Officer); 
"Hypermarket needs 1 million of customers per year to 
survive, but Cash and Carry needs only 10% of that. We 
ieed to stick to our concept everywhere we go." (General 
Manager); "Our main concept is to have low cost: having 
stores and offices away from city centres, simple offices and 
stores with the minimum decorations, buy in bulk, no or 
minimum processing of merchandise on our side, good 
somplicated computer system to manage inventory. In other 
ivords, we need to minimise our operation costs in long 
term." (Chief Non-food Purchasina Officer) 
Require customers to register so that they can form a 





J lone is 2 000 sq. m. The other is 1 200 
sq. m (selling space) 
J 
C 
8 000 (in which 1 200 are imported) 
M 
Supermarket: 1 500 sq. m store size; 1 
000 sq. m sales area 
Whole supermarket: 5 000 sq. m 
L 










A good retailing mix 
1st: Human Resource; 2nd: Peace; 3rd: Location 
"We have got only one store. It is difficult to compete on price. So, we compete 
on assortment and freshness of fresh food. We also use our expertise from 
home country to deal with store atmosphere and decoration." 
Quality, Assortment and Shopping Environment. Company L's slogan: "Take 
your time, enjoy your shopping". 
"In China now, the most important thing element that consumers look at is 
price, secondly, it's service and third, shopping environment. By service, I mean 
the enthusiasm of our staff towards our customers. Our staff has been doing 
really well in this regard. One of our retail concepts is to be a 'Home town 
store', meaning that the people nearby will come round and feel homely. We 
found that this is very important for our business here." 
Convenience, cheap, good quality and good service 
"If you can find the same thing cheaper somewhere else, we will give you the 
difference." "know-how in selling fresh food" 
- 
Efficiency (Chief Food Purchasing Officerj 
Competitive advantage comes out of productivity ar;d efficiency, which depands 
on the unit size of products to be sold and hcw they sell it; 
"Having low prices is also important, but it is also importarit to have a good 
combination of different factors. First of all, your buying activities. You have to 
get good prices from suppliers. This is mainly related to the payment and 
volume when you buy. So we have to keep on developing new stores and 
growing in order to have that advantage and manage the value of our 
organisation on top of our buying prices." 
Company Istore Size INo. of Product Lines (SKU) 





30 000 sq. ft (2 840 sq. m) selling area 
12 000 sq. m store size 
1st store: > 20 000 sq. m store size. 
3thers: 8 000 sq. m 
selling space: one store is 12 000 sq. 
n. The other is I1 000 sq. m. non- 
;elling space in store is about 3 000- 
d 000 sq. m. 
looking for a new store with gross 
space in store of 12 000-12 500 sq m. 
The size of first two stores here are 
Df European standard. Smaller size 
Nil1 be adequate for China. So, we 
qeed a site o f  i%:al area 0% 30 000 sq. 
v, so ?hat we caf! have roads m d  
3bwf 400-500 parking slots. A floor 
space o f  as low as 10 GO0 sg. m will 
31so be suitable here, depending on 
the citv. 
-argest: up to 20 OOOsq.m (worldwide); 
15 OOOsq.m (China); Sale Area: about 8 
300 sq. m in China; Traditionally: 2 
'loors, one for food and some non-food 
2nd the other for non food 
16 000 currently, will be increase in 
the future 
14 000 SKU; product range must be 
xoad. Smaller suppliers each on 
werage supplies 20 to 200 SKU 
15 000 
more than 10 000 
lf different colour and size are 
counted as the same product, 12 
300 products. Don 't know whether 
will increase this no. or decrease. 
Weed to wait and see. The norm for 
large scale supermarket in Beijing 
is about 10 000-20 000 products 
2bout 12 500 to 13 000 
No intention to increase the no. of 
woducts because for a cash and 
carry, it is important to have a full 
range of different items but not 
into depth. "We need high rotation 
and to gain productivity, we need 
to sell high volume to big 
customers such as factories" 
(Chief Operating Officer) 
Food: 5 000 (same as original 
concept), non-food: 7 000-8 000 
(SKU) (multi pack and single pack 
of the same product are counted 
as 2 SKU and so the actual number 
of articles is lower), intend to 
decrease no. of products in the 







Selling space: 10 000 sq. m 14 000. Probably will increase this 











"Fresh food is becoming more 
important, but our main emphasis 
is still packaaed food. " 
Fresh Food 
Meat, fish, delicatessen 
Fresh food and el&troriic goods 
Fresh food, cooked food, bakery, 
and personal care products 
we don't have one particular 
focused item 
daily products and food 
Fresh food, "this is our 
competitive advantage " 
Fresh food. This is what generates 
traffic in stores. "We will upgrade 
the fresh food area when this 
current store is 3 years old. " 
Fresh products .- perish able, meat, 
vegetables, fresh fish and dairy 
products. 
FoodlNon Food Proportion 
"Not much selling space is devoted to- 
fresh food, as we would normally do, 
because we are in commercial location 
here, where we don't need that much 
fresh food." 
400 sq. m for fresh food, which is about 
18% of floor space of supermarket; the) 
account for about 23% of sales of 
supermarket 
about 30% of sales space for fresh 
food; similar ratio for sales. "we 
want to increase the proportion of 
fresh food in the store and we also 
want to increase the supermarket 
store size to increase overall sales. " 
1 000 sq. m for food. Fresh food 
accounts for about 30% cf saies of 
s u pe rm a rke t . 
Fresh food .accounts for about 20% 
floor space. Sales: 
Veg e ta b I e + f i s h + m eat = 1 5 o/o ; 
bakery+cooked food+dairy 
products=l5% 
Fresh food: 7-8% sales. Fresh and 
frozen food account for about 25% of 
selling space by observation. 
15%-20% floor space for fresh food 
Proportion of Fresh Food in China is 
greater than in home country, both in 
terms of sales and floor space. 
In China, chilled 
products+vegetables+meat: about 3 
000 sq. m, which is about 20%-25% 
floor space. Fresh food accounts for 
about 30% of sales 
Fresh and Frozen Food: about 25%- 
30% (both sales and floor space) 
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K I "basically you have to use /Fresh, frozen, chilled and pre-packed 
different products, pricing and 
display to get people in the store 









4verage Basket Value (RMB 8.3 = 
J S $ l )  
20-30 rmb 
about 30 rmb "this is not a very high 
Jalue but higher than most state 
3wned retailers, where they get about 
20 rmb" 
i0  rmb (about 5 items) 
Not disclosable 
20-30 rmb 
food: about 25% of selling space and 
sales 
Shrinkage 
Between I % and 2% "manageable. We 
put in extra effort, such as CCTV. The 
percentage is not bad compared to that 
in home country" 
"It is a problem everywhere. Our rate is 
fairly well controlled. We are trying to 
budget it below 1% and we are pretty 
close to it . . . . . .  we use security guards, 
electronic systems and CCTV." 
W e  moved staff changing room to 
outside the store so that they passed 
through security before they leave go to 
changing rooms. This reduced our 
shrinkage by 50%. . . . . .The rate has 
been decreasing each year in the past 
and now it is about I%." 
Very serious 
stealing is very serious, more serious 
than in home cocntry. For exampie: 
some customers drink and eat ir, tne 
store before checkout. Once, the GM of 
the distribution centre of this company 
saw a mother give her child an ice- 
cream from the store to eat in the store; 
serious staff stealing too. Use CCTV 
and security guards 
"we have very good approach and 
procedures on control this aspect. So, 
this is not a problem to us. Our main 
shrinkage is due to procedural 
mistakes, negligence but not really 
theft ." 
About 0.5 o/o. "for state-owned 
enterprises, normally it is 1 %, some 
even get a shrinkage of as high as 
10%. . . . . .Main reason for shrinkage is 
staff and customer stealing.. ... we use 






130 rmb on average (host country: 
?quivalent to 200-250 rmb) 
Average Gross Margin 
30-90 rmb 
M 
100 rmb approximately 
about 16.5-1 7% 
lot disclosable, but about 8-9 times 
iigher than Carrefour (GM); 
- 
-rem very little up to a few hundred 
3ven thousands rmb sometimes 
:Chief Food Purchasing Officer) 
170 rmb 
catch about 600 incidents of theft in half 
a year, but still control the shrinkage 
between 0.2-0.3%. Customers 
sometimes damage goods in store. 
Example: once the Operating Division 
Specialist saw a customer pick up a 
frozen product and then put it on a 
normal shelf. She once also saw a 
customer eat the bakery they sell inside 
the store without buying. 
Very serious, use CCTV 
not disclosable 
about 0.3%. 'I. .... within our tolerance, 
and surprising this is smaller than in the 
UK. This is very low and our rate is 
better than a lot of other business 
cou n te r p a rts . 
Far under 1%, which has always been 
the case, because of our high volume 
and turnover. (Chief Food Purchasing 
Officer); 
about 0.61 %, "in line with industry rate" 
"for our industry, it is acceptable when it 
is within 2°/0"; "It's just the advantage of 
cash and carry. You have less people 
and so you have less shrinkage due to 
damages made by people. On 
weekends, yolj have 20 t~ 40 lhousarid 
people in this store. You have 
automatically a lot of theft and damage. 
There is no way to avoid it. Bu! 
normally, we have less people but high 
turnover per person and less 
shrinkage." (Chief Non-Food 
Purchasina Officer) 
~ 
Very high, three times higher than in 
Europe. Mainly due to staff stealing 
because staff here have different 
mentality. What this company does is to 
lay staff off if caught for stealing. 
J 
C Between 10% and 20% 
Freauencv of Store Visit bv Customers 
at least l/wk, or 2/wk or 3/wk. They are 
people who live or work nearby 
more than 3-41wk. Neighbourhood consists 
of people with higher income, e.g. 
university staff. More customers over 
weekends. 
70% customers visit daily or 1 -2/wk. 





about 20%, which is lower than in 
home country, probably because 
"we have lower buying power 
here than in home country." 
Not disclosable, but lower than in 
home country 
about 20%, which is "quite an 
acceptable rate, but we want it to 
be higher" 
8-9% on average. "our boss do 
not want to set too high a margin" 
Between 10 '/O and 20%, which is 
"similar to Metro and Carrefour" 
10%-15% here vs. 15-1 8% in 
home country 
about 10.5%. For food, the margir 
here is lower than that, and for 
non-food, the margin is higher 
than that. 
10-1 I%, which is lower than in 
their home country. This is about 
hsli of that in their home country. 
(COO, Chief Food and Non Food 
Purchasing Officers) Because of 
this. need 5 stores to be 
profitable. 
about 10% 
Zxpect customers from within 5 km of 
store, buy daily. Most of customers come 
3n foot. 
Exact frequency not disclosable. In home 
sountry, l /wk.  In China, more often. 
I-21wk. Customers come on foot, by 
bicycle, or motorbike (no on site car park 
but cars can be parked in surrounding 
area) 
1 -2/w k. 
1 -2/wk. Customers mainly from 
neighbourhood. There are most customers 
on Sundays. 
2/wk. Customers come by car, taxi, bus, 
bicycle, or on foot. 
once every 2.5 wks on average. 85% 
customers live within 30 mins of store. 
Customers come by car, motorcycle, 
tricycle, bicycle, taxi, bus, all means. 
Depends on customer group. Some visit 
the store as often as 2-3 times a day (Chief 
Operating Officer). 
Some ?/wk (General Manager]. 
Depends on time zons. Some customers 
live as far away as ir, Heiiongjiang, Jiangzi, 
Qinghai. For these customers, they may 
visit the store about once a month or once 
every two months, but they normally buy 
more each time (Chief Food Purchasing 
Officer). 
5 times a month. Customers come to store 








Adjustments Made that were Specifically Pointed Out by Interviewees 
Brands, assortments; "taste, lifestyle and habits are very different 
here ... need to understand local preference.. .the store format here at 
the moment is very similar to that in our home country. However, I 
believe that it should be different. But this is a process of adjustment, 
depending on what local people like. We first put our home country 
model into China to test and change continuously towards a model 
that suits local people's preference. It is difficult to tell how different 
the model here will be or should be, because it is a continuous 
process of adjustment. Even the stores in our home country, we are 
also changing them continuously to suit the needs of people there. 
Format keeps evolving. Moreover, when at one time there are more 
than one store, more than one format will evolve. In China, we are at 
the very early stage of format evolution." 
"There is adjustment as far as range and everything but you won't see a big 
different to our original concept. Also, you have to look at the location to see 
what type of customers is around. In some stores, you can't sell products 
that are too expensive or too high end. In our home country, different stores 
in different locations are a bit different in terms of assortment. However, our 
focus is still the same, which is freshness and convenience." 
Mainly food, need to adapt to local taste and seasonal change. At the 
beginning, they sold fish in aquarium, but they found it costly to keep them 
alive and it needed a very special skill to do so. Fish died a lot and so after 
about 4 weeks, they stopped selling fish in aquarium. 
*The adaptation prGcess of this company is discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
mainly different assortment 
- - 
mainly assGrtment and packaging 
"A lot of elements in our system/concept are not applicable to the China 
market. For example, our stores outside China are very well decorated, 
which are comparable to Wal-Mart. However, cost of decoration is too high 
in China. Also, there is no such thing as image design in China. Therefore, 
there are a lot of things we used to do but can't be done here. As a result, 
we are concentrating on product assortment, quality and services at the 
moment ...... Another example is that we have a standardised store 
evaluation system. But now in China, the system is not completely 
applicable. We need to and are modifying the evaluation form to suit China. 
A lot of elements in our formula need to be modified to suit China. It 
takes time. It is a process. Of course, the core ideology is the same, 
but then other things about how to achieve that ideology, i.e. the 
executive things, have to be adjusted according to the environment." 
"A lot of issues concerning fresh food are different here. We can't simply 
copy what we do in home country in this aspect because we need to suit the 
Chinese market. We choose fresh food products that are best sold in China. 
However, say for beef, we use our home country's cutting method here, 
because the 'beef culture' in our home country is much better developed 
than that here. Also because of that, we have a lot of information about how 
to cook different parts of beef and what kind of beef goes with what kind of 
cuisine. Nevertheless, the 'pork culture' is better here. So, we adopted the 
Chinese 'Dork culture'." Thev Dack their own fresh food. make their own 
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Shinese 'pork culture'." They pack their own fresh food, make their own 
Jakery and some ready meals themselves in store. 
Don't want to go away too much from their formula, because the most 
important thing is to maintain the economics of their business. If not, 
they will lose. But adjustments have to be made whenever suitable. One 
2xample: "I was sitting in my office doing my China study and five people 
same on tricycles. They had the same merchandise on their tricycles. So, I 
aas looking at the economics of having five tricycles delivering at our 
sompany. It didn't make sense to me. It didn't fit my idea of supply chain 
Inanagement. So, I pointed it out. These local people thought what they 
aere doing was very normal and didn't even see there was anything wrong. 
So, I asked them what it was, the merchandise, and what else had been 
happening. The answer literally came back, it was a cookerhood, so it is 
quite like merchandising but it was bulky. So, the five tricycles with the men 
paddling, came in convoys, we had a convoy for those people. They put to 
me that it was more economical to deliver that shipment with five people. 
That was a saving on the supplier side. But they also showed that if they 
needed a sixth tricycle, it would be cheaper to send it on a truck. Moreover, 
there are restrictions in transportation in Beijing. With tricycles, these guys 
can move and delivery more freely than a truck. So, in China, there are 
these little bits to which Western logic would not be applicable. We try to 
change and modify th? Chinese system but we also need to work with the 
locai system .'I 
Main!\/. asso;tmer;i; bigger packr?gi?g here than in home country and broade; 
assoirinent here because customers want varkty instead of voiLiiile here. 
for exsmp!e, they prefer buying 30 Sottles of different whisky to buying 3G 
bottles of one whisky (Chief Operating Officer). Sell fish alive in China 
(General Manager). Sell multi-packs here, but not in any other countries 
because of different customer's needs (Chief Food Purchasing Officer). 
Basically follow the same rules worldwide; Sell more food in Europe, 
because of a heavier focus on catering clients there. 
The information presented in Table 7.1 demonstrates that making adjustments to 
different elements in their retail operations to adapt to market conditions is crucial to 
retailers. The elements that were changed range from product focus, number of 
product lines, store size, assortments, brands, packaging to even the core concept of 
retailers. The empirical results in bold and italic, and in the column named 
'Adjustments made that were specifically pointed out by interviewees' are the more 
prominent examples of adaptation effort of the retailers interviewed. A detailed 
discussion of the adaptation issues that are reflected by the empirical results is given 
in the next few sections. 
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7.3.3 Adjustments to Retail Format and Formula 
The empirical results in the previous section reflect some adjustment-related issues 
that are worth examining in detail. First, different retailers viewed their competitive 
advantage differently. Some retailers believed that competitive advantages come 
from a concept. An example of such concept is “take your time, enjoy your 
shopping” by Company L. Another example can be taken from Company E, who 
believed that they could win customers by packaging and presenting their stores as 
“home town stores”. Some other retailers perceived competitive advantages as 
something to do with numbers. Company K stated that their success was derived 
from the concept of selling high volume at low prices with a low cost structure and 
hence they would stick with this concept regardless of where they go. Some retailers, 
on the other hand, considered their competitive advantages to be derived from a 
practical skill, such as Company I, who claimed that their competitive advantage was 
the possession of superior skills in controlling and maintaining freshness of food. 
Regardless of how retailers perceived their competitive advantages. an appropriate 
. .  
combinati XI 0’ different rezai: elemenrs is s i g ~ i  f k x  t in reailsing their comp~:trtive 
advs:;tzges. ‘&her. adapraiion is mzde, re:ailm t ex j  io retain their cor2 conce;:; arid 
change the combination of their other retail elementsi. 
The retailers interviewed, as shown in the empirical results, made adjustments to a 
number of retail elements of their operations in China. When they engaged in foreign 
direct investment activities in China, they kept their core concept and changed their 
retail mix in order to achieve a combination that would suit the condition and need of 
a particular market while maintaining their core competence. The retail elements that 
are to be changed were termed ‘the executive things’ by the Executive Director, 
Finance, of Company E, as shown in the last column of the table. The elements that 
the retailers interviewed changed included number of product lines, store size, 
product focus, product assortment, range, packaging and product brands. In China, 
freshness of food is very important in Chinese eating culture and therefore they had 
to adjust their product focus to gwe emphasis on fresh food. All of the retailers 
interviewed offered a large proportion of fresh food in their stores in China. Store 
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size was also seen as one element that had to be adjusted when retailers went to 
China. As shown, Company D claimed that a smaller store size than that they usually 
had elsewhere in the world would suit the Chinese market better. On the other hand, 
from the last column in the table, assortment and packaging appear to be the most 
obvious elements that need to be changed when a retailer transfers their expertise to a 
new market. One must note that adaptation to a new environment does not only 
happen when a retailer first enters a new market. This is a learning process that takes 
time and requires hand-on experience in the market. The retailers interviewed 
continuously made changes as they learnt more about the market through their 
operations day by day. 
Apart from making adjustments to different retail elements, continuously fine-tuning 
of their retail concepts in each country in which they operate is also crucial. This is 
the learning and adaptation process that gives rise to the evolution of new retail 
ideas. The case of Company M serves as a good illustration on this point. 
*C'orngany MI wantes to establish a modernised supem-m-ket tha! offered high 
quality of fresh f o d  in China. i-Iowever, they encoxtered objection from 
'their Chinese pafiners to investGent in selling fresh mea1 and vegetables. 
There -were two main reasons for the objection of their partners. The first 
reason was that the fresh food offered in their store would be more expensive 
than those in wet markets because they had processing and they had to add 
17%VAT on their prices, in which case consumers might not be willing to 
buy in their stores. The second reason was that controlling freshness of food 
required a specific skill. 
For the tax-related problem, Company M later found out from the municipal 
government that the VAT on fresh food was only 5 %  instead of 17%. 
Moreover, they tried to purchase in larger quantity to reduce cost. 
Consequently, the problem with high prices was solved. 
For the problem of freshness control, Company M admitted that educating the 
staff to control the quality of fresh food from purchasing, processing to 
selling was very difficult. In addition, obtaining meat with freshness 
guarantee in China is also difficult. Consequently, they decided to operate the 
meat department in their store jointly with a reliable, large scale meat 
producer who had been supplyng meat to Company M because this meat 
producer had the know-how to control the freshness of meat. That way, the 
meat purchasing, processing and in-store freshness control and selling were 
managed by the specialists who were sent by the meat producer to Company 
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M. Instead of charging the meat producer for rent, Company M charged them 
a fix percentage of their sales every month and the rest of the sales belonged 
to the meat producer. Company M found that this was a very good solution 
and the meat sales had risen dramatically. 
The tenet of continuous fine-tuning of retail concept is also well illustrated by the 
remark of the Director of Company A as shown in the table under the column 
‘description of or remarks related to retail concept and format in China’ and the last 
column. “Formats keep evolving.’’ Company A started off their retail operation in 
China with their concept at their home country. Then, they learnt from their daily 
operation and modified their concepts continuously, hoping for the evolution of a 
concept and format that would best suit the Chinese market. The Director of 
Company A further pointed out that this fine-tuning process also existed in their 
operations in other countries and their home country. This example reflects exactly 
what the author advocates in the analytical framework of international transfer of 
retail expertise at the beginning of this chapter. The transfer of retail expertise is in 
essence a process of learning and adjustment that leads to the evolution of innovative 
retail ideas and concepts that are crucial to the success of retailing, given thu 
dFariiic and diverse nature of consumer mai-kets. 
Other Operational Issues Umeiled b?) the Stud13 
In addition to the adjustments that foreign retailers made on their operations in China 
discussed above, the empirical results presented earlier also reveal several retail 
operational issues in China that are worth noting. 
First, all of the retailers interviewed maintained a gross margin of between 10% and 
20%. Four retailers claimed that their gross margin in China was lower than that in 
their home countries. The General Manager of the distribution centre of Company L 
claimed that this was probably because they had a lower buying power in China than 
in their home country. 
Second, the average basket value for foreign supermarket retailers interviewed 
ranges fi-om RMB 20 to RMB 30 (US$ 2.4 to US$ 3.6), except for Company M and 
Company L. Company M had only about RMB 10 (US$ 1.2). However. the average 
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frequency of store visits by their customers was higher for Company M than for 
other supermarket retailers interviewed. One main difference between Company M 
and other supermarket retailers interviewed is that Company M located in sub-urban 
area. Therefore, one plausible implication is that sub-urban consumers had different 
consumption patterns to urban dwellers. 
Third, the frequency of store visit for most retailers interviewed, except Company D 
and Company F, ranges from one to four times a week, regardless of whether the 
company is a supermarket retailer, a supercentre retailer, a superstore retailer, a 
hypermarket retailer or a cash and carry. This reflects that consumers in China tend 
to shop more often than consumers in Europe or the US. “The people here are used to 
buying everyday to suit their daily needs,” said the Agnculture Specialist of the US 
Agncultural Trade Office in Guangzhou. Moreover, physical household size in 
China in general is smaller than that in Europe and the US. Consequently, there is 
less storage space in a normal Chinese household. This contributes to explaining why 
Chinese consumers tend to buy a small amount of goods every time but shop more 
frequently. The frequency c f store visits of the Patrons of Coinpany D and Cmqxy.? 
F differ from that of other reiailers ir,temlewed. This is probably duz to the fact that 
thc patrons of Company D and Company F tended to be the non-end ;Ism. such 2s 
restaurants and other smaller retailers, which were the target customers of the two 
companies. 
Lastly, four retailers claimed that theft was a very serious issue in China. Most of the 
retailers interviewed believed that theft is the main cause of shrinkage in China. 
Rigorous control measures had to be taken. CCTV and security guards were used in 
stores. Furthermore, the author observed that most of the foreign retailers in China 
required customers to put all their belongings in lockers located just outside the 
entrance of the stores before they enter the stores. Theft was not only caused by 
customers but also staff. Most of the retailers interviewed appeared to be able to 
control their shrinkage rate below 1%, which most of them claimed as not too bad 
and tolerable. 
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7.3.4 Communication with Consumers 
The axiomatic aim of retailing activities is to satisfy consumer wants and needs. 
Therefore, communication to customers about their needs and satisfaction on their 
visits is important. Furthermore, the strategy that a food retailer adopts on customer 
communication partly constitutes to the distinctiveness of the product (the store) the 
retailer offers. The degree of devotion of a retailer to customer communication 
reflects its commitment towards satisfying its customers. 
Customer communication involves the way in which customers are treated by the 
staff of the store (this is called the interpersonal element), the channel through which 
customers can make complaints and comments, the policies on dealing with 
complaints, the refund policy and the delivery of store publications to customers. 
These elements offer scope for differentiation and customer satisfaction to food 
retailers (Bell, Gilbert and Lockwood, 1997), because, for instance, given the 
comparatively low level of direct staff involvement in the grocery store shopping 
experience, the involvement of interpersonal element has a significant and frequent 
impact on customer perception on the store.  FOG^ retailers who can guarmtee good 
interpersonal interaction wiII gain - advantage (Hell, Gilbert and imkwcjod, 1997’). 
This is a hdief shared by Company E, who stressed that one of their main concepts 
was to be a “home town store”, as mentioned in an earlier section. Furthermore, 
customer services and communication provides a more effective way to increase 
market share than price competition (Bell, Gilbert and Lockwood, 1997). 
This section investigates very briefly the type of consumer research that foreign 
retailers in China conducted, the difficulties, if any, they encountered in doing so, 
some statistics on food consumption pattern and Chinese consumer behaviour that is 
related to the foreign direct investment activities of foreign retailers in China. The 
reader should note that a detail study on the topic of market and consumer research, 
consumer behaviour and consumption pattern, and promotion in China is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
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7.3.4.7 Consumer/Market Research 
No information about consumer research was obtained from Company C. All the 
other twelve retailers interviewed carried out some sort of consumer research 
themselves. In some companies, the research was carried out by the store manager, 
and in some other companies it was by a special team such as marketing team. Seven 
retailers conducted the research continuously but most of them were not on a regular 
basis. The Executive Director of Company E pointed out that they planned to 
conduct the research regularly in the future. The methods they used included 
informal chat, proper survey and focus group with customers inside their stores. For 
the other five retailers, two of them had conducted similar consumer research only 
once at the time of interview but both of them stated that they were planned to do 
another one soon after the time of the interview. 
The other three retailers, Company F, Company D and Company K, operated Cash 
and Carry in China and they had a European origin. Membership was required in 
order to shop in these three companies. Their target customers were the more 
professionai clients. ijrstead of end-users. During membership registration, customers 
hed to provide much information. Consequently. a database wirs formed, which was 
updated continuously as their customers made purchases ai :he store. Furtheirnore, 
all these three retailers claimed that they regularly invited their customers to have 
meetings with them or paid visits to their customers to discuss their needs and buying 
profiles. The General Manager of Company K alleged that they also regularly 
conducted presentations to about 20 customers each time to educate them about 
Company K's concept and how Company K could benefit their businesses. On the 
other hand, according to the Chief Operating Officer of Company F, they had 15 
representatives who were devoted to maintaining contacts with customers. Apart 
from constantly posting direct mails about promotional activities and news of their 
stores to all their registered customers, they kept track of customer profiles 
continuously and visited the bigger customers regularly and contacted the smaller 
customers by telephone. All these three companies stated that their customer 
database and communication with customers were enough to serve the purpose of 
knowing about their customers and letting their customers know about them. 
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One retailer, Company K, claimed that people in China were less willing to spare 
time to participate in consumer research activities than the people in Europe. On the 
contrary, four of the twelve retailers interviewed, Companies J, F, E and L, pointed 
out that Chinese customers were very willing to spend time on participating in their 
consumer research activities. The Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer stated that 
once their company had demonstrated that they took customer’s opinion seriously, 
their customers were quite active in providing comments. The other seven retailers 
interviewed did not give any information on the attitude of Chinese consumers 
towards consumer research. Although the author’s results on the attitude of Chinese 
consumers towards consumer research is far from conclusive, it poses a challenge to 
Yau’s (1 988 in McDonald, 1991) claim that effective customer communication in 
China is difficult to achieve because Chinese people do not demonstrate overt 
complaint activity. 
In terms of market information, most retailers interviewed claimed that there was not 
I ~ U &  market, informaticr available in China. The way they obiained information 
about competitors was niainlv 4 .  bv sore  visits to their competitors to check their price 
and products. The Executive Director, Finance, of Company E stated that they 
mainly obtain market information through informal means 
“We have a lot of colleagues who worked for other retailers before joining us. 
They have very good network and channel to find out what’s going on in the 
market and with other retailers.. . . . .Also, we are a member of the Chain Store 
Association here and we obtain quite a bit of market information there 
informally.” 
According to an Agncultural Specialist of US Agncultural Trade Office Guangzhou 
office, 
“The availability of market information is pretty pitiful in China. It takes a lot 
of effort to get some useful information. It is true that there are market 
research companies here who are willing to provide market research services 
for you. But the problem is that the price they charge is ridiculously high. 
Moreover, they are mainly local companies. They are poor at best. They don’t 
quite understand what you really want. So, if you want real market 
information, it is very difficult to get.” 
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Company A claimed that they had use consulting companies to carried large scale, 
more sophisticated consumer/market research. Company K also stated that they did 
one market research jointly with AC Neilson in China. 
7.3.4.2 Consumption Pattern 
As mentioned before, China, occupying an area of 9 596 960 square km, cannot be 
treated as one homogenous market because each place has its unique social, cultural, 
economic and political background. Consequently, characterising the ‘typical’ 
Chinese consumers is meaningless. For retailing purpose, each city has to be looked 
at individually. The current section details some statistical figures related to urban 
consumption patterns in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong. The statistical figures are 
obtained from China National Bureau of Statistics (1 999b) unless otherwise stated. 
In urban areas, the average number of people per household in 1998 is 3.16, in which 
2.18 people are income generators. In the same year, the average annual expenditure 
of a person in urban households is RMB 4331 (US5 521.8), which accounts for 
79.8% of the RMB 5425 (US$ 653.6) average disposable income of a person in 
urban households. 44.5% of‘the average mn;lal expenditure is on food (Table ~ 2 ) .  Tn 
other words, a person in xban  households, on average, spends 35.5% of his annuzi 
disposable income on food. 
- 
The average urban diet contains a high proportion of meat, grain (mainly rice) and 
vegetables. In urban food sales, there is a greater expenditure in the fresh produce 
sectors. Although the majority of households in urban area in China own 
refrigerators (Table 7.3), meat, fish, poultry and vegetables are mostly bought on a 
daily basis because Chinese people prefer having fresh produce every day when they 
cook at home (Anderson, 1988 in Goldman, 1998). A detailed breakdown on the 
food expenditure of an average person in urban households in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangdong is given in Table 7.2. In Shanghai, consumers spend about 60% of their 
food retail purchases on fresh food (China Statistical Publishing House, 1995 and 
Euromonitor, 1996B in Goldman, 1988). Basing on their emphasis on fresh food in 
their stores, as shown in the ‘empirical results’ section, the foreign food retailers 
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interviewed appear to have responded well to this Chinese consumer’s need of 
freshness. 
Alongside the increase in average urban incomes, which allows for more frequent 
consumption, the consumption on meat has increased fastest in value terms. 
Moreover, a greater spending on more expensive and better quality meat because of 
increasing awareness of quality among Chinese consumers has been shown 
(Euromonitor, 1996). At the same time, fruit and vegetables are also important to 
Chinese diet. According to Mueller and Mueller (1996), the perception of food 
quality can be improved with store layout and cleaning of the produce before 
displaying. Consequently, an increasing number of consumers buy food in modem 
food retail stores in which there is pleasant shopping environment and better display. 
The Vice General Manager of Company M described, 
“Consumers here increasingly care about hygiene, especially in the summer. 
A lot of them still go to wet markets to shop, but their frequency of buying 
meat from those markets is decreasing. This is because their living standard 
and knowledge of hygiene are rising.” 
On the other hand, car ownership in China is very lciv. as showrn ir, Table 7.3. So is 
motorbike ownership, except in Guangdong, where, on average, alimst one ir, twc 
households owns a motorbike. However, bicycle ownership is very common in 
China. Therefore, most consumers make their shopping trips on foot, by bike or 
motorbike. 
7.3.4.3 Consumer Behaviour 
In Europe or America, different formats target different customers and consumers are 
able to distinguish among different formats. However, in China, this is not the case. 
There is no doubt that the warehouse clubs in China claimed that their target 
customers are professional customers, but a closer investigation revealed that they 
are in fact giving in and retailing instead of wholesaling. Evidence suggests that 
people without a membership card were able to get into the outlets, or membership 
cards were easy to obtain without the need to produce a business certificate, and 
items were sold individually or in a small pack instead of in bulk. The author 
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attempted to make purchase in a number of different warehouse clubs and cash and 
carry in China without a membership card. When asked, the staff responded that the 
author could just borrow a membership card from someone in the queue at the 
checkouts. It appeared that the membership policy was not well implemented. These 
phenomena were discussed with the respondents during interviews. They explained 
that the consumers in China were not capable of distinguishing among different retail 
formats and educating and soliciting business from professional consumers takes 
time. 
“They just don’t understand! Everybody wants to shop in our stores and they 
just don’t care what your format is. If you don’t let them shop here, they will 
get annoyed with you”, pointed out by the Chief Operating Officer of 
Company F. 
The point that Chinese consumers cannot differentiate among different retail formats 
is further supported by the author’s interviews with some government officials who 
were involved with economic development and FDI in China. Regardless of the 
fxmat of a retailer, xhether it is a hypermarket. Supnxx1i-e. cash and caz-y, 
’warehome club. ~ ) r  :he Zlkz, Chinese consumers called aIi cf‘ them ‘damrzii.h,zng’ 
3 meaning i! big markeiplacc sclling a very wide range ofpro-2ucrs in reasonably low 
prices in a clean and modem self-service environment. This is all the knowledge that 
they have of foreign food retailers in China. and is also the image that foreign food 
retailers have created. Shopping in these outlets has become a convenient and 
fashionable way of shopping. The author observed during her fieldwork that some 
consumers even took taxi to go to and leave from these ‘damaichung’. This 
behaviour shows the popularity of these outlets among Chinese consumers, 
considering the average income of the people. In fact, the format of ‘dumaichang’ 
has been extensively copied by many local retailers in China soon after the entries of 
foreign food retailers. According to the General Manager of Company K, some local 
‘danzuichang’ retailers even partly copied the Chinese names of those foreign 
‘damaichang’ such as Makro and Metro, which are ‘ Wunkalong’ and ‘Maidelong’ 
respectively. Two examples are Jir2kulong and Tiankelong, who are two local food 
retailers in Beijing. The widespread imitation of the ‘dunzaichung’ concept further 
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indicates the popularity of those large-scale foreign food retailers among Chinese 
con sum er s. 
According to the behaviour model of purchase and consumption (Foxall, 1993)”, 
consumer behaviour is affected by both current behaviour setting and consumer’s 
learning history. The behaviour setting is made of all the physical, social and 
temporal elements that indicate the likely consequences of behaving in a particular 
way. Consumer’s learning history is the cumulative effect of rewarding and 
punishing outcomes of past behaviour. As mentioned before, the consumers in China 
possessed little information and purchasing experience about modern retailing prior 
to 1992. When the market was open to foreign retailers, many different formats of 
retailing were brought into China within a very short period of time. Consequently, 
Chinese consumers suffered from an ‘experience gap’ between the old Chinese 
concept of food shopping and the modem way. Mun (1988) claims that when 
consumers do not have a solid history about consumption, they are susceptible to 
ideas and influences. This ‘catch-up’ mentality offers a plausible explanation to the 
swift take-off of the format of ‘Danzaichang’ in China soon after its first zppearance. 
In fact, many mafketers of foreign brands h2ve been surprised by the speed with 
which their brands gained acceptance among Chinese consuniers (MUG, 1988). 


































































































































7.3.5 Impact on Chinese Retail Structure in terms of Modernisation 
During the author’s interviews with the foreign retailers, six companies revealed 
information on whether they had any net profit at the time. Two retailers reported to 
have net profit, after operating in China for three years. One retailer stated that they 
were breakeven. Another retailer claimed that they were close to making net profit. 
The other two retailers responded that they did not have any net profit yet. These two 
retailers and the one who was breakeven at the time claimed that the main problem 
was the overhead costs. Therefore, these two retailers who were not making any net 
profits said that they needed a total number of five to six outlets in one region in 
order to have net profit. 
Although most retailers interviewed did not make any net profit at the time of 
interview, they have had made some significant market effect on the retail industry in 
China. According to the 1999 Market Statistical Yearbook of China, Metro Cash and 
Carry ranks the fourth among all chain store enterprises with capital of RMB 50 
mi!lion (U%$ 6.02 million) or over in china in 19% in terms annual sales. With oniy 
four outlets at the time, their annual saies in that year reached more than RMB 2 
billior, (US$ 0.24 billion). In fact, six retailers interviewed believed that they were 
occupying good market positions in the cities in which they operated. The Chief 
Operating Officer of Company F claimed that they were having a market share of 
about 16.5% in the FMCG retailing sector in Shanghai at the time of interview. The 
General Manager of Company K believed that they were occupying either a first or 
second position in the retail sector in Beijing in terms of market share. while 
Company D were occupying a third or fourth position in Guangzhou. The General 
Manager of the distribution centre of Company L also believed that Company L were 
having a highly favourable position in the market. Similarly, both the Executive 
Director, Finance, of Company E and the Manager of the Supermarket Diyision of 
Company C alleged that they were doing well and there was not any significant 
threat of competition. 
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Due to their high volume of sales and favourable market positions, foreign food 
retailers have already started to induce changes in the retail industry in China. One 
impact is that they have changed consumers’ expectations regarding services, pricing 
and quality. They introduced a new experience of food shopping to Chinese 
consumers. Consumers are made aware that they could now purchase goods of high 
quality at a low price. Consequently, all the players in the field are compe!led to 
improve the quality of products and services they offer and reduce their prices. As 
described by the Buying Manger of Company J, 
“Players like Makro and Carrefour are influencing the market. They deal with 
suppliers everyday and the quantity they are talking about is big. They make a 
lot of joint promotions with the suppliers. Therefore, they always sell 
products at a discounted price. Their behaviour has become one of the factors 
to be considered in pricing decisions in the market. For example, if Carrefour 
today sells this product at 3 Rmb, it’s not long before everybody else follows, 
because otherwise they are going to lose. Consumers are sensitive to these 
things. They believe that if Carrefour can sell it at such a low price while the 
product quality is maintained at a good level, all the other retailers should be 
able to, and should, do so as well.” 
Subsequent to the pressure of i;r?p!-oving quality but reducing pricxs. oihzr t-etders in 
the field have to redacz their ccsts by employing the ri1Crr.e advanced ii~&rr;lati.;>ri 
technoiogy and retsil h o w - h ~ w  chzt, fgreign retailers h a w  brought a l m g  as the) 
entered China. 
However, retail know-how consists of much tacit knowledge, which requires time to 
learn. This makes true modernisation difficult for many local retailers. As mentioned 
before, many local retailers have copied the format of foreign retailers’. 
Nevertheless, there is a difference between superficial modernisation and true 
modernisation, which incorporates many elements that are beyond the tangible and 
visible hardware in a store. The hardware of a retail store is build around a concept. 
The success of a retail business depends largely on a formula that is made up of a 
delicate balance of different elements, as demonstrated earlier in the present section 
(section 7.3). Possession of adequate managerial skills in different areas is also 
essential. As pointed out by the Chief Operating Officer of Company F, 
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“To copy is one thing, to do business is another. To do business, you need the 
experience and management skills. So, copying and being able to run the 
business successfully is two totally different things.” 
Similarly, the Chief Non-Food Purchasing Officer of the same company also stressed 
that, 
“The local retailers who are copying our formats have a long way to go. Even 
if they hire ten people from our company, they will still not be able to run the 
business as we can because they lack the experience and skills in helping the 
staff to develop.. . . . .For a company to be successful, the people who run it 
must know every details of the business and the environment in a heart beat. 
This knowledge and ability comes from experience.” 
True modernisation of the Chinese retail industry will only emerge after a certain 
period of time’ ’ . 
Some scholars claim that certain selected indicators on retail structure and economic 
and social environment in the economically advanced countries may be used as a 
basis for forecasting future retailing trends in the less developed countries (Kaynak, 
19884. In other words, they believe that, development of retailing in transitionai 
ecsncmies will be a repeat process of whe:: happened in developed countries in the 
past. Based on the modernisation impact that foreign retailers brought into China. as 
discussed in the last few paragraphs, the future retailing structure in China might 
seem to converge towards those in the developed countries and hence those scholars’ 
belief appear to be plausible. However, there are traits that suggest this may not 
necessarily be the case. 
As mentioned earlier, the retail development in China is truncated. The retail and 
distribution structure before the 1990s was very primitive. In early 1990s, the 
Chinese government intended to modernise the sector and therefore opened the 
sector to foreign direct investment. Subsequently, different kinds of modem retail 
operators suddenly appeared in China. At the time, income level of the majority of 
the Chinese population remained low. Due to their much higher operating costs than 
that of the conventional food retail outlets, foreign food retailers had to target the 
medium to high income earners in China when they first entered and wait for the 
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average disposable income of the rest of the population to increase before they could 
absorb a wider customer base. The modem retail concepts of foreign retailers are 
ahead of the economic and social development in China when they entered the 
market. This situation is different from the retail development in Western countries, 
in which different retail formats evolve in response to the changes in the economic 
and social environment. This implies that China nowadays is experiencing a retailing 
development process that is different from that being found in developed countries in 
the past. Consequently, the retail structure and the economic and social environment 
indicators in the economically advanced countries may not be appropriate in 
predicting the future retail landscape in China. 
There is no doubt that the strategic, management and operational elements of foreign 
retailers will shape the retail landscape in China to a certain extent. Nevertheless, 
foreign food retailers are also making adaptation to the local environment, which is 
very different from the European or American environment. Furthermore, the retail 
development process in the contemporary China is unprecedented in the developed 
countfies. as just pcinted out. Therefore, a distinct retail structure mzy evolve ir. thz 
f3ture in China. 
7.4 Learning-Oriented Culture 
The concept of organisational learning orientation is introduced during the discussion 
of the process model in section 2.1.2.1, where the concept of knowledge is also 
examined. Process model views internationalisation as a process of geographical 
expansion enabled by knowledge accumulation. In other words, knowledge is the 
ultimate source of competitive advantage. In order to accumulate knowledge, an 
organisation must possess a capability to learn. This tenet lays the foundation of the 
concept of organisational learning orientation. Having an organisational learning 
orientation is particularly crucial to retailers because it provides an approach for 
continuous adjustment of organisation issues and knowledge utilization in a turbulent 
The importance of the learning process to a retailer is investigated in the next section 11 
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competitive climate (Geman, 1993; Stata, 1994 in Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah- 
Adu, 1998). Furthermore, the flexibility inherent in a learning organisation means 
that rapid company responses are possible in order to exploit emerging opportunities 
or extinguish threats (Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). In addition, 
information usually flows efficiently within learning organisations and this could 
lead to significant reduction of transaction costs and economies of information 
(Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). Retailing is an industry that directly 
interacts with consumers. With rapid development of technology and intensifyng 
competition, together with rapid changes in consumers' taste, retailers could not 
sustain their favourable positions in the market without the capability to continuously 
fine-tune their organisational issues. 
For the present study, organisational learning is defined as the capacity or process 
within an organisation to maintain or improve performance based on experience" 
(Nevis, DiBella and Gould, 1995), and that capacity is termed organisational 
capability (OC), which is discussed in section 2.1 2. 
This section discusses thc view that retailers hold ori the irnpxtance of human 
resources and how they use human resources to leverage knowledge accumulation 
for the whole international organisation to improve performance and innovate. 
7.4.7 Human Resources Policies 
The issues that are examined in this part include the balance between using 
expatriates and local people, qualification and experience required of recruited local 
staff, methods of training adopted by foreign retailers for local staff and a brief 
evaluation of the performance of local staff. 
There is little consensus as to what is meant and understood by the term organisational learning 
(Schein, 1996b in Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). Some scholars discuss organisational 
learning in terms of knowledge and new insights (Hedberg, 1981 in Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah- 
Adu, 1998). Some others discuss it at the level of structural priority (Chandler. 1962 in Morgan, 
Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). There are also some who inivestigate organisational learning by 
looking at systems and procedures (Jelinek, 1979 in Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). 
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7.4.1. I Extent of Localisation 
In order to maintain faithfulness to the original concept without overlooking local 
sensitivities, multinational firms tend to employ mixed management teams consisting 
of both local and expatriate executives. No information on the extent of localisation 
was obtained from Company H. All the other twelve retailers interviewed reported 
that they tried to localise as much as possible for two reasons. First, using expatriates 
in China was very expensive, which substantially increased their overhead costs, 
especially at the beginning of their foreign direct investment. Secondly, the local 
people had a better understanding of the local consumers’ need. The second reason 
given by the retailers interviewed is in line with the claim of Nakata and Sivakumar 
(1997), who argue that local people are more capable in reading the local market 
conditions and understanding local consumers’ taste and consumption behaviour. 
Their main reasons for bringing in expatriates in the first place were to introduce the 
expertise of their company into their operations in China and to train local staff, who 
hardly had any knowledge and experience in running a modem retail operation. 
All the expatriates in Companies B, I, D, K, F. A, J and E that the author 
interviewed, who were the top executives, had substantial expertise and expeiience in 
the retailing industry in the developed countries. The number of years thzt they have 
worked in the industry ranges from five to thirty-four. Some of them eyen have 
worked in the industry in many different countries. According to the Chief Operating 
Officer and the General Manger of Company F, besides possessing adequate 
knowledge of and experience in the retail industry, expatriates should also be open 
minded about different cultures, believe in trust and team building and seek to 
develop the staff members of the company 
“Expatriates should be open-minded, modest, willing to listen to people, 
learning oriented, and very importantly, able to work with people but not rule 
people,” said the Chief Operating Officer of Company F. 
No information on the experience of the expatriates in the other five companies were 
obtained. 
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Companies B, D, K and F revealed that at the time of interview, the proportion of 
expatriates in their entire work force in China was about 5%, 1%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. Companies A, J, E, C, M and L also stated that the number of 
expatriates in their Chinese operations was 3, 2, 4, 7, 3 and 15 respectively. The total 
number of the workforce of these six companies was not available. However, these 
six companies claimed that expatriates accounted for a very small proportion of the 
staff in their companies. Except Company E, all the other eleven retailers disclosed 
that they had a higher number of expatriates at the commencement of their Chinese 
business than at the time of interview. Companies B, A, C and L pointed out that 
they were still actively trying to reduce the number further, whereas Companies D 
and F specifically claimed that they would maintain the number reported at the 
interview. The Chief Operating Officer of Company F emphasised, 
“We are not decreasing the number of expatriates here any more because we 
need to have some expatriates here to make sure that every store is run under 
the same regulations, instructions and rules so that the ‘store culture’ is the 
same for every outlet and our core concept is maintained.’’ 
The General Mai1agt:r of the distribution ceiitre of Company L made a siniilx 
renark, 
“Although ihe Company was stiI‘l tryng to reduce the iiGniber of expatriates, 
the number will only be reduced to a certain point because we need to have 
the expatriates to make sure our style is implemented and maintained properly 
in the stores here.’’ 
Contrasting the policies of the other retailers, there were less expatriates at the 
beginning than at the time of interview in Company E. When Company E first started 
their business, according to their Executive Director, Finance, they wanted to keep 
the overhead cost as low as possible because they could not afford to lose too much 
money at the beginning. Therefore, they started off with only one or two expatriates. 
To solve the problem of finding competent management staff, they employed people 
at the management level from other retail companies in China, whose salary was 
lower than expatriates. He claimed that competent human resources for the 
management level in a modem retail firm was rare but they managed to get enough 
quality people. He pointed out that these colleagues of his were well trained and were 
competent in performing their job. Moreover, they possessed the understand of and 
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sensitivity to the local market, including issues related to consumers, competitors and 
the government. Company E had been having a good development and therefore they 
could afford to increase the number of expatriates to four at the time of interview. 
More expatriates were also needed as their business expanded. Nevertheless, the 
Executive Director, Finance, believed that having four expatriates was optimal for 
the time being and hence they would maintain the number of expatriates at around 
that level. 
One plausible reason for the difference in the policy of using expatriates between 
Company E and the other companies is related to their organisational structure. The 
foreign partner of Company E bought a franchise from another foreign company to 
develop Company E in China. The foreign partner of Company E was not a grocer 
retailer and therefore unlike other retail counterparts, did not have a particular retail 
‘concept’ or ‘style’ to put through in their operations in China when they first entered 
China. Furthermore, they obtained very good support in every way from their 
franchiser. Consequently, whether the management staff was expatriates or local was 
not a sigriiiicant issue provided that their staff possessed adequate experiefice and 
howledge about modern retaiiing. Su brecjueIitly. theic need for expatriates at the 
inception cf‘their business ir;. China was not as intense as their counterparts. This. 
together with the budget constraint, leads to a lower number of expatriates in 
Company E than in other retailers at the early stage of their Chinese operations. 
Nevertheless, as their retail business developed and became more mature than at the 
beginning, more expatriates were bought in from the home country to ensure the 
smooth running of the business. 
7.4.7.2 Requirements on Recruiting Staff in China 
As mentioned before, the retail and distribution industry in China, as a legacy of the 
command economy, is under-developed. Therefore, there is a shortage of well- 
trained and experienced workforce for the retail industry. Furthermore, the concept 
of service hardly existed under the ‘iron rice bowl’ system”. Consequently, the 
Under the communist regime, there was no reward or punishment system for encouraging people to 
improve performance. Jobs were allocated to people by the government. People would not be laid off 
for poor performance. This system was termed ’iron rice bowl’. 
13 
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proportion of workforce with the right mentality for modem retailing is small. 
Knowing the situation of the labour market in China, foreign retailers tended to relax 
their usual requirement on the amount of experience one should possess for middle 
managerial positions. Instead, they emphasised more on other qualities. Based on the 
discussion with Companies D, K and A, the suitable candidates for middle 
managerial positions would be those who were open-minded, progressive and with a 
learning attitude. Companies B, J and G said the suitable candidates had also to be 
university degree holders. The Vice President of Company B remarked, 
“...knowledge can be taught, experience can be gained, we can train them, as 
long as they’ve got the intellectual potential and are with the right mentality.” 
Actually, the General Manager of the distribution centre of Company L claimed that 
he preferred to employ people with no experience in the retail and distribution field 
in China because that would guarantee that their employees did not have “bad 
habits”. He alleged that the “practice” for the buyer on the retailer side to receive 
commission from the seller on the supplier side had been very common within the 
local distibution chanzel In China, which was a “practice” thst they did not want 
their emp 10 yees to adopt I 
7.4.7.3 Training 
No information relating to training was obtained from Companies C and M. 
Therefore, the discussion in this particular section is based on the information 
obtained from the other eleven retailers. 
Due to the lack of well-experienced retail human resources, foreign retailers 
recognised training for local staff as very important. Based on the interviews with the 
retailers, there were four main forms of training: in-house training courses, sending 
staff to their operations in home or other countries, bringing in trainers from their 
home countries and using external training agencies. 
All of the eleven retailers claimed that their retail corporation had very well- 
developed training materials and resources for them to carry out training for local 
staff in China. According to the General Manager of Company K, the training they 
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provided for their managerial staff was very comprehensive, which included 
customer care training, different management training, selling skills training, buying 
training and negotiation training. 
Nine of the above eleven retailers also sent their local staff who occupied higher 
managerial positions to their operations in home countries or other developed 
countries as part of the training. If the staff was sent abroad for a very short period of 
time, such as a week, they were required to visit the operations to learn how the 
whole system worked. If they were sent abroad for a longer period of time, such as 
half a year, the activity would be similar to a proper placement. These activities were 
meant to be practical sessions for the staff to learn in the real environment about 
what their retail system is all about. The duration of the visit depended on the 
position of the staff. Normally, it would be longer for staff at a higher managerial 
level. In Companies A, J, E and L, who are Asian companies, the visits usually lasted 
for a week or two. In Companies B, I, D, K and F, who are European companies, the 
visits could last up to eight months. The situation with Company E was slightly 
different. They seni thcir Chinese staff who occup’ed very hig!i manageriai positions 
to the country of origin of‘ theii- franchiser to lea-m about their retail concept and 
system by visiting their franchised stores. In order to train al l  other Chinese staff. 
Company E sent a few key people to the Asian headquarters of their franchiser to 
learn about their retail concepts and systems so that they became trainers when they 
got back to China for all the other staff. They termed it “train the trainers 
pro gramme”. 
Company H used to place some key staff in their headquarters’ operation but they 
had stopped it when they had successfully arranged with Wal-Mart to let their staff 
visit and learn in Wal-Mart’s stores in Southern China, which saved much cost for 
Company H. 
Company G had planned to send some higher managerial staff to their headquarters 
at the beginning but they abandoned the plan because their country of origin had very 
strict policy in approving entries for people from China. 
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On the other hand, Company A and D claimed that obtaining a visa to go abroad was 
not easy for their Chinese staff and therefore they had to incorporate this 
consideration in deciding their training plans. The President of Company D pointed 
out, 
“Chinese people have difficulty in travelling. There are restrictions on their 
travelling. So, it is not a question of what we decide to do. I tried to send 
people to Singapore, and it ended up we could not, because they did not have 
the visa. So, all we could do at the end was to give seminars to them here, in 
China.” 
The third form of training that was used by foreign retailers is seminars held by 
visiting colleagues from outside China. This method was not popular among the 
retailers interviewed. Only Companies I, D, E and K adopted it and they only did it 
occasionally. Furthermore, the visiting colleagues only stayed for a few days each 
time. 
Apart from the three forms of training as discussed abox ,  Compsnies J and E: 
clainxd that they soi-nz;iriizs also pr?t their staff CIT! specific courses ~ii! by sxtenial 
training agexies. 
Seven retailers specifically pointed out that their local staff “picked things up very 
quickly”. Six of these seven retailers were generally happy with their staffs 
performance, although two of them revealed some little problems with their staff. 
The General Manger of Company F found that the behaviour of Chinese people was 
difficult to understand sometimes and therefore he had to “check things out himself 
to make sure everything was right”. The President of Company D claimed that their 
Chinese staff were not very used to working in a company of their scale, in which 
there was tremendous amount of details that staff had to look into, and therefore he 
had to put some extra effort in making sure all the details were attended to. On the 
other hand, one of those seven retailers, Company L, alleged that they were not very 
satisfied with the performance of their Chinese staff, although they learnt quickly, 
because their performance was not of a high enough standard and they still had a 
different mentality towards retailing. The General Manager of the distribution centre 
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of this company attributed this problem to the fact that they had no control on the 
recruitment of staff“ and he felt that their Chinese partner did not recruit exactly the 
kind of people they wanted. 
7.4.2 Importance of Human Resources in a Retail Company 
In response to the author’s question of their views on the importance of human 
resources to a retail company, all nine retailers with whom the author had discussed 
this issue replied that it was very important. They used wordsiphrases such as “vital”, 
“very important”, “almost the most important” and “the most important”. The Vice 
President of Company B replied, 
“Human resources is vital. It’s people who make a company different. Our 
people make the difference. Our people are among the best trained in the 
industry.. .The most important element for our successful retailing in China is 
our people.” 
Similarly, the General Manger of Company I stated, 
“Human resources is a very important element that gives rise to our long term 
and sustzined success and therefore we put a lot of emphasis human resources 
training everywhere we go.” 
In the same vein, the Buying Manager of Company J believed. 
“Human resources is very important. It’s central. Our people are our 
important assets.” 
In fact, their emphasis on the importance of human resources to the success of a 
retailing company is also reflected in their human resources policy that is discussed 
in the previous section. Their rationale for believing in the importance of human 
resources was that retailing was about serving customers and how they could serve 
their customers significantly depended on their people because successful retailing 
involves the accumulation and effective utilisation of tacit knowledge. This tenet is 
most obviously implied in the responses of the Chief Non Food Purchasing Officer 
of Company F and the Buying Manager of Company J. The Chief Non Food 
Purchasing Officer of Company F described, 
This is because it was agreed in their joint venture agreement that the Chinese partner controls staff 14 
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“Basically, we (Company F and our competitors) sell more or less the same 
merchandise, and the price competition is already down to the bone. There is 
no more meat left. And the thing that makes differences between different 
retail organisations is human resources: what type of people have you got? 
How do they perceive and understand your concept? How they react to 
market changes and how they serve the customers? These are the most 
imp ortan t i s sues. ” 
The Buying Manager of Company J pointed out that, 
“Hardware and systems can be taught. Everyone can see the tangible 
elements and it is not that difficult to put up the whole store with the same 
hardware and system. However, if you want to be a successful retailer, you 
must have the human resources who have got a vision about what is going to 
happen in the market in a year, two years, five or so.” 
What the Buyng Manager of Company J referred to as “vision” is the tacit part, 
which can only be acquired through experience of individuals. Different individuals 
perceive the same concept differently and they have different sensitivity to the 
market situation. A successful retailer requires human resources that are capable to 
flexibly apply its core concept to different market conditions. This again, is tacit and 
experience and time are needed for an individual 10 acquire this capability through a 
lezming process. This tacit element of retailing is the ultjinzte e lmen i  that gives rise 
to sustained competitive advantage of a firm in the especially d y a m i c  retail market. 
This is the reason why retail firms put much emphasis on developing individual 
expertise in their organisations. 
In the learning process, one crucial element that has to be cultivated is market 
. As stressed by the Chief Operating Officer of Company F, “. . .the orientation 15 & 16 
recruitment. ’’ Market orientation, based on marketing concept, has been advocated, cnticised and defended since 
the 1950s (Felton, 1959; Liu, 1995 in Appiah-Adu. 1998). It is considered to be a cornerstone of 
marketing thought (Morgan, Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu, 1998). However, a review of relevant 
literature reveals that relatively little is understood of the ingredients of this theoretical construct 
(Deng and Dart, 1994 in Morgan. Katsikeas and Appiah-Adu. 1998). During the late 1980s. advances 
in this area were made and efforts were directed towards determining the conceptual domain, scope, 
interpretation and measurement of market orientation. 
16 . Since the late 1980s two conceptual frameworks of market orientation have been dominating the 
marketing and strategy literature. The first one is advocated by Slater and Narver (1995) n-ho define 
market orientation as “the culture that places the highest priority on the profitable creation and 
maintenance of superior customer value while considering the interests of other stakeholders and [it] 
provides norms for behaviour regarding the organisational development and responsiveness to market 
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main point is to get our staff customer-oriented...” Market dynamics have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of strategic orientation (Snow and Hrebeniak, 
1980; McKee et al., 1989). Consequently, firms must continuously monitor and act 
on their external environment (Houston, 1986; Kohli and Jaworski, 1990). In fact, a 
positive relationship between market orientation and a firm’s return on assets (ROA), 
which is one way to measure performance, has been demonstrated in various studies 
camed out in some developed countries such as the US (Narver and Slater, 1990; 
Ruekert, 1992; Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Slater and Narver, 1994, 1995) and the UK 
(Pitt et al., 1996). Furthermore, evidence also exists in the literature that shows a 
positive association between a firm’s level of market orientation and the realisation 
of organisational or performance objectives, although it may take years for this 
positive link to emerge or it may be hidden in yearly fluctuations (Appiah-Adu, 
1998). 
7.4.3 Organisational Learning 
Organisations ultimately learn via the individual learning processes of their 
employees (ILm, 1993). Whe:i a forei_=n food retailer launches its operation in a new 
country, adaptation i s  necessary due tc cultural. socio-eocncmic and techologicar 
information” (p.67). The other one is proposed by Kohli and Jaworski (1 990). They operationalised 
the implementation of the marketing concept as market orientation, which they define as *the 
organisation-wide generation of market intelligence pertaining to current and future customer needs, 
dissemnation of the intelligence across departments and organisation-m.ide responsiveness to it‘ (p. 
6). 
These two perspectives are complementary to each other and share certain similarities. First. they both 
maintain that customer is central to the manifestation of market Orientation. Secondly. they both 
balance an internal and external business view of the specific environment situation. Thirdly. they 
both express an explicit sentiment that the whole firm should respond to identified customer needs. 
Lastly. they both suggest that the scope of market orientation goes beyond customers and incorporates 
competitors or the forces shaping customer needs such as technology and regulation. 
Despite these similarities, there are fundamental differences between the two perspectives. Kohli and 
Jaworski‘s perspective focuses on the activities and behaviours that underlie the generation and 
dissemination of market intelligence and the associated response by all parties within the firm. On the 
contrary, in addition to including behavioural elements within their conceptualisation of market 
orientation, Narver and Slater’s perspective also embrace a cultural perspective in their discussion. 
They suggest that specific activities involving information processing are a natural product of market 
orientation instead of the orientation per se and accordingly. they define market orientation as the 
organisational culture that creates the essential behaviour for the generation of superior value for 
customers and on-going superior performance for the business in the most effective and efficient way 
(Narver and Slater, 1990). 
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differences. Adaptation is a learning process of individual employees that bridges the 
gap between the existing knowledge of the retail organisation and the knowledge 
required to appropriately serve the new market. In order to fully utilise this new 
knowledge that individual employees in the overseas operation acquired so that it 
could be further assimilated to enhance the performance and growth of the whole 
retail organisation, it has to be transferred from the individual employees to the 
whole organisation. 111 other words, knowledge of individual members has to be 
integrated through some mechanism in order to give rise to certain organisational 
capability. This process is crucial to a retail organisation. The remark of the General 
Manager of Company K provided an illustration of this point, 
“Our corporation have specialists in almost all areas in retailing, such as 
purchasing and new store construction. They are responsible for all 
international projects. These specialists have very close contact with 
operations all over the world. They continuously accumulate experience in 
different countries, both developed and developing. Consequently, they 
continuously develop new retail expertise. As a result, they give very strong 
support to subsidiaries anywhere in the world. This support is crucial to the 
international expansion of our company.” 
Ths integration of knowledge can be achieved by hioxledge sharing within ths 
o1Terseas operation unit and within the whole retail organisation. This can be doge 
formally or informally. 
The author was only able to briefly discuss knowledge sharing with eight retailers. 
According to them, a large part of knowledge sharing was achieved through informal 
communication among colleagues, both within the Chinese operation unit and within 
the whole retail organisation. Simultaneously, there are also designated meetings that 
were held regularly to gather colleagues from different parts of the world to share 
their knowledge and experience. For example, according to the Managing Director of 
Company C, meetings were held three to four times a year by and at their Asian 
headquarters so that managers from different departments and different stores met up 
and shared their experience. Similarly, the Chief Operating Officer of Company F 
stressed that board members of operations in different countries met up regularly to 
talk about their experience. which he thought was vital to the long term growth and 
success of their retail organisation. 
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Sergeant and Frenkel’s (1 998) advocate that individual learning can be better 
captured for organisational learning by having returned managers from a particular 
country undertake more active roles in managing or supporting current expatriates in 
that country. The current study found that most retailers interviewed understood the 
importance of using their experienced member in developing new operations and 
were putting this understanding into practice. For example, the General Manager of 
Company K, who had rich experience in the retailing industry in different countries, 
was a key expatriate in their operations in China. He stated that, 
“I have been working in many subsidiaries of our corporation in different 
countries and my past experience is always very helpful when in new 
operation development in a new country.’’ 
Another example is Company F. Their Chief Operating Officer had been in the 
industry for more than thirty years and had extensive work experience in many 
different overseas subsidiaries of their Company. He stated that he had already 
reached the age of retirement but he chose to carry on helping the company to 
expand and de\-elop in different countr;es because his experience wi?s very valuable. 
In fact, as  sltown eariier. narly of the expatriates in the retail companies in the 
present study were all well-experienced ir, retailing in more than one country. 
From the above discussion, the reader may question that foreign food retailers do not 
seem to have any formalised mechanisms to incorporate all the knowledge that 
individual members acquired. As argued by &m (1 993), when an individual does not 
codify the learning through systematic data gathering, analysis and standardisation 
for later use, situational learning occurs and this makes organisational learning 
incomplete. However, the author would like to draw the attention of the readers to 
the fact that a large part of competitive advantages in retailing comes from tacit 
knowledge, as discussed earlier. By its own very nature, tacit knowledge cannot be 
codified in the way claimed by Kim. Moreover, heavy codification requirement may 
lead to distraction to employees’ focus on being alert and sensitive to changes in the 
retail environment. Consequently, the author would argue that in the retail industry, 
heavy investment in training and developing capable human resources, and 
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cultivation of a learning oriented culture are significantly more important than 
codification of the learning process. 
7.4.4 Incorporating Learning Orientation into Corporate Culture 
According to Schein (1 992), culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions that a 
group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, 
and has worked well enough to be considered valid and hence desirable to be taught 
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those 
problems. Corporate culture, therefore, is how an organisation has learnt to deal with 
its environment. It is a complex mixture of assumptions, beliefs, behaviours, stones, 
myths, metaphors, company symbols, rituals, routines and other ideas that fit 
together to define the norm in a particular organisation. It provides a framework that 
guides daily behaviour and decision making for employees and directs their actions 
towards the achievement of company goals. 
Gamin (1993) strongly believes that the right corporate culture must be created if 
knowledge is tc be acquired. assimilated and utilised in a conmmtive way to the 
czrporation or, an on?-goii?g basis, because bdiavic~ural changs is required for: 
learning. Sha-ing the same belief. Nevis DiBella and Goulc! (1995) also argue that 
the nature of learning and the way in which it occurs are determined by the 
organisation’s culture, which is manifested in forms such as shared insights and 
organisational routines. Furthermore, organisational structure and management style 
also influence the type of experience that individuals contribute to the organisation 
(Gm,  1993). 
In the context of foreign direct investment in retailing, the overseas operation unit 
inherits the corporate culture of the parent retail organisation in three ways. First, 
expatriates who share the corporate culture of the organisation bring the culture 
along with them when they develop the overseas operation. Secondly, they would 
normally recruit people with the mentality that suits their corporate culture. This 
way, the culture is reinforced. Thirdly, training of local staff further consolidates the 
culture. Therefore, expatriates play an important role in determining the culture of an 
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overseas operation, which in turn, according to the discussion of in the last 
paragraph, significantly affects the learning capability of the operation. 
Consequently, expatriates of a retail firm must believe in the tenet of learning in 
order to create the right culture for organisational learning to take place. In fact, as 
discussed in section 7.4.1.1, most expatriates who the author interviewed appear to 
have strong emphasis on learning and firm belief in a learning oriented culture. 
Company A is one example, 
“It’s our group culture to share information, resources and experience and to 
learn from each other,” said the Director. 
Furthermore, the relationship and structure between the overseas operation units and 
their headquarters in the home country is also significant in determining the learning 
capability of the overseas unit. Tordjman and Dionisio (1991) claim that when a 
retail firm does not delegate much autonomy to its overseas unit, the role ol’ the 
manger of the overseas operation is mainly to ensure the rules and procedures laid 
down by the parent firm are f d c w e d .  In other words, the unit is a passive obsenw 
No howledgs  is generatcd. Il/l07mver, as the headquarters !Gates so dis:ar;! from 
the local market, it is difficult for it to efficienily and effecti\.ely process and 
assimilate the information about the local market that is acquired by the overseas 
unit. This renders the overseas unit vulnerable to changes in consumers’ tastes and 
pressure from competitors. This leads to an inability to take the particularity of local 
market into consideration. Therefore, a very centralised decision making structure 
between headquarters and overseas units in the retail industry is not conducive to 
organisational learning, both in the overseas unit and the retail corporation as a 
whole. This, in turn, is detrimental to the competitiveness of a retailer. 
“The market is here in China, which is very different from other markets. 
Therefore, it is difficult to use the headquarters located away from the market 
to give instruction because the decision makers must have the first hand 
mark et know 1 edge. ” 
Following this whole line of argument, headquarters must delegate much autonomy 
to their overseas operations, especially in the development phase of FDI, to create a 
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conducive environment for organisational learning and hence increase the learning 
capability of the whole retail corporation. 
The present research found that all the foreign retailers interviewed had much 
autonomy to run the retail units in China and at the same time obtained all the 
supports they needed from their parent firms. As the General Manager of Company 
K described, 
“We have got good support from our headquarters for whatever we need and 
whenever we need, but we also have the autonomy that we need to run the 
business here competitively.” 
Similarly, The President of Company D stated, 
“I think I’ve got quite a lot autonomy. I am happy with the freedom I have for 
my work. That’s the culture of the company as a whole.. .The culture is that 
we have a very small central head office. We don’t have an army of people 
there. People like myself are given a business to develop, grow and run in 
different countries. We get on and we do it. The head office is involved 
mainly when finance is concerned. We have a lot of autonomy.” 
In facl., accordiflg to the mm detailed disixssjon with Companies E ,  0, F. A, J ax!d 
L, their headquarters were also ocly involved in decisiorr makiags relateci to the more 
important strategic issues such as plens to open new stores and budgeting. 
The high autonomy delegated to the retail operations in China by their headquarters 
in the present cases might be due to the fact that there is a very large cultural 
difference between their the Western countries and China. Because of this cultural 
distance, the headquarters may feel that they do not know much about China and 
their investments in China carry an experimental nature. Consequently, they are 
willing to delegate much autonomy to their Chinese operations. 
IQm (1 993) argues that very decentralised organisations that do not possess the 
networking capability to keep different parts connected are susceptible to fragmented 
learning. In the cases of the foreign retailers in the present study, they had high 
autonomy but yet their retail organisations as a whole were not susceptible to 
fragmented learning. This is because their headquarters, although giving them a free 
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hand, maintained very close connection with them (according to most of the retailers) 
and played an important role in managing and utilizing knowledge and experience 
accumulated in different overseas operations. As pointed out by the Vice President of 
Company B, “Our parent company provides knowledge and information about other 
markets.” The Buying Manager of Company J also stated that “As a whole company, 
basically, our parent provides transfer of ideas and experience.” By undertaking the 
role of knowledge organiser, the headquarters are able to provide very strong 
supports to their overseas operations, which enhance the competitiveness of the 
overseas operations. The respondents from Companies B, D, K, F, E and L stressed 
that they obtained very good support from their headquarters in any aspects that they 
might require for establishing and running the business in China. 
To summarise, the retail industry appears to be an industry that stresses the 
importance of being a learning-oriented organisation because their long term success 
largely depends on their ability to make continuous adjustments to match with their 
environment. In order to generate an organisational cap-bility, they invest heavily in 
training and value their staff as important. assets to the cornpany. Furthermore, a 
learning oriented culture seems to have been .deeply planted in many international 
retail corporations. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the complicating issues that foreign retailers faced when 
they transferred their retail expertise from their home country to China. In China, 
transportation and electricity infrastructure is not well developed. The concept of 
distribution and the norms and practices in the distribution channel in China are very 
different. Consumer literacy is low. Lifestyle and eating habits of Chinese people 
differ significantly from those of the people in Europe or the US. Chinese socio- 
economic indicators have not reached the level of those in developed countries. 
Reliable information concerning the consumer market is not widely available. There 
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is also a lack of well-experienced human resources for the retailing industry. All 
these factors affect the extent to which the origin retail concept and expertise are 
applicable in the Chinese environment. In order to overcome the differences, retailers 
must possess the sensitivity to local retail environment and make adjustments 
accordingly. The balance between maintaining certain core constructs and adapting 
to the local environment is delicate. Fine-tuning an original retail system without 
losing the core competence requires both experience in the industry and a thorough 
understanding of the market situation”. Expatriates possess tremendous experience 
and expertise while local people possess better market knowledge. Consequently, 
intensive training programmes are provided to local employees by the foreign 
retailers so that the local staff can be taught the core explicit knowledge about their 
own retail system. Furthermore, the local staff also acquires the tacit knowledge of 
retailing as their hands-on experience increases. The cultivation of a corporate 
culture with a learning orientation effectively facilitates the whole learning process. 
Simultaneously, expatriates are also learning about the Chinese market as time goes. 
With a mixed effort, a retail formula that suits the Chinese market best is anticipated 
tc evolve. In fact, the last decade was a valuable t i r x  for foreig!? retailers to leani 
about the Chinese market. develop corn-petent human rcsmrces in China and test out 
the their concepts because competition was not too intense. 
On the other hand, this chapter also demonstrates that the factor that ultimately 
derives a difference for a retailer and hence gives rise to competitiveness is 
organisational capability. A culture with emphasis on learning has to be started from 
the headquarters and carried over to all the overseas operations in order to maximise 
organisational capability. Furthermore, experience and knowledge accumulated and 
assimilated at each overseas operation has to be shared among the entire retail 
organisation. The headquarters is in the best position to act as an organiser for 
knowledge sharing. 
There is one point that should be noted. Formation of perception involves a complicated interaction 
of influences. When decisions on adjustments are made in a retail operation, human factors are 
involved. The type of decision that i s  made is affected by the experience, perception and background 
of the personnel who are concerned. This area is not studied in the present research because it is 
beyond the scope of the thesis. However, there is a need for more detailed studies to ascertain how the 





The study investigates the critical variables in the process of foreign direct 
investment in retailing and develops a framework to help understand and explain the 
phenomenon. In its entirety, the research reveals some fundamental behavioural 
differences between retail foreign direct investment and manufacturing foreign direct 
investment. Such discovery has theoretical implications in the retailing and 
international business disciplines, and business implications for food retailers that 
want to expand into China and countries that share similar political and economic 
characteristics. Before discussing these implications, an oven-iew of the key issues of 
this study is presented and the section closes with suggestions made for further 
research. 
8.1 Overview of Key issues 
8.7.7 Motivation Behind Retail Foreign Direct Investment 
With respect to the long-term strategic objectives behind retail internationalisation, 
the findings of the present study pose challenges to the reactive school of thought 
and the psychic distance concept, and furthermore suggests that the proactive school 
of thought does not fully explain why retailers engage in FDI. The empirical work 
shows that a significant number of the retailers studied were very proactive. They 
expanded their operational domain well before their home countries had become 
unfavourable for retail investment. Furthermore, none of the retailers in the study had 
stopped domestic investment after they went abroad. This further renders the reactive 
school of thought unsuitable. On the other hand, the proactive school places too 
much emphasis on the pull factors in host countries. Based on the empirical work it 
appears to be more suitable to treat these as the determining factors that a retai er 
uses in selecting the host countries, instead of being the reasons for retailers to 
engage in foreign direct investment. 
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The reasons behind retail internationalisation, as the present study reveals, are related 
to the retailers’ long-term strategic objective of growth in market power, both 
horizontally and vertically. Owing to significant global changes in trade policies and 
political climate in the last two decades, national boundaries no longer pose strict 
confines to the expansion of a retailer. At the same time, it  also means that national 
boundaries provide no more shelter for local retailers. No one is safeguarded from 
being forced off the playing field by large-scale retailers from another country. 
Under such circumstances, size does matter. Middle size retailers who have a strong 
market share in a certain country but little international spread are the most 
wlnerable in the acquisition game. Small size retailers, on the other hand, lack 
competitiveness because of cost problems. Therefore, in order to survive, retailers 
strive to increase in scale by both domestic and overseas expansion. There is no 
denying that growth through merger and acquisition can take place at a quicker pace 
than organic growth. However merger and acquisition requires a suitable acquiree, 
wThich is not easily found. Consequently. organic growth is still a popular and useful 
way for retailers to expand and increase their market share on a global scale. 
By increasing horizontal market power, retailers can also drive cost down by having 
greater bargaining power o\7er their suppliers, which in turn gi\ves rise to lower costs 
incurred in merchandising. By so doing, retailers can offer consumers better iyalue 
for money, which is important in competitive survival. Despite the popularity of the 
tenet of collaboration between vertical channel members to create a ‘win-win’ 
situation, this study discloses that the struggle for control and bargaining power still 
heavily underpins the buyer and seller relationship. Building up trust and long-term 
relationships between partners in the channel is important because their ultimate 
customers are the consumers. However, issues related to control and bargaining 
power should not be overlooked. 
Horizontal and vertical market power are closely intertwined and mutually 
reinforcing. In order to achieve high profits, a food retailer must simultaneously 
possess strong bargaining power over their suppliers and a large market share in the 
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consumer market. In fact, it is this desire to achieve such a position that drives 
retailers to expand their domain of operation. 
The majority of the retailers interviewed chose to enter China because of its huge 
population, remarkable economic development, and because the market was largely 
untapped. Considering all these factors, China possesses tremendous potential and 
this was what prompted the entrance of food retailers, once they were allowed to do 
so. As the market also offered significant retailing space, China, during the last 
decade, has provided a testing ground for the retailers to learn about the market and 
experiment with the formats that would best suit it. 
Sourcing is found to be an important secondary factor in retailers’ decision to choose 
China. The low cost of production makes China a good source of merchandise for 
retailers all over the world. CO-location of retailers and manufacturers offers benefits 
to both parties in terms of knowledge of requirements and working practices, and 
improvements in the standards of locally manufactured products. In other words, 
foreign direct investment In China is a means by which retailers can obtain a more 
reliable supply of products, from china, for their operations in other parts of the 
world. 
A few cases revealed that sentimental attachment is also a secondary reason why 
some retailers went into China. 
By tracking the chronological order of the countries which the retailers entered, this 
study has produced enough evidence to suggest that the psychic distance concept 
about retail internationalisation does not seem to capture the pattern in reality. 
Retailers appear to be more ad-hoc in the choice of host country. There is no denying 
that a country has to have passed the test on certain economic, demographic and 
political characteristics in order to be considered by a retailer. However, in reality, 
the sequence seems to be more related to how the management of the company feels 
about a country. The discovery of sentimental attachment as a secondary reason 
behind retailers’ entry into China is one example. The choice of host country appears 
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to be more contingent on the country knowledge that the personnel in the 
management of a company possess. This familiarity of the management to a 
particular country is unquestionably a manifestation of psychic distance. 
Nonetheless, the difference between the argument of the present study and that of the 
psychic distance concept is that the present study argues that there is no objective 
way to measure psychic distance, and hence predicting which country a retailer will 
approach next is difficult. Furthermore, even if there is a pattern of the 
internationalisation process of retailers, the present research shows that cultural 
studies such as Hofstede's offer little help in the explanation of this. Therefore, this 
study proposes that the pattern of retail internationalisation is more complicated than 
what the psychic distance concept and the process model suggest. 
8.1.2 Market Entry Issues 
Regarding market entry issues, one main hurdle that a host country poses to a foreign 
retailer is its legal and regulatory infrastructure. Inherent in the under-developed 
legal and regulatory infrastructure in China are three main problems that foreign food 
retailers considered significant: inconsistency in policies and differences between 
international legal practice and Chinese legal practice; tight control on foreign retail 
activities; and discriminatory practices by legal authorities towards foreign retailers. 
Based on the study, one way to alleviate these problems is to use both Chinese and 
foreign lawyers as legal consultants. Chinese lawyers are needed because lawyers 
from any other country cannot represent clients in courts in China. Foreign lawyers 
are needed because they understand international legal practice, which foreign 
retailers are accustomed to. Hong Kong lawyers are well positioned to advise foreign 
retailers on legal issues in China because they have a very good understanding of 
both international and Chinese legal practices. 
Foreign retailers require a high degree of managerial control over their business in 
China for two main reasons. Firstly, they need the ultimate decision making authority 
so that they can put through their system, concept and know-how, which in turn can 
minimise dilution and degradation of their company brand equity. Secondly, they 
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need the ability to control the strategic direction of the business in China so that joint 
ventures in China can be aligned with overall strategies and long-term goals on a 
global scale, such as international supply strategies and global expansion. This is 
very important because as mentioned earlier, it is the attainment of both 
oligopsonistic and oligopolistic positions that generates maximum rent for retailers. 
If they are unable to integrate joint ventures in China with overall organisational 
strategies, they will be unable to fully capture the advantages that their foreign direct 
investment in China can offer. 
In addition to this need for maximum control, possessing a good guansi network in 
China is also essential. Moreover, by law, wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries were 
not allowed in China at the time of the study. Consequently, the best arrangement 
was to develop a joint venture with a Chinese partner who is not a retailer, is willing 
to accept little managerial control, and has very good connections with different 
stakeholders of a retail business in China. This arrangement facilitates the 
establishment of good relationships between foreign retailers and the government 
authorities in China. The possession of gzraizxi with government officials is very 
important in a country in which the institutional environment is pervasive, dynamic 
and uncertain, and where the legal system is not well developed. Establishing guaizsi 
requires a considerable amount of effort and time. Moreover, it requires a good 
understanding of the Chinese culture. Therefore, foreign retailers are not in a position 
to master the art of guanxi building in China within a short period of time after they 
entered China. Consequently, the guanxi network of their joint venture partners 
becomes crucial to the smooth development of their business in China. In fact, the 
majority of the foreign retailers interviewed pointed out that the major contribution 
of their Chinese partner was their guanxi networks with both the government 
authorities and other relevant stakeholders. The empirical work indicates that no 
major conflicts between partners were found in retail joint ventures in which the 
foreign retailers practised dominant parent management. In other words, in cases that 
a joint venture partner has to be taken for reasons other than management input, 
dominant parent management appears to be a good arrangement. 
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The finding that foreign retailers preferred to acquire a majority stake in joint 
ventures also reveals that their underlying rationale is not about safeguarding against 
the opportunistic behaviour of their joint venture partners as suggested in most of the 
current literature. The underlying reason, in fact, is to pursue maximum exploitation 
of their core competence in order to generate rent. 
Site selection and store development is another area in which retailers have to go 
through complicated procedures. The empirical work found that food retailers 
basically used the same set of criteria in choosing a site for their store development 
regardless of which country they were in. Nevertheless, statistical and market 
information required for the assessment of potential sites are not widely a\ ailable. 
Consequently, some retailers pointed out that their site selection process in China 
involves a considerable amount of “guessing”. In other words, the science that they 
applied in other developed countries was not directly and completely applicable to 
the cases in China. 
Moreover, land is still strictly controlled by the government. The administrative 
process for a foreign retailer to obtain land is onerous. The land system in China and 
its legal structure is reviewed and discussed in the thesis. In general, foreign retailers 
can apply for granted land use right for 30 to 50 years through negotiation with the 
relevant government authority. Apart from getting the land use right, foreign retailers 
also need to go through a bureaucratic process of getting approval for site 
development and construction projects, which includes building design. According to 
some studies by scholars outside China, the Class 1 Chinese contractors’ are of world 
class standard. Nevertheless, the study reveals that they are not very experienced in 
retail construction projects. As foreign contractors are in essence not allowed t9 carry 
out construction projects in China on their own, one solution is to use local branches 
of Hong Kong construction companies who have rich experience of building retail 
comp 1 ex es . 
In China, contractors are classified into different classes that define the scale and tjpe of 1 
construction projects that they can undertake (Walker, Levett and Flanagan, 1998). 
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Political opposition from local interest groups was experienced as foreign retailers 
entered and expanded in China. The form of opposition ranged from informal 
lobbying to local authorities, to the spreading of negative propaganda about foreign 
retailers. The retailers interviewed claimed that such opposition did not have any 
material effect on their business operations. Moreover, they reported that their good 
relationships with local authorities also helped guard against malicious disturbance 
by local opposition groups. Most foreign retailers in the study claimed that they 
established good relationships with governmental authorities through holding 
seminars and arranging training for government officials who were in charge of the 
retail and distribution industry, and by sponsoring community events. 
Disregarding the legal and regulatory hurdles they experienced in China, the retailers 
studied appeared to be very bullish about expanding into other provinces in China. 
especially into the western part of China. China successfully became a member of 
WTO in December 2001. This brings the promise of further relaxation in foreign 
direct investment policies in the retail and distribution sector. The legal system as a 
whole will also be improved, and economic and political reform will most probably 
be pushed even further. All these changes should make the expansion of foreign 
retailers in China easier. 
8.1.3 Retail Operational Issues 
On the subject of operational issues concerning food retailing in China, an analytical 
framework of international transfer of retail know-how is proposed’, in which there 
are three elements: retail technology, retail concept and format, and corporate 
culture. The first element consists of systems, methods, procedures and techniques. 
The second element consists of the physical features of a retail store that are visible 
to consumers. The third element is the culture that underlies the whole retail 
organisation, including the headquarters and all its subsidiaries. 
During the transfer of those elements from one country to another, adaptation is 
needed in some areas because market conditions vary from country to country. The 
’ Section 7.1. 
323 
study uncovers several major differences in the retail environment between China 
and the majority of developed countries that foreign retailers have experience of. 
These differences are categorised under supply chain management, retail format and 
formula, and human resources issues. 
In terms of supply chain management in China, there are many tiers in the 
distribution channel. This characteristic makes direct dealings between foreign food 
retailers and manufacturers in China difficult. Furthermore, the quality of 
merchandise supplied by suppliers in China is not consistent. This is especially the 
case for fresh food products because cold and chilled chain facilities are not 
common. Therefore, strict control of the quality of products at the receptions 
departments is necessary. In addition, the distribution system between different 
provinces is not well co-ordinated and the transportation infrastructure is poor in 
China, although the situation is improving. These conditions hamper the efficient 
movement of goods in China from manufacturers to retailers. Moreover, the heavy 
involvement of the army in the transportation industry in China encumbers a rapid 
transformation of the industry, despite several foreign investors having already 
entered the market. 
The level of computerisation in China is low. The retailers interviewed found 
difficulties in raising the level of computerisation of their local suppliers. The major 
reasons are that most local suppliers lack the financial capability to invest in 
technology, and they do not have a thorough understanding of the advantages they 
could benefit from by investing in such technology. International companies in China 
who have the resources to introduce high technological equipment and systems in 
their supply chain management are also unwilling to invest in such technology for 
the time being. This is because the aggregate scale of retailers in China who have the 
capability to participate in such technology introduction is not large enough to justify 
the investment. In other words, category management hardly existed in China at the 
time of study. 
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In general, the foreign retailers interviewed perceived that multinational 
manufacturers possessed stronger bargaining power, and hence were less flexible, 
than local manufacturers and suppliers with respect to the terms of purchase. In other 
words, foreign retailers could exert a higher influence on the local suppliers than on 
the multinational manufacturers during their interactions. However, local suppliers 
were not as reliable as multinational suppliers in terms of quality and reliability of 
product supply. The choice then depended on the risk preference of the company. 
Some retailers interviewed did express serious consideration in developing 
relationships with some local suppliers and carry out joint product development with 
them. 
In terms of retail format and formula, the study reyeals that core retail know-how 
must be preserved whereas adaptation should be made on the peripheral know-how. 
Core know-how is the source of core competence of a retailer and therefore must be 
preserved. Peripheral know-how, however, must be adjusted to suit local conditions 
and consumer tastes and demand, which display differences in different markets. 
Core lcnow-how is the generic element of a retail firm no matter where it goes. 
Concepts and expertise on cash flow management and stock turn are two examples of 
the core know-how of a retailer. When the retailer undertakes foreign direct 
investment, core know-how such as these two examples should perpetuate. 
Nevertheless, the question of how to achieve, for example, the stock turn they desire 
in the host market requires an appropriate adjustment of the peripheral know-how 
such as merchandising, pricing and store ambience to suit the local consumer 
demand. It is difficult to define what is core and what is peripheral because they are 
different in different retailers’ mind. Nevertheless, it appears that core retail know- 
how tends to encompass the intangible concepts or ideas of a retailer, whereas the 
peripheral retail know-how has more to do with the retailing mix. 
The balance between preserving certain know-how and adjusting other dimensions is 
very delicate. It is in fact a learning process that evolves as a retailer accumulates 
both tacit and explicit knowledge about a particular market through hands-on 
experience. Readers should note that the tenet of preserving certain core know-how 
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does not restrict the emergence of new retail concepts because the dividing line 
between the peripheral know-how and the core know-how is very fine and dynamic. 
Moreover, the emergence of new retail concepts is an evolutionary process. The 
study shows that some retailers perceived that their operations in China in the last 
few years were exploratory in nature, and reported that they were actually in the 
process of searching for a retail concept and format that would serve the Chinese 
market best. 
In terms of human resources issues, the study finds that all retailers interviewed 
placed large emphasis on the development of their personnel at all levels. Expatriates 
with rich experience were relocated to China to develop the business. They were 
given significant autonomy in formulating their operational strategies. This is 
probably due to recognition by the headquarters of the importance of tacit knowledge 
to the success of retail foreign direct investment, especially in a market such as 
China, where the market characteristics are perceived to be very different from the 
Western countries. These foreign retailers recognised the importance of developine Y
their local workforce to bezome capable of assuming increased responsibilities. They 
offered rigorous training. both courses and on the job training, to their local 
employees in China, who lacked knowledge and experience of the retailing industry. 
As a whole, a learning-oriented culture throughout the whole retail organisation, 
from headquarters to subsidiaries, is crucial to the success of a retail firm. Within 
such a culture, the headquarters play an important organising role in facilitating 
knowledge exchange and utilisation throubout the entire organisation. 
8.2 Theoretical Implications 
A holistic picture that carries an important contribution to knowledge in the field of 
international business and international retailing emerges when all the issues that this 
study uncovered are combined together. The study demonstrates that foreign direct 
investment in retailing is significantly different from that in manufacturing, and that 
theories of foreign direct investment developed fi-om manufacturing international 
business are unable to fully capture the essence of foreign direct investment in 
retailing. 
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The literature in international manufacturing operations is much concerned with the 
economic rational of relocation of the production function in different countries. By 
contrast, when food retailers engage in foreign direct investment, they establish 
almost a completely new value chain in the host country. This is because sourcing 
merchandise from within the host country is inevitable due to cost concern and 
heterogeneous consumer tastes. A large part of knowledge accumulation and 
utilisation also occurs at the subsidiary level because the majority of the retail 
knowledge is tacit and a strong consumer-orientation and rapid response to market 
needs and changes are crucial to food retailing. Establishing and managing a new 
upstream distribution channel in the host country, and having the responsibility to 
absorb and utilise knowledge and to adapt in terms of operational strategies in the 
host market are therefore central to the overseas operations of retailers, whereas this 
is not necessarily the case for manufacturers. 
Consequently. the scope and scale of the interface between a foreign retailer and its 
host country is generally more extensive and more complicated than that between a 
foreign manufacturer and its host country. International retailers can be perceived as 
being made up of many different individual overseas operations each of which has its 
own value chain, both upstream and downstream in the host country, and chooses the 
strategy that best suits the local market. Each of these overseas operations are only 
inter-dependent and inter-related with each other in the sense that the headquarters 
control the overall business strategy and direction of the entire organisation, financial 
resources and cash flow, and real estates development. The headquarters also provide 
information technology to the subsidiaries and sometimes organise some of the 
activities in the value chain of the overseas operations. Each of these overseas 
operations are also inter-connected in that knowledge accumulated by each overseas 
operation is shared among the entire organisation in order to improve the 
performance of the entire organisation and catalyse innovation in retail concept and 
format. 
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Because of this structure, an international food retailer is not as heavily dependent on 
any particular overseas operation in comparison to an international manufacturer. 
Closing down an overseas factory disrupts a manufacturer's value chain. Closing 
down an overseas retail operation simply means losing one investment in a portfolio. 
The value chain of the retailer as a whole is not much affected. In other words, 
divesting oneself of a foreign direct investment is relatively much less disruptive to a 
retailer than to a manufacturer. Furthermore. a large proportion of the inventory of a 
food retailer includes fast moving consumer goods, which are usually bought on 
credit. Therefore, a retailer is less tied down in terms of cash flow, and their 
inventory can be sold faster in the case of closing down than that of a manufacturer. 
Consequently, exit is relatively easy in retail foreign direct investment. This point is 
very important because without the ease of exit, retailers would have probably been 
less proactive in seizing opportunities overseas than this study finds. 
Beyond the finding that retailers are rather proactive in their internationalisation of 
operations, the evidence of this study also suggests that underlying their proactive 
behaviour, retailers pursue the objective of maximising long-term profits through 
exploiting and developing resources by maximising opportunities. This is instead of 
following a control led objective to minimise transactional market failure due to 
opportunism and bounded rationality as suggested in most of the existing 
international business literature. Provided that their financial situation permits, 
retailers proactively pursue foreign direct investment in order to exploit structural 
market failure to generate rent- . It appears that a retail firm chooses to undertake 
foreign direct investment rather than franchising or licensing' because their core 
competence is so firm specific6 that when transferred to another firm, if transferable, 
?&-I  
the function and value of such expertise deteriorates. The deterioration is due to the 
absence of the support of the original firm's other resources, such as the origmal 
human resources and culture, that are conducive to the full functioning of the 
Transactional and structural market failure are discussed in Chapter 2. 
The rent earned by a firm i s  defined as the return in excess of the firm's opportunity cost. 
' Export is out of consideration because of the non-tradable nature of retail semices. 
A resource that is firm specific means that the function and hence value of such a resource 
deteriorates when it is transferred to another firm because the support of the original firm's other 





expertise. In other words, if the retail expertise or know-how is transferred to another 
firm, it will not generate the same maximum rent as if it would in the original firm. 
In this case, whether or not the retailer is able to form contracts that incorporate 
every possible detail to safeguard against opportunism is irrelevant to the decision. 
Therefore, the assumption of opportunism does not seem to be necessary in the case 
of retail FDI. At the same time, the role of bounded rationality in retail FDI seems to 
be different to that in manufacturing FDI. In the latter case. bounded rationality plays 
the role of limiting a firm’s ability to form contracts to minimise opportunistic 
behaviour. In the case of retailing, it limits the rate at which a retail firm can expand. 
Obviously, a retailer’s decision on whether to pursue a particular overseas expansion 
opportunity depends on the management’s evaluation of the situation that surrounds 
the opportunity, based on its own activities and the activities of other actors in the 
environment. How they perceive the opportunity is then affected by bounded 
rationality. Moreover, if a retailer wants to expand, they need to increase 
management personnel. However, when a new member of staff joins the original 
team, it takes time for him to fit into the existing routine and culture of the 
management team. This, in turn, will also limit the rate of expansion of a retailer. 
Elaborating on this idea, an international retail firm, as a whole, can be perceived as 
a collection of physical, human and organisational resources bounded together in an 
administrative framework. The capability of such firm i s  determined by its capacity 
to perform an activity as a result of organising and co-ordinating a group of relevant 
resources. If the retail firm possesses a certain capability that is better than that of its 
competitors, that capability becomes its competence or termed ‘know-how’ in this 
thesis. Retail know-how is highly firm specific due to the fact that it is derived from 
a specific combination of complementary resources embedded in the firm’s extant 
context. Retail know-how is also largely tacit because it consists of a large amount of 
experiential insights that are difficult to articulate in precise terms. Therefore, 
transfer of retail know-how with the minimum loss of function and value may only 
be possible through real life interactions and exchanges between employees. This 
condition has two consequences. First, the scale of overseas expansion at any 
particular time depends on the number of capable managerial personnel in the 
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existing organisation who can be relocated to the potential host countries to develop 
a capable team of managerial personnel. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, during the 
process of retail know-how transfer, core retail know-how is preserved while 
peripheral know-how is adjusted according to the local market condition. Deciding 
on what adjustments are adequate requires the accumulation and utilisation of 
knowledge of the local market. A high degree of autonomy given to the overseas 
operation is central to this whole process because it is the personnel who are actually 
experiencing the local market that possess the best knowledge of the market and how 
to react promptly. 
Knowledge accumulation and utilisation does not only happen at the subsidiary level. 
The knowledge accumulated and learned in each overseas subsidiary forms an 
important source of innovation for the entire retail organisation, which in turn is 
crucial to the ability of the firm to carry on expanding overseas. Therefore, a retailer 
must possess the capability to presewe and coordinate the knowledge acquired by 
different overseas operations in order to facilitate the utilisation of knowledge in the 
organisation as a whole. The headquarters of food retailers are the strategic apex to 
assume this role. By so doing, new retail concepts can be generated and the retail 
firm can evolve and expand virtually endlessly, provided that the retail firm is 
fi nanc i a1 1 y he a1 t h y . 
8.3 Business Implications: Prospective Retail Landscape in China 
8.3. I Continuity and Changes 
The present research demonstrates that foreign retailers have experienced a certain 
degree of difficulty in their foreign direct investment undertakings in China over the 
last decade. Part of the difficulty stems from the lack of a systematic and reliable 
legal and regulatory framework; the strict control of the activities of foreign retailers; 
an under-developed road, transportation and telecommunication system; and a 
largely unskilled retail workforce, which are features of an economy in transition 
from a centrally planned economy towards a market economy. Another part of the 
difficulty is the lack of understanding of Chinese business and social culture. 
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The features of a transitional economy will gradually disappear in China as the 
country’s development progresses. For example, as part of the process of 
strengthening the rule of law in China, a large amount of legislation covering areas 
such as land ownership, contract and securities has been prepared. The process will 
continue as the economic transformation carries on. Consequently, the uncertainty 
and confusion that surrounds the legal status of economic entities and transactions 
will s l 0 ~ i . l ~  recede. As a further example, the complicated legislation concerning site 
acquisition and store development that foreign retailers face in China should become 
increasingly simplified and systematic. As a whole, the accelerated development of a 
more transparent and systematic legal system is expected. On the other hand, China’s 
transportation system, although it has failed to keep pace with the country’s 
economic development, is being continuously improved. The system should see 
significant advancement as China’s economic reform proceeds. Consequently, the 
difficulty caused by the ephemeral features of a transitional economy will disappear 
as the transition process advances. 
By contrast, trust and gzdanx-i will always remain an important element in doing 
business in a Chinese community. Some scholars argue that informal relationships 
and the development of trust are only important in China at the moment when its 
institutional environment, in particular the legal and regulatory system, is uncertain 
and dynamic (Chen and Boggs, 1998; Alston, 1989 in Park and Luo, 2001). The 
importance of relationships and trust development with governmental authorities will 
undeniably diminish as government intervention in the market decreases. However, 
reliance on trust and gzcanxi in business dealings between channel members in China 
is believed to remain important. This is because heavy reliance on trust and 
relationships is witnessed in the business communities of the overseas Chinese 
Diaspora, even when the community operates in a well-developed and reliable legal 
system such as the US, the UK and Singapore. Hong Kong also used to be one 
example of such overseas Chinese communities. It has a well-developed legal system 
that follows the system of the United a n g d o m  but displays heavy reliance on trust 
and guanxi within business dealings. Furthermore, the advantages of having trust 
between channel members have been well-documented. Therefore, foreign retailers 
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should spend time and effort in understanding Chinese culture and in cultivating trust 
and long-term oriented gziuizxi with their channel members. 
8.3.2 Economic Outlook and Institutional Changes 
Taking a long-term, holistic perspective, the author has confidence that the economy 
in China will take off. The process of transformation is gaining further momentum 
after the country’s entry into the WTO in December 2001, which will 
incontrovertibly produce greater integration between China and the rest of the world. 
As discussed in the thesis, this event has brought about China’s promise to abolish 
restrictions on foreign trade and foreign direct investment within three to five years. 
Simultaneously, the intention and determination of the Chinese government to 
accelerate the process of transition is also reflected in the Tenth Five-Year Plan 
(2001-2005)’, which was published in March 2001 and approved at the annual 
meeting of the National People‘s Congress. According to the plan, China will 
endeavour to maintain a GDP growth rate of 7% a year, takinq c GDP in 2005 to 
Rmb12.5 trillion (USS1.5 trillion) in 2000 prices and GDP per capita to Rmb 9 400 
(US$ 1 135). In terms of economic reform, the country aims to transform the 
“socialist market economic system” to “complete the establishment of a modem 
enterprise system with clearly established ownership, well defined power and 
responsibility, and separation of enterprise management from government 
administration”, albeit “public ownership plays a dominant rde”.  Simultaneously, 
government organisations will be continuously reformed and streamlined. 
In fact, the Economist Intelligence Unit8 speculates that gradual but steady economic 
liberalisation will continue in China and predicts that real GDP will grow by 7.30/0 in 
2002 and accelerate to 7.6% in 2003. The Development Bank of Singapore9 
estimates that FDI inflow in China will increase to US$ 50 billion in 2003. Per capita 
- 
See Appendix 8.1 
Economist Intelligence Unit. 2002. “Forecast” Economrst Inrelligcnc~~ I h t  22 February. [Online] 
Available from: URL: http: ww~.econormst.com/count~es~Chinaprofile.cfm?folder-Profile- 
Forecast [Accessed 22 February 20021. 
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income is also believed to rise in 2002 and hence continuously increase urban 
affluence. Moreover, the growth in per capita income is expected to lead to an 
increase of 8.7% in private consumption in the same year“’. 
Based on the above factors, the author believes that the economic development in 
China will reach new heights in the near future. This, together with the promising 
advancement in the supporting infrastructure, should increase China’s attractiveness 
to foreign direct investment in retailing. 
8.3.3 Forecast on Foreign Food Retailing in China 
According to the present study, foreign retailers who adopted the formats of 
hypermarket, supercentre, superstore and cash and carry have been continuously 
expanding in terms of number of outlets in China. Up to 2000, there were 29 state- 
approved retail joint ventures, with most of them originating from Asia and a few 
from Europe and North America (Euromonitor, 2000a). Among them, Wal-Mart has 
successfully opened seven supercentres and one ‘Sam’s Club’, with a total 
investment close to RMB 905 million. Carrefour has opened 23 chain stores in 15 
Chinese cities. Metro has also opened seven outlets. Furthermore, Metro has 
successfully signed an official investment agreement to set up the Metro Warehouse 
Management Company, which is the first wholly foreign-owned wholesaler in 
Western China. Further expansion of these retailers in terms of number of outlets and 
into different cities is expected. 
In the past, foreign retailers were unable to exploit their expansion into other cities to 
achieve a surge in bargaining power because it was difficult to centralise buying 
activities across provinces due to regional protection. Local governments tended to 
close their markets to companies from other Chinese cities and provinces. The tactics 
employed included the use of issuance of border cards, which companies needed if 
they wanted to bring their goods in from other cities; discriminatory fees imposed on 
Development Bank of Singapore. 2001. A First Look at China in 2002 21 September. [Online] 
Available from: URL: http://www.tdb.gO\..sg chinaimarketresearch reports/mf200 1 sep20cn.pdf 
[Accessed 13 February 20023. 
Institute of Developing Economies. 2002. [ Online] ‘4vailable from: URL: 




goods from other cities; and the application of special technical requirements or 
inspection standards on products from other cities and regions. In such a situation, 
the mobility of goods was hindered. Consequently, integrating buying activities of 
outlets in different provinces was difficult. However, this situation should be 
changed by the implementation of the Measures to Bar1 Regional Eco~omic  
Blockades promulgated in April 2001. This measure prohibits local governments 
from using methods such as those described above to achieve regional protection. 
This prohibition will help foreign retailers to integrate their buying activities in 
different provinces, which will in turn increase their bargaining power over suppliers. 
An increase in scale of supply chain activities co-ordination between different retail 
outlets of a retailer in different provinces will also be further assisted as the number 
of foreign companies entering the wholesaling and the transportation sectors in China 
increases. This is because these foreign companies will offer services of a higher 
standard than local ones, and will catalyse the modernisation of the distribution 
industry at a faster pace. Following this prediction, foreign retailers should be able to 
establish a national supply chain network in China in the near future. which will 
benefit both local manufalzturers and foreign retailers. With a national supply chain 
network, foreign retailers, as mentioned earlier, could derive more bargaining power. 
Simultaneously, local manufacturers could extend the reach of their products to other 
provinces, leading inevitably to increased concentration of production. 
The expansion of foreign retailers in China, however, is likely to be constrained by 
the deficiency of competent human resources. There is no question that foreign 
retailers rigorously train their Chinese staff to take up managerial positions in China. 
Nevertheless, food retailing is a highly labour-intensive industry. The rapid opening 
of stores in different provinces of China will require a large number of competent 
personnel for managerial positions. How can the number of people being trained by 
foreign food retailers catch up with the number they require for their cross-province 
expansion is an important issue that foreign retailers should consider seriously. 
Furthermore, such expansion of foreign food retailers and their formation of a 
national supply network will also require a compatible logistic and transportation 
industry in China. Nonetheless, the logistic and transportation sector in China is still 
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not well-developed. In other words, this is another problem that foreign retailers will 
need to confront. As mentioned earlier, some foreign companies have entered the 
logistic and transportation sector in China. Undeniably, this would help the 
modernisation of the sector and may consequently alleviate the problem. However, 
as foreign retailers expand, their demand on logistic and transportation services will 
increase. In other words, there will be pressure to expand on these foreign logistic 
and transportation firms. When these foreign logistic and transportation firms 
expand, they will face the same problem regarding the availability of competent 
human resources in China, as will the other supporting industries. 
On the other hand, supply chain networks of retailers beyond the national level may 
be developed as China further opens up and extends its export trade. Foreign retailers 
in China, with their global presence, provide an excellent means through which 
Chinese products can enter the global procurement system. In fact, as pointed out in 
the thesis, some foreign retailers were enthusiastic to find and develop producers in 
China from whom they can source quality merchandise for operations in other 
countries. In Asia, China and many other countries are members of the Asian Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, whose primary goal is to promote open trade 
and practical economic cooperation in the region. Connected by APEC, the import 
and export activities among the member countries should become easier. Based on 
these factors, there is a high possibility that foreign retailers in China will increase 
the scale of their supply chain network to cover Asia in due course. In other words. 
China may become an important base for supply chain activities of retailers in Asia. 
In such a scenario, the power of international retailers will be further consolidated. 
Foreign food retailers in China are indisputably instrumental in the modernisation of 
the retail and distribution industry in the country because they have introduced 'new' 
marketing methods, technology and management in both the retail and distribution 
sectors. Furthermore, their power, following the previous discussion, is likely to be 
further strengthened. However, does it mean that foreign retailers in China u7ill 
dominate the country as they develop further? The author would suggest that this is 
not necessarily the case because of the following factors. 
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First, despite the success of a number of foreign food retailers, some retailers have 
withdrawn their investment in China. Royal Ahold, a leading retailer from Holland, 
entered China with the supermarket format. It opened quite a large number of outlets 
in Shanghai. In mid-1999, the company was attempting to consolidate the chain. 
However, towards the year-end of 1999, it decided to withdraw from China. Dairy 
Farm Group from Hong Kong has also closed all its supermarket outlets in China, 
mainly in the southern part, about two years ago and decided to concentrate on their 
convenience store businesses in China. The present study has not researched the 
reasons of exit for these companies. Nevertheless, on a superficial level, entering 
China with the supermarket format does not appear to be an appropnate strategy. For 
foreim CI retailers at the time being, food retailing in larger scale seems to be more 
appealing in China". One plausible explanation for the take-off of the concept of 
one-stop shopping is, as pointed out in the thesis, that stores with such a concept 
offer a familiar department store setting with less elaborate decoration and products 
sold at much lower prices. Such combination of ambience and price creates the more 
casual shopping experience that many Chinese consumers desired. Although the 
actual reasons for the take-off of hypermarkets, superstores and cash and carrys, and 
the real cause of disposal of Ahold's and Dairy Farm's businesses in China are 
unknown, the two examples do show that foreign retailers with the latest retail 
information technology and retail know-how do not necessarily prosper in China. 
Secondly, some indigenous retailers in China have the potential to develop into 
significant rivals to the foreign retailers. Shanghai is the city in China where retailing 
has been most developed. There are two big local supermarket chains in the city: 
Lianhua and Hualian. Each of them has over 300 supermarket outlets. Their 
respective sales value ranks among the top businesses in the whole of China. As 
pointed out in the thesis, the Chinese government was keen to restructure and 
consolidate the indigenous retailers in Shanghai and Beijing in order to improve and 
strengthen the power of Chinese retailers. 
This point is discussed further in section 8.4. I 1  
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Some people may argue that the local retailers do not possess the management and 
marketing skills that are crucial to the success of a retail business. This may be true 
for the time being. However, as the retail and distribution industry develops, local 
retailers will gradually catch up with these skills. This, if combined with the 
continuous strong support of the Chinese government, will ensure that some Chinese 
retailers will have the potential to become strong competitors to foreign retailers in 
the future. In fact, the present study shows that the development of the retail and 
distribution industry in China as a whole has been quite remarkably rapid. The 
advance of Chinese retailers may also take place at an amazing pace. Actually, 
indigenous hypermarkets were already emerging when the author undertook 
fieldwork. In one of these hypermarkets, there were posters all around the store with 
”, meaning “Chinese People’s Own Darnaichang”. The seeds of 
enthusiasm of local retailers for catching up and competing with foreign retailers 
appear to be well planted. 
Third, the instant success of foreign retailers in China may not imply that the retail 
concepts from their home countries are suitable for China in the long run. Retailers 
should note that demographic factors and consumer behaviour in terms of food 
shopping in China are not identical to those in many Western countries. For example, 
household floor space in China is very limited and Chinese consumers have a strong 
preference for fresh food. When these two conditions are combined together, Chinese 
consumers shop more frequently but have a smaller basket value than Europeans or 
Americans on each shopping trip. Moreover, the author observed that many 
customers of hypermarkets walked to the store. The author also observed that one 
Carrefour outlet in Beijing did not even offer a proper parking area around the store. 
These situations are different to those in Europe. Even with further economic reform, 
the situation will probably remain unchanged in China for deep-rooted social and 
economic reasons. The author remains sceptical about the sustainability of the 
success of all current foreign retail formats in China. In fact, the present study has 
shown that some retailers recognised the need to invest in developing a more optimal 
format for China and have started modifjmg their formats. There is a high 
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probability that the existing foreign retail formats will evolve to something different 
as they develop in China. 
When the above three factors are combined together, the author would suggest that 
some Chinese retailers should be able to catch up with foreign retailers in terms of 
size, retail information technology and management skills in the foreseeable future. 
At the same time, it seems doubtful that the ‘uniqueness’ of the demographic 
characteristics and consumer behaviour in China are fully reflected in retail concepts 
in the country. This process of adaptation essentially requires an in-depth 
understanding of the Chinese grocery-shopping culture and a high sensitivity to 
consumers’ need. Therefore, taking a long-term perspective, the fundamental factor 
that will determine the future competitive landscape of Chinese and foreign food 
retailers is not who possesses the latest retail technology and know-how, but who 
possesses the most relevant retail know-how in the context of China. Consequently, 
the author would argue that foreign retailers may not necessarily dominate the 
Chinese food retail market in the long run. 
8.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
Apart from contributing to a better understanding of the process of foreign direct 
investment in food retailing in China, the present study has also revealed several 
issues that need further research. First, as mentioned earlier, some foreign food 
retailers have exited China not long after their entry. The reasons that led to their exit 
should be investigated to provide further insights into the relationship between retail 
format and success in food retailing in China. 
Secondly, the present study looks at the process of foreign direct investment in food 
retailing in China mainly from the viewpoint of foreign retailers. The perceptions and 
reactions of Chinese consumers has not been examined. Future research effort should 
be invested in this topic because this will offer a significant understanding of 
adaptations that foreign retailers need to make in the future. Such research will also 
shed some light on the retail conceptiformat that is most suited to Chinese 
consumers’ needs. 
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The third issue to which future research effort should be directed is the development 
of supply chain relationships in China. Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) is a 
popular system in Europe and the US. Some foreign retailers in the present study 
were looking forward to implementing a similar system in China in cooperation with 
multinational manufacturers such as Proctor and Gamble. However, there has to be a 
sufficiently high level of retailer and producer concentration before such system is 
viable. The question is whether or not such consolidation will occur in the 
foreseeable future in China. Another significant issue is whether foreign retailers will 
prefer to develop and collaborate with local retailers or whether they will stick with 
multinational manufacturers. The author’s empirical work suggests that several 
foreign retailers were keen to develop local manufacturers and were considering joint 
product development with them. The question then arises as to whether foreign 
retailers are deliberately attempting to reduce their reliance on multinational 
manufacturers. On the other hand, if local manufacturers achieve a high standard of 
supply, they may not be able to stay in the market for long because multinational 
manufactures may acquire these firms. All these issues are worth exploring because 
this will not only facilitate understanding of the development of relationships 
between manufactures and retailers in China but will also deepen understanding of 
the price setting power of retailers and manufacturers as both groups seek to 
consolidate their positions in China and more widely. 
Lastly, the current investigation has revealed that a learning-oriented culture and 
knowledge accumulation and utilisation are crucial in the process of foreign direct 
investment of food retailers at both the subsidiary level and across the whole 
organisation. This issue should be examined further at headquarters level in order to 
obtain a deeper understanding of how knowledge learnt at the subsidiary level can be 
disseminated and exchanged across the entire retail organisation in order to sustain 
retail innovation and enhance competitiveness at an international level. 
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As a final remark, the author hopes that this exploratory study of one of the major 
retail markets will stimulate further research efforts and lead to a more solid 
understanding of the process of retail internationalisation. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Year GDP (billion RMB) 
1978 362.4 1 
1979 403.82 
1980 451.78 
Gross Domestic Production (GDP) Statistics of China 
Between 1978 and 2001 
GDP (billion US$) GDP Index (previous 
year=lOO) 







I 1981 1 486.24 I 58.581 105.21 
593.45 64.99 1 10.91 
717.10 86.40 1 1  5.2 
896.44 108.00 113.5 
108.8, 1 020.22 122.92 





1492.83 179.86 111.3 
1690.92 203.73 104.1 
1854.79 233.47 103.8 
21 61.78 260.46 109.2 





41 7.28 113.5 
563.37 1 12.61 
704.56 110.5 
81 7.89 109.6[ 
i 19921 2663.81 [ 320.941 114.21 
1999 
2000 
81 91.09 986.88 107.1 
8963.59 1 079.95 108.0 
I 19971 7446.26 1 897.141 108.81 
2001 I Amrox. 9500, 1 144.58 
I 19981 7834.521 943.92 j 107.81 
107.4 
Sources: 
GDP in RMB and GDP Index between 1978 and 1999 are obtained from: 
China National Bureau of Statistics. 2000b. China Statistic Yearbook 2000. [Online] 
Available from: URL: http://www.stats.cjov.cn/siiw/ndsilzcjni/2000/CO1 c.htm [Accessed 16 
February 20021. 
GDP in US$ in 2000 is obtained from: 
World Bank. 2001 a. World Development lndicators database. 16 July. [Online] Available 
from: URL: http:/lwww.worldbank.orcj/data/databytopic/GDP,pdf [Accessed 16 February 
20021. 
GDP Index 2000 is obtained from: 
China National Bureau of Statistics. 2002. “Statistics on China’s Economy in Recent Five 
Years”. People’s Daily Online. 3 January. [Online] Available from: URL: 
http://enql ish .peopledaily.com .cn/20020 1 /03/eng20020 1 03 87987 .s htm I 1 6 
February 20021. 
[Accessed 
GDP in RMB and GDP Index in 2001 are obtained from: 
People’s Daily Online. 2001. “China’s Economy to Grow 7.4 Percent, GDP to Top US$1 . I  5 
Trillion This Year.” People’s Daily Online. 21 December. [Online] Available from: URL: 
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http://enc~lish.peopledaily.com.cn/200112/21/enc~20011221 87212.shtml [Accessed 16 
February 20021. 
GDP 1978-1999 and 2001 are converted from RBM to US$ and GDP 2000 from US$ to 
RMB using the exchange rate of RMB 8.3=US$ 1. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Ba i n -Type Ad va n t a g es 
The following is a table taken out from Hymer (1976:44-45) that summarises J. S. 
Bain's description of advantages of established firms and the circumstances in which 
they arise. These advantages are termed Bain-type advantages, which are seen as 
structural imperfections, by scholars such as Dunning and Rugman ( I  985). 
I. Typical circumstances giving rise to an absolute cost advantage to established firms 
A. Control of production techniques by established firms, via either patents or secrecy. 
(Such control may permit exclusion of entrants form access to optimal techniques, or 
alternatively the levying of a discriminatory royalty charge for their use.) 
B. Imperfections in the markets for hired factors of production (e.g. labour, materials, 
etc.) which allow lower buying prices to established firms; alternatively ownership or 
control of strategic factors supplies (e.g. resources) by established firms, which 
permits either exclusion of entrants from such supplies, driving entrants to use 
inferior suppliers, or discriminatory pricing of suppliers to them. 
C. Significant limitations of the suppliers of productive factors in specific markets or 
submarkets for them, relative to the demands of an efficient entrant firm. Then an 
increment to entry will perceptibly increase factor prices. 
D. Money-market conditions imposing higher interest rates upon potential entrants than 
upon established firms. (These conditions are apparently more likely to be effective 
as a source of advantage to established firms as the absolute capital requirement for 
an efficient entrant increases.) 
I I. Typical circumstances giving rise to a product differentiation advantage to established 
firms 
A. The accumulative preference of buyers for established brand names and company 
reputations, either generally or except for small minorities of buyers. 
B. Control of superior product designs by established firms through patents, permitting 
either exclusion of entrants from them or the levying of discriminatory royalty 
charges. 
C. Ownership or contractual control by established firms of favoured distributive outlets, 
in situations where the supply of further outlets is other than perfectly elastic. 
Ill. Typical circumstances discouraging entry by sustaining significant economies of the 
large-scale firm 
A. Real economies (i.e. in terms of quantities of factors used per unit of output) of 
large-scale production and distribution such that an optimal firm will supply a 
significant share of the market. 
B. Strictly pecuniary economies (i.e. monetary economies only, such as those due to 
the greater bargaining power of large buyers) of large-scale production, having a 
similar effect. 
C. Real or strictly pecuniary economies of large-scale advertising or other sales 
promotion, having a similar effect. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Case Study Memorandum 
This case study memorandum served as the blueprint for the author to collect 
information from various sources for the study. The questions set out here were also 
used as semi-structured, open-ended questions for the interviews. The reader should 
note that this memorandum was not distributed to any informants to be filled in. 
Questions were asked by the author and the respondents were expected and 
encouraged to elaborate. On the other hand, when the respondents felt that certain 
questions were too sensitive and refused to discuss, they were welcome to do so. 
Topics of Inquiry 
1.  Retailing environment 
How7 does your company evaluate the retailing environment of Shenzhen, 
Guangdong, Shanghai and Beijing in terms of competitions, consumers, 
governement support and availability of market information? 
Why did your company choose only to operate in Shenzhen and Guangdong at 
the moment? 
2. Supply Chain Management 
How many layers are there in the channel for fresh food, chilled food, frozen food, 
canned food, or others (in other words, do you deal with middlemen or with 
manufacturers)? Why do you choose this channel structure? What is your 
future direction in this aspect? 
Who are your suppliers and how do you choose your suppliers? 
What is the proportion of merchandise supplied by local Chinese suppliers, regional 
Chinese suppliers, international suppliers (such as P&G) and are imported? 
Why these proportion? How dynamic are these proportions? 
What is the proportion of sales accounted for by local Chinese suppliers, regional 
Chinese suppliers, international suppliers, import products? How dynamic are 
these proportions? 
What are the credit systems with local, regional and international suppliers 
respectively? Are they different significantly? How are the credit terms 
determined? 
What are your relationships with the local, regional and international suppliers? Hour 
do these relationships, if any, affect the development of your retail presence 
in China? Do you have any collaborating activities (such as product 
development)? Do you share market information? If yes, what kind? 
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How are the buying activities organised in your company (stored based or 
centralised) (any differences for different products)? (such as, who are 
responsible for the buying for the different stores?) 
How is the co-ordination of supply chain activities for all the stores in China 
(especially inter-provincial coordination)? 
What do you think about the quality of products supplied by local and regional 
suppliers, especially fresh food, in China when compared with the situation in 
say America? And how do you control the quality? 
Logistic issues: 
What kind of transportation fleets do you use? 
What is the number of distribution depots and floor area? 
What kind of warehousing do you use? How about in- 
store warehouses and their floor space? 
How do you co-ordinate the logistic activities? 
What are the problems with logistic activities in China? 
What is the extent to which technology is involved in logistic activities? 
How is the situation of delay in delivery from suppliers? 
How do you overcome it? 
How you do you think the distribution system in China will change in the near 
future? 
3. Retailing Operation 
What is the number of product lines you carry? What is the average floor space? 
How much is devoted to fresh food? 
What is the proportion of sales accounted for by fresh food? (if it is too sensitive, is it 
possible for you to give me a rough idea?) 
What is the product you emphasis most in your retail stores? 
How do you describe your retail concept? In other words, what do you think your 
competitive advantage is in Shenzhen and Guangdong? On what do you 
compete? How do you describe your retail store format and atmosphere? 
What adjustments are made to the parent company’s strategy to suit the local 
What changes have been introduced into the product range compared with domestic 
situation? 
operations? (such as range of assortment, package size, price, packaging) 
What is the approximate shrinkage rate (staff and customer stealing plus wastage)? 
Do you think they are a serious problem to your stores? How do you 
overcome it? 
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How often do you conduct consumer research in your stores or outside your stores? 
How is it conducted? Who does market research for your company? What are 
the difficulties in doing market research in China? 
How do you evaluate the performance and market position of your retail operations 
in China at the moment when compared to your original expectation? What 
do you expect in it to be in the future? 
Other factual information: 
Volume of stock? 
Sales turnover p.a? 
Average amount per shopping trip of customers? 
Average margin? 
How frequent do the customers visit the store? 
What point of sales data is collected and what is done with it? 
What is the usual method of payment by Customers? 
(for all of the above questions, if you cannot provide me with the exact answer, could 
you please suggest me a rough idea?) 
4. Store Development and Site-Selection/Acquisition 
What is the number of stores opened per year since your first entry into China? Any 
closure? If yes, why? What are their format and what are the store sizes(ni’)? 
What will be the rate of increase in number of stores in the near future and 
where? 
Are the sites of current stores owned or rented? Were they greenfield or 
brownfield sites? What is the preference of your company and why? How 
many and what kinds of licenses are needed for different products and for 
each site? From whom? How important are local lawyers to get these 
licenses? 
How does the company become aware of a possible site? (role of auctiodpartnership 
How does the company evaluate sites? 
What is the availability of (I) advisors and (11) contractors for the development of 
Is there any expertise introduced from the parent in terms of site selection and store 
with other company’private overture) 
store? 
development? 
What is the trends in site availability in terms of numbers of sites available and 
Are your stores one off locations or part of centre development? 
Any political opposition from small local retailers? 
cost/price trends? 
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5. Legal and regulatory catalysts/barriers to establish retail presence in China 
What are the legal and regulatory procedures for establishing a store in China (or in 
Beijing, ShenzhedGuangdong, or Shanghai)? 
What is the role, if any, of the Chinese government (at different levels) in your 
FDI venture? 
What are the main legal and regulatory catalysts (or any help from the government at 
different levels: municipal, provincial and central) and barriers (at different 
levels)? How do you overcome the barriers? 
What kind of relationship do you have with the Chinese government at different 
levels? (such as do you have any joint activities with the governemnt? What 
are they?) 
6. Input from Chinese Partners 
Which kind of joint venture is your retail operation in China, equity, wholly-owned 
or coop er at ive venture ? 
Who is/are your partner(s)? Why did you choose thishhese partners? What is the 
contribution to the venture from each partner? 
What is the sharing of power among different partners (Legal equity and ownership 
vs. managerial control/amount of influence through broad members and 
specific managers)? 
Is there any advantage or problem arise as a result of this partnership structure? 
7. Human Resources Management 
What is the proportional of expatriates vs. local stafP Why this proportion? What is 
the future trend in this proportion? 
What qualifications are required on your local employees? What is the training 
package offered to local management team and local staff? How do you 
describe the availability of quality candidates in China? Are there any 
problems with using local employees? Any advantages? 
How experienced are the expatriates on running retail operation away from the home 
country? How long do they usually stay in China? Do they receive any 
training before they leave the home country? If yes, what kind of training is 
it? 
How important does the company think human resources is? 
Personally, how will you describe your experience on retailing in China when 
compared with your experience on retailing in your home country? What 
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have you learnt which is unique in retailing in China? How do you share your 
experiences within the company? 
8. What kind of support do you get from your parent retail company in the 
home country o r  from your retail operations in other countries for your retail 
operation in China? How much autonomy is delegated to your operation in 
China? 
9. What is the history of internationalisation of your company? How does it 
affect the establishment of a retail presence in China? Why does your company 
internationalise? Why is China chosen? Were other countries instead of China 
considered? If yes, which? 
Note: Apart from the questions above, ask the retailers for an address list of all their 




Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign Capital Enterprises 
(Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on April 12, 
1986, promulgated by Order No. 39 of the President of the People's Republic of 
China and effective as of April 12, 1986) 
Article 1 With a view to expanding economic co-operation and technical exchange 
with foreign countries and promoting the development of China's national economy, 
the People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign economic 
organisations and individuals (hereinafter collectively referred to as "foreign 
investors") to set up enterprises with foreign capital in China and protects the lawful 
rights and interests of such enterprises. 
Article 2 As mentioned in this Law "enterprises with foreign capital" refers to those 
enterprises established in China by foreign investors, exclusively with their own 
capital, in accordance with relevant Chinese laws. The term does not include 
branches set up in China by foreign enterprises and other foreign economic 
organisations. 
Article 3 Enterprises with foreign capital shall be established in such a manner as to 
help the development of China's national economy; they shall use advanced 
technology and equipment or market all or most of their products outside China. 
Provisions shall be made by the State Council regarding the lines of business which 
the State forbids enterprises with foreign capital to engage in or on which it places 
certain restrictions. 
Article 4 The investments of a foreign investor in China, the profits it earns and its 
other lawful rights and interests are protected by Chinese law. 
Enterprises with foreign capital must abide by Chinese laws and regulations and 
must not engage in any activities detrimental to China's public interest. 
Article 5 The State shall not nationalise or requisition any enterprise with foreign 
capital. Under special circumstances, when public interest requires, enterprises with 
foreign capital may be requisitioned by legal procedures and appropriate 
compensation shall be made. 
Article 6 The application to establish an enterprise with foreign capital shall be 
submitted for examination and approval to the department under the State Council 
which is in charge of foreign economic relations and trade, to another agency 
authorised by the State Council. The authorities in charge of examination and 
approval shall, within 90 days from the date they receive such application. decide 
whether or not to grant approval. 
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Article 7 After an application for the establishment of an enterprise with foreign 
capital has been approved, the foreign investor shall, within 30 days from the date of 
receiving a certificate of approval, apply to the industry and commerce 
administration authorities for registration and obtain a business licence. The date of 
issue of the business licence shall be the date of the establishment of the enterprise. 
Article 8 An enterprise with foreign capital which meets the conditions for being 
considered a legal person under Chinese law shall acquire the status of a Chinese 
legal person, in accordance with the law. 
Article 9 An enterprise with foreign capital shall make investments in China within 
the period approved by the authorities in charge of examination and approval. If it 
fails to do so, the industry and commerce administration authorities may cancel its 
business licence. The industry and commerce administration authorities shall inspect 
and supervise the investment situation of an enterprise with foreign capital. 
Article 10 In the event of separation, merger or other major changes, an enterprise 
with foreign capital shall report to and seek approval from the authorities in charge 
of examination and approval, and register the change with industry and commerce 
administration authorities. 
Article 11 The production and operating plans of enterprises with foreign capital 
shall be reported to the competent authorities for the record. 
Enterprises with foreign capital shall conduct their operations and management in 
accordance with the approved articles of association, and shall be free from any 
interference. 
Article 12 When employing Chinese workers and staff, an enterprise with foreign 
capital shall conclude contracts with them according to law, in which matters 
concerning employment, dismissal, remuneration, welfare benefits, labour protection 
and labour insurance shall be clearly prescribed. 
Article 13 Workers and staff of enterprises with foreign capital may organise trade 
unions in accordance with the law, in order to conduct trade union activities and 
protect their lawful rights and interests. 
The enterprises shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the trade 
unions in their respective enterprises. 
Article 14 An enterprise with foreign capital must set up account books in China, 
conduct independent accounting, submit the fiscal reports and statements as required 
and accept supervision by the financial and tax authorities. 
If an enterprise with foreign capital refuses to maintain account books in China, the 
financial and tax authorities may impose a fine on it, and the industry and commerce 
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administration authorities may order it to suspend operations or may revoke its 
business licence. 
Article 15 Within the scope of the operations approved, enterprises with foreign 
capital may purchase, either in China or from the world market, raw and semi- 
processed materials, fuels and other materials they need. When these materials are 
available from both sources on similar terms, first priority should be given to 
purchases in China. 
Article 16 Enterprises with foreign capital shall apply to insurance companies in 
China for such kinds of insurance coverage as are needed. 
Article 17 Enterprises with foreign capital shall pay taxes in accordance with 
relevant state provisions for tax payment, and may enjoy preferential treatment for 
reduction or exemption from taxes. 
An enterprise that reinvests its profits in China after paying the income tax ,may, in 
accordance with relevant state provisions, apply for refund of a part of the income 
tax already paid on the reinvested amount. 
Article 18 Enterprises with foreign capital shall handle their foreign exchange 
transactions in accordance with the state provisions for foreign exchange control. 
Enterprises with foreign capital shall open an account with the Bank of China or with 
a bank designated by the state agency exercising foreign exchange control. 
Enterprises with foreign capital shall manage to balance their own foreign exchange 
receipts and payments. If, with the approval of the competent authorities. the 
enterprises market their products in China and consequently experience an imbalance 
in foreign exchange, the said authorities shall help them correct the imbalance. 
Article 19 The foreign investor may remit abroad profits that are lawfully earned 
from an enterprise with foreign capital, as well as other lawful earnings and any 
funds remaining after the enterprise is liquidated. 
Wages, salaries and other legitimate income earned by foreign employees in an 
enterprise with foreign capital may be remitted abroad after the payment of 
individual income tax in accordance with the law. 
Article 20 With respect to the period of operations of an enterprise with foreign 
capital, the foreign investor shall report to and secure approval from the authorities in 
charge of examination and approval. For an extension of the period of operations, an 
application shall be submitted to the said authorities 180 days before the expiration 
of the period. The authorities in charge of examination and approval shall, within 30 
days from the date such application is received, decide whether or not to grant the 
extension. 
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Article 2 1 When terminating its operations, an enterprise with foreign capital shall 
promptly issue a public notice and proceed with liquidation in accordance with legal 
procedure. 
Pending the completion of liquidation, a foreign investor may not dispose of the 
assets of the enterprise except for the purpose of liquidation. 
Article 22 At the termination of operations, the enterprise with foreign capital shall 
nullify its registration with the industry and commerce administration authorities and 
hand in its business licence for cancellation. 
Article 23 The department under the State Council which i s  in charge of foreign 
economic relations and trade shall, in accordance with this Law, formulate rules for 
its implementation, which shall go into effect after being submitted to and approved 
by the State Council. 
Article 24 This Law shall go into effect as of the date of its promulgation. 
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Appendix 6.2 
Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises 
(Approved by the State Council on October 28, 1990, and promulgated by Decree 
No. 1 of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on December 12, 
1990) 
Contents 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Chapter I1 Procedures for Establishment 
Chapter I11 Form of Organisation and Registered Capital 
Chapter IV Methods of Contributing Investments and the Time Limit 
Chapter V Use of Site and the Site Use Fees 
Chapter VI Purchasing and Marketing 
Chapter VI1 Taxation 
Chapter VI11 Control of' Foreign Exchange 
Chapter IX Financial Affairs and Accounting 
Chapter X Workers and Staff Members 
Chapter XI Trade Union 
Chapter XI1 Term of Operations, Termination and Liquidation 
Chapter XI11 Supplementary Provisions 
Chapter I 
General Provisions 
Article 1 These Rules are formulated in accordance with the provisions in Article 23 
of The Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises. 
Article 2 Foreign-capital enterprises shall be under the jurisdiction of and protection 
by China's laws. 
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Foreign-capital enterprises, while engaged in business operational activities within 
the territory of China, must abide by Chinese laws and regulations and must not 
jeopardise the social and public interests of China. 
Article 3 A foreign-capital enterprise to be established in China must be conducive to 
the development of China's national economy, be capable of gaining remarkable 
economic results and shall meet at least one of the following conditions: 
(1) The enterprise is to adopt advanced technology and equipment, engage in the 
development of new products, conserve energy and raw materials, and realise the 
upgrading of products and the replacement of old products with new ones which can 
be used as import substitutes; 
(2) Its annual output value of export products accounts for more than 50% of the 
annual output value of all products, thereby realising the balance between revenues 
and expenditures in foreign exchange or with a surplus. 
Article 4 No foreign-capital enterprise shall be established in the following trades: 
(1) The press, publication, broadcasting, television and movies; 
(2) Domestic commerce, foreign trade, and insurance; 
(3) Post and telecommunications; 
(4) Other trades in which the establishment of foreign-capital enterprises is 
forbidden, as prescribed by the Chinese government. 
Article 5 The establishment of foreign-capital enterprises shall be restricted in the 
following trades: 
(1) Public utilities; 
(2) Communications and transportation; 
(3) Real estate; 
(4) Trust investment; 
(5) Leasing 
The application for the establishment of a foreign-capital enterprise in the trades 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be submitted to the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter 
referred to as the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade) for approval, 
except as otherwise provided by Chinese laws and regulations. 
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Article 6 Application for the establishment of a foreign-capital enterprise shall not be 
approved if the proposed enterprise would involve one of the following 
circumstances: 
(1 ) Injury to China's sovereignty or to social and public interests; 
(2) Impairment of China's national security; 
(3) Violation of Chinese laws and regulations; 
(4) Incompatibility with the requirements of China's national economic development; 
or 
(5) Possible creation of environmental pollution. 
Article 7 A foreign-capital enterprise shall make its own managerial decisions within 
the approved scope of business operations and shall not be subject to intervention. 
Chapter I1 
Procedures for Establishment 
Article 8 The application for the establishment of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be 
submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and after 
examination and approval, a certificate of approval shall be issued by the Ministry. 
With respect to the application for the establishment of a foreign-capital enterprise 
that comes under one of the following circumstances, the State Council shall 
authorise the people's government of the relevant province, autonomous region, 
municipality directly under the Central Government, municipality separately listed 
on the state plan, or the special economic zone, to issue the certificate of approval 
after examining and approving the application: 
(1) The total amount of investment is within the limits of powers for the examination 
and approval of investments stipulated by the State Council; 
(2) The proposed enterprises does not need the raw and processed materials to be 
allocated by the State, or does not influence unfavourably the national 
comprehensive balance of energy resources, communications and transportation, as 
well as export quotas for foreign trade. 
Where the people's government of the province, autonomous region, municipality 
directly under the Central Government, municipality separately listed on the state 
plan, or the special economic zone has approved the establishment of a foreign- 
capital enterprise within its limits of powers granted by the State Council, it shall 
within 15 days after the approval submit a report to the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade for the record (hereinafter the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade, the people's g o v e m e n t  of the province, 
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autonomous region, municipality directly under the Central government, 
municipality separately listed on the State plan, and the special economic zone shall 
be called generally as the examining and approving organ). 
Article 9 With respect to a foreign-capital enterprise, the establishment of which has 
been applied for, if its products are subject to export license, export quota, or import 
license, or are under restrictions by the State, prior consent of the department of 
foreign economic relations and trade shall be obtained in accordance with the limits 
of powers for administration. 
Article 10 A foreign investor shall, prior to the filing of an application for the 
establishment of a foreign-capital enterprise, submit a report to the local people's 
government at or above the county level at the place where the proposed enterprise is 
to be established. The report shall include: the aim of the establishment of the 
proposed enterprise; the scope and scale of business operation; the products to be 
produced; the technology and equipment to be adopted and used; the proportion of 
the sales of products between the domestic market and the foreign market; the area of 
land to be used and the related requirements; the conditions and quantities of water, 
electricity, coal, coal gas and other forms of energy resources required; and the 
requirement of public facilities. 
The local people's government at or above the county level shall within 30 days after 
receiving the report submitted by the foreign investor, give a reply in writing to the 
said foreign investor. 
Article 11 In case that a foreign investor wishes to establish a foreign-capital 
enterprise, an application shall be submitted to the examining and approving organ 
through the local people's government at or above the county level at the place where 
the enterprise is to be established, together with the following documents. 
(1 ) The written application for the establishment of a foreign-capital enterprise; 
(2) A feasibility study report; 
(3) The articles of association of the foreign-capital enterprise; 
(4) The name-list of the legal representatives (or the candidates for members of the 
board of directors) of the foreign-capital enterprise; 
(5) The legal certifyng documents and the credit position certifying documents of 
the foreign investor; 
(6) The written reply given by the people's government at or above the county level 
at the place, where the enterprise is to be established; 
(7) An inventory of goods and materials needed to be imported; 
(8) Other documents that are required to be submitted. 
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The documents mentioned in items (1 ) and (3) in the preceding paragraph must be 
written in the Chinese language; while the documents mentioned in Items (2),  (4) and 
(5) in the preceding paragraph may be written in a foreign language, but a 
corresponding Chinese translation shall be attached. 
In the event that two or more foreign investors jointly file an application for the 
establishment of a foreign capital enterprise, they shall submit a duplicate of the 
contract concluded and signed between them to the examining and approving organ 
for the record. 
Article 12 The examining and approving organ shall, within 90 days after receiving 
all the required documents with respect to an application for the establishment of 
foreign-capital enterprise, make a decision whether to approve or disapprove the 
application. In the event that the examining and approving organ has found that the 
documents mentioned above are not complete, or that some of them are 
inappropriate, it may call on the applicant to make up the incomplete documents, or 
to make necessary revisions, within a prescribed time limit. 
Article 13 After the approval of the application for the establishment of a foreign- 
capital enterprise by the examining and approving organ, the foreign investor shall, 
within 30 days after receiving the certificate of approval, file an application with the 
relevant administrative department for industry and commerce for registration, and 
obtain a business license. The date on which the business license is issued shall be 
the date of the establishment of the said enterprise. 
In the event that the foreign investor fails to file an application with the 
administrative department for industry and commerce for registration on the 
expiration of the 30 days after receiving the certificate of approval, the certificate of 
approval for the establishment of the proposed enterprise shall become invalid 
automatically. 
A foreign-capital enterprise shall, within 30 days after its establishment, go through 
the procedures for taxation registration with the tax authorities. 
Article 14 Foreign investors may appoint a Chinese service agency for enterprises 
with foreign investment or other economic organisations to handle, on their behalf, 
the affairs stipulated in Article 9, the first paragraph of Article 10 and Article 11 of 
these Rules, but a contract of entrustment shall be concluded and signed between 
them. 
Article 15 The written application for the establishment of a foreign-capital 
enterprise shall include the following contents: 
(1) The name or designation, the residence and the place of registration of the foreign 
investor, and the name, nationality, and position of the legal representative; 
(2) The name and residence of the foreign-capital enterprise; 
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(3) The scope of business operations, the varieties of products, and the scale of 
production; 
(4) The total amount of investment, the registered capital, the source of funds, and 
the method of investment contribution and the operation period; 
(5) The organisational form and organs, and the legal representative of the foreign- 
capital enterprise; 
(6) The primary production equipment to be used and the degrees of depreciation, 
production technology, technological level and their sources; 
(7) The sales orientation and areas, the sales channels and methods, and the sales 
proportion between China's market and foreign markets; 
(8) The arrangements for the revenues and expenditures in foreign exchange; 
(9) The arrangements for the establishment of relevant organs of working personnel 
the engagement and use of workers and staff members, their training, salaries and 
wages, material benefits, insurance, and labour protection; 
(10) The degrees of probable environmental pollution and the measures for tackling 
pollution; 
(1 1) The selection of sites and the area of land to be used; 
(12) The funds, energy resources, raw and processed materials needed in capital 
construction and in production and business operations and the solutions thereof; 
(1 3) The progress plan for the construction of the project; and 
(14) The period of business operations of the foreign-capital enterprise to be 
established. 
Article 16 The articles of association of a foreign-capital enterprise shall include the 
following contents: 
(1) The name and the residence; 
(2) The aim and the scope of business operations; 
(3) The total amount of investments, the registered capital, and the time limit for 
contributing investment; 
(4) The form of organisation; 
(5) The internal organisational structures and their functions and powers as well as 
their rules of procedures; the functions, duties and limits of powers of the legal 
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representative as well as of the general manager, chief engineer, chief accountant and 
other staff members; 
(6) The principles and system of financial affairs, accounting and auditing; 
(7) Labour administration; 
(8) The term of business operations, termination, and liquidation; and 
(9) The procedures for the amendment of the articles of association. 
Article 17 The articles of association of a foreign-capital enterprise shall become 
effective after the approval by the examining and approving organ. The same 
procedure shall apply when amendments are made. 
Article 18 The division or merge of foreign-capital enterprises, and the significant 
change in capital resulting from other causes, shall be subject to the approval by the 
examining and approving organ; in addition, the said enterprises shall engage a 
Chinese registered accountant to carry out verification, and to submit a report on the 
verification of capital; after the approval by the examining and approving organ, the 
enterprises concerned shall go through the procedures for the change of the 
registration with the relevant administrative department for industry and commerce. 
Chapter 111 
Form of Organisation and Registered Capital 
Article 19 The organisational form of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be a limited 
liability company. With approval, the enterprise may also take any other liability 
With respect to a foreign-capital enterprise which is a limited liability company, the 
liability of the foreign investor to the enterprise shall be limited to the amount of 
investment subscribed and contributed to the enterprise by the investor. 
With respect to a foreign-capital enterprise which takes any other liability form, the 
liability of the foreign investor to the enterprise shall be dealt with in accordance 
with the provisions of Chinese laws and regulations. 
Article 20 The total amount of investment of a foreign-capital enterprise refers to the 
total amount of funds needed for the establishment of the enterprises, i. e. the sum 
total of the funds invested in capital construction in accordance with the scope of 
production and the circulating funds for production. 
Article 21 The registered capital of a foreign-capital enterprise refers to the total 
amount of capital registered with the administrative department for industry and 
commerce for the purpose of establishing the foreign-capital enterprise, i. e the total 
amount of investment the foreign investor undertakes to contribute. 
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The registered capital of a foreign-capital enterprise shall fit in with the enterprise's 
scope of business operations; and the proportion between the registered capital and 
the total amount of investment shall conform with the provisions of the relevant 
Chinese laws and regulations. 
Article 22 A foreign-capital enterprise shall not reduce the registered capital during 
the term of business operations. 
Article 23 The increase or assignment of the registered capital of a foreign-capital 
enterprise shall be subject to approval by the examining and approving organ; in 
addition, the said enterprise shall go through the procedures for the change of the 
registration with the administrative department for industry and commerce. 
Article 24 In case that a foreign-capital enterprise intends to mortgage or assign its 
assets or rights and interests to a foreign unit, the case shall be submitted to the 
examining and approving organ for approval, and then to the administrative 
department for industry and commerce for the record. 
Article 25 The legal representative of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be the person- 
in-charge who, in accordance with the stipulations in the enterpnse's articles of 
association, executes hidher functions and powers on behalf of the enterprise. 
In the event that the legal representative is unable to execute his/her functions and 
powers, he/she shall entrust in writing an agent with the execution of hidher 
functions and powers. 
Chapter IV 
Methods of Contributing Investment and the Time Limit 
Article 26 Foreign investors may use convertible foreign currencies for the 
contribution of investment, or use as their investment machinery and equipment, 
industrial property rights, and proprietary technology that are assigned a fixed price. 
Foreign investors may, after approval by the examining and approving organ, use, as 
their investment, their profits in Renminbi ( R I B )  earned from other enterprises with 
foreign investment established within the territory of China. 
Article 27 In case that foreign investors intend to use machinery and equipment, 
being assigned a fixed price, as their investment, the said machinery and equipment 
must meet the following requirements: 
(1) Those that are needed for the production of the foreign-capital enterprise; 
(2) Those that cannot be produced in China, or that can be produced in China but 
cannot be guaranteed to meet the needs in terms of technical performance or time of 
supply- 
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The price fixed for the aforesaid machinery and equipment shall not be higher than 
the normal price for similar machinery and equipment sold on the international 
market at the time. 
With respect to the machinery and equipment, being assigned a fixed price and used 
as contributing investment, an inventory listing in detail the assigning of fixed prices 
as contributing investment, including the names, categories, quantities. and the 
assignment of prices, shall be made and submitted to the examining and approval 
organ as an appendix to the application for the establishment of the foreign-capital 
enterprise. 
Article 28 In case that foreign investors intend to use industrial property rights and 
proprietary technology. being assigned a fixed price, as their investment, the said 
industrial property rights and proprietary technology must meet the following 
requirements : 
(1) Owned by the foreign investors themselves; 
(2) Capable of producing new products that are urgently needed by China, or that are 
suitable for export and marketable abroad. 
The assigning of a fixed price for the aforesaid industrial property rights and 
proprietary technology shall be in conformity with the general pricing principles of 
the international market, and the amount of pricing thereof shall not exceed 20% of 
the registered capital of the foreign-capital enterprise. 
With respect to those industrial property rights and proprietary technology. being 
assigned a fixed price for contributing investment, a detailed inventory of relevant 
data, including a duplicate of the proprietary rights certificate, the effective 
condition, technological performance, the practical value, the basis and standard for 
the calculation of pricing, shall be prepared and submitted to the examining and 
approving organ as an appendix to the application for the establishment of the 
forei gn-c api tal enterprise. 
Article 29 When the machinery and equipment, being assigned a fixed price and used 
as Contributing investment, have arrived at China's port, the foreign-capital enterprise 
shall apply to China's commodity inspection authorities for inspection, which shall 
then issue an inspection report. 
In the event that the variety, quality and quantity of the machinery and equipment, 
being assigned a fixed price and used as contributing investment, are not in 
conformity with the variety, quality and quantity of the machinery and equipment, 
being assigned a fixed price as contributing investment and listed in the inventory 
submitted to the examining and approving organ, the examining and approving organ 
has the power to require the foreign investors to make corrections within a prescribed 
time limit. 
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Article 30 After the industrial property rights and proprietary technology priced as 
contributing investment have been put to use, the examining and approving organ has 
the power to carry out inspection. In the event that the said industrial property rights 
and proprietary technology are not in conformity miith the data originally provided by 
the foreign investors, the examining and approving organ has the power to require 
the foreign investors to make corrections within a prescribed time limit. 
Article 31 The time limit for a foreign investor to make the investment contributions 
shall be clearly stipulated in the written application for the establishment of the 
foreign-capital enterprise and also in the articles of association of the enterprise. A 
foreign investor may make the investment contribution by instalments, but the last 
instalment of the contribution shall be made within the period of three years 
beginning from the day when the business license is issued. The first instalment of 
investment contribution shall not be less than 15% of the total amount of investment 
contribution that the foreign investor undertakes to make, and shall be made in full 
within a period of 90 days beginning from the day when the business license is 
1 s sued. 
In the event that a foreign investor fails to make in full the first instalment of the 
investment contribution within the time limit stipulated in the preceding paragraph. 
the certificate of approval for the establishment of the proposed foreign-capital 
enterprise shall become invalid automatically. The foreign-capital enterprise in 
question shall go through the procedure for registration cancellation with the relevant 
administrative department for industry and commerce, and hand in its business 
license for cancellatioE. In the event of the failure to go through the procedure for 
registration cancellation and to hand in the business license for cancellation, the 
administrative department for industry and commerce shall revoke the business 
license and announce the case publicly. 
Article 32 After making the first instalment of investment contribution, the foreign 
investor shall make the remaining instalments of contribution strictly as scheduled. 
In the event that a foreign investor is in arrears with the contribution for 30 days 
ufithout any justification, the case shall be handled in accordance with the provisions 
of paragraph 2 of Article 3 1 of these Rules. 
In the event that a foreign investor has proper reasons for requesting the 
postponement of investment contribution, prior consent of the examining and 
approving organ shall be obtained, and the case shall also be reported to the 
administrative department for industry and commerce for the record. 
Article 33 After the foreign investor's each instalment of investment contribution, the 
foreign-capital enterprise shall engage a Chinese registered accountant to carry out 
verification, and to prepare a report on the verification of capital, which shall be 
submitted to the examining and approving organ and the administrative department 
for industry and commerce for the record. 
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Chapter V 
Use of Site and the Site Use Fees 
Article 34 With respect to the site to be used by a foreign-capital enterprise, the local 
people's government at or above the county level in the place where the enterprise is 
to be located, shall make arrangements after examination and verification in the light 
of the local conditions. 
Article 35 A foreign-capital enterprise shall. within 30 days from the day the 
business license is issued, go through the procedure for the use of land and obtain the 
land certificate by presenting the certificate of approval and the business license to 
the land administration department under the local people's government at or above 
the county level in the place where the enterprise is to be located. 
Article 36 The land certificate shall be the legal instrument for the foreign-capital 
enterprise to use land. The foreign-capital enterprise within its term of operations, 
may not assign its land-use right without permission. 
Article 37 A foreign-capital enterprise shall, when obtaining the land certificate, pay 
its land use fee to the land administrative department in the place where the 
enterprise is located. 
Article 38 In case that a foreign-capital enterprise uses land that has already been 
developed, it shall pay :he land development fee. 
The land development fee , as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, includes the 
expense for the requisition of land, the expense for the pulling down of houses and 
the settlement allowance, and the expense for the construction of basic installations 
that match the foreign-capital enterprise. The land de1:elopment fee may be 
calculated and collected by the land development unit in a lump-sum, or by yearly 
instalments. 
Article 39 In case that a foreign-capital uses land that has not been developed, it may 
develop the land by itself, or it may entrust a department concerned in China to 
develop the land. 
The infrastructure construction shall be camed out under the unified arrangement of 
the local people's government at or above the county l e t d  in the place where the 
enterprise is to be located. 
Article 40 The standard for the calculation and collection of land use fee and land 
development fee shall be handled in accordance with pertinent provisions of China. 
Article 41 The term for the use of land by a foreign-capital enterprise shall be the 
same as the approved operation period of the said enterprise. 
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Article 42 foreign-capital enterprise, besides obtaining the land-use right in 
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, may also obtain the same right in 
accordance with the pertinent provisions of other Chinese laws and regulations. 
Chapter VI 
Purchasing and Marketing 
Article 43 A foreign-capital enterprise shall formulate and execute its production and 
operation plans on its own; the said production and operation plans shall be 
submitted to the competent department in charge of the trade, in the place where the 
said enterprise is located, for the record. 
Article 44 A foreign-capital enterprise is entitled to make decisions for itself on the 
purchase, for its own use, of machinery and equipment, raw and processed materials, 
fuels, parts and components, fittings, primary parts, means of transport, and articles 
for office use (hereinafter uniformly called "goods and materials"). 
A foreign-capital enterprise shall, when purchasing goods and materials in China 
under the same conditions, enjoy the same treatment as enjoyed by the Chinese 
enterprises. 
Article 45 In case that a foreign-capital enterprise sells its products on the Chinese 
market, it shall conduct its sales in accordance with the approved sales proportion. 
In the event that sales of products on the Chinese market by a foreign-capital 
enterprise exceed the approved sales proportion, the case shall be subjected to the 
approval by the examining and approving organ. 
Article 46 A foreign-capital enterprise is entitled to export of its own accord, goods 
produced by itself; it may also appoint a Chinese foreign trade company or a 
company outside the territory of China to sell its goods on a commission basis. 
A foreign-capital enterprise is entitled to sell, of its own accord, the products 
produced by itself on the Chinese market in accordance with the approved sales 
proportion; it may also appoint a Chinese commercial agency to sell its products on a 
commission basis. 
Article 47 Where machinery and equipment being assigned a fixed price and use by 
foreign investors as contributing investment require, according to the pertinent 
provisions of China, import licenses, the foreign investors shall, on the strength of 
the approved inventory of equipment and goods and materials of the said enterprise 
to be imported, file an application directly, or through an agency entrusted by them, 
with the license-issuing organ for obtaining due import licenses. 
Where a foreign-capital enterprise has to import, in accordance with the approved 
scope of business, goods and materials for its own use and needed by its production 
and if, according to the pertinent provisions of China, it is necessary for the said 
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enterprise to obtain import licenses, it shall work out an annual plan for importation, 
and apply, every six months, to the license-issuing organ for the licenses. 
With respect to products to be exported by a foreign-capital enterprise, if, according 
to the pertinent provisions of China, it is necessary for the said enterprise to obtain an 
export license, it shall work out an annual plan for exportation, and apply, every six 
months, to the license-issuing organ for the license. 
Article 48 The prices of the goods and materials and technological labour service 
imported by a foreign-capital enterprise shall not be higher than the normal prices of 
similar goods and materials and technological labour service on the international 
market at the time. The price of export products produced by a foreign-capital 
enterprise shall be fixed by the enterprise itself with reference to the international 
market prices at the time, but the prices must not be lower that the reasonable export 
prices. With respect to the evasion of tax by using such methods a importing at high 
prices while exporting at low prices, the tax authorities shall have the power, in 
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the tax law, to investigate the legal 
responsibilities there for. 
The pricing of products to be sold by a foreign-capital enterprise on the Chinese 
market in accordance with the approved sales proportion shall be governed by the 
pertinent provisions of China concerning the administration of prices. 
The pricing mentioncd in the preceding paragraph shall be reported to the 
administrative authorities for prices and the tax authorities for the record, and shall 
be placed under their supervision. 
Article 49 A foreign-capital enterprise shall provide statistical data and submit 
statistical statements to the departments concerned in accordance with the provisions 
in the Statistics Law of the People's Republic of China and the relevant provisions of 
China concerning the statistical system for the utilisation of foreign capital. 
Chapter VI1 
Taxation 
Article 50 A foreign-capital enterprise shall pay taxes and duties in accordance with 
the provisions of Chinese laws and regulations. 
Article 51 The workers and staff members of a foreign-capital enterprise shall pay 
individual income tax in accordance with the provisions of Chinese laws and 
regulations. 
Article 52 The following goods and materials imported by a foreign-capital 
enterprise shall be exempted from Customs duties and consolidated industrial and 
commerc i a1 tax ; 
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(1) The machinery and equipment, parts and components, building materials as well 
as other materials used as investment by the foreign investor and needed for 
construction, as well as the installation and reinforcement of machinery; 
(2) The machinery and equipment, parts and components, nieans of communications 
and transportation for use in production, and equipment for use in production and 
management. imported, for their own use, by a foreig-capital enterprise with the 
funds included in the total amount of investment; 
(3) The raw materials and processed materials, auxiliary materials, primary parts, 
parts and components, and articles and materials for packaging imported by a 
foreign-capital enterprise for the production of export products. 
In the event that the imported goods and materials, as mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph, are resold within the territory of China, or are used in the production of 
products to be sold within the territory of China, the foreign-capital enterprise 
concerned shall pay the taxes or make up the taxes in accordance with the provisions 
of the tax law of China. 
Article 53 The export commodities produced by a foreign-capital enterprise. except 
those whose exportation is restricted by China, shall be exempted form Customs 
duties and consolidated industrial and commercial tax in accordance with the tax law 
of China. 
Chapter VI11 
Control of Foreign Exchange 
Article 54 Foreign exchange affairs of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be handled in 
accordance with the pertinent laws and regulations of China concerning foreign 
exchange control. 
Article 55 A foreign-capital enterprise shall, on the strength of the business license 
issued by the administrative department for industry and commerce, open an account 
at a bank which may handle foreign exchange business within the temtory of China, 
and its receipts and payments in foreign exchange shall be subject to the supervision 
by the interested bank. 
The foreign exchange revenue of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be deposited in the 
foreign exchange account of the bank where it has opened an account: and the 
foreign exchange expenses shall be paid from the foreign exchange account. 
Article 56 A foreign-capital enterprise shall achieve by itself the balance of revenues 
and expenditures in foreign exchange. 
In the event that a foreign-capital enterprise is unable to strike by itself the balance 
between revenue and expenditure in foreign exchange, the foreign investor shall 
indicate it clearly in the application for the establishment of the enterprise, and put 
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forward a specific plan for solving the problem; the examining and approving organ 
shall give a reply after consultation with departments concerned. 
In the event that the foreign investor has indicated in the application for the 
establishment of the foreign-capital enterprise, that the balance of revenue and 
expenditure in foreign exchange would be achieved by itself no government 
department shall be responsible for the solution of the balance problem of revenue 
and expenditure in foreign exchange for the said enterprise. 
With respect to products, manufactured by a foreign-capital enterprise, urgently 
needed in China, capable of replacing similar imported goods, and permitted to be 
sold in China, the payments may be made in foreign exchange, subject to the 
approval by the Chinese administrative department for foreign exchange control. 
Article 57 In case that a foreign-capital enterprise has the necessity to open a foreign 
exchange account at a bank outside the territory of China to meet the needs of 
production and business operations, the case shall be submitted the Chinese 
administrative department for foreign exchange control for approval and, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Chinese administrative department for foreign 
exchange control, regular reports on the conditions of revenues and expenditures in 
foreign exchange and statements of account shall be submitted. 
Article 58 The wages and salaries as well as other rightful earnings in foreign 
exchange of foreign workers and staff members and of those form Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan working in a foreign-capital enterprise may be remitted freely out 
of the country after taxes have been paid in accordance with the provisicns of the 
Chinese tax law. 
Chapter IX 
Financial Affairs and Accounting 
Article 59 A foreign-capital enterprise shall, in accordance with Chinese laws, 
regulations and the provisions of financial organs, set up financial and accounting 
systems, which shall be reported, for the record, to the financial departments and the 
tax authorities at the place where the enterprise is located. 
Article 60 The fiscal year of a foreign-capital enterprise shall begin from January 1 
and end on December 3 1 of Gregorian calendar. 
Article 61 Reserve funds and bonus and welfare funds for workers and staff members 
shall be withdrawn from the profits after a foreign-capital enterprise has paid income 
tax in accordance with the provisions of the Chinese tax law. The proportion of 
reverse funds to be withdrawn shall not be lower than 10% of the total amount of 
profits after payment of tax; the withdrawal of reserve funds may be stopped when 
the total cumulative reserve has reached 50% of the registered capital. The 
proportion of bonus and welfare funds for workers and staff members to be 
withdrawn shall be determined by the foreign-capital enterprise of its own accord. 
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In the event that deficits of previous fiscal years of a foreign-capital have not been 
made up. it may not distribute the profits, while the undistributed profits of previous 
fiscal year may be distributed together with the distributable profits of the current 
fiscal year. 
Article 62 Accounting vouchers, account books and accounting statements made by a 
foreign-capital enterprise shall be written in the Chinese language; if they are written 
in a foreign language, notes in the Chinese language are required. 
Article 63 Business accounting of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be conducted 
independently. The annual accounting statements and liquidation accounting 
statements of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be prepared in accordance with the 
provisions of the Chinese competent departments for financial and tax affairs. If 
accounting statements are prepared in foreign currencies, accounting statements in 
which the foreign currencies are converted into Renminbi (RMB) shall be prepared 
at the same time. 
The annual accounting statements and liquidation accounting statements of a foreign- 
capital enterprise, as stipulated in the second and third paragraphs of this Article, 
together with the verification report prepared by a Chinese registered accountant, 
shall be submitted, within a prescribed time limit, to the China competent 
departments for financial and tax affairs and also to the examining and approving 
organ and the administrative department for industry and commerce for the record. 
Article 64 The foreign investor may engage Chinese or foreign accounting personnel 
to consult the account books of a foreign-capital enterprise, and the expenses thus 
entailed shall be borne by the foreign investor. 
Article 65 A foreign-capital enterprise shall submit its annual statement of assets and 
liabilities and annual statement of profit and loss to the competent departments for 
financial and tax affairs, and also to the examining and approving organ as well as 
the administrative department for industry and commerce for the record. 
Article 66 A foreign-capital enterprise shall set up account books at the place where 
the said enterprise is located, and shall receive supervision of the competent 
departments for financial and tax affairs. 
With respect to any foreign-capital enterprise which violates the provisions in the 
preceding paragraph, the competent departments for financial and tax affairs may 
impose a fine, and the administrative department for industry and commerce may 
order to suspend its business operations or revoke its business license. 
414 
Chapter X 
Workers and Staff Members 
Article 67 In case that a foreign-capital enterprise employs workers and staff 
members within the territory of China, both the enterprise and the workers and itaff 
members shall, in accordance with the Chinese laws and regulations, conclude and 
sign a labour contract. Matters as employment, dismissal, salaries and wages, we fare 
labour protection and, labour insurance shall be clearly stipulated in the contract. 
Foreign-capital enterprises may not hire child labourers. 
Article 68 The workers and staff members of a foreign-capital enterprise shall have 
the right to set up a grass-roots trade union organisation and carry out trade union 
activities in accordance with the provisions of the Trade Union Law of the People's 
Republic of China. 
Chapter XI 
Trade Union 
Article 69 The workers and staff members of a foreign-capital enterprise shall have 
the right to set up a grass-roots trade union organisation and carry out trade union 
activities in accordance with the provisions of the Trade Union Law of the People's 
Republic of China. 
Article 70 The trade union in a foreign-capital enterprise shall represent the interests 
of workers and staff members, and have the right to conclude labour contracts with 
the enterprise on their behalf, and to supervise the execution of the labour contracts. 
Article 71 The basic tasks of the trade union in a foreign-capital enterprise shall be as 
follows: to safeguard the lawful rights and interests of workers and staff members in 
accordance with the provisions of Chinese laws and regulations, and to assist the 
enterprise in the rational arrangements and use of welfare and bonus funds for the 
workers and staff members; to organise workers and staff members in carrying on 
political study, in learning scientific, technical and professional knowledge, in 
carrying out cultural, artistic and sports activities; to educate workers and staff 
members in complyng with labour discipline and in striying to fulfil various 
economic tasks of the enterprise. 
When a foreign-capital enterprise holds discussions on problems concerning the 
commendation and punishment of workers and staff members, the wage system, 
welfare benefits, labour protection and labour insurance, representatives of the trade 
union shall have the right to attend the discussions as nonvoting attendants. A 
foreign-capital enterprise shall listen to the opinions of the trade union, and win its 
co-operation. 
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Article 72 A foreign-capital enterprise shall give an active support to the work of the 
trade union of the enterprise, and, in accordance with the provisions of the Trade 
Union Law of the Peoples' Republic of China, provide the trade union organisation 
with the necessary houses and equipment for handling trade union work, holding 
meetings and conducting such collective undertakings as welfare benefits, and sports 
activities for workers and staff members. Every month, the enterprise shall 
appropriate a sum equal to 2% of the actual total amount of wages and salaries of 
workers and staff members to the trade union as outlay, and the trade union of the 
enterprise shall use this sum of money in accordance with the measures for the 
administration of trade union outlay, as formulated by the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions. 
Chapter XI1 
Term of Operations, Termination and Liquidation 
Article 73 The term of operations of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be proposed by 
the foreign investor in the written application for the establishment of the enterprise 
in the light of the specific conditions of different enterprises, and shall be subjected 
to the approval by the examining and approving organ. 
Article 74 The term of operations of a foreign-capital enterprise shall be calculated 
form the day when the business license is issued. 
In the event that the term of operations of a foreign-capital enterprise has to be 
extended upon its expiration, the enterprise shall, 180 days before the expiration of 
the tern1 of operations, file an application for the extension of the term of operations 
with the examining and approving organ. The examining and approving organ shall, 
within 30 days from the day of receiving the application, determine whether to 
approve or disapprove the extension. 
The foreign-capital enterprise shall, after obtaining the approval for an extension of 
its term of operations and within 30 days from the day of receiving the approval for 
the extension, go through the procedure for the change of registration with the 
administrative department for industry and commerce. 
Article 75 A foreign-capital enterprise that falls under one of the following 
circumstances shall terminate its business operations: 
(1) The term of operations expires; 
(2) The foreign investor decides to dissolve it because of poor operation and 
management resulting in serious losses; 
(3) Business cannot be carried on because of heavy losses as a result of natural 
disasters, wars or other force majeure; 
(4) Bankruptcy; 
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(5) Disbanded by law because it has violated Chinese laws and regulations or 
jeopardised social and public interests; 
(6) Other causes for dissolution, as stipulated in the enterprise's articles of 
association, have occurred. 
If a foreign-capital enterprise falls under any of the circumstances as stipulated in 
Items (2), (3) and (4) of the preceding paragraph, it shall submit, of its own accord, 
an application for the termination of business operations to the examining and 
approving organ for verification and approval. The date of approval after verification 
by the examining and approving organ shall be the date of the said enterprise's 
termination. 
Article 76 In case that a foreign-capital enterprise terminates its business operations 
in accordance with the provisions in Items (l), (2) ,  (3) and (6) of Article 75, the 
enterprise shall, make a public announcement and notify the creditors; and, it shall, 
within 15  days from the day of the public termination announcement for liquidation, 
the principles of liquidation, and the candidates for the liquidation committee to the 
examining and approving organ for verification and approval before liquidation is 
carried out. 
Article 77 The liquidation committee shall be composed of the legal representatives 
of the foreign-capital enterprise, the representatives of the creditors, the 
representatives from the competent authorities concerned; Chinese registered 
accountants and lawyers shall be engaged in the liquidation. 
Priority shall be given to the payment of expenses for liquidation made from the 
existing property of the foreign-capital enterprise. 
Article 78 The liquidation committee shall execute the following functions and 
powers: 
(1) To convene a meeting of creditors; 
(2) To take over and liquidate the property of the enterprise in question, and to 
prepare the statement of assets and liabilities and the inventory of property; 
(3) To propose a basis for the valuation and computation of the property of the 
enterprise in question; 
(4) To work out a liquidation plan; 
(5) To recover creditor's rights and to pay the debts; 
(6) To receive the payments from shareholders which have not yet been made; 
(7) To distribute the remaining property; 
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(8) To represent the foreign-capital enterprise in bringing a suit or responding to a 
suit. 
Article 79 Prior to the conclusion of the liquidation of foreign-capital enterprise, the 
foreign investor shall not remit or carry the said enterprise's funds out of the temtory 
of China, nor dispose of the enterprise's property privately. 
I f ,  upon the conclusion of the liquidation of a foreign-capital enterprise, its net assets 
and remaining property exceed its registered capital, the excess portion shall be 
regarded as profit on which income tax shall be imposed in accordance with the 
Chinese tax law. 
Article 80 Upon the conclusion of the liquidation of a foreign-capital enterprise, i t  
shall go through the procedures for the cancellation of registration with the 
administrative department for industry and commerce, and to hand in the business 
license for cancellation. 
Article 8 1 While disposing of the assets and properties of a foreign-capital enterprise, 
Chinese enterprises or other economic organisations shall, under equal conditions, 
have the priority in purchasing the aforesaid assets and properties. 
Article 82 In case that a foreign-capital enterprise terminates its business operations 
in accordance with the provisions in Item (4) of Article 75, its liquidation shall be 
carried out with referenze to the pertinent laws and regulations of China. 
Chapter XI11 
Supplementary Provisions 
Article 83 With respect to the various categories of insurance for a foreign-capital 
enterprise, it shall take out insurance from insurance companies within the territory 
of China. 
Article 84 If a foreign-capital enterprise concludes economic contracts with any other 
Chinese enterprise or economic organisation, the Economic Contract Law of the 
People's Republic of China shall be applied. 
If a foreign-capital enterprise concludes economic contracts with any foreign 
company, enterprise or individual, the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interests shall be applied. 
Article 85 Cases concerning the establishment, in China's mainland, of enterprises, 
the capital of which is owned solely by the companies, enterprises, and other 
economic organisations or individuals in the regions of Hong Kong. Macao or 
Taiwan, or by Chinese citizens residing in foreign countries, shall be handled with 
reference to these Rules. 
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Article 86 Foreign workers and staff members, and workers and staff members from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, who are working in a foreign-capital enterprise. 
may carry into the country means of transport and articles for daily use that are 
within reasonable quantities and for their own use, and they shall go through the 
import procedures in accordance with pertinent provisions of China. 
Article 87 The right to interpret these Rules shall reside in the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade. 
Article 88 These Rules shall go into effect as of the date of promulgation. 
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Appendix 6.3 
Interim Provisions on Guidance for Foreign Investment 
(Jointly promulgated by Decree No.5 of the State Planning Commission, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation on June 20, 1995) 
Article 1 The following provisions are formulated in accordance with the stipulations 
of state laws related to foreign investment and the requirements of relevant industrial 
policies in order to guide foreign investment, adapt foreign investment to China’s 
national economic and social development programs, and adequately protect the 
legal rights and interests of investors. 
Article 2 The provisions are applicable to projects involving Sino-foreign joint 
ventures, cooperative ventures and solely foreign-funded enterprises, as well as other 
forms of projects involving foreign funding (hereinafter referred to as foreign-funded 
projects). 
Article 3 The State Planning Commission, acting in concert with relevant State 
Council departments, will regularly compile and intermittently amend the Industrial 
Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment (hereinafter referred to as the Catalogue) in 
accordance with the provisions and national economic and technological 
development. The Catalogue will be released with the approval of the State Council. 
The Catalogue shall scrve as the basis for guiding the examination and approval of 
foreign-funded projects. 
Article 4 Projects involving foreign investment shall be divided into four categories: 
Projects in which foreign investment shall be encouraged, permitted, restricted or 
prohibited (hereinafter referred to as Group I, Group 11, Group 111, and Group IV). 
Projects in which foreign investment shall be encouraged, restricted or prohibited are 
listed in the Catalogue. Remaining projects in which foreign investment shall be 
permitted are not listed in the Catalogue. 
The Catalogue may explicitly list projects in which exclusive foreign investment 
shall not be allowed and projects in which state-owned assets shall take a controlling 
or dominant position. 
Article 5 Projects in which foreign investment shall be encouraged are as follows: 
(1) Projects involving new agricultural technology, comprehensive agncultural 
development and the development of energy, communications and essential raw 
materials; 
(2) Projects involving new, high and advanced technology, improved products, 
energy and raw materials conservation, enhanced technological and economic returns 
of enterprises, or the production of new equipment and materials with high market 
demand which remains unfulfilled due to inadequate domestic production capacity: 
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(3) Projects which meet the demand of international market, and help raise the grade 
of products, open new markets, expand overseas marketing of products and increase 
the export volume; 
(4) Projects involving new technologies and new equipment for the comprehensive 
use of resources and renewable resources, and the prevention and control of 
environmental pollution; 
(5) Projects which tap the advantages of human and natural resources in China's 
central and western regions, and which fulfil the requirements of State industrial 
policies; 
(6) Other projects encouraged by stipulations of State laws and administrative rules 
and regulations. 
Article 6 Projects in which foreign investment shall be restricted are as follows: 
(1) Projects already developed nationally or those which have absorbed technology 
and developed a production capacity capable of fulfilling demand on the domestic 
market; 
(2) Sectors in which foreign investment is absorbed by the state on a trial basis or 
monopolistic industries; 
(3) Exploration and exploitation of rare and valuable mineral resources; 
(4) Industries subject to overall State planning; 
(5) Other projects restricted by stipulations of State laws and administrative rules and 
regulations. 
Projects in which foreign investment shall be restricted are classified as Category A 
or Category B in accordance with State industrial policies and the requirements of 
macro-economic control. 
Article 7 Projects in which foreign investment shall be prohibited are as follows: 
(1) Projects which jeopardise state security or ham1 public interest; 
(2) Projects which create environmental pollution, damage natural resources or 
threaten the health of the people; 
(3) Those which occupy large tracts of arable land or are otherwise unfavourable to 
the protection and development of land resources, as well as those which are 
detrimental to the safety and the efficiency of the use of military installations; 
(4) Projects involving products made with the country's specific technical processes 
or technology; 
(5) Other projects prohibited by stipulations of State laws and administrative rules 
and regulations. 
42 1 
Companies, enterprises, other economic entities and individuals are prohibited from 
setting up projects listed in the preceding article. 
Article 8 Apart from enjoyng preferential treatment in accordance with relevant 
State laws and administrative rules and regulations, when approved, projects in 
which foreign investment is encouraged shall be permitted to expand their pertinent 
business scope if they involve the construction and management of energy and 
communications facilities (coal mining, power generation, regional railway, highway 
and port facilities) which require large investments and long-term recovery of 
investment. 
Article 9 Projects in which foreign investment is restricted shall observe relevant 
State laws and administrative rules and regulations, and shall be subject to the 
fo 11 owing provi si ons : 
(1) In cases involving Sino-foreign joint ventures, time limits for operations shall be 
agreed upon between pertinent parties; 
(2) In cases involving foreign-funded projects listed in Category A, the fixed assets 
invested by the Chinese party shall be funds or assets owned by the Chinese investor. 
Article 10 Projects in which foreign investment is encouraged or permitted shall be 
examined, approved and put on file according to procedures stipulated in working 
re gul at i ons . 
Foreign-funded projects listed in Category A shall be examined, approved and put on 
file in accordance with procedures stipulated in working regulations. In cases when 
investment projects in Category A are below the examination and approval level 
determined by the State Council, such projects shall, in accordance with their 
construction characteristics, be examined and approved by the planning department 
or department in charge of the technical renovation of enterprises in related 
provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central 
Government or cities listed separately in state budget. The examination and approval 
of such projects shall not be granted to departments at lower levels. 
Should the level of investments of projects in Category B be below the examination 
and approval level determined by the State Council, the letter of proposal for such 
projects shall be examined and approved by the department assigned by the State 
Council to take charge of the specific trade sector, while the feasibility study report 
shall, in accordance with their characteristics of construction, be examined and 
approved by the planning department or the department in charge of the technical 
renovation or enterprises in related provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities 
directly under the Central Government or cities listed separately on State plans. A 
report shall be submitted to the State Planning Commission or the State Economic 
and Trade Commission for record. The responsibility for examining and approving 
such projects shall not be transferred to any department at a lower level. However, in 
cases when investments in projects surpass the examination and approval level 
determined by the State Council, examination and approval shall be carried out in 
accordance with the procedures and methods in force. 
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Projects involving quotas or licenses shall apply for the quotas or licenses required 
from departments in change of foreign trade and economic cooperation. 
Additional stipulations on the procedures and methods for project examination and 
approval provided in relevant laws or administrative decrees or regulations shall be 
observed. 
Article 11  In cases when foreign-funded projects in the category described in Article 
6, Clause 1, export more than 70 percent of their products, when approved, such 
projects shall be treated as those in which foreign investment is permitted and shall 
not be subject to restrictions outlined in Article 9. Controls may be appropriately 
lifted on projects which take full advantage of the superior resources in China's 
central and western regions and which at the same time operate in accordance with 
state industrial policies. 
Article 12 With regard to foreign-funded projects in violation of these provisions, 
departments examining and approving such projects shall cancel their approvals 
within 30 days after receiving documents of record concerning projects concerned. 
The articles of association and contract of such projects shall be invalidated, 
enterprise registration departments shall refuse or cancel registration, and custom 
houses shall reject import or export procedures. 
Article 13 Any party which uses deceit or other illegal means to win approval of 
foreign-funded project shall bear legal responsibility in accordance with law and in 
line with the seriousness of the case. At the same time, the examination and approval 
organ shall revoke the approval. The case shall be adjudicated by the responsible 
department in accordance with law. 
Article 14 Members of the staff of a department responsible for examination and 
approval found to have abused their power and position, resorted to fraud for 
personal gain, neglected their prescribed duties, or otherwise overstepped their 
authority shall be subject to administrative discipline or shall be held criminally 
responsibility in accordance with the law if the case is extremely serious and falls 
into requisites to constitute a crime. 
Article 15 Projects funded by overseas Chinese, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 
investors shall be treated in accordance with the aforementioned provisions. 
Article 16 The State Planning Commission, the State Economic and Trade 
Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation shall be 
responsible for organising implementation of these provisions. 
Article 17 These Provisions shall go into effect on the date of promulgation. 
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Appendix 6.4 
State Council, Foreign Investment in Retailing Provisions 
(Announced on 23 November 1992) 
The State Council formulated the following Provisions permitting Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Guangzhou, Dalian and Qingdao municipalities and the five Special Economic 
Zones to allow foreign investment in retailing on a trial basis. 
1. Enterprises shall take the form of co-operative or equity joint ventures. For the 
time being, the form of wholly owned enterprise may not be adopted. 
2. Projects shall be submitted for examination and approval to the State Council by 
local governments. The qualifications of the Chinese and foreign parties to the 
joint ventures shall be examined by the Ministry of Commerce. 
3. The scope of business shall be restricted to the commercial business of retailing 
general merchandise and import and export. Enterprises may not engage in 
commercial wholesaling or import and export agency. 
4. Imports shall be restricted to general merchandise of the enterprises. Their 
import volume in any given year may not exceed 30% of their total retail sales 
for that year. The import of household electrical appliances, cosmetics, cigarettes 
and alcoholic and other beverages shall be subject to examination and approval 
in accordance with the relevant regulations of the State. Category 1 merchandise 
may not be exported. With respect to dealings in merchandise of Categories 2 
and 3, merchandise which is listed in plans or require quota permits shall be 
reported for examination and approkral to the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade on an annual basis. 
5. Taxation shall be handled in accordance with the State's taxation policy for 
foreign investment enterprises in the place where the enterprises are located. 
6. Purchase and sales prices of merchandise may be fixed autonomously, except if 
the national or local commodity price authorities provide otherwise. Subject to 
the approval of the foreign exchange authorities of the State, prices for imported 
merchandise may be charged in Foreign Exchange Certificates. 
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Appendix 6.5 
Regulations of the State Council for Encouraging Investment 
from Overseas Chinese and Compatriots from Hong Kong 
and Macao 
(Promulgated on August 19,1990) 
Article 1 The present Regulations are enacted to stimulate China's economic 
development and encourage investment within the territory of mainland from 
overseas Chinese and compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao (hereinafter referred 
to as overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors). 
Article 2 Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors may invest in any 
province, autonomous region, municipality and Special Economic Zones in the 
main1 and. 
Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors are encouraged to undertake 
land development and management in accordance with relevant State regulations. 
Article 3 Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors may invest in the 
mainland in any of the following ways: 
( 1 ) To establish wholly-owned enterprises; 
(2) To establish equity or contractual joint ventures; 
(3) Undertaking compensation trade, processing or assembling with supplied 
materials, co-production; 
(4) Purchasing enterprise shares and bonds; 
(5) Buying real estates; 
(6) Obtaining the rights of land use according to law and undertaking land 
development and management; 
(7) Any other form permitted by laws and regulations. 
Article 4 Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors may invest in industry. 
agriculture, service trades and other industnes that conform to the direction of social 
and economic development. They may choose the investment projects promulgated 
by the relevant departments of local people's government, or may put forward their 
own investment plans and apply to the departments of foreign economic relations 
and trade or examination and approval authorities under the people's government of 
the localities where they intend to invest. 
The State encourages overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors to establish 
export enterprises and technologically-advanced enterprises and grants them 
corresponding preferenti a1 treatment. 
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Article 5 In addition to treatment laid down in these Regulations, wholly-owned 
enterprises, equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures which are established 
by overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors, may enjoy the corresponding 
preferential treatment given to enterprises with foreign investment in accordance 
with the state laws and regulations. 
Except these Regulations, the State laws and rules concerning foreign economic 
affairs are applicable to overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors investing 
in other forms and having no business offices in the mainland but receiving 
dividends, interests, rentals, royalties and other incomes from the mainland. 
Article 6 Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors may contribute 
convertible currencies, machinery and equipment of in kind, industrial property 
rights or know-how, etc. as their investment. 
Article 7 The investment by overseas Chinese Hong Kong and Macao investors, 
assets bought by them, industrial property rights, profits from their investment and 
their other lawful rights and interests in the mainland are protected by the state law 
and may be transferred and inherited according to law. 
All the activities in the mainland of overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao 
investors shall be governed by the state laws and regulations. 
Article 8 The state shall not nationalize any investment made by overseas Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Macao investors or other assets bought by them. 
Article 9 In case the state expropriates entevrises with overseas Chinese, Hong 
Kong and Macao investment, based on the social need of public interest, this shall be 
done according to legal procedures and appropriate compensation shall be paid. 
Article 10 The legitimate profits from overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao 
investors' investment, their other lawful incomes and funds after liquidation may be 
remitted from the mainland pursuant to the law. 
Article 11 Machines and equipment, vehicles used in production and office 
equipment that the enterprises with oyerseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao 
investment need to import and within the total investment, and appropriate volumes 
of daily necessities and vehicles of overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao 
compatriots for private use while working in the enterprises shall be exempted from 
import duty and the consolidated industrial and commercial tax, and from the 
requirement for import licences. 
Raw materials, fuel, bulk parts, spare parts, machine component parts and fittings 
that enterprises with overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investment need to 
import for export-oriented production shall be exempt from import duty and the 
consolidated industrial and commercial tax, and from the requirement for import 
licences. The Customs departments shall exercise the supervision and control. If the 
imported materials and items mentioned above are used in products to be sold in the 
mainland, import formalities shall be handled according to the relevant regulations, 
and taxes shall be paid according to the governing sections of laws and regulations. 
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Products manufactured to be exported by the enterprises with overseas Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Macao investment, except those restricted by the state, shall be 
exempt from export duty and the consolidated industrial and commercial tax. 
Article 12 Enterprises with overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investment 
may acquire loans from financial institutions in or outside the mainland. The loans 
may be mortgaged and guaranteed with the enterprise assets, rights and interests. 
Article 13 The term of operation of enterprises wholly-owned by overseas Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Macao investors shall be decided by the investors; the term of 
operation of equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures shall be determined 
through consultation by the parties to joint ventures or may not be determined. 
Article 14 The composition of the board of directors of an equity joint venture and 
the appointment of its chairman, and the composition of the board of directors or the 
joint managerial institution of a contractual joint venture and the appointment of its 
chairman or director shall be determined through consultation by the partners 
according to the proportion of investment or conditions for cooperation. 
Article 15 Enterprises with overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investment 
shall conduct operational and managerial activities in accordance with its contract, 
articles of association approved. Its rights of autonomous management shall not be 
interfered with. 
Article 16 Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investors and technical and 
managerial staff employed outside the mainland by enterprises with overseas 
Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investment any apply for multiple entrance visas. 
Article 17 In investing in the mainland, overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao 
investors may entrust their relatives or friends in the mainland as their agents. Such 
agents shall hold letters of entrustment with legal force. 
Article 18 In the areas where enterprises with overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and 
Macao investment are concentrated, the investors may apply to the local people's 
government for the founding of businessmen association of overseas Chinese, Hong 
Kong and Macao. 
Article 19 The application of the establishment of an equity joint venture or a 
contractual joint venture with overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao investment 
in the mainland shall be handled by the participant in the mainland, the application 
for the establishment of an enterprise wholly owned by a overseas Chinese, Hong 
Kong and Macao investor may be handled by the investor directly or by the 
investor's relatives and h e n d s  or consultant service agencies in the mainland 
entrusted by the investor. All the application above mentioned shall be submitted to 
the local department of foreign economic relations and trade or the examination and 
approval authority under the local people's government. 
The examination and approval of an enterprise with overseas Chinese. Hong Kong 
and Macao investment is subject to the authority limited by the State Council. The 
departments of foreign economic relations and trade at all levels or the examination 
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and approval authorities under the local people's government shall, within 45 days 
after receiving all application documents, make a decision of approval or not. 
The applicants shall, within 30 days after the receipt of the certificate of approval, 
apply to the administrations for industry and commerce for registration and obtain a 
business license in light of relevant procedures for registration and administration. 
Article 20 Disputes between the parties arising over the execution of the contract or 
concerning the contract shall be settled through possible friendly consultation or 
mediation. 
In the event that the parties are unwilling to settle their dispute through consultation 
or mediation, or bring about no results after consultation or mediation, any party to 
the dispute may submit it for arbitration to the Chinese or other arbitration agencies 
in accordance with the arbitration clause in the contract or a written arbitration 
agreement concluded after the dispute. 
Any party may bring their case to a Chinese court, if no arbitration clause is laid 
down in the contract and if no written arbitration agreement is concluded after the 
dispute. 
Article 21 The right of the interpretation of these Regulations resides in the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. 
Article 22 These Regulations shall enter into force on the date of promulgation. 
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Appendix 6.6 
Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of 
Investment of Taiwan Compatriots 
(Adopted at the Sixth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People's Congress on March 5, 1994, promulgated by Order No.20 of the President 
of the People's Republic of China on March 5, 1994 and effective as of the date of 
promulgation) 
Article 1 This Law is formulated for the purpose of protecting and encouraging 
investment of Taiwan Compatriots, and promoting the economic development on 
both sides of the Straits. 
Article 2 Investment of Taiwan compatriots shall be governed by this Law. In respect 
of matters concerning investment of Taiwan compatriots not covered by this Law, 
where there are provisions thereon in other relevant laws and administrative rules 
and regulations of the State, such provisions shall apply. 
''Investment of Taiwan compatriots" as used in this Lam7 means investment made in 
other provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central 
Government by the companies, enterprises, other economic organisations or 
individuals from the region of Taiwan as investors. 
Article 3 The State shall, according to law, protect the investments. investment 
returns and other lawful rights and interests of investors who are Taiwan compatriots. 
Taiwan compatriots in making investment must abide by laws and administrative 
rules and regulations of the State. 
Article 4 The State shall not nationalise or requisition the investment made by 
investors who are Taiwan compatriots; under special circumstances and on the basis 
of the need of public interests, the State may in accordance with legal procedures 
requisition the investments made by investors who are Taiwan compatriots and make 
appropriate compensations theret 0. 
Article 5 The invested properties, industrial property rights, investment returns and 
other lawful rights and interests of investors who are Taiwan compatriots may be 
transferred and inherited according to law. 
Article 6 Investors who are Taiwan compatriots may make investment Qith 
convertible currency, machinery equipment or other physical assets, industrial 
property rights or non-patented technologies, etc. 
Investors who are Taiwan compatriots may make reinvestment with the returns 
derived from their investment. 
Article 7 Taiwan compatriots may make investment by establishing equity joint 
ventures, contractual joint ventures or enterprises with all capital invested by Taiwan 
compatriots (hereinafter generalised as enterprises with investment of Taiwan 
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compatriots) or may also invest in other forms as provided by laws or administrative 
rules and regulations. 
The establishment of enterprises with investment of Taiwan compatriots shall be in 
conformity with the industrial policy of the State and conducive to the development 
of the national economy. 
Article 8 To establish an enterprise with investment of Taiwan compatriots, an 
application shall be made to the department prescribed by the State Council or to the 
local people's government prescribed by the State Council. The examining and 
approving authorities that have received the application shall, within 45 days from 
the date of receiving all the documents for the application, decide whether or not to 
grant approval. 
After an application for the establishment of an enterprise with investment of Taiwan 
Compatriots has been approved, the applicant shall, within 30 days from the date of 
receiving the certificate of approval, register its establishment with the enterprise 
registration authorities and obtain a business licence according to law. 
Article 9 Enterprises with investment of Taiwan compatriots shall cany out their 
activities of operation and management in accordance with the law, administrative 
rules and regulations as well as the contract and articles of association approved by 
the examining and approving authorities, and their decision-making power in 
operation and management shall be free from interference. 
Article 10 In areas where enterprises with investment of Taiwan compatriots are 
located in compact forms, an association of enterprises with investment of Taiwan 
cornpatriots may be established according to law and its lawful rights and interests 
shall be protected by law. 
Article 11 Investors who are Taiwan compatriots may remit in accordance with law 
their legal returns from investment, other lawful earnings and funds after settlement 
of accounts back to Taiwan or outside of the territory of the People's Republic of 
China. 
Article 12 Investors who are Taiwan compatriots may entrust their relatives or 
friends to act as agents to act as agents for their investment. 
Article 13 Enterprises with investment of Taiwan compatriots shall enjoy preferential 
treatment in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State Council on 
encouraging investment of Taiwan compatriots. 
Article 14 With respect to disputes over investment arising between ini-estors who 
are Taiwan compatriots and companies, enterprises, other economic organisations or 
individuals in other provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under 
the Central Government, the parties concerned may settle them through consultation 
or mediation. 
Where the parties concerned are not willing to resort to consultation or mediation, or 
where consultation or mediation proves unsuccessful, they may, in accordance with 
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the arbitration clause in the contract or the written arbitration agreement reached 
subsequently, submit the matter to an arbitration organ for arbitration. 
Where there is no arbitration clause in the contract, and no written arbitration 
agreement reached subsequently, the parties concerned may bring a suit to the 
people's court. 
Article 15 This Law shall go into effect on the date of promulgation. 
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Appendix 6.7 
Experimental Measures on Commercial Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises 
Issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission and the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade And Economic Cooperation 
These Measures, promulgated on June 25, 1999, were formulated in accordance with 
the PRC Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, the PRC Sino-Foreign Cooperative 
Joint Venture Law, and other relevant laws and regulations to promote reform and 
development of commercial enterprises and the domestic consumer market, and to 
facilitate experimentation with the use of foreign investment in the commercial 
sector. 
The Measures sanction the creation of Sino -foreign equity or cooperative joint 
ventures, but not wholly foreign-owned investments, in the PRC's retail and 
wholesale markets. They permit the establishment of joint venture commercial 
outlets in provincial capitals, the capitals of autonomous regions, and special 
economic zones, as well as in Beijing. Tianjin. Shanghai, Chongqing and 
municipalities granted provincial status by the State. In addition to retail business, 
wholesale activities may be conducted by approved joint venture commercial 
enterprises in any of these geographical areas. 
A foreign party to a joint venture commercial enterprise must demonstrate that it 
possesses financial strmgth, advanced commercial operations, management 
expertise, an extensive international sales network, a sound reputation and the ability 
to promote the export of Chinese products through the joint venture. 
In order to apply for the establishment of a retailing joint venture. the foreign party 
must have: 
(i) average yearly sales turnover of at least US52 billion during the three years prior 
to the date of application, and 
(ii) assets of more than U S 2 0 0  million during the year prior to the date of 
application. 
For a wholesaling joint venture, the foreign party must have: 
(i) average yearly sales turnover of at least US$2.5 billion during the three years 
prior to the date of application, and 
(ii) assets of more than US$300 million during the year prior to the date of 
application. The Chinese party to a joint venture commercial enterprise must be a 
qualified distributor demonstrating financial strength and solid operating capacity. In 
addition, it must satisfy certain conditions as follows: 
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It must have assets for the year preceding the date of application of not less than 
50 million yuan (30 million yuan if in central or western China). 
If the Chinese party is a commercial enterprise, it must have an average yearly 
sales turnover of at least 300 million yuan during the three years prior to the date 
of application (200 million yuan if in central or western China). 
If the Chinese party is a corporation with foreign trade privileges, its average 
yearly import and export turnover (on its own account) for the three years 
immediately prior to the date of application must be more than U S 5 0  million. 
Of this, the export volume must be at least USS30 million. 
A joint venture commercial enterprise must observe the following conditions and 
requirements: 
For retail joint ventures, registered capital must be at least 50 million yuan (30 
million yuan in central and Western China). 
For wholesale joint ventures, registered capital must be at least 80 million yuan 
(60 million yuan in central and Western China). 
For wholesale joint ventures, the Chinese party's investment stake must be at 
least 51 percent. 
For joint ventures with three or fewer chain stores, including convenience stores. 
specialty stores, and franchise stores that operate as chain stores, the Chinese 
party's investment stake must be at least 35 percent. 
In joint ventures with three or more chain stores, the Chinese party's investment 
stake must be at least 51 percent. However, for joint ventures where the foreign 
party has procured large quantities of domestic products and is able to expand 
domestic exports via its international marketing network, the foreign party may 
be permitted to be the controlling shareholder, subject to State Council approval. 
The joint venture may establish branch stores only in the form of direct chain 
stores which are directly invested in and operated by the joint venture. 
The operating term shall not be more than 30 years (40 years for those in central 
or Western China). 
In the case of a trademark, trade name, or technology transfer contract, the fees 
paid to the foreign party shall not exceed 0.3 percent of the joint venture's annual 
sales turnover (excluding Value-added Tax). 
A joint venture commercial enterprise may not engage in commodity importing 
or act as an export agent. 
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The total annual amount of imports of a joint venture shall not exceed 30 percent 
of its commodity sales volume for the same year. 
For retail joint ventures, the permitted business scope includes: 
(1) commercial retailing, 
(ii) organising the export of domestically produced products 
(iii) import and export of commodities on its own account, and 
(iv) relevant ancillary services. 
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its secondary business. For wholesale joint ventures, the permitted business scope 
includes : 
(i)  wholesaling of domestically produced and imported commodities on its own 
account. and 
(ii) organising the export of domestically produced products. 
In order to obtain approval for the establishment of a joint venture commercial 
enterprise, the Chinese party must first submit a feasibility study report to the local 
Economic and Trade Commission which, together with the local bureau of' jriternal 
trade, submits the report to the central-level State Economic and Trade Commission 
("SETC"). SETC may approve the feasibility study report after consulting the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC"). Once [he 
feasibility study report is approved, the local foreign economic and trhde department 
submits the joint \venture contract and articles of association, together with other 
required documents, to MOFTEC for approval. Within one month of MOFTEC 
approval, the joint venture must register with the local administration of industry and 
commerce on the basis of its MOFTEC approval certificate. 
If an established joint venture commercial enterprise wishes to engage in wholesaling 
as its secondary business, open branch offices, or transfer an interest in the joint 
venture, it must apply to MOFTEC, which will make its determination in 
consultation with SETC. MOFTEC and SETC or their authorised institutions shall 
supervise and administer regulation of foreign-invested commercial enterprises in 
accordance with PRC laws and regulations. 
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Appendix 6.8 
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese- 
Foreign Joint Ventures 
(Adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 
1979 and Promulgated on and Effective as of July 8, 1979) 
Article 1. 
With a view to expanding international economic co-operation and technical 
exchange, the People's Republic of China permits foreign companies, enterprises, 
other economic organisations or individuals (hereafter referred to as "foreign joint 
venturers") to join with Chinese companies, enterprises or other economic 
organisations (hereafter referred to as "Chinese joint venturers") in establishing joint 
ventures in the People's Republic of China in accordance with the principle of 
equality and mutual benefit and subject to approval by the Chinese Government. 
Article 2. 
The Chinese Government protects, in accordance with the law, the investment of 
foreign joint venturers, the profits due them and their other lawful rights and interests 
in a joint venture, pursuant to the agreement, contract and articles of association 
approved by the Chinese Government. 
All the activities of a joint venture shall comply with the provisions of the laws, 
decrees and pertinent regulations of the People's Republic of China. 
Article 3. 
The joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association signed by the parties 
to the venture shall be submitted to the Fore& InLTestment Commission of the 
People's Republic of China, and the Commission shall, within three months, decide 
whether to approve or disapprove them. After approval, the joint lyenture shall 
register with the General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China, obtain a license to do business and start operations. 
Article 4. 
A joint venture shall take the form of a limited liability company 
The proportion of the investment contributed by the foreign joint venturer(s) shall 
generally not be less than 25 per cent of the registered capital of a joint venture. 
The parties to the venture shall share the profits, risks and losses in proportion to 
their respective contributions to the registered capital. 
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No assignment of the registered capital of a joint venturer shall be made without the 
consent of the other parties to the venture. 
Article 5. 
Each party to a joint venture may make its investment in cash, in kind or in industrial 
property rights, etc. 
The technology and the equipment that serve as a foreign joint venturer's investment 
must be advanced technology and equipment that actually suit our country's needs. If 
the foreign joint venturer causes losses by deception through the intentional use of 
backward technology and equipment, it shall pay compensation for the losses. 
The investment of a Chinese joint venture may include the right to the use of a site 
provided for the joint venture during the period of its operation. If the right to the use 
of the site does not constitute a part of a Chinese joint venturer's investment, the joint 
venture shall pay the Chinese Government a fee for its use. 
The various investments referred to above shall be specified in the joint venture 
contract and articles of association, and the value of each (excluding that of the site) 
shall be jointly assessed by the parties to the venture. 
Article 6. 
A joint venture shall have a board of directors, which shall have its size and 
composition stipulared in the contract and the articles of association after 
consultation between the parties to the venture, and the directors shall be appointed 
and replaced by the parties to the venture. The board of directors shall have a 
chairman, whose office shall be assumed by the Chinese joint venture(s), and one or 
two vice-chairmen, whose office(s) shall be assumed by the foreign joint venture(s). 
In handing major problems, the board of directors shall reach a decision through 
consultation by the parties to the venture, in accordance with the principle of equality 
and mutual benefit. 
The board of directors is empowered, pursuant to the provisions of the articles of 
association of the joint venture, to discuss and decide all major problems of the 
venture: expansion programs, proposals for production and operating activities, the 
budget for revenues and expenditures, distribution of profits, plans concerning 
manpower and pay scales, the termination of business and the appointment or 
employment of the president, the vice-president( s), the chief engineer. the treasurer 
and the auditors, as well as their powers and terms of employment, etc. 
The offices of president and vice-president(s) (or factory manager and deputy 
manager(s)) shall be assumed by the respective parties to the venture. 
The employment and dismissal of the staff and workers of a joint venture shall be 
provided for in accordance with the law in the agreement and contract of the parties 
to the venture. 
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Article 7. 
After payment out of the gross profit earned by the joint venture of the joint venture 
income tax, pursuant to the provisions of the tax laws of the People's Republic of 
China, and after deduction from the gross profit of a reserve fund, a bonus and 
welfare fund for staff and workers, and a venture expansion fund, as provided in the 
articles of association of the joint venture, the net profit shall be distributed to the 
parties to the joint venture in proportion to their respective contributions to the 
registered capital. 
A joint venture that possesses advanced technology by world standards may apply 
for a reduction of or exemption from income tax for the first two to three profit- 
making years. 
A foreign joint venturer that reinvests in China its share of the net profit may apply 
for refund of a part of the income taxes already paid. 
Article 8. 
A joint venture shall open an account with the Bank of China or a bank approved by 
the Bank of China. 
The pertinent foreign exchange transactions of a joint venture shall be conducted in 
accordance with the regulations on foreign exchange control of the People's Republic 
of China. 
In its operating activities a joint venture may directly raise funds from foreign banks. 
The various kinds of a insurance coverage of joint venture shall be furnished by 
Chinese insurance companies. 
Article 9. 
The production and operating plans of a joint venture shall be filed with the 
departments in charge and shall be implemented through economic contracts. 
In its purchase of required raw and processed materials. fuels. parts and auxiliary 
equipment, etc., a joint venture should give first priority to purchases in China. It 
may also purchase them directly from the international market with foreign exchange c 
raised by itself. 
A joint venture is encouraged to market its products outside China. Export products 
may be distributed to foreign markets through the joint venture directly or through 
associated agencies, and they may also be distributed through China's foreign c trade 
agencies. Products of the joint yenture may also be distributed in the Chinese market. 
Whenever necessary, a joint venture may establish branches outside China. 
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Article 10. 
The net profit that a foreign joint venturer receives after fulfilling its obligations 
under the laws and the agreement and the contract, the funds it receives at the time of 
the joint venture's scheduled expiration or early termination, and its other funds may 
be remitted abroad through the Bank of China in accordance with the foreign 
exchange regulations and in the currency specified in the joint venture contract. 
A foreign joint venturer shall be encouraged to deposit in the Bank of China foreign 
exchange that it is entitled to remit abroad. 
Article 11. 
The wages, salaries and other legitimate income earned by the foreign staff and 
workers of a joint venture, after payment of the individual income tax under the tax 
laws of the People's Republic of China, may be remitted abroad through the Bank of 
China in accordance with the foreign exchange regulations. 
Article 12. 
The contract period of a joint venture may be decided through consultation by the 
parties to the venture according to its particular line of business and circumstances. 
Upon the expiration of the joint venture contract period, if the parties have agreed, 
the period may be extended, subject to approval by the Foreign Investment 
Commission of the People's Republic of China. An application for extension of the 
contract shall be made six months before expiration of the contract. 
Article 13. 
Before the expiration of the joint venture contract period, in case of heavy losses, 
failure of a party to fulfil1 the obligations prescribed by the contract and the articles 
of association, force majeure, etc., the contract may be terminated before the date of 
expiration through consultation and agreement by the parties to the venture, subject 
to approval by the Foreign Investment Commission of the People's Republic of 
China and to registration with the General Administration for Industry and 
Commerce. In cases of losses caused by a breach of contract, the financial 
responsibility shall be borne by the party that has violated the contract. 
Article 14. 
Disputes arising between the parties to a joint venture that the board of directors 
cannot settle through consultation may be settled through mediation or arbitration by 
a Chinese arbitration agency or through arbitration by another arbitration agency 
agreed upon by the parties to the venture. 
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Article 15. 
This Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation. The power to amend 
this Law is vested in the National People's Congress. 
(The English translations are for reference only) 
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Appendix 6.9 
Procedures of the People's Republic of China for the 
Registration and Administration of Chinese-Foreign Joint 
Ventures 
(Promulgated by the State Council on and Effective as of July 26, 1980) 
Article 1.  
In accordance with the provisions of the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, these Procedures are formulated in order to carry 
out the registration and administration of Chinese-foreign joint ventures and to 
safeguard their lawful operations. 
Article 2. 
A Chinese-foreign joint venture that has been approved by the Foreign Investment 
Commission of the People's Republic of China shall, within one month after 
approval, register with the General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China. 
The General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of 
China shall authorise the administrative bureau for industry and commerce of the 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central authority 
to handle registration procedures for Chinese-foreign joint ventures within the areas 
under their jurisdiction, and business license shall be issued after examination and 
approval by the General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China. 
Article 3. 
A Chinese-foreign joint venture that applies for registration shall present the 
fo 1 1 owing do c um en t s : 
(1) The document of approval issued by the Foreign Investment Commission of the 
People's Republic of China; 
(2) Three copies each of the Chinese and foreign language texts of the joint venture 
agreement and contract signed by the parties to the joint venture and its articles of 
association; and 
(3) A copy of the business license or other documents issued by the competent 
department of the government of the country (or region) from which the foreign joint 
venturer( s )  come. 
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Article 4. 
When a Chinese-foreign joint venture applies for registration, i t  shall f i l l  out three 
copies each of a registration form in Chinese and a foreign language. The main items 
of registration shall be: the name of the venture. the address, the scope of production 
and operation, the form of production and operation, the registered capital and the 
proportion to be provided by each party to the joint venture, the chairman and vice- 
chairman of the board of directors, the president and vice-presidents or the factory 
manager and deputy factory managers, the number and date of the document of 
approval, the total number of staff and workers and the number of staff and workers 
of foreign nationality. 
Article 5. 
From the date it is issued its business license, a Chinese-foreign joint venture shall be 
regarded as formally established, and its legitimate production and operation 
activities shall be protected by the laws of the People's Republic of China. 
Unregistered enterprises shall not be permitted to go into operation. 
Article 6. 
A Chinese-foreign joint venture shall, upon presenting its business license, open an 
account with the Bank of China or a bank approved by the Bank of China and 
register with the local tax authorities for the payment of taxes. 
Article 7. 
When a Chinese-foreign joint venture desires to moye to a new site, change its line 
of production, increase, decrease of assign the registered capital or extend the 
contract period, it shall, within one month after approval by the Foreign Investment 
Commission of the People's Republic of China go through procedures for registering 
the changes with the administrative bureau for industry and commerce of the 
province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the central authority 
where it is located. 
When there are changes in other registered items, they shall be reported in writing at 
the end of the year to the administrative bureau for industry and commerce of the 
province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the central authority 
where the joint venture is located. 
Article 8. 
When a Chinese-foreign joint venture registers or modifies its registration, i t  shall 
pay a registration fee or a fee for modification of registration, the amount of which 
shall be stipulated by the General Administration for Industry and Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China. 
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Article 9. 
A Chinese-foreign joint venture, upon the expiration of the contract period or upon 
termination of the contract before the date of expiration, shall go through procedures 
for nullifyng its registration by presenting the document of approval, issued by the 
Foreign Investment Commission of the People's Republic of China, to the 
administrative bureau for industry and commerce of the province, autonomous region 
or municipalities directly under the central authority where it is located and, after 
examination and approval by the General Administration for Industry and Commerce 
of the People's Republic of China, hand in its business license for cancellation. 
Article 10. 
The General Administration for Industry and Conimerce of the People's Republic of 
China and the administrative bureau for industry and commerce of the provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central authority have the 
right to supervise and inspect the Chinese-foreign joint ventures within the area 
under their jurisdiction. Violators of these Procedures shall be given a warning or a 
fine in accordance with the seriousness of each case. 
Article 11. 
These Procedures shall go into effect on the day they are promulgated. 
(The English translations are for reference only) 
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Appendix 6.1 0 
Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
(Adopted at the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress on J d y  1, 
1979, and Amended in accordance with " The decision on Amendment to The Law 
of the People's Republic of China on Chinese--Foreign Equity Joint Ventures" 
adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 4, 
1990) 
Article 1 With a view to expanding international economic cooperation and 
technological exchange, the People's Republic of China permits foreign companies. 
enterprises, other economic entities or individuals (hereinafter referred to as foreign 
parties) to incorporate themselves, within the territory of the People's Republic of 
China, into equity joint ventures with Chinese companies, enterprises or other 
economic entities (hereinafter referred to as Chinese parties) on the principle of 
equality and mutual benefit and subject to authorisation by the Chinese Government. 
Article 2 The Chinese Government protects, by the legislation in force, the 
investments of foreign parties. the profits due to them and their other lawful rights 
and interests in equity joint ventures, pursuant to the agreements. contracts and 
article of association approved by the Chinese Government. 
All the activities of an equity joint venture shall be governed by the laws, decrees 
and pertinent rules and regulations of the People's Republic of China. 
The State will not nationalise or expropriate any equity joint venture. Under special 
circumstances, based on the need of the social public interests, equity joint iientures 
may be expropriated under legal procedures and against appropriate compensation. 
Article 3 All parties to an equity joint venture shall submit their agreements, 
contracts and articles of association to the State's Competent Department of Foreign 
Relations and Trade (simplified as the examination and approval authority 
hereinafter) for examination and approval. The examination and approval authority 
shall decide whether to approve or disapprove them within 3 months. Once 
approved, the equity joint ITenture shall register with the concerned department of the 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and start operation after receiving 
its business license. 
Article 4 An equity joint venture shall take the form of a limited liability company. 
In the registered capital of an equity joint venture, the proportion of the investment 
contributed by the foreign parties shall in general not be less than 25 percent. 
The profits, risks and losses of an equity joint venture shall be shared by the parties 
to the venture in proportion to their contributions to the registered capital. 
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The transfer of one party's share in the registered capital shall be effected only with 
the consent of the other parties to the venture. 
Article 5 Each party to an equity joint yenture may contribute cash, capital goods, 
industrial property rights, etc. as its investment in the venture. 
The technology or equipment contributed by any foreign party as investment shall be 
truly advanced and appropriate to China's needs. In cases of losses caused by 
deception through the intentional provision of outdated equipment or technology, 
compensation shall be paid for such losses. 
The investment contributed by a Chinese party may include the right to the use of a 
site provided for the equity joint venture during the period of its operation. In case 
such a contribution does not constitute a part of the investment from the Chinese 
party, the venture shall pay the Chinese Government a fee for its use. 
The various contributions referred to in the present Article shall be specified in the 
contracts concerning the equity joint yenture or in its articles of association, and the 
value of each contribution (excluding that of the site) shall be ascertained by the 
parties to the venture through joint assessment. 
Article 6 An equity joint venture shall have a board of directors with a composition 
stipulated in the contract and the articles of association after consultation between the 
parties to the venture; each director shall be appointed and replaced by his own side. 
The chairman and the vice-chairmen shall be chosen through consultation by the 
parties to the venture or elected by the board of directors. If the Chinese side or the 
foreign side assumes the office of the chairman, the other side shall assume the office 
(s) of the vice- chairman or vice-chairmen. The board of directors shall decide on 
important problems Concerning the equity joint venture on the principle of equality 
and mutual benefit. 
The board of directors is empowered to discuss and take action on, pursuant to the 
provisions of the articles of association of the equity joint yenture, all fundamental 
issues concerning the venture, namely, expansion projects, production and business 
programmes, the budget, distribution of profits, plans concerning manpower and pay 
scales, the termination of business, the appointment or hiring of the president, the 
vice-president (s), the chief engineer, the treasurer and the auditors as well as their 
functions and powers and their remuneration, etc. 
The president and vice-president (s) (or the general manager and assistant general 
manager (s) in a factory) shall be chosen from the various parties to the equity joint 
venture . 
Procedures concerning the employment and discharge of the workers and staff 
members of an equity joint venture shall be stipulated according to law in the 
agreement or contract concluded between the parties to the venture. 
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Article 7 The net profits of an equity joint venture shall be distributed among the 
parties to the venture in proportion to their respective shares in the registered capital 
after the payment of an equity joint venture income tax on its gross profit pursuant to 
the tax laws of the people's Republic of China and after the deductions therefrom as 
stipulated in the articles of association of the venture for the serve funds, the bonus 
and welfare funds for the workers and staff members and the expansion funds of the 
venture . 
An equity joint venture may, in accordance with provisions of the relevant laws and 
administrative rules and regulations of the State on taxation. enjoy preferential 
treatment for reduction of, or exemption from taxes. 
A foreign party who re-invests any part of his share of the net profit within Chinese 
temtory may apply for the restitution of a part of the income taxes paid. 
Article 8 An equity joint venture shall, on the strength of its business licence, open a 
foreign exchange account with a bank or and other financial institution which is 
permitted by the State agency for foreign exchange control to handle foreign 
exchange transactions . 
An equity joint venture shall conduct its foreign exchange transactions in accordance 
with the Foreign Exchange Regulations of the People's Republic of China. 
An equity joint venture may. in its business operations, obtain funds from foreign 
banks directly. 
The insurance appropriate to a joint venture shall be furnished by Chinese insurance 
companies 
Article 9 The production and business programmes of an equity joint venture shall be 
filed with the authorities concerned and shall be implemented through business 
contracts. 
In its purchase of required raw and semi-processed materials, fuels, auxiliary 
equipment, etc. , an equity joint venture shall give first priority to Chinese sources, 
but may also acquire them directly from the international market with its own foreign 
exchange funds. 
An equity joint venture is encouraged to market its products outside China. It may 
distribute its export products on foreign markets through direct channels or its 
associated agencies or China's foreign trade establishments. Its products may also be 
distributed on the Chinese market. 
Whenever necessary, an equity joint venture may set up affiliated agencies outside 
China. 
Article 10 The net profit which a foreign party receives as his share after performing 
his obligations under the pertinent laws and agreements and contracts. the funds he 
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receives at the time when the equity joint venture terminates or winds up its 
operations and his other funds may be remitted abroad in accordance with the foreign 
exchange regulations and in the currency (.ies) specified in the contracts concerning 
the ventures. 
A foreign party is encouraged to deposit in the Bank of China any part of foreign 
exchange which he is entitled to remit abroad. 
Article 11 The wages, salaries or other legitimate income of the foreign employees of 
an equity joint venture, after payment of the personal income tax under the tax laws 
of the People's Republic of China, may be remitted abroad in accordance with the 
for e i gn ex change re g u 1 at i on s. 
Article 12 The operation periods of equity joint ventures may be handled differently 
according to their particular lines of business and circumstances. Equity joint 
ventures engaged in a certain line of business shall specify in the contracts their 
operation periods, while equity joint ventures engaged in another line of business 
may choose whether or not to specify their operation periods. In the case of an equity 
joint venture with its operation period specified, if the parties to the \venture agree to 
extend the operation period, the venture may send an application to the examining 
and approval authority 6 months before the expiration of the operation period. The 
examination and approval authority shall, within 1 month of receipt of the 
application, decide whether to approve or disapprove it. 
Article 13 If there occur heavy losses, the failure of a party to perform its obligations 
under the contract and the articles of association or force majeure, etc., the equity 
joint venture may terminate the contract through consultation and agreement by the 
parties, and subject to approval by the examination and approval authority and to 
registration with the State's Competent Department of Industry and Commerce 
Administration. In cases of losses caused by a breach of contract, the financial 
responsibility shall be borne by the party that has breached the contract. 
Article 14 Disputes arising between the parties to an equity joint venture which the 
board of directors fails to settle through consultation may be settled through 
conciliation or arbitration by an arbitral body of China or through arbitration by an 
arbitral body agreed upon by the parties. 
Article 15 The present law comes into force as of the date of its promulgation. The 
right to amendment is vested in the National People's Congress. 
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Appendix 6.1 1 
Interim Provisions for the Duration of Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures 
(Approved by the State Council on September 30, 1990 and promulgated by the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on October 22, 1990) 
Article 1 These Provisions are formulated in accordance with the Article 12 of the 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
(amended by the Third Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 
4, 1990). 
Article 2 The parties to a Chinese-foreign equity joint venture (hereinafter referred to 
as a "joint venture") may or may not stipulate the duration in the contract of the joint 
venture which falls within the category of the investment projects encouraged and 
permitted by the State, unless the Article 3 of these Provisions otherwise stipulates. 
Article 3 The parties to a joint venture shall specify the duration in the contract of the 
joint yenture in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of the State 
provided that the joint venture is engaged in any of the following lines of trade or 
operates in the following circumstances: 
(1) Service trades, such as hotel, apartment or office buildings, entertainment, 
catering, taxi, colour developing and printing, maintenance, consultations; 
(2) Land development, and operation and management of real estate; 
(3) Exploration and exploitation of resources; 
(4) Investment projects restricted by the State; 
(5) Others for which the duration is required to be included in the contract by the 
laws or regulations of the State. 
Article 4 A joint venture contract in which the parties do not specify the duration 
shall be examined and approved pursuant to the authorisation and procedures of 
examination and approval stipulated by the State. And the examination and approval 
authorities shall report this to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
for the record within 30 days after the approval is granted except for those approved 
by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade itself. 
Article 5 A joint venture to which the parties do not provide the duration in the joint 
venture contract may, subject to the approval of a taxation authority, enjoy the 
preferential treatment of tax reduction or exemption according to the tax laws of the 
State. If the actual operation period of such joint venture is shorter than the time limit 
for enjoying the preferential treatment of tax set by the State, the joint venture, 
according to law, shall make up for the amount of tax which has been reduced or 
exempted already. 
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Article 6 A joint venture approved and established before the implementation of 
these Provisions may continue its operation under the provisions of duration in the 
approved contract. Except for the joint ventures stipulated in Article 3 of these 
Provisions, such joint venture may alter its fixed duration to non-duration agreed 
upon by the parties and the parties shall conclude the amendment to the joint venture 
contract and make an application with reasons to the original examination and 
approval authority for examination. 
The original examination and approval authority shall decide to grant an approval or 
disapproval of the alteration within 90 days after the receipt of the above mentioned 
relevant documents. Upon approval, the joint venture shall go through the procedures 
of filing according to Article 4 of these Provisions. 
Article 7 These Provisions shall be implemented from the date of its promulgation. 
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Appendix 6.12 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese- Foreign 
Contractual Joi n t Ventures 
(Adopted at the First Session of the Seventh Xational People's Congress and 
promulgated by Order No.4 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 
April 13, 1988, and effective as of the date of promulgation) 
Article 1 This Law is formulated to expand economic cooperation and technological 
exchange with foreign countries and to promote the joint establishment, on the 
principle of equality and mutual benefit, by foreign enterprises and other economic 
organisations or individuals (hereinafter referred to as the foreign party) and Chinese 
enterprises or other economic organisations (hereinafter referred to as the Chinese 
party) of Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures (hereinafter referred to as 
contractual joint ventures) within the territory of the People's Republic of China. 
Article 2 In establishing a contractual joint venture, the Chinese and foreign parties 
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Law, prescribe in their contractual 
joint venture contract such matters as the investment or conditions for cooperation. 
the distribution of earnings or products, the sharing of risks and losses, the manners 
of operation and management and the ownership of the property at the time of the 
termination of the contractual joint venture. 
A contractual joint venture which meets the conditions for being considered a legal 
person under Chinese law, shall acquire the status of a Chinese legal person in 
accordance with law. 
Article 3 The State shall, according to law, protect the lawful rights and interests of 
the contractual joint ventures and of the Chinese and foreign parties. 
A contractual joint venture must abide by Chinese laws and regulations and must not 
injure the public interests of China. 
The relevant State authorities shall exercise supervision over the contractual joint 
ventures according to law. 
Article 4 The State shall encourage the establishment of productive contractual joint 
ventures that are export-oriented or technologically advanced. 
Article 5 For the purpose of applyng for the establishment of a contractual joint 
venture, such documents as the agreement, the contract and the articles of association 
signed by the Chinese and foreign parties shall be submitted for examination and 
approval to the department in charge of foreign economic relations and trade under 
the State Council or to the department or local government authorised by the State 
Council (hereinafter referred to as the examination and approval authority). The 
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examination and approval authority shall, within 45 days of receiving the application, 
decide whether or not to grant approval. 
Article 6 When the application for the establishment of a contractual joint venture is 
approved, the parties shall, within 30 days of receiving the certificate of approval, 
apply to the administrative authorities for industry and commerce for registration and 
obtain a business license. The date of issuance of the business license of a contractual 
joint venture shall be the date of its establishment. 
A contractual joint venture shall, within 30 days of its establishment, carry out tax 
registration with the tax authorities. 
Article 7 If the Chinese and foreign parties, during the period of operation of their 
contractual joint venture, agree through consultation to make major modifications to 
the contractual joint venture contract, they shall report to the examination and 
approval authority for approval, if the modifications include items involving 
statutory industry and commerce registration or tax registration, they shall register 
the modifications with the administrative authorities for industry and commerce and 
with the tax authorities. 
Article 8 The investment or conditions for cooperation contributed by the Chinese 
and foreign parties may be provided in cash or in kind, or may include the right to 
the use of land, industrial property rights, non-patent technology or other property 
rights. 
Article 9 The Chinese and foreign parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
the laws and regulations and the agreements in the contractual joint venture contract, 
duly fulfil their obligations of contributing full investment and providing the 
conditions for cooperation. In case of failure to do so within the prescribed time, the 
administratke authorities for industry and commerce shall set another time limit for 
the fulfilment of such obligations; if such obligations are still not fulfilled by the new 
time limit, the matter shall be handled by the examination and approval authority and 
the administrative authorities for industry and commerce according to relevant state 
provisions. 
The investments or conditions for cooperation provided by the Chinese and foreign 
parties shall be verified by an accountant registered in China or the relevant 
authorities, who shall provide a certificate after verification. 
Article 10 If a Chinese or foreign party wishes to make an assiug-ment of all or part 
of its rights and obligations prescribed in the contractual joint venture contract, it 
must obtain the consent of the other party or parties and report to the examination 
and approval authority for approval. 
Article 11 A contractual joint venture shall conduct its operational and managerial 
activities in accordance with the approved contract and articles of association for the 
contractual joint venture. The right of a contractual joint venture to make its own 
operational and managerial decisions shall not be interfered with. 
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Article 12 A contractual joint venture shall establish a board of directors or a joint 
managerial institution which shall, according to the contract or the articles of 
association for the contractual joint venture, decide on the major issues concerning 
the venture. If the Chinese or foreign party assumes the chairmanship of the board of 
directors or the directorship of the joint managerial institution, the other party shall 
assume the vice-chairmanship of the board or the deputy directorship of the joint 
managerial institution. The board of directors or the joint managerial institution may 
decide on the appointment or employment of a general manager, who shall take 
charge of the daily operation and management of the contractual joint \-enture. The 
general manager shall be accountable to the board of directors or the joint managerial 
institution. 
If a contractual joint venture, after its establishment, chooses to entrust a third party 
with its operation and management, it must obtain the unanimous consent of the 
board of directors or the joint managerial institution, report to the examination and 
approval authority for approval, and register the change with the administrative 
authorities for industry and commerce. 
Article 13 The employment, dismissal, remuneration, welfare, labour protection and 
labour insurance, etc. of the staff members and workers of a contractual joint venture 
shall be specified in contracts concluded in accordance with law. 
Article 14 The staff and workers of a contractual joint venture shall, in accordance 
with law, establish their trade union organisation to carry out trade union activities 
and protect their lawfi-11 rights and interests. 
A contractual joint venture shall provide the necessary conditions for the venture's 
trade union to carry out its activities. 
Article 15 A contractual joint venture must establish its account books within the 
territory of China, file its accounting statements according to relevant provisions and 
accept supervision by the financial and tax authorities. 
If a contractual joint venture, in violation of the provisions prescribed in the 
preceding paragraph, does not establish its account books within the temtory of 
China, the financial and tax authorities may impose a fine on it, and the 
administrative authorities for industry and commerce may order it to suspend its 
business operations or may revoke its business license. 
Article 16 A contractual joint venture shall, by presenting its business license, open a 
foreign exchange account with a bank or any other financial institution which is 
permitted by the exchange control authorities of the State to conduct transactions in 
foreign exchange. A contractual joint venture shall handle its foreign exchange 
transactions in accordance with the provisions of the State on foreign exchange 
control. 
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Article 17 A contractual joint venture may obtain loans from financial institutions 
within the temtory of China and may also obtain loans outside the territory of China. 
Loans to be used by the Chinese and foreign parties as investment or conditions for 
cooperation, and their guarantees, shall be provided by each party on its own. 
Article 18 The various kinds of insurance coverage of a contractual joint venture 
shall be furnished by insurance institutions within the territory of China. 
Article 19 A contractual joint venture may, within its approved scope of operation, 
import materials it needs and export products it produces. A contractual joint venture 
may purchase, on both the domestic market and the world market, the raw and 
processed materials, fuels, etc. within its approved scope of operation. 
Article 20 A contractual joint venture shall achieve on its own the balance of its 
foreign exchange receipts and expenditures. If a contractual joint venture is unable to 
achieve the balance of its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures on its own, i t  
may, in accordance with State provisions, apply to the relevant authorities for 
assistance. 
Article 21 A contractual joint venture shall, in accordance with State pro\.isions on 
tax, pay taxes and may enjoy the preferential treatment of tax reduction or 
exempt ion. 
Article 22 The Chinese and foreign parties shall share earnings or products, 
undertake risks and losses in accordance with the agreements prescribed in the 
contractual joint venture contract. 
If, upon the expiration of the period of a venture's operation, all the fixed assets of 
the contractual joint venture, as agreed upon by the Chinese and foreign parties in the 
contractual joint venture contract, are to belong to the Chinese party, the Chinese and 
foreign parties may prescribe in the contractual joint venture contract the ways for 
the foreign party to recover its investment ahead of time during the period of the 
venture's operation. If the foreign party, as agreed upon in the contractual joint 
venture contract, is to recover its investment prior to the payment of income tax, it 
must apply to the financial and tax authorities, which shall examine and approl-e the 
application in accordance with State provisions concerning taxes. 
If, according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the foreign party is to 
recover its investment ahead of time during the period of the venture's operation. the 
Chinese and foreign parties shall, as stipulated by the relevant laws and agreed in the 
contractual joint venture contract, be liable for the debts of the venture. 
Article 23 After the foreign party has fulfilled its obligations under the law and the 
contractual joint venture contract, the profits it receives as its share, its other 
legitimate income and the funds it receives as its share upon the termination of the 
venture, may be remitted abroad according to law. 
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The wages, salaries or other legitimate income earned by the foreign staff and 
workers of contractual joint ventures, after the payment of the individual income tax 
according to law, may be remitted abroad. 
Article 24 Upon the expiration or temiination in advance of the term of a contractual 
joint venture, its assets, claims and debts shall be liquidated according to legal 
procedures. The Chinese and foreign parties shall, in accordance with the agreement 
specified in the contractual joint venture contract, determine the ownership of the 
venture's property. 
A contractual joint venture shall, upon the expiration or termination in advance of its 
term, cancel its registration with the administrative authorities for industry and 
commerce and the tax authorities. 
Article 25 The period of operation of a contractual joint venture shall be determined 
through consultation by the Chinese and foreign parties and shall be clearly specified 
in the contractual joint venture contract. If the Chinese and foreign parties agree to 
extend the period of operation, they shall apply to the examination and approval 
authority 180 days prior to the expiration of the krenture's temi. The examination and 
approval authority shall decide whether or not to grant approval within 30 days of 
receking the application. 
Article 26 Any dispute between the Chinese and foreign parties arising from the 
execution of the contract or the articles of the association for a contractual joint 
venture shall be settled through consultation or mediation. In case of a dispute which 
the Chinese or the foreign party is unwilling to settle through consultation or 
mediation, or of a dispute which they have failed to settle through consultation or 
mediation, the Chinese and foreign parties may submit it to a Chinese arbitration 
agency or any other arbitration agency for arbitration in accordance with the 
arbitration clause in the contractual joint venture contract or written agreement on 
arbitration concluded aft erwards. 
The Chinese or foreign party may bring a suit in a Chinese court, if no arbitration 
clause is provided in the contractual joint venture contract and if no written 
agreement is concluded afterwards. 
Article 27 The detailed rules for the implementation of this Law shall be formulated 
by the department in charge of foreign economic relations and trade under the State 
Council and reported to the State Council for approval before implementation. 
Article 28 This Law shall come into force as of the date of its promulgation. 
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Appendix 6.1 3 
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative 
Joint Ventures 
(Approved by the State Council of the People's Republic of China on August 7, 1995 
and Promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on 
September 4. 1995) 
Chapter I General Provisions 
Article 1 These Detailed Rules are formulated in accordance with the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures. 
Article 2 The establishment of Chinese-Foreign cooperative joint kyentures 
(hereinafter referred to as cooperatiL7e joint ventures) in the territory of China shall 
comply with the development policy and industrial policy of the State, and the 
provisions of the State for the guidance of foreign investment direction. 
Article 3 A cooperative joint venture may, within the perimeters of the approved 
cooperative joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association, conduct 
business and management activities independently according to law and free from 
the intervention of any organisation or individual. 
Article 3 A coopera.tive joint venture may be either a joint venture with the status of 
a Chinese legal person obtained according to law or one without the legal person 
status. 
For a cooperative joint venture without the legal person status, where Chapter IX of 
the Detailed Rules has special pro\.isions, these provisions shall apply. 
Article 5 The competent authority for a cooperative joint venture shall be the 
competent authority for the Chinese party of the joint venture. Where there are more 
than one Chinese party to the cooperative joint venture, the examination and 
approval authority shall decide on a competent authority for the cooperative joint 
venture in consultation with relevant departments, unless otherwise stipulated in laws 
and administrative rules. 
The competent authority for a cooperative joint venture shall conduct coordination 
and afford assistance in relation to matters of the cooperative joint venture. 
Chapter 11 The Establishment of a Cooperative Joint Venture 
Article 6 The establishment of a cooperative joint venture shall be examined and 
approved by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation or the 
department and local people's government authorised by the State Council. 
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The department or local people’s government authorised by the State Council may 
examine and approve cooperative joint ventures in the following circumstances: 
(1 ) The total amount of investment is within the authorisation for approval as set by 
the State Council, by the departments or local people’s governments authorised by 
the State Council; 
(2) The capital has been raised by the applicants themselves, construction and 
production conditions do not need to be balanced by the State; 
(3) Exportation of the products of the cooperative joint venture does not require 
export quota and license to be issued by relevant competent departments of the State; 
or if exportation requires quota and license, the consent of relevant competent 
departments has been obtained prior to submitting the application for establishing the 
cooperative joint venture. 
(4) Other circumstances in which the departments or local governments authorised 
by the State Council may examine and approve cooperative joint ventures as 
stipulated in laws and administrative rules. 
Article 7 To establish a cooperative joint venture, the Chinese party/parties 
(hereinafter referred to as the Chinese party) shall submit to the examination and 
approval authority the following documents: 
(1 ) Application for establishing a cooperative joint venture accompanied by the 
examination and apyoval documents of the competent authority; 
(2)  Feasibility study report jointly prepared by all parties to the cooperative joint 
J’enture accompanied by the examination and approval documents of the competent 
authority; 
(3) Joint venture agreement, contract and articles of association signed by the legal 
representatives or representatives authorised by them of all parties to the joint 
venture ; 
(4) Business licenses or registration certificates, financial credit documents and valid 
certification documents of the lesa1 representatives of all parties to the joint venture; 
where the foreign partyiparties (hereinafter referred to as the foreign party) is a 
natural person, valid certification documents on his/her identity, resume and financial 
credit shall be presented; 
(5) List of chairman, deputy chairmen and members of the board of directors or list 
of director, deputy directors and members of the joint management committee of the 
cooperative joint venture as determined by all parties through consultation: 
(6) Other documents as required by the examination and approval authority. 
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The documents listed in the preceding paragraph shall be written in Chinese with the 
exception of the documents in the subparagraph (4) to be presented by the foreign 
party, each of the documents required under subparagraph (2) ,  (3)  and (5)  may be 
accompanied by a version of a foreign language agreed upon by all parties. 
The examination and approval authority shall decide whether to approve or 
disapprove the application for the establishment of a cooperative joint \.enture within 
45 days from the date of receiving all the documents as stipulated; should anything 
incomplete or inappropriate be found in the documents presented. the examination 
and approval authority may demand a supplement or amendment to them within a 
limited period of time. 
Article 8 For a cooperative joint venture approved by the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation or by departments authorised by the State Council, the 
certificate of approval shall be granted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation. 
For a cooperative joint venture approved by local people's government authorised by 
the State Council, the relek-ant local people's government shall grant the certificate of 
approval and submit the relevant approval documents to the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation for recordation within 30 days from the date of 
approval. 
The cooperative joint venture approved for establishment shall apply. according to 
law, to the administrative authorities for industry and comnie-rce for registration and 
business license. 
Article 9 An application for establishing a cooperative joint venture shall not be 
approved if the venture involves in any of the following circunistances: 
( 1 ) Detriment to China's sovereignty or public interest; 
(2)  Jeopardising the State security; 
(3) Polluting and damaging the environment; 
(4) Other circumstance involving violation of laws, administrative rules and the State 
industrial policies. 
Article 10 For the purpose of the Detailed Rules, the cooperative joint venture 
agreement refers to a written document produced after all parties reached consensus 
on the principles and significant matters in relation to the establishment of the 
cooperative joint venture. 
For the purpose of the Detailed Rules, the cooperative joint venture contract refers to 
a wntten document produced after all parties reached consensus on their respective 
rights and obligations in the cooperative joint venture. 
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For the purpose of the Detailed Rules, the articles of association of a cooperative 
joint venture refers to a written document laying down the principles of organisation 
and method of operation and management as agreed on by all parties in line with the 
cooperative joint venture contract. 
Where there are any contents in the agreement and articles of association which are 
inconsistent with the contract of a cooperative joint venture, the contract shall 
prevail 
The parties to a cooperative joint venture may not sign a cooperatiye joint t.enture 
agreement. 
Article 11 The agreement, contract and articles of association of a cooperative joint 
venture shall enter into force upon the issuance of the certificate of approval by the 
examination and approval authority. For the duration of the cooperative joint \venture, 
and substantive amendment to the agreement, contract and article of association of 
the cooperative joint venture shall be approved by the examination and approL-al 
authority. 
Article 12 The contract of a cooperative joint venture shall bear the following items: 
(1)  Names, place of registration, domicile of all parties, and names, titles and 
nationalities of their legal representatives (where the foreign party is a natural person, 
hidher name, nationality and domicile); 
(2) Name, address and business scope of the cooperative joint venture; 
(3) Total amount of investment, registered capital, way and duration of investment or 
cooperation conditions contributed by each party; 
(4) Transfer of investment contribution or provision of cooperation conditions by 
each party; 
(5) Distribution of income or products to all parties, apportioning of risk or loss 
between the parties; 
(6) Composition of the board of directors or the joint management committee, 
allocation of the members of the board of directors or the joint management 
committee, responsibilities of and the ways for employment and dismissal of the 
president and other senior management people; 
(7) Main production equipment and production technology to be employed, and their 
sources; 
(8) Arrangement for sales of products in and outside China; 
(9) Arrangement for the income and expenditure of foreign exchanges of the 
cooperative joint venture; 
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(1 0) duration, dissolution and liquidation of the cooperative joint venture; 
( 1  1 )  Other obligations of the parties and the responsibilities arising from breach 
the contract; 
( 12) Principles for handling finance, accounting and auditing: 
( 13) Settlement between and among all parties; 
(1 4) Procedures for amending the cooperatiL7e joint venture contract. 
Article 13 The articles of association of a cooperative joint venture shal 
following items: 
(1  ) Name and address of the cooperative joint venture; 
include t 
of 
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(2) Business scope and duration of cooperation of the cooperative joint \.enturei 
(3) Names. places of registration, domicile of all parties to the cooperative joint 
venture and names, titles, and nationalities of their legal representatives (where the 
foreign party is a natural person. his/'her name, nationality and domicile); 
(4)  Total amount of investment. registered capital, ways and duration of investment 
or cooperation conditions contributed by the parties to the cooperative joint venture; 
( 5 )  Distribution of income or products to all parties and apportioning of risk and loss 
between the parties ; 
(6) Composition, terms of reference and proceedings of the board of directors or joint 
management committee of the cooperative joint venture; term of office for directors 
of the board of directors or members on the joint management committee; terms of 
reference of chairman and vice chairmen of the board of directors or director and 
deputy directors of the joint management committee; 
(7) Establishment, terms of reference and rules for handling matters of the operation 
and management body; temis of reference, engagement and dismissal of general 
manager and other senior management personnel; 
(8) Regulations related to labour management covering employment of staff and 
workers, training, labour contract, salaries & wages, social insurance, welfare 
benefits, job safety, etc.; 
(9) Finance, accounting and auditing system of the cooperative joint venture; 
(1 0) Dissolution and liquidation of the cooperation joint venture; 
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(1  1 )  Procedures for amendment of the articles of association of the co0peratiL.e joint 
venture. 
Chapter I11 Form of Organisation and Registered Capital 
Article 14 The cooperative joint venture, after obtaining the status of Chinese legal U 
person, shall take the form of a limited liability company. Unless otherwise 
stipulated in the cooperative joint venture contract, each party shall be held liable to 
the cooperative joint venture within the limit of its investment and cooperation 
conditions contributed to the cooperative joint venture. 
The cooperative joint venture shall be held liable to its debts within the limit of its 
total assets. 
Article 15 The total amount of investment of a cooperative joint venture refers to the 
sum of funds necessary for reaching the production scale provided for by the 
cooperative joint venture contract and the articles of association of the cooperative 
joint venture. 
Article 16 The registered capital of a cooperative joint venture refers to the total 
amount of capital, contributed by all parties to the cooperative joint venture and 
registered with the authority for industry and commerce when applying for the 
establishment of the cooperative joint \-enture. Registered capital can be either 
denominated in Renminbi Yuan or in any other freely conkrertible foreign currency as 
agreed upon by all parties to the cooperatiL-e joint venture. 
Any decrease in the registered capital of the cooperative joint venture is not allowed 
during the term of cooperation. However, any decrease, necessary due to changes in 
the total amount of investment and production scale, shall be subject to the approval 
of the examination arid approval authority. 
Chapter IV Investment and Cooperation Conditions 
Article 17 All parties to cooperative joint venture shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of relevant laws and administrative regulations and stipulations of the 
cooperative joint venture contract, make their investment or pro\-ide cooperation 
conditions to the cooperative joint venture. 
Article 18 The investment made or cooperation conditions provided by all parties to 
the cooperative joint venture may be in cash, in kind, or in other property rights such 
as industrial property rights, know-how and land-use rights. 
Where the investment or cooperation conditions provided by the Chinese party fall 
into the category of State assets, an asset evaluation shall be conducted in accordance 
with relevant provisions of laws and administrative regulations. 
For a cooperative joint venture which has obtained the status of a Chinese legal 
person according to law, the investment made by the foreign party shall be. in 
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general, no less that 25% of the registered capital of the venture. For a cooperative 
joint venture without the status of a legal person, the specific requirements for the 
investment made and cooperation conditions contributed by all parties to the venture 
shall be subject to the regulations stipulated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade & 
Economic Cooperation. 
Article 19 The investment made or cooperation conditions provided shall be the 
property or property rights owned by the parties to a cooperative joint venture. The 
investment made or cooperation conditions provided shall not be property or 
property rights already posted as mortgage or other forms of collaterals. 
Article 20 All parties to a cooperative joint venture shall stipulate, based on the 
production and operation requirements of the venture and in light of the provisions of 
relevant laws and administrative regulations, the duration of the investment to be 
niade and the cooperation conditions to be contributed in the joint \venture contract. 
In the event of a failure to make the investment or provide the cooperative conditions 
as set forth by the cooperative joint venture contract. the authority for the 
administration of industry & commerce shall specify a time limit for performance. If 
the said obligations are still not perfonned upon the expiration of the specified time 
limit, the examination and approval authority shall revoke the certificate of approval 
and the authority for the administration of industry and commerce shall revoke the 
business license of the cooperative joint venture and make a public announcement to 
that effect. 
Article 21 The party failing to make investment or provide cooperation conditions as 
set forth by the cooperative joint venture contract shall be held liable for the breach 
of contract to the other party which have performed their duties as stipulated in the 
contract . 
Article 22 The investments made or cooperation conditions contributed by all parties 
to the cooperative joint venture shall be verified by, and reports of verification shall 
be submitted by accountants registered in China. -4nd certificates of contribution 
shall be issued thereupon to all parties by the cooperative joint venture. The 
certificate of contribution shall include the following items: 
(1) Name of the cooperative join venture; 
(2) Date of the establishment of the cooperative joint venture; 
(3) Names of all parties to the cooperative joint venture; 
(4) Contents of the investments made or the cooperation conditions contributed by all 
parties to the cooperative joint venture; 
(5) Date of contribution of investments or provision of operation conditions by all 
parties to a cooperative joint venture; 
460 
(6) Serial No. and date of issuance of the certificate of contribution. 
Copies of the certificate of contribution shall be submitted respectively to the 
examination and approval authority and the authority for the administration of 
industry and commerce. 
Article 23 Mutual transfer of all or part of its rights under the cooperative joint 
venture contract between parties to the venture or transfer of all or part of its rights 
under the contract from one party to a third party other than the parties to the venture 
shall be subject to the consent in written form from the other party, and the matter 
shall be submitted to the examination and approval authority for approval. 
The examination and approval authority shall decide to approve or disappro\Te the 
assignment within 30 days of receipt of the relevant documents. 
Chapter V Organisational Structure 
Article 24 A board of directors or a joint management committee shall be established 
in a cooperative joint venture. The board of directors or the joint manazement 
committee shall be the power organ of the cooperative joint venture, and shall, in 
accordance with the provisions of the articles of association of the cooperatil,.e joint 
venture, decide on major important issues concerning the cooperative joint L’enture. 
Article 25 The board of directors or the joint management conimittec shall consist 0; 
at !east three persons. The allocation of mtmbers shall, thrmgh c consultations 
between the Chinese party and the foreign party, be decided with reference to the 
proportion of the investments or cooperation conditions contributed by each party. 
Article 26 Directors of the board of directors or members on the joint management c 
committee shall be appointed or replaced by all parties themsell-es. The sclection of 
chairman and vice chairmen of the board of directors or director and. deputy 
directors of the joint management committee shall be provided for in the articles of 
association of the cooperative joint venture. Where the position of chairman of the 
board of directors or director of the joint management committee is assumed by a 
nominee of the Chinese party or the foreign party, the positionlpositions of vice 
chairmadchairmen or depu:y director directors shall be assumed by a nominee of the 
other party . 
Article 27 The tenure of directors and members on the joint management committee 
shall be decided by articles of association of the cooperative joint t-enture, with cach 
tenure no longer that three years. Upon expiration of each tenure, directors and 
members may renew their tenure if reappointed by the appointing party. 
Article 28 Directors of the board or members on the joint management committee 
shall meet at least once a year, with the meeting convened and presided over by the 
chairman of the board or director of the committee. Where the chairman of the board 
or the director of the committee is unable to perform hisher duties out of special 
reasons, he/she may appoint a \-ice chairman of the board, deputy director of the 
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committee, other directors or members to convene and preside over such meetings. 
Meetings of the board or committee may be convened on proposals made by more 
that one third of the total number of directors or members. Meetings of the board or 
committee can only be convened with the presence of more than two thirds of 
directors or members. Directors or members unable to participate in such meetings 
shall entrust, in written form, others to participate in such meetings and lodge votes 
on their behalf. Decisions made at the board or the committee meetings shall be 
adopted with the consents of more than half of the directors or members. Directors or 
members who neither participate in the said meetings nor entrust others to participate 
in the said meetings on their behalf without any reasonable excuse shall be regarded 
as having participated in the meetings of the board or the committee and having 
lodged abstention votes. 
All directors or members shall be notified of the board or the committee meetings 10 
days prior to their convocation. 
Decisions may also be made by the board or the committee through correspondence. 
Article 29 Decisions concerning the following items can only be adopted with the 
unanimous consent of all the directors or members participating in the meetings of 
the board or the committee: 
(1) Amendment to the articles of association of the cooperative joint venture; 
(2)  Increase or reduction of the registered capital of the cooperative joint venture; 
(3) Dissolution of the cooperative joint venture; 
(4) Mortgage of the assets of the cooperative joint venture; 
(5) Merge and split of the cooperative joint venture and change in the form of the 
organisation; 
(6) Other matters which may only be decided with unanimous consent at the 
meetings of the board or the committee as previously agreed upon by parties to the 
joint venture. 
Article 30 Decision-making process and voting procedures of the board of directors 
and the joint management committee, other than those being stipulated in these 
Detailed Rules, shall be provided for in the articles of association of the cooperative 
joint venture. 
Article 31 The chairman of the board or the director of the committee is the legal 
person of the cooperative joint venture. Where the chairman of the board or the 
director of the committee is unable to perform his duty out of special reasons, yice 
chairman of the board, deputy director of the Committee, other directors or members 
shall be authorised to represent the cooperative joint 1.entur-e in its external relations. 
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Article 32 A cooperative joint venture shall have one general manager who will be 
responsible for the routine operation and management of the joint venture and 
accountable to the board of directors or the joint management committee. 
The general manager of a cooperative joint venture shall be engaged or dismissed by 
the board of directors or the joint management committee. 
Article 33 Posts of the general manager and other senior managers may be assumed 
by Chinese or foreign citizens. 
Directors of members may assume concurrently the posts of the general manager or 
other senior manages of the cooperative joint venture, as engaged by the board of 
directors or the joint management committee. 
Article 34 The general manager or other senior managers who are incompetent or 
found to have actions of malpractices or serious negligence of duty may be dismissed 
as decided by the board of directors or the joint management committee, and those 
who cause losses to the cooperatiix joint venture shall be held responsible in 
accordance with relevant laws and regulations. 
Article 35 Where a party other than the parties to a cooperative joint venture is 
entrusted with the business operation and management of the venture after its 
establishment, unanimous consent of the board of directors or the joint management 
committee shall be obtained and a contract of trusteeship for operation and 
management shall be entered into with the trustee. 
The cooperative joint venture shall submit documents such as the resolution of the 
board of directors or the joint management committee, the contract of trusteeship that 
has been signed and the financial credit documents of the trustee, etc. to the 
examination and approval authority for approval. The examination and approval 
authority shall thereupon decide to approve or disapprove within 30 days upon 
receipt of the said documents. 
Chapter VI Purchase of Materials and Marketing of Products 
Article 36 The cooperative joint venture shall work out production and operation 
plans on its own, based on the approved business scope and scale of production and 
operation. 
Governmental organisations shall not a force cooperative joint venture to carry out 
production and operation plans formulated by governmental organisations. 
Article 37 a cooperative joint venture may decide, on its own, to purchase either 
within the temtory of China or from foreign countries machines and equipment, raw 
materials, fuels, parts and components, accessories, transportation tools and office 
articles, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "materials"). 
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Article 38 The State encourages cooperative joint ventures to sell their products on 
international markets. These ventures may directly sell their products on international 
markets or entrust overseas distributors or Chinese Foreign trade companies to sell 
their products by proxy or on commission. 
Prices of the products sold by the cooperative joint venture shall be decided by the 
venture itself according to law. 
Article 39 Machines and equipments, parts and components as well as other 
materials imported by the foreign party as investment in kind and machines and 
equipments, parts and components and other materials needed in production and 
operation, which are imported by the cooperative joint venture with funds of the total 
investment are exempt from import tariffs and turnover tax in the import links. When 
the above-mentioned imported materials which are exempt from tariffs and tax are 
resold within the territory of China or put into domestic conimercial channel upon 
approval, tariffs and tax or overdue tariffs or tax shall be paid in accordancc with 
relevant laws and regulations. 
Article 40 A cooperative joint venture shall not export products at prices ostensibly 
lower than reasonable prices of products of the like on international markets or 
import materials at prices higher than those of products of the like on the 
international markets. 
Article 41 Products of a cooperative joint venture shall be sold in compliance with 
the provisions of the approved contract of the venture. 
Article 42 The cooperative joint venture shall apply, in accordance with relevant 
State regulations. for import or export licenses and quotas for products subject to 
licensing and quota administration which they intend to import or export. 
Chapter VI1 Distribution of Income and Recovery of Investment 
Article 43 Chinese and Foreign parties to a cooperative joint venture may distribute 
income through profit-sharing or other forms as agreed upon by both parties. 
Tax payable shall be calculated according to relevant provisions of the tax law when 
product-sharing or other forms are adopted in income distribution. 
Article 44 On the expiration of the cooperation as defined in the contracts of the 
cooperative joint ventures by Chinese and foreign parties, all the fixed assets of the 
ventures shall belong to the Chinese party on a gratuitous basis and the Foreign party 
may apply, within the term of the cooperation, for an early recovery of their 
investment in the following ways: 
(1) On the basis of distribution according to the contribution of investment or 
cooperation conditions, agreement shall be reached in the contract of the cooperative 
joint venture to increase the proportion of profit sharing to the Foreign party: 
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(2) Upon examination and approval by the finance and taxation authorities according 
to State provisions on taxation, the Foreign party may first recover its investment 
before income tax payment is made by the cooperative joint venture; 
(3) Other means of investment recovery approved by the finance and taxation 
authorities as well as the examination and approval authority. For a cooperative joint 
venture that allows the Foreign party to first recover the investment, as defined in the 
preceding paragraph, the Chinese and F o r e i g  parties shall share the liabilities of the 
cooperative joint venture in light of relevant legal provisions and agreements in the 
joint venture contract. 
Article 45 When the foreign party of the venture applies for an early recovery of 
investment according to Article 44 ( 1  ) and (2). the party shall specifically explain the 
amount of the investment and the time and ways it would like to first recover such 
investment. Upon approval by the finance and taxation authorities after examination, 
such application shall be submitted to the examination and approval authority for 
final review and approval. 
The Foreiglr party shall not be allowed to recover its investment unless the losses of 
the cooperative joint venture is recovsred. 
Article 46 A cooperatiye joint venture shall entrust, according to rele\,ant State 
pro\-isions, accountants registered in China to check and verify the account-books. 
Parties to the cooperative joint venture may either jointly or separately entrust 
accountants registcd in China to check the account-books, and costs incurred 
therefrom shall be born by the party (or parties) that entrust the accoufitants. 
Chapter VI11 Duration and Dissolution 
Article 47 The duration of a cooperative joint venture shall be decided upon by all 
parties to the joint venture through consultation and shall be stipulated in the joint 
venture contract. 
If extension of the term of cooperation is agreed upon by all parties upon expiration 
of the duration of the cooperative joint venture, an application shall be submitted 180 
days before the expiration to the examination and approval authority, with due 
explanations on the execution of the contract establishing the cooperative joint 
venture, reason for the extension, and agreement on rights and obligations and other 
matters of each party in the extended period. The examination and approval authority 
shall decide to approve or disapprove within 30 days upon receipt of the extension 
application. 
Upon approval of the extension of duration, the cooperative joint venture shall go 
through formalities for the alteration of registration with the administrative authority 
for industry and commerce, and the extended duration shall start from the first day 
after the expiration of the original term of cooperation. 
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The duration for a cooperative joint venture shall not be extended if the joint venture 
contract has allowed the Fore@ party to first recover its investment and such 
investment has been fully recovered. However, when the Foreign party of a 
cooperative joint venture agrees to increase the investment and when all parties reach 
consensus after consultation, an application for extension of the term of cooperation 
may be filed with the examination and approval authonty in light of paragraph I1 of 
this Article. 
Article 48 A cooperative joint venture shall be dissolved in one of the following 
situations: 
( 1 ) Termination of duration; 
(2) Inability to continue operations due to have financial losses of the cooperative 
joint venture or heavy losses caused by force majeure; 
(3) Inability to continue operations due to the failure of one or several parties to fulfil 
the obligations as stipulated in the contract and articles of association; 
(4) Occurrence of other reasons for dissolution stipulated in the contract and articles 
of association; 
(5) Revocation made by aiithorities according d to law due to violation of laws and 
administrative regulations. In cases described in (2) and (4) of this Article. the board 
of directors or joint management comxittee of a cooperative joint venture shall make 
the decision and submit it  to tht: examination and approL-al authority for approval. In 
case of (3) of this Article, the party or parties failing to fulfil obligations as stipulated 
in the contract and articles of association shall Se held liable to losses thus occurred 
to party or parties fulfilling the stipulated obligations. The party or parties that ha\-e 
fulfilled their obligations have the rights to apply to examination and approval 
authority for the dissolution of the cooperative joint venture. 
Article 49 The liquidation procedures of a cooperative joint venture shall be handled 
according to relevant Chinese laws, administrative regulations and stipulations in the 
joint venture contract and articles of association. 
Chapter IX Special Provisions on Cooperative Joint Ventures without Legal 
Person Status 
Article 50 A cooperative joint venture without legal person status and all parties to 
the venture shall be held responsible for civil liabilities according to relevant 
provisions in Chinese civil laws. 
Article 51 A cooperative joint venture without legal person status shall register the 
investment made or cooperation conditions provided by each party at the 
administrative authority for industry and commerce. 
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Article 52 The investment made or cooperation conditions provided by each party to 
a cooperative joint venture without legal person status shall belong to the 
Contributing party. Depending on agreements reached by all parties, such investment 
or cooperation conditions may be jointly owned by all parties. or partly owned by 
each contributing party and partly owned by all parties. Assets accumulated from 
operations of the cooperative joint venture shall belong to all parties. 
Investment made or cooperation conditions provided by parties to a cooperative joint 
venture without legal person status shall be subject to unified management and 
utilisation by the cooperative venture. No party shall take the liberty to take actions 
on such matters without the consent from other parties. 
Article 53 A cooperative joint venture without legal person status shall establish a 
joint management committee which shall consist of representatives of all parties to 
the cooperative joint venture and shall manavge the cooperative joint venture on 
behalf of all parties. 
The joint management committee shall decide on all major issues concerning the 
cooperative joint venture. 
Article 54 A cooperative joint irenture without legal person status shall establish 
unified account books on the location of the joint 1-enture. and each party to the joint 
venture shall establish its own account books. 
Chapter X Supplementary Provisions 
Article 55 Chinese laws shall be applied in the conclusion, effectiveness. 
interpretation, execution of the contract and settlement of disputes of a cooperative 
joint venture. 
Article 56 Provisions in other relevant laws and administrative regulations shall 
apply to matters other than those provided for in the Detailed Rules, including 
financial affairs, accounting and auditing, foreign exchange, taxation. labour 
management and trade union etc. concerning a cooperative joint venture. 
Article 57 Where a cooperative joint venture is established by a company, enterprise, 
other economic organisation or individuals in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan region 
and Chinese citizens inhabited abroad, it shall be handled with reference to these 
Detailed Rules. 
Article 58 These Detailed Rules shall enter into force as of the date of promulgation. 
467 
Appendix 6.14 
Explanations on Implementing Certain Articles of  Detailed 
Rules on the Implementation of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Joint Cooperative 
Ventures 
(Promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on 
October 22, 1996) 
Detailed Rules on the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Sino-Foreign Joint Cooperative Ventures (hereinafter referred to as the Detailed 
Rules) was promulgated and enforced on September 4, 1995. Now, explanations 
concerning the implementation of the Detailed Rules are hereby made as follows: 
1. Article 14 of the Detailed Rules stipulates: 
"Joint ventures with Chinese legal person status shall be limited liability companies. 
The partners shall share responsibilities within the limit of its investment or 
cooperative means rendered, unless otherwise stipulated under the contracts. 
The joint venture shall have liability for its debts with all of its capital." 
The explanations: In accordance with the Section 1 of the present article and Article 
18 of the Law of Corporation of the People's Republic of China, the organisational 
form of any joint cooperative ventures with Chinese legal person status which have 
been set up after the approval shall be limited liability companies. 
2. Article 18 of the Detailed Rules stipulates: 
"The partners' investment or cooperative means could be currencies, or material 
objects or industrial rights, special technologies, land use rights and other property 
rights. 
The Chinese partners' investments or cooperative means, if they are State fixed 
assets, shall undergo assets assessment in accordance with related laws and 
administrative regulations or provisions. 
For joint ventures with Chinese legal person status, the foreign partners' investment 
shall normally be no less than 25% of the total registered capital of the joint venture. 
For joint ventures without Chinese legal person status, the specific requirements for 
the partners' investments or rendition of cooperative means shall be stipulated by 
MOFTEC." 
The explanations: The investment, as mentioned in Section 1 of this article, refers to 
currencies, buildings, machinery and equipment or other materials, industrial 
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property rights, special technologies, land use right and others which are assigned a 
fixed price and used as the investment of partners. 
The cooperative means, as mentioned in Section 1 of this article, refers to the real 
estate and other property rights, including: land use right, ownership or right of use 
concerning the buildings constructed on the land and other fixed accessory 
equipment attached to the buildings, industrial property rights, special technologies 
and other property rights. The cooperative means rendered by partners to the joint 
cooperative ventures belong to the property of joint cooperative ventures. The said 
means shall not be expressed in the form of currencies, but shall be registered as 
subsidiary and have liability for the debts of the joint cooperative ventures. 
The Chinese partners' investment and cooperative means shall undergo assessment, if 
they are required to do so in accordance with the stipulations of relevant laws and 
administrative regulations. The assessment results shall be the basis for the 
negotiations for cooperation, so as to prevent the loss of the state property. 
For joint cooperative ventures without Chinese legal person statures. the foreign 
partners' investment shall be no less than 25% of the total investment made by the 
Chinese and foreign partners. 
3. Article 44 of the Detailed Rules stipulates: 
"When the operation term as set in the joint venture's contract expires, if the joint 
venture's fixed assets have been set to be handed to the Chinese partners free of 
charge, the foreign partners can, during the operative term, apply to recover their 
investment in the following manners: 
(1 ) Aside from the distribution in accordance with the investment and/or cooperative 
means rendered, the foreign partner can increase its share in the distribution in the 
contract; 
(2) With the examination and approval of the finance and taxation authorities in 
accordance with related taxation regulations, the foreign partners recover their 
investment before the joint venture pays its income tax; 
(3) Other investment recovery measures approved by the examination and approval 
departments and finance and taxation departments. 
When the foreign partners recover investment during the operation term as described 
in the previous paragraphs, the Chinese and foreign partners shall shoulder the joint 
ventures' debts in accordance with provisions of related laws as well as the ventures' 
contracts. " 
The explanations: The fixed assets of joint cooperative ventures, as mentioned in 
Section 1 of this article, refer to the fixed assets out of the remaining assets after the 
joint cooperative venture liquidates its assets, financial claims and debts and pays its 
debts in accordance with the stipulations under Article 24 of the Law of the People's 
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Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures. Before the joint 
cooperative venture pays off after liquidation and discharges its debts, the Chinese 
partner shall not distribute in advance the fixed assets of the joint cooperative venture 
even when the operation term of the venture expires. 
Item 3 of Section 1 in this article means that, with the approval by the finance and 
taxation departments and the examination and approval departments, foreign partners 
are allowed to recover their investment in advance during the operation term through 
means of distributing depreciation costs of the fixed assets of the joint cooperative 
venture. In case the assets of joint cooperative venture decrease as a result of foreign 
partner's distribution of depreciation costs of the venture's fixed assets, the foreign 
partners must submit letters of guarantee with the amount equivalent to the aforesaid 
distribution of depreciation costs, presented by banks or financial institutions within 
the territory of China (including those branch banks or affiliated agencies established 
within the territory of China by overseas banks or overseas financial institutions) so 
as to guarantee that the joint cooperative venture has the debt paying ability. 
Procedures of application and approval: 
In case the joint cooperative venture's contract stipulates before the establishment of 
the venture that foreign partners adopt the investment recovery measures as 
described in Item 3 of Section 1, Article 44 of the Detailed Rules, the Chinese 
partner shall first file an application to the financial organization with the aforesaid 
letters of guarantee in accordance with the procedures. With the examination of and 
approval by the financial organization, the application shall then be filed to the 
examining and approving departments for examination and approval in line with 
Article 7 of the Detailed Rules. 
During the term of business operation of the joint cooperative venture, in case 
foreign partners intend to recover their investment in advance through the means as 
stipulated in Item 3, Section 1 of the said article, the joint cooperative venture shall 
file an application to the examining and approving departments with the aforesaid 
letters of guarantee in accordance with the procedures. The examination and 
approval departments shall decide jointly with financial organizations nrhether or not 
to grant approval within 60 days of receiving the aforesaid documents. 
In case a joint cooperative venture needs to accelerate the depreciation of the fixed 
assets so as to ensure the foreign partners to recover their investment in advance. the 
joint cooperative venture, in addition to abiding by the regulations as stipulated in the 
previous section, shall gain the approval by the State Administration of Taxation in 
accordance with the relevant regulations of Detailed Rules for the Implementation of 
the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Enterprises. 
"The examining and approving authorities" as mentioned in the present Explanations 
refers to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation or departments 
and provincial governments (departments in charge of foreign trade and economic 
cooperation) authorised by the State Council. 
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"The finance and taxation authorities" refers to the financial organisations and 




Report on the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development (I) 
(Delivered ut the Fourth Session ofthe Niiith National People j .  Congress OIZ Murch 
5, 2001) 
Zhu Rongji 
Premier of the State Council 
Fellow Deputies, 
Beginning this year, China will implement the first five-year plan for the new 
century. The Proposal of the CPC Central Committee for the Formulation of the 
Tenth Five-Y ear Plan for National Economic and Social Development was adopted 
at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committee. The Proposal 
defined objectives, guiding principles and major tasks for China's economic and 
social de\-elopment during the next five years. In the spirit of the Proposal and on the 
basis of opinions solicited from all sectors of society, the State Council has drawn up 
the Outline of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Deyelopment (Draft). On behalf of the State Council, I now make my report to you 
and present the Outline (Draft) for your consideration and also for comments from 
members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference. 
I. Review of National Economic and Social Development 
During the Ninth Five-Y ear Plan Period 
Over the past five years, the people of all ethnic groups worked hard together. blazed 
new trails with a pioneering spirit, and obtained great achievements in all fields of 
endeavour under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. 
The national ecorzoq> experienced siistuiiied, rapid and sozriid de\~elopmciit, and 
overall national strength continued to grow. In the five years, China's GDP increased 
by an average annual rate of 8.3% and reached 8.9404 trillion y a n  in 2000. The 
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mission of quadrupling the per capita GNP of 1980 has been overfulfilled. As the 
economy continued to grow and economic performance improved, national revenue 
in 2000 reached 1.338 trillion p a n ,  an average increase of 16.5% annually. The 
output of major industrial and apcultural products now stands in thc front ranks of 
the world’s economies, and commodity shortages were by and large eliminated. 
Progress was made in industrial restructuring. The quantities of grain and other major 
agricultural products we are capable of producing increased noticeably, marking a 
historic change from a long-term shortage of agricultural products to a basic balance 
in their total supply and demand, with even a surplus during good harvest years. 
Good results were achieved in eliminating outmoded industrial production capacity, 
reducing excess production capacity and upgrading technology in key enterprises. 
Information technology and other new and high-tech industries grew rapidly. Marked 
success was achieved in infrastructure development, alleviating bottlenecks in 
energy, transportation, communication, and raw and processed materials. 
Ecoiiorzzic restructuring 12’as estensiveli. carried fomard .  and n socialist market 
econoq .  was preliininarilj~ established. Significant advances were made in the 
establishment of a modem corporate structure in  large and medium-sized state- 
owned enterprises. Most key state enterprises became corporations, and a 
considerable number of them were listed on stock markets inside or outside China. 
There was a marked reduction of losses and increase of profits in enterprises, and 
total profits from state-owned industrial enterprises and from the industrial 
enterprises with a controlling share held by the state reached 239.2 billion yuan in 
2000, an increase of 190% over the 1997 figure. The objectives of reforming large 
and medium-sized state-owned enterprises and turning around loss-generating 
operations within three years were basically attained. At the same time that public 
sectors of the economy further developed, private and individual sectors also grew 
rapidly. The market system continued to improve, and the supply of capital, 
technology and labour expanded rapidly. The basic role of the market in the 
allocation of resources was noticeably enhanced. The system of finance and taxation 
continued to improve. Banking reform was accelerated. Major progress was made in 
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the reform of the urban housing system. the social security system and government 
institutions. The state macro-regulation system was further strengthened. 
We opened wider to the outside world, mid the patter71 of all-round opeiiing took 
basic shape. Reform of the foreign trade system steadily progressed, and the 
internationally-oriented economy grew rapidly. The total volunie of China's imports 
and exports reached USS474.3 billion in 2000, with exports accounting for USU49.2 
billion, a rise of 69% and 67% respectively over the 1995 figures. The mix of exports 
improved. and the proportion of electromechanical products and high-tech products 
increased. The spheres of activity open to foreign businesses were gradually 
widened, and the investment environment was improved. Foreign investment was 
increased and better utilised. More than US$289.4 billion in foreign funds were put 
to use during the past five years, an increase of 79.6% over the period of the Eighth 
Five-Year Plan. China's foreign exchange reserves totalled US$1 65.6 billion at the 
end of 2000, USS92 billion more than in 1995. 
People k liiYiig standal-ds continued to iniproi*c. a i d  genemllj. people began to lead a 
relatively covzfortanle life. In 2000 the per capita net income of rural dwellers and 
the per capita disposable income of urban residents reached 2,253 p a n  and 6,280 
p a n  respectively, increasing by 4.7% and 5.7% annually in real terms. There was 
abundant supply of commodities; the level of consumption continued to rise, and the 
total volume of retail sales of consumer goods increased by an average annual rate of 
10.6%. Housing, telecommunications, electricity and other aspects of li\Ting 
conditions for both urban and rural residents improved considerably. Personal 
savings deposits of residents increased by more than 100% over the past five years. 
The value of stocks, bonds and other financial assets increased rapidly. The number 
of people below the poverty line in rural areas decreased drastically. The objectives 
set in the seven-year plan to help 80 million people get out of poverty were basically 
attained . 
The development of science, technolog!. and education was accelerated, curd other 
social undertakings progressed in a coniprehmsi\ve ~ q . .  The March I 986 Program 
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to stimulate the development of high technologies was implemented successfully. A 
number of major results were achieved in the fields of aeronautics and astronautics, 
information technology, materials science, bioengineering and other high 
technologies. New advances were made in basic and applied research. The 
transfonnation of applied research institutes under government departments into 
enterprises has been basically accomplished, and restructuring of other research 
institutes has been carried out in a comprehensive way. The process of getting 
scientific and technological achievements to the market and applying them in 
production was accelerated. Progress was made in strengthening various types of 
education at all levels. Initial success was achieved in fulfilling the objectives of 
making nine-year compulsory education basically universal in the country and 
eliminating illiteracy among young and middle-aged people. Major progress was 
made in the reform of the management system of higher education. The increase of 
university and college enrolment was widely appreciated by the general public. New 
advances were made in population management and family planning. Great efforts 
were made in ecological conservation and environmental protection. Culture, public 
health, sports and other social undertakings continued to develop. Successive results 
were achieved in building a clean and honest government and in the struggle against 
corruption. The administration of all facets of public security was improved. New 
progress was made in improving socialist spiritual civilisation, democracy and the 
legal system. Continuing progress was made in modernising national defence and the 
armed services. 
During the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, the Chinese government resumed its 
exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, and historic progress was made 
in the great cause of peaceful reunification of the motherland. Since the return of 
Hong Kong and Macao to the embrace of the motherland, the principle of “one 
country, two systems” and the basic laws of the two regions have been implemented 
in a comprehensive way. Outstanding achievements were made in the work of the 
governments of the special administrative regions. Social stability and economic 
development were secured in Hong Kong and Macao. 
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With the fulfilment of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, we attained the strategic objectives 
for the second stage of China’s modernisation drive, which laid a solid foundation 
for undertaking the Tenth Five-Year Plan and moving on to the third stage. This 
constituted a great achievement in China’s socialist modernisation drive and a new 
milestone in the progress of the Chinese nation. 
These tremendous achievements in economic and social development during the 
Ninth Five-Year Plan period were hard-won victories over numerous difficulties. We 
successfully coped with the challenges posed by unexpected international events. We 
protected ourselves from the impact of the Asian financial crisis. We controlled 
inflation during the initial stage of the Ninth Five-Year Plan and curbed deflation in 
the middle and late stages. We also conquered severe floods and droughts. We 
attained these achievements thanks to the timely and correct policy decisions made 
by the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin at its core in the face of 
numerous problems and difficulties and to the concerted efforts of the people 
throughout the country. On behalf of the State Council, I would now like to pay my 
highest respects to the people of all ethnic groups. You have all been working hard 
and making contributions in your own fields of endeavour. I also wish to express our 
sincere thanks to our compatriots in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Macao Special Administrative Region, Taiwan, as well as to overseas Chinese who 
have shown their concern and support for the development and reunification of the 
country. 
During the implementation of the Ninth Five-Year Plan, we have accumulated a 
wealth of experience in improving macro-economic management and regulation to 
meet the requirements for developing a socialist market economy. 
First, we have solved problems blocking our advance bj? stimulating ecoiionzic 
development. Development is the fundamental principle. In the face of various social 
problems, we have always made economic development the central task and adopted 
effective measures to promote a sustained, rapid and sound development of the 
national economy, thus providing a foundation for handling other problems properly. 
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Meanwhile, we adhered to the principle of “doing two jobs at once and attaching 
equal importance to each”. We increased our efforts to improve socialist spiritual 
civilisation, democracy and the legal system, and this has created a good political and 
social environment and provided a strong impetus for economic development. 
Second, we made tiniel]? adjustmerits to the macro-control policy in accordance ~-1itIi 
the changing economic situation. In dealing with inflation, we paid attention to 
ensuring sustained expansion of the economy and a successful “soft-landing”. In 
curbing deflation, we adhered to the principle of boosting domestic demand, 
resolutely enforced a proactive fiscal policy, and improved various policies and 
measures in the course of experience. We issued additional national bonds and 
expanded investment on the one hand, and we appropriately increased the income of 
the medium- and low-income urban residents apd encouraged more consumption on 
the other, thus stimulating economic growth. We also adopted such measures as 
raising the export tax rebate rate and cracking down on smuggling in order to expand 
exports, achieve a balance of international payments, and keep the value of RMB 
stable. We implemented prudent monetary policies. adjusted interest rates and 
adopted many other measures to support eco:ioniic growth. At the samc time, we 
regulated the monetary supply, guided the direction of credit, and guarded against 
and reduced financial risks. 
Tliird, we integrated the expansion of domestic deriiuiid rvith ecoriomic restrtrctiii-ing. 
In view of the over-productivity in the general processing industries, investments 
from national bonds were mainly put into infrastructure development. Investment in 
agriculture, science, technology and education was also increased, and support was 
rendered for technological upgrading in enterprises. We made use of the surplus 
production capacity in the capital goods industry to accomplish some large 
undertakings we had been wanting to but were unable to do for years. By so doing;, c 
we stimulated economic growth and increased the stamina for further econoniic 
development. 
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Fourth, we balanced reform, developmeTit a?id stabiliti:. Under complicated and 
difficult conditions, instead of coming to a halt, reform pressed forward vigorously 
and in an orderly manner, giving a powerful impetus to economic development. In 
the meantime, attention was paid to adjusting the magnitude of reform to the 
tolerance of the people. When ecu iomic restructuring and deepening reforni 
unavoidably touched deep-seated interests, great attention was paid and various 
policies and measures were adopted to safeguard the fundamental interests of the 
general public. Vigorous efforts were made to implement re-employment projects 
and ensure that laid-off workers receive their basic living expenses and retirees their 
old-age pension payment on time and in full. The farmers’ surplus grains were 
purchased without restriction at a protective price. All these measures helped to 
safeguard social stability and achieve sustained economic growth. 
While fully affirming our achievements, we are clearly aware that there are still 
numerous problems in our economic and social life. The principal problems are as 
follows: inappropriate industrial structure and non-co-ordinated development of local 
economies; low overall qua!ity of the national economy and low cornpetitiveness ifi 
the international market; impei-fections in tbe socialist rnaket economy and 
conspicuous systematic factors hampering the development of productive forces; a 
comparatively backward state of science, technology and education, and relatively 
weak innovati\,e ability in science and technology; a shortage of important resources 
such as water and petroleum and the deterioratiop of the ecological environment in 
some regions; growing employment pressure, slow income increase of farmers and 
some urban residents, and an increasing income gap; considerable disorder in some 
areas of the market economy; frequent occurrences of grave accidents; serious 
corruption, extravagance and waste, formalism and bureaucratism; and poor public 
order in some localities. The causes for these problems are rather complicated, but 
they are not unrelated to shortcomings and errors in our work. We must pay great 
attention to them and take further steps to solve them. 
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